

DECEMBER 22, 2021



North Korea's Political Prison Camp, *Kwan-li-so* No. 14, Update 1


Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu, and Amanda Mortwedt Oh



THE COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA
북한인권위원회

Approximate alignment

NORTH KOREA'S POLITICAL PRISON CAMP, *KWAN-LI-SO* NO. 14, UPDATE 1



Location

Kaech'ŏn-si and Pukch'ang-gun, Pyongannam-do (Kaech'ŏn City and Pukchang County, South Pyongan Province)

CenterPoint Coordinates

39.646810, 126.117058

Date of Report

December 22, 2021

Date of Imagery Used

September 2, 2021, Copernicus Sentinel Data

November 20, 2020, Maxar DigitalGlobe, NextView License

Size of Facility

153 square kilometers (58.9 square miles)

21.9 kilometers by 13.8 kilometers (13.9 miles by 8.5 miles)

Background

The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (UN COI) determined that "crimes against humanity have been committed in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as North Korea), pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State." Many of these crimes against humanity take place against persons detained in political and other prisons—persons who the Commission determined are among the "primary targets of a systematic and widespread attack" by the North Korean regime, including murder, enslavement, torture,

imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political grounds, and the enforced disappearance of persons.

According to the UN COI, "The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the *kwan-li-so* political prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth century."

Based on research conducted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), seven trends have defined the human rights situation under the Kim Jong-un regime:

1. an intensified crackdown on attempted defections
2. a restructuring of the political prison camp system, with some facilities closer to the border with China being shut down, while inland facilities have been expanded, and construction of internal high-security compounds

within the prisons

3. the sustained, if not increased, economic importance of the political prison camps
4. the disproportionate oppression of women by North Korean officials; women have assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families and thus represent the majority of those arrested for perceived wrongdoing at the "jang-madang" markets, or for "illegally" crossing the border
5. an aggressive purge of senior officials, aimed to consolidate the leader's grip on power
6. targeting of North Korean escapees, and
7. increased focus on eliminating "reactionary" thoughts.

While commercially available satellite imagery as used in this report allows the world to see guard positions and sometimes people, for example in political prison camps, the full extent

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of Kim Jong-un's human rights violations in the camps remains uncovered. Nevertheless, the continued monitoring of such camps provides a way to shed some light on the abuses endured by North Korea's most vulnerable—its political prisoners who are oppressed through unlawful arrest, detention, torture, inadequate prison conditions, sexual violence, and public and private executions.

Analysis

Executive Summary

This report is part of a comprehensive long-term project undertaken by HRNK to use satellite imagery and former prisoner interviews to shed light on human suffering in North Korea by monitoring activity at political prison facilities throughout the nation.¹ This is the second HRNK satellite imagery report detailing activity observed during 2015 to 2021 at a prison facility commonly identified by

former prisoners and researchers as "*Kwan-li-so* No. 14, Kaech'ŏn" (39.646810, 126.117058) and serves as an update to our earlier 2015 report entitled *North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14*, which analyzed imagery from 2002 to 2014.²

For this report HRNK analyzed 10 high-resolution commercial pan-sharpened multispectral and pan-chromatic satellite images of *Kwan-li-so* (Political Penal-Labor Colony) No. 14 and its immediate environs focusing upon examination of the following physical features:³

- » Security perimeters (internal and external), entrance and guard positions
- » Headquarters, administration, barracks, and support facilities
- » Housing, agricultural, and agricultural support facilities
- » Mining and forestry activity
- » Internal road network
- » Hydroelectric and light industrial facilities
- » Railroad network


- » Ferry crossings
- » Miscellaneous activity

Based upon analysis of these features *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 remains one of North Korea's oldest continuously operating political prisoner camps having been established as far back as 1965. That it is mature and well-maintained by North Korean standards is indicated by ongoing, expanding agricultural activity, minor construction, maintenance of roads and buildings, and overall good maintenance in and immediately surrounding the camp. When taken individually, these activities (e.g., agricultural, razing and construction of various structures, changes in light industrial facilities, additional guard positions, etc.) observed since our 2015 report are what is typically expected to be observed at *kwan-li-so* around the country. However, when taken as a whole, they likely represent an expansion or reorganization of security forces, modest increase in prisoner population, or both.

Satellite imagery coverage of the facility and interviewee testimony indicates that the prison's economic activity is a combination of agricultural production and logging, with smaller instances of mining, light industry (e.g., clothing and other products), and hydroelectric power production—all using some level of forced labor.

Despite extensive satellite imagery coverage of the prison, HRNK is presently unable to confirm or deny escapee and open-source reports that the prisoner population of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is 43,000 people.⁴ With that said, the composition and physical size of the prison suggests that it could accommodate large numbers of prisoners. Prisoners detained at *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 are thought to never be eligible for release. HRNK anticipates that we will be able to develop an accurate estimate of the prison's population in the future when emerging satellite imagery is correlated with newly declassified

Figure 1

Overview of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14

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information and interviews with additional former prisoners. As with the analytical caution presented in previous HRNK reports (such as *North Korea's Chŭngsan No. 11 Detention Facility*) it is important to reiterate that North Korean officials, especially those within the Korean People's Army and the internal security organizations, clearly understand the importance of implementing camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) procedures to mask their operations and intentions.⁵ It would not be unreasonable to assume that they have to some degree done so here.


Location and Subordination

Parts of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 (39.646810, 126.117058) are located approximately 19 kilometers southeast of Kaech'ŏn and 61 kilometers northeast of the capital city of P'yŏngyang. It straddles the counties of Pukch'ang-gun (북창군) and Tukchang-gun (독창군), and the three cities (-si) of Kaech'ŏn-si (개천시), Tŏrch'ŏn-si (덕천시), and

Sunch'ŏn-si (순천시), all of which are within Pyongannam-do (평안남도, South Pyongan Province). The *Kwan-li-so* encompasses an irregularly shaped area of approximately 153 square kilometers (58.9 square miles) that stretches approximately 21.9 kilometers by 13.8 kilometers (13.9 miles by 8.5 miles) on forested slopes of the Changan Mountain Range (장안산줄기) and contains 25 named and numerous unnamed villages.

Kwan-li-so No. 14 is reported to be subordinate to the Prisons Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS).⁶ Specifically, it would be under the control of the ministry's Pyongannam-do Bureau. However, it cannot be ruled out that it is subordinate to the ministry's Kaech'ŏn-si Bureau. The MSS itself reports to the State Affairs Commission chaired by Kim Jong-un.⁷ Since 2018 Colonel General Jong Gyong-taek has been reported to be the Minister of State Security.⁸

Ministry of State Security, Pyongannam-do Prisons Bureau (Simplified)



In December 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury included Colonel General Jong Gyong-taek on its "Specially Designated Nationals List Update" as head of the MSS and a person of interest for illegal activities [including human rights violations].⁹ Two years later, in May 2020, the U.S. updated its designation of the MSS Prisons Bureau (also known as Farm Bureau and Farm Guidance Bureau).¹⁰ Then in March 2021, the European Union designated Colonel General Jong as a person of interest for major human rights violations stating,

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"As Head of the Ministry of State Security, Jong Kyong-thaek is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread forced labour and sexual violence against women."¹¹

Organization

What little publicly available information and known North Korean organizational patterns indicate is that *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is likely to be organized along

a somewhat standard pattern similar, but enlarged, to that seen at smaller *Kwan-li-so* and *kyo-hwa-so* (long-term re-education through labor camp). Such an organization would likely consist of a headquarters staff, communication section, finance section, political guidance section, legal and records, administration and welfare section, liaison section (Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Social Security, Korean People's Army, Pyongannam-do and Kaech'ŏn-si Korea Workers' Party Committees, etc.), transportation section, safety/medical section, and a security section (a guard unit). There is likely some level of coordination with the Ministry of Light Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Electric Power Industry, Ministry of Food Procurement & Administration,

and the Ministry of Mining Industry. What coordination there is between *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and other organizations is unknown, as is the level of cooperation with the remnants of the adjacent *Kwan-li-so* No. 18.

Kwan-li-so No. 14 is physically divided into three broad geographic areas by the Kūmgwang-ch'ŏn (금강천, Kūmgwang Stream) and Kilsang-ch'ŏn (길상천, Kilsang Stream) that run generally from north to south. These streams are tributaries of the larger Taedong-gang (대동강, Taedong River) which forms the southern perimeter of the facility. It also serves as a common border with what remains of *Kwan-li-so* No. 18 to the south after that camp's partial deactivation.

Functionally, most villages, agricultural and livestock activity, mining, and light industrial activities are located along these waterways.

Little current detail is known concerning the forced labor activities imposed upon the prisoners at *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. What we do know from several interviews is that prisoners are routinely treated with brutality and receive limited food rations. At various times they have reportedly been engaged in agricultural and livestock production, light industry production, mining, and more.

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Kwan-li-so No. 14 (Provisional)





Figure 2



NORTH KOREA'S POLITICAL PRISON CAMP, *KWAN-LI-SO* NO. 14, UPDATE 1

The primary entrance to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is in the southwest corner of the camp, along the Taedong-gang and approximately 19 kilometers southeast of the city of Kaech'ŏn in Kaech'ŏn-si, Pyongannam-do. The location includes a road entrance and checkpoint and a rail entrance with checkpoint. There are also five secondary entrances: one on the southeastern perimeter along the Taedong-gang at the village of Sangdoryŏng-ni; one on the northeast perimeter, 2.3 kilometers northeast of the village of Sanjunaedong; and one each at the ferry crossing and road and rail bridges across the Taedong-gang.

Electric power for the camp is likely provided by both the hydroelectric powerplant across the Taedong-gang, 1 kilometer west of Chamsang-ni (39.602222, 126.113889), and by local generators. The camp is connected to the national rail network via the station at

Naenjŏngcha'm, 1.7 kilometers east of the main entrance and within the camp. The prison is likely connected to the regional telephone network via buried service as no evidence of overhead service was identified in satellite imagery. It is also connected by a microwave communications facility outside the southwest perimeter of the prison.

Aside from the guard, military, and paramilitary garrisons within both *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and the remnants of *Kwan-li-so* No. 18, there are several such garrisons and air defense artillery sites observed within 15 kilometers of the prison's center point. The closest air facility is the Korean People's Air Force Pukch'ang-ni Airbase, which is 7 kilometers to the southwest of the main entrance. This is a fighter/interceptor base for MiG-23 aircraft that, due to its mission, organization, and location very likely provides no support to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14.

Finally, the Ch'oma-bong Restricted Area (a *Kwan-li-so*) partially shares a common security perimeter along the west side of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. What, if any, relationship there is between these two is unknown.

Imagery Analysis

As noted above for this report HRNK analyzed 10 high-resolution commercial pan-sharpened multispectral and pan-chromatic satellite images of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and its immediate environs focusing upon examination of the following physical features:¹²

- » Security perimeters (internal and external), entrances and guard positions
- » Headquarters, administration, barracks, and support facilities
- » Housing and agricultural support facilities and activity
- » Internal road network
- » Hydroelectric and light in-

dustrial facilities


- » Mining and forestry activity
- » Railroad network
- » Ferry crossings
- » Miscellaneous activity.

For analytical purposes, the camp is divided into the security perimeter and 25 discrete areas of interest that provide insight into changes and typify activity in the camp and miscellaneous activities.

Security Perimeter

The security perimeter around *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is approximately 59 kilometers long and encompasses approximately 158 square kilometers (59 square miles). It consists of a network of security fences, patrol paths, and roads that are secured by a total of 53 barracks, guard positions, and checkpoints broken down as follows:

Figure 3

*Kwan-li-so* No. 14 Guard Positions and Entrances

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Type of Facility	Number Observed
Barracks	7
Internal Guard Positions/Checkpoints	3
Perimeter Guard Positions	37
Entrances and Checkpoints	6
Total	53

By themselves, these numbers have only fluctuated slightly since our 2015 report and are what is typically expected to be observed at *kwan-li-so* around the country. **When, however, taken with other low-level activity (e.g., agricultural, razing and construction of various structures, addition of guard positions, changes in light industrial facilities, etc.) observed throughout the camp during the past six years, they likely represent an expansion or reorganization of guard forces, modest increase in prisoner population, or both.**

The absence of any vehicles observed along the perimeter

or at perimeter guard positions in the imagery analyzed, along with the size and quality of the perimeter roads/trails, suggests that guards patrol primarily on foot rather than by vehicle. Vehicles are, however, often seen at the larger guard barracks around the camp. A majority of the perimeter guard positions are not sited to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the *kwan-li-so*. Rather, they are located along the most obvious routes of escape and appear to be well maintained and in good repair.

As noted above, the southern section of the camp's perimeter is secured by the Taedong-gang.

This river, due to its fast current and width, represents a significant obstacle to any who are not strong swimmers. The rugged wilderness area to the camp's north serves as a significant, but not insurmountable, deterrent to escape as there are large population centers within 5-10 kilometers.

Area 1, Naenjongch'am

The farming village of Naenjöngcha'm (39.566667, 126.025000) is in the southwest corner of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and is bordered by the camp's perimeter and the Taedong-gang. It contains the camp's main road and rail entrances and is surrounded by agricultural fields. Approximately 780 meters east of the village is a small coal loading facility, rail station, and the remains of a light narrow-gauge electrified mine railroad. This mine railroad runs from the loading facility to a mine portal approximately 1 kilometer further to the east. Both the mine railroad and the mine portal

appear to have been abandoned before 2004.

To the northwest of the railroad station lies a threshing house and a small agricultural village. In early 2016, one building in the agricultural village was razed and rebuilt. By late 2020, at least three new buildings were constructed directly southwest of the threshing house and north of the railroad tracks. The design of the long, rectangular building suggests that it is for livestock rearing, while the two smaller new buildings likely function as agricultural support.

Additionally, security in the area has increased with the construction of two guard positions along the Taedong-gang. One position is situated slightly southeast of the livestock buildings and was constructed sometime by August 2018. The second position is situated in the southeast corner of Area 1 and was constructed by March 2016. The road, buildings, and surrounding fields appear to

Figure 4



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be clearly defined and well-maintained, indicating significant and sustained activity in this area.

Area 2, Main Camp Entrance and Guard Barracks

Located in the extreme southwest corner of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14, on the north shore of the Taedong-gang and 940 meters west of Naenjöngcha'm, is the main entrance (39.558234, 126.012311) to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. It consists of a walled guard barracks with both road and rail entrance checkpoints. The road is the primary access route for *Kwan-li-so* No. 14, while an electrified rail spur line from here feeds the coal mines to the southeast at Pongch'ang-ni (39.559167, 126.078611)—within the partially deactivated *Kwan-li-so* No. 18. There is a small livestock confinement and agricultural area immediately north of the main entrance and adjacent to the edge of the camp's western perimeter fence that may be associated with the guard barracks.

Between September 2016 and August 2017, a structure to the north of the rail entrance and checkpoint was expanded considerably and is likely a guard barracks.

Area 3, Yasach'am – Headquarters, Administration, Support, and Housing

The village of *Yasach'am* (39.570278, 126.055833), located along the banks of the Taedong-gang, serves as the camp's primary headquarters, administrative, support, training, and housing area. On the northwest side of the village, leading up a small valley, is *Kwan-li-so* No. 14's Ministry of State Security headquarters, main barracks, and training area. On the south side of the village are two bridges across the Taedong-gang. The first is a 300-meter-long rail bridge that, as noted above, carries the electrified rail spur line to the coal mines at Pongch'ang-ni within the partially deactivated *Kwan-li-so* No. 18.

The second is a 200-meter-long road bridge 500 meters upstream of the rail bridge that also leads to Pongch'ang-ni. While the rail bridge is well maintained and usable year-round, the road bridge is often submerged and is only marginally usable when the river level is low.

The village and Ministry of State Security areas are active in all imagery analyzed and all buildings and roads are well maintained. Between September 2013 and December 2014, available imagery indicated the construction of two new buildings along the river in early 2013. In 2020, an additional third building was constructed immediately to the west of the first two new buildings. Additionally, a building along the river likely used as a cultural hall was significantly expanded. In particular, the expansion of the cultural hall suggests a growing emphasis on cultural activities in *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. New blue roofs were also added to the

prison's Ministry of State Security headquarters building and the camp headquarters building (located north of the village), as well as to six other buildings in the surrounding area.


Area 4, Yasach'am – Ministry of State Security Barracks and Training Area

Immediately up-valley from the headquarters and administrative area at *Yasach'am* is the entrance to the Ministry of State Security's main barracks and training area. Within the training area, at the head of the small valley, are several clearings (likely used for training or gardens for the troops), a likely firing range, and what may be an armory. No changes of significance were observed in imagery since 2015. However, clearings in the training area, which were first identified in 2013, appear clearly defined and slightly expanded.

Figure 5



Figure 6



Area 3, Yasach'am - Headquarters, Administration, Support, and Housing

Figure 7



Area 4, Yasach'am – Ministry of State Security Barracks and Training Area

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Area 5, Tongch'ang-gol

Immediately northeast of *Yasach'am* is the village of *Tongch'ang-gol* (39.576111, 126.070556). Aside from agricultural fields surrounding it, this area consists of a coal mine and tailings pile, mine headquarters and shipping yard, large greenhouse, two likely prisoner housing areas, a school reportedly for children born in the camp, and a motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility. This area is bordered along the river by at least three guard positions, one of which was expanded upon in 2019. In 2016, three new buildings were constructed in a section of an agricultural field directly north of the river in the southern part of Area 5. Between 2017 and 2019, an additional, larger building was added directly to the west. These buildings are likely used for agricultural or administrative purposes. In late 2020, a new greenhouse was constructed northeast of these new buildings

and part of the barracks were expanded.

Area 6, Guard Barracks

Approximately 2.6 kilometers north-northeast of *Tongch'ang-gol* at the confluence of the Taedong-gang and Kumgwang-ch'on (40.218056, 124.565833), sits a guard barracks with a small agricultural field. The confluence of these two water features creates a delta of sediment that extends out two-thirds (i.e., 100 meters) across the Taedong-gang. No changes of significance were observed on imagery since 2015. However, the roads and surrounding fields remain well-maintained and indicate signs of activity.

Area 7, Kadök-kol

Located approximately mid-way along *Kwan-li-so* No. 14's southern perimeter is a small unnamed stream that runs north-south through the villages of Kadök-kol (39.607778, 126.098056)

and Sangmu-gol (39.615278, 126.098056) and into the Taedong-gang. A diversion dam and two hydroelectric power plants are situated on the northern bank of the Taedong-gang approximately 420 meters east of this stream. Given its location and size it is likely that these power plants provide electricity to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14, the coal mines around Pongch'ang-ni within the partially deactivated *Kwan-li-so* No. 18, and the local railroad network. A roadway checkpoint is situated at the eastern end of the hydroelectric power plant.

The light industrial plant (reportedly a processing plant) on the west side of the confluence of the stream and Taedong-gang contains a five-story building—the tallest within *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. In 2020, a new building was added to the plant. A second processing plant is located to the east of the stream on the banks of the Taedong-gang. Approximately 500 meters up the stream is the small village of Kadök-kol that consists of a fish farm and

a few buildings. Previously, this area reportedly also contained a prisoner housing area on the west side of the stream. This was razed sometime between 2007 and 2011. In 2019, satellite imagery showed an addition added to a small building on the southern side of the stream, likely associated with light industry and the hydroelectric plant. The light industrial plants and the roads and bridges serving them appear in a good state of repair. Changes since 2015 suggest a small increase in the light industry activities and manufacturing output.

Area 8, Sangmu-gol

Approximately 500 meters upstream from Kadök-kol is a prisoner housing area including approximately 30 structures that consists of barracks-style prisoner housing. A processing plant and threshing house are situated on the east side of the stream. Approximately 400 meters north of this is the village of Sangmu-gol, which also consists of

Figure 8




Figure 9



Area 6, Guard Barracks

Figure 10



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barracks-style prisoner housing, processing plant and a probable livestock facility (located on the east side of the stream). The areas immediately surrounding both locations consist of several small agricultural fields. Overall, the processing plants, prisoner housing areas, and the single road serving them appear to be in a good state of repair. In April 2019, one likely prisoner house was constructed directly northeast of the threshing house.

Area 9, Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-ma-eul, Sadun, and Yongsu-ma-eul

The four villages of Chamsang-ni, *Kiyang-ma-eul* (39.606944, 126.111944), Sadun (39.604444, 126.119167), and *Yongsu-ma-eul* (39.607222, 126.123889) are located along the Kilsang-ch'ŏn at its confluence with the Taedong-gang. While this area is dedicated to agriculture, there is a light industrial plant and what is likely a guard barracks located on the west side of the Kilsang-ch'ŏn. A

small fish farm in this area was abandoned sometime between 2016 and 2017. One new building situated in an agricultural area and immediately to the left of the guard barracks was constructed in 2019. On the north side of the Kilsang-ch'ŏn, and up a small valley is *Kiyang-ma-eul*. Immediately east of this, straddling the Kilsang-ch'ŏn and connected by an 8-meter-long footbridge, are the sister villages of Chamsang-ni and Sadun. The area south of the stream contains a housing area and numerous agricultural support structures. The area immediately north of the stream contains a housing area and a threshing house and is primarily dedicated to cultivating several orchards. Approximately 500 meters to the northeast is *Yongsu-ma-eul*. Of significance here is a large vehicle maintenance and storage facility, which likely serves the entire camp. At times as many as 20 vehicles have been seen within the facility. As of November 2020, available imagery showed up to 12 vehicles at this facility.

Area 10, Hajunaedong

Located along the upper reaches of the Kilsang-ch'ŏn is the village of Hajunaedong (39.648056, 126.180278). Agricultural activity within this region has steadily decreased since May 2003. Between 2003 and 2014, 20 buildings, including prisoner housing and agricultural support buildings, were razed. In April 2018, two likely agricultural support buildings were razed. A threshing house situated directly to the southeast of the agricultural support buildings was razed between 2014 and 2018. The agricultural activity in this area was likely relocated to other areas in the camp. As of April 2021, three prisoner housing units remain in this area.

Area 11, Perimeter Fence Relocation

Located approximately 2.3 kilometers east of Area 11 is a 1-kilometer section of the perimeter security fence that has been relocated approximately 50

meters to the south sometime after May 2011. The reasons for this move are unclear, however, there are two guard positions present in the area, one near each end of the relocated fence section, possibly indicating a history of perimeter breaches in the area. No further changes to this area have been observed on imagery since 2015.

Area 12, Sanjunaedong

The agricultural village of Sanjunaedong (39.665278, 126.196944) is located on one of the tributaries of the Kilsang-ch'ŏn in the northeast corner of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. The area consists of agricultural fields, support buildings, a housing area, and a fish farm. Additionally, there is what appears to be a guard position on the northwest corner of the village along a road that leads to a secondary camp entrance and guard position 1.5 kilometers to the northeast. This area has experienced some changes since December 2014. While the fish farm remain unchanged, the

Figure 11



Figure 12





Figure 13



Figure 14



Area 11, Perimeter Fence Relocation

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livestock facility approximately 95 meters away experienced minor changes. This area consisted of ten structures arranged in a square in December 2014. Between 2014 and 2018, a building was partially razed. By 2019, the remaining part of the building along with another smaller building were razed, leaving eight structures. Between 2019 and 2020, a small building was added, and these nine structures remain unchanged from November 2020 to April 2021.

Area 13, Reinforced Guard Position

Located along the northeast section of the security perimeter, 1.5 kilometers north of the village of Nujinmogi (39.675000, 126.148333), is one of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14's two remote reinforced guard positions with double walls. No changes to this area have been observed on imagery since 2015.

Area 14, Abandoned Mining Facilities

Approximately 1 kilometer north of the village of Kilsang-ni, in the isolated area of Paekt'ap-san (Paekt'ap Mountain, 39.683333, 126.093333), are what appears to be two abandoned mining facilities. Three guard positions lie to the north. To the south, there is the small village of Kilsang-ni (see Area 15). No changes were observed in this area on imagery since 2015. However, the general area and surrounding roads appear to be maintained. It is probable that some activity continues in the area, such as small-scale artisanal mining, logging, or unauthorized activity at the facilities.

Area 15, Kilsang-ni

The small village of Kilsang-ni is located along the upper reaches of the Kilsang-ch'ŏn. It consists of approximately eight structures, which may be barracks with a livestock pen. It is likely that at

one time this village supported the activities of the mine 1 kilometer to the north. No changes were observed in this area on imagery since 2015. However, satellite imagery from October 2016 shows the presence of automobiles near the barracks, indicating that there was still activity in this area.

Area 16, Reinforced Guard Position

Located along the northwest section of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and 400 meters east of the security perimeter is the second of two remote reinforced guard positions with double walls. Between September 2016 and August 2017, the guard position appears to have been expanded.

Area 17, Logging and Agricultural Activity

This area, along the Kumgwang-ch'ŏn and approximately 1 kilometer northeast of the agricultural village of Kumgwang (39.627778, 126.059167), has three

new logging roads constructed since 2015. Construction of the roads began in 2013 and was likely completed by 2016. These roads provide access to the forest west of an agricultural support area consisting of two large buildings where there is evidence of logging activity (e.g., thinning of the forest). No significant changes to this area have been observed since 2015. However, the area is being maintained.

Area 18, Road Construction Completed

Area 18 is in the western section of the camp between the villages of Ch'ang-dong (39.604167, 126.063056) and Kumgwang. Construction of a temporary road on the east side of the Kumgwang-ch'ŏn was likely completed by 2016. This road provides access to support increased logging activity in the area. This road was most likely built to replace the original road on the west side of the Kumgwang-ch'ŏn that suffered damage caused by seasonal

Figure 15



Figure 16



Figure 17



Area 14, Abandoned Mining Facilities

Figure 18



Figure 19



Area 16, Reinforced Guard Position

Figure 20



Area 17, Logging and Agricultural Activity

Figure 21



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flooding. No further changes in this area have been identified in imagery since 2015.

Area 19, New Agricultural Activity

Between September 2013 and December 2014, a new 3-kilometer-long road was constructed approximately 1.5 kilometers northwest of the village of Ch'ang-dong. The new road provides access to support new agricultural and logging activity in the area. Since 2016, there are several new agricultural fields in the area. This development is consistent with other new construction activities identified in Areas 17 and 18.

Area 20, Ch'ang-dong

One kilometer northwest of the guard barracks discussed in Area 6 is the agricultural village of Ch'ang-dong located on the Kumgwang-ch'on. This village consists of worker housing and livestock confinement areas, a fish

farm, and on the west side a light industrial facility. This is the largest industrial facility within *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and consists of several large buildings—the longest of which is 140 meters—with two tall smokestacks. The purpose of this facility is unclear. Between March 2016 and October 2017, one building in the northeast section of the industrial facility was razed. A road leading west from Ch'ang-dong, past what may be a checkpoint, continues 3 kilometers up a small valley past several agriculture fields and a fish farm. A road to the west leads to what may be a new prisoner housing facility which is surrounded by agricultural fields.

Area 21, Microwave Communications Facility

Located approximately 2.5 kilometers north of the main entrance, and 100 meters west of the security perimeter (i.e., outside *Kwan-li-so* No. 14), is a microwave communications facility with a large tower, guard barracks, and

guard position along the perimeter fence. While the communications facility is part of a nationwide network, it is likely that it is also used by the camp. A road leading to the southwest side of the mountain, away from the camp, appears to be maintained and well-defined. No major changes in this area have been observed on imagery since 2015.

Area 22, Southeast Camp Entrance

A secondary camp entrance is located along the Taedong-gang at the camp's southeast corner adjacent to the village Sangdoryŏng-ni (39.5775, 126.140278). It consists of an entrance and checkpoint, walled guard barracks, and several support buildings. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery since 2015.

Area 23, Ferry Crossing

Located on the Taedong-gang, 400 meters north of the village of

Sol-gol (39.586389, 126.074167), is a ferry crossing connecting *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 to the partially deactivated *Kwan-li-so* 18. This crossing was built sometime during 2007-2011 and consists of an entrance checkpoint, a landing ramp on both sides of the Taedong-gang, and a 12-meter-long ferry. The precise reasons for constructing this crossing are unclear. However, the crossing may be to supplement the road bridge (Area 3) at *Yasach'am* that is often submerged and only marginally usable when the river level is low. No changes of significance were observed on imagery in this area since 2015. A ferry is sometimes observed docked on either bank of the river.

Area 24, Mining Activity

Located immediately west (and outside) of the main road and rail entrances to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 are several small mining activities. Given the practice of using prisoners as mine laborers within

Figure 22



Area 19, New Agricultural Activity

Figure 23



Figure 24



Area 21, Microwave Communications Facility

Figure 25



Figure 26



Area 23, Ferry Crossing

Figure 27

Area 24, Mining activity immediately outside the west entrance of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14

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the camp and within the adjacent *Kwan-li-so* No. 18, it is likely that prisoners are, or were, being used at these mining activities and at similar mining activities in the immediate areas around the camp.

Area 25, Motor Vehicle Maintenance and Storage Facility

Approximately 500 meters to the northeast is *Yongsu-ma-eul*. Of significance here is a large motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility, which likely serves the entire camp. At times as many as 20 vehicles have been seen within the facility. As of November 2020, available imagery showed 13 vehicles at this facility.

Assessment

Analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and its environs collected between 2016 and 2021, supplemented with our 2015 *North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14* report, indicates that:

- » *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 has been and remains an operational political prison camp. It is one of North Korea's oldest operating political prisoner camps and is, by North Korean standards, a mature and generally well-maintained facility.
- » When taken as a whole, the low-level activity (e.g., agricultural, razing and construction of various structures, additional guard positions, changes at light industrial facilities, etc.) observed throughout the camp during the past six years, likely represents an expansion or reorganization of guard forces, modest increase in prisoner population, or both.
- » Given the physical security measures observed, it is likely that most of the camp's population are prisoners. These prisoners are used to maintain the agricultural fields, orchards, and livestock, and work in the camp's logging activities and wood products manufacturing, light industrial facilities, and mines.
- » Agricultural (including minor livestock rearing), light industries, logging, and wood products production appear to be the primary economic activities at the camp.
- » Administrative, barracks, housing, light industrial and support buildings, and grounds are well maintained and in good repair. The grounds around these structures and the road network throughout the camp are well maintained as is typified by the road construction/maintenance operations undertaken in the western section of the camp along the Kumgwang-ch'on.
- » There is a moderate diversity of agricultural production, and all agricultural fields and orchards are well defined and maintained. Some of these are irrigated from mountain streams and rivers.
- » Most of the electric power for the camp is likely pro-

vided by the hydroelectric power plant situated on the northern bank of the Taedong-gang. This power plant likely also provides electricity to the coal mines around Pongch'ang-ni and the local railroad network.

Recommendations

While commercially available satellite imagery resolution allows the public to see guard positions and people, for example, in the political prison camp, the full extent of Kim Jong-un's and the Ministry of State Security's atrocities in the camps requires further scrutiny.

Continued background investigation and ongoing monitoring of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is recommended to identify all its components, provide a detailed accounting of its previous operations, and develop an objective baseline understanding of its continuing activities, maintain an evidentiary

Figure 28



Area 25, motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility northeast of *Yongsu-ma-eul*.

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catalog of physical changes at the facility, update its status, develop evidence of prisoner population size, and assist with the identification of human rights abuses.

HRNK calls upon the Kim Jong-un regime to acknowledge the existence of its political prisons as the first step towards their dismantlement, immediately improve the nutritional status of prisoners, many of whom suffer from severe malnutrition; “grant immediate, free and unimpeded access to international humanitarian organizations to

provide assistance to the most vulnerable groups, including prisoners” as per Ireland’s May 2019 Universal Periodic Review recommendation, which North Korea supported;¹³ improve health and safety standards at worksites where prison labor is present; allow the ICRC immediate, full, and genuine access to this and all other detention facilities in North Korea; abide by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of

Female Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules); and provide access to Colonel General Jong Gyong-taek, his predecessors and successors.

HRNK calls upon the United Nations and any international organizations or civil society organizations operating near *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 to consider the vulnerability of prisoners inside this facility and incorporate a Human Rights up Front approach when delivering humanitarian

aid to North Koreans in need.¹⁴ Prisoners inside this facility should be treated as one of the most vulnerable populations. The Kim regime’s practice of state-sponsored forced labor and egregious human rights violations, constituting crimes against humanity in both the *kwan-li-so* and *kyo-hwa-so*, must be highlighted by UN Member States when engaging with North Korea.

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Gazetteer

Location	Latitude (N)	Longitude (E)
Ch'ang-dong	39.604	126.063
Chamsang-ni	39.602	126.114
Hadoryŏng-ni	39.588	126.136
Hajunae-dong	39.648	126.180
Hydroelectric Power Plant	39.602	126.101
Kadŏk-kol	39.608	126.098
Kaech'ŏn	39.700	125.893
Kilsang-ni	39.663	126.135
Kiyang-mal	39.607	126.112
Kūmgwang	39.628	126.059
<i>Kwan-li-so</i> No. 14 Ferry Crossing	39.589	126.076
<i>Kwan-li-so</i> No. 14 Main Entrance	39.557	126.011
<i>Kwan-li-so</i> No. 14 Northeast Entrance	39.678	126.214
<i>Kwan-li-so</i> No. 14 Rail Bridge	39.567	126.057
<i>Kwan-li-so</i> No. 14 Road Bridge	39.570	126.062
<i>Kwan-li-so</i> No. 14 Southeast Entrance	39.577	126.136
Malguri	39.644	126.125
Naenjŏngcha'm	39.567	126.025
Nūjinmogi	39.675	126.148
Oedong-ni	39.578	126.073
P'yŏngji-ri	39.609	126.152
Paegŏriha-ri	39.644	126.141
Pongch'ang-ni	39.559	126.078
Sadun	39.604	126.119
Samhūng-ni	39.649	126.179
Sang-ni	39.644	126.162

Sangdoryŏng-ni	39.577	126.140
Sangmu-gol	39.615	126.098
Sanjunae-dong	39.665	126.197
Sindŏk-tong	39.623	126.146
Sinhūngch'am	39.558	126.005
Sol-gol	39.586	126.074
Toch'ŏng-mal	39.652	126.128
Tongch'ang-gol	39.576	126.071
Yasach'am	39.570	126.056
Yongsu-mal	39.607	126.124

Research Note

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1. Previous reports in the project can be found at <https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php>.
2. Some interviewees and researchers have occasionally identified the facility as "Political Prison Camp No. 14," "Camp No. 14," "Political Prison Camp 14," or the "Kaech'ŏn Kwan-li-so."
3. The term "high resolution" in this report refers to digital satellite images with a ground sample distance (GSD) of less than 1 meter. The GSD is the distance between adjacent pixel centers when measured on the ground.
4. Mun Dong Hui, "The number of inmates in North Korean political prisons have increased by at least 20,000 since March 2020," (original article in Korean) *Daily NK*, July 28, 2021, <https://www.dailynk.com/english/number-inmates-north-korean-political-prisons-increased-at-least-20000-since-march-2020/>.
5. Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., Greg Scarlatoiu, Amanda Mortwedt Oh, and Rosa Park, *North Korea's Chŭngsan No. 11 Detention Facility*, (Washington, D.C.: HRNK), December 21, 2020, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Chŭngsan%20No_%2011%20Detention%20Facility%20Web.pdf; and Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., Greg Scarlatoiu, Amanda Mortwedt Oh, and Rosa Park, *North Korea's Long-term Prison-Labor Facility Kyo-hwa-so No. 12, Jŏngŏ-ri - Update 3*, (Washington, D.C.: HRNK), September 30, 2020, https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/KHS12_FINALFINAL.pdf.
6. Also known as the "Farm Bureau" and "Farm Guidance Bureau." <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20200513>. The United Kingdom identifies "Bureau 7 of the MSS" [likely the Prisons Bureau] as part of its *Global Human Rights* sanctions regime. *UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Letter to HRNK*, dated July 22, 2021.
7. According to researcher Fyodor Tertitsky the MSS is under the *de facto* control of the Korean Workers' Party's (KWP) Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). Tertitsky also states that the MSS became the Ministry for Protection of the State (국가보위성, Guḡ-ga-bo-wi-sung) in 2016 under Kim Jong-un. Fyodor Tertitsky, "How the North is Run: The Secret Police," *NK News*, July 24, 2018, <https://www.nknews.org/pro/how-the-north-is-run-the-secret-police-2/>.
8. Jong Gyong-taek is sometimes identified as Jong Kyong Thaek, Jong Kyong-thaek or 정경택. According to *Yonhap*, Jong was demoted to the rank of colonel general (three stars) in September 2020. <https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200930004900320>.
9. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions North Korean Officials and Entities in Response to Regime's Serious Human Rights Abuses and Censorship," December 10, 2018, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm568>.
10. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "North Korea Administrative Designations Updates," May 13, 2020, <https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20200513>.
11. "Legislation," Official Journal of the European Union 64, no. L 99 I (March 22, 2021): 7, 31, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2021:099I:FULL&from=EN>.
12. While satellite imagery is normally rotated to its "look angle" (the angle of view as if looking out an airplane window at the ground), the imagery in this report is all set at "north up" (north is at the top of the image) to ease comparison with our original report.
13. Recommendation 126.58. *List of all recommendations made to Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its responses*, Session 33 - May 2019, https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/korea_dpr/session_33_-_may_2019/2rps_dprk.pdf.
14. "Rights Up Front," May 2014, <http://www.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/doc/RuFAP-summary-General-Assembly.htm>; see also Roberta Cohen, "Must UN Agencies Also Fail in North Korea?," *38 North*, April 21, 2015, https://www.38north.org/2015/04/rcohen042115/#_ftn2.

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THE COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA
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HRNK is the leading U.S.-based bipartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, tasked to focus international attention on human rights abuses in that country. It is HRNK's mission to persistently remind policy makers, opinion leaders, and the general public in the free world and beyond that more than 20 million North Koreans need our attention.

Since its establishment in 2001, HRNK has played an important intellectual leadership role on North Korean human rights issues by publishing over 50 major reports (available at <https://hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php>). HRNK became the first organization to propose that the human rights situation in North Korea be addressed by the UN Security Council. HRNK was directly, actively, and effectively involved in all stages of the process supporting the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry. HRNK has been invited numerous times to provide expert testimony before the U.S. Congress. In April 2018, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) granted HRNK UN consultative status.

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