Hosted by the Institute for Science and International Security and The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs' Nuclear Policy Talks series
South Africa stands out as the only country to have given up indigenously produced nuclear weapons. It also allowed an unprecedented level of verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The case of South Africa's nuclear disarmament in the late 1980s and early 1990s offers many lessons for achieving and monitoring denuclearization and non-proliferation activities in many states, including Iran and North Korea, today and in the future. Although many factors led to South Africa's decision to abandon nuclear weapons, including governance changes, its experience has direct relevance to the difficult cases of Iran and North Korea as well as those of other states. A key lesson from the South African case is that disclosing past military nuclear activities was vital to regaining the trust of the international community and to the full removal of sanctions.
The Institute for Science and International Security has an unrivaled set of unpublished information about the South African nuclear weapons program, its dismantlement, and the IAEA verification effort. Much of this information resulted from ISIS President David Albright's work in the early 1990s as an unofficial advisor to the African National Congress' Nuclear Policy Team. Partly as a result, he was given unprecedented access in 1994 to former South African nuclear weapons production sites and former members of the program, and again in the early 2000s. As a result, the lessons in this project have been derived from a far more detailed portrait of the South African nuclear weapons program and its verified dismantlement than has been publicly available to date.
At this briefing, David Albright and Andrea Stricker will discuss 1) the history of South Africa's nuclear armament, 2) the events surrounding its dismantlement, and 3) policy lessons from dismantlement for today's proliferation cases.
A forthcoming report by the Institute for Science and International Security on this topic is made possible in part by support from the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC), Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, under Grant No. N00244-15-1-0005. PASCC is supported by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
Please RSVP to
Wednesday, April 27, 2016.
A light lunch will be provided.
David Albright, a physicist, is founder and President of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. During his career, Albright has testified numerous times on nuclear issues before the U.S. Congress. He has spoken to many groups, technical workshops and conferences, briefed government decision-makers, and trained many government officials in non-proliferation policy making. The media frequently cite Albright, and he has appeared often on television and radio. Albright has co-authored four books, including 2010's Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemies, listed by The Atlantic as one of the best foreign affairs books of 2010.
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Andrea Stricker is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Institute for Science and International Security. Stricker writes country-specific and regional proliferation assessments and develops policy recommendations for U.S. and international non-proliferation efforts. Stricker has written the largest collection of case studies available to date on illicit nuclear trade, deriving lessons and observations about ways to halt this trade, helping to pioneer ISIS's work on understanding illicit nuclear trade and finding ways to detect and stop it. Stricker has also written extensively on Iran's nuclear program. She has developed technical and policy recommendations for a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran, shaped Congressional testimony, and briefed staffs of members of Congress.
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