North Korea’s
ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT
The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial

ROBERT COLLINS
North Korea’s
ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT

The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

By Robert Collins
Dedicated to Steve Bradner.
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About the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) is the leading U.S.-based nonpartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, tasked to focus international attention on human rights abuses in that country. It is HRNK’s mission to persistently remind policymakers, opinion leaders, and the general public that more than 20 million North Koreans need our attention. Since its establishment in October 2001, HRNK has played an important intellectual leadership role in North Korean human rights issues by publishing more than 35 major reports (available at https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnkpublications.php). Recent reports have addressed issues including political prison camps, the dominant role that Pyongyang plays in North Korea’s political system, North Korea’s state sponsorship of terrorism, the role of illicit activities in the North Korean economy, the structure of the internal security apparatus, the songbun social classification system, and the abduction of foreign citizens. HRNK is now the first non-governmental organization that solely focuses on North Korean human rights issues to receive consultative status at the United Nations (UN). It was also the first organization to propose that the human rights situation in North Korea be addressed by the UN Security Council. HRNK was directly and actively involved in all stages of the process supporting the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on North Korean human rights. Its reports have been cited numerous times in the report of the COI, the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on North Korean human rights, a report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, a report of the UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and several U.S. Department of State Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Human Rights Reports. HRNK has also regularly been invited to provide expert testimony before the U.S. Congress.
About the Author: Robert M. Collins

Robert M. Collins completed 37 years of service as a soldier and U.S. Department of the Army civilian employee. He served 31 years in various assignments with the U.S. military in Korea, including several liaison positions with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Mr. Collins’ final assignment was as Chief of Strategy, ROK-US Combined Forces Command, serving the four-star American commander as a political analyst for planning on Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asian security issues. He received the Sam-il Medal (Republic of Korea Order of National Security Medal, Fourth Class) from President Lee Myung-bak and the U.S. Army Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service by the Secretary of the Army. Mr. Collins earned a B.A. in Asian History from the University of Maryland in 1977, and a M.A. in International Politics, focusing on North Korean Politics, from Dankook University in 1988. Mr. Collins is a Senior Advisor at HRNK, where he conducts interviews with North Korean defectors in South Korea to gather information for North Korean population and human rights data. He is the author of Marked For Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System, Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial, From Cradle to Grave: The Path of North Korean Innocents, and Denied From the Start: Human Rights at the Local Level in North Korea, which were published by HRNK.
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Thank you to Kim Chongsuk for her support, which enabled this project.

The author would like to dedicate this work to the memory of his mentor and friend, Steve Bradner, who died shortly before the research on this book was completed. Steve served as a political adviser to the Commander of U.S. Forces in the Republic of Korea for 50 years. His expertise on Korea—both on South Korea and north Korea—supported the command decisions of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Alliance in dealing with the threat of North Korea’s Kim regime. Human rights of the Koreans living in the north were always part of his counsel. His friendship and critical encouragement were always of tremendous value to the author.

Robert Collins
# Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Administration Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Central Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Central Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>Commission of Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPB</td>
<td>Executive Policy Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPB</td>
<td>General Political Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCNA</td>
<td>Korean Central News Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA</td>
<td>Korean People’s Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWP</td>
<td>Korean Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGS</td>
<td>Monolithic Guidance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>Military Industries Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIS</td>
<td>Monolithic Ideology System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPAF</td>
<td>Ministry of People’s Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Ministry of People’s Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Security Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSS</td>
<td>Ministry of State Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Defense Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKWP</td>
<td>North Korea Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OGD</td>
<td>Organization and Guidance Department</td>
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NORTH KOREA’S
ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT
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OD  Organization Department
OHCHR  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
PAD  Propaganda and Agitation Department
PHQC  Party Headquarters Committee
PLG  Party Life Guidance
PRC  People’s Republic of China
SPA  Supreme People’s Assembly
TPMI  Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology
TRT  Three Revolutionary Teams
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
UN  United Nations
## Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buwon</td>
<td>Staff action officer; lowest KWP cadre rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kippumjo</td>
<td>“Joy Brigade”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inminban</td>
<td>Neighborhood watch unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inminbanjang</td>
<td>Neighborhood watch unit chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jangmadang</td>
<td>Local market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jido</td>
<td>Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juche</td>
<td>Self-reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saenghwal chonghwa</td>
<td>Self-criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Songbun</td>
<td>Socio-political classification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suryong</td>
<td>Supreme Leader</td>
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Foreword

North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial is the latest installment in a series of reports by Robert Collins, all aimed to deconstruct and explain the DNA of North Korea’s Kim regime and its policy of human rights denial. After Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea’s Social Classification System (2012), Pyongyang Republic: North Korea’s Capital of Human Rights Denial (2016), From Cradle to Grave: The Path of North Korean Innocents (2017), and Denied from the Start: Human Rights at the Local Level in North Korea (2018), North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial, the author’s fifth HRNK report, amounts to a true Robert Collins opus magnum. The report gives the full measure of the depth and breadth of the author’s knowledge and analysis, acquired over many decades spent as a North Korea expert, strategist, and human rights scholar.

North Korean human rights violations have been condemned by United Nations (UN) agencies, governments, and civil society worldwide. The 2014 Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea found that crimes against humanity are committed in North Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the state. The UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly have continued to pass strong annual resolutions on North Korean human rights ever since. The UN Security Council placed North Korean human rights on its agenda in December 2015, 2016, and 2017. In February 2016, the “North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016” became U.S. Public Law No. 114-122, including the first sanctions ever to address North Korean human rights violations.

In order to enact effective policies to sanction individuals and organizations committing human rights violations, to halt economic activity and weapons development that both generate and rely on human rights violations, to conduct effective information campaigns, to end North Korea’s human rights violations, to prepare for transitional justice, and to protect the most vulnerable victims in case of dramatic political change, policy makers must understand the main components and sub-components of the mechanism that generates, transmits, and transgresses North Korea’s policy of human rights denial. Human rights violations are at the core of the North Korean
regime’s modus operandi. Effective policy implementation requires a firm understanding of the core of the regime. As Collins puts it, “Pyongyang is the capital of the Kim family regime’s power, and the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) is North Korea’s citadel of political terror.” In order to understand and address North Korea’s human rights violations now and in the future, one must understand what Collins describes as the Pyongyang-OGD nexus of human rights denial.

Under the guidance of the OGD, the terrifying dystopian visions of George Orwell have become reality in North Korea across three generations of the Kim family dynasty. Collins scrutinizes the mighty bureaucratic machinery of the OGD from the top down to the local level, underlining the critical role that the OGD has been playing in the surveillance, oppression, indoctrination, control, and regimentation of North Korea’s people. Prior to assessing comprehensive, realistic, and thought-provoking scenarios for the future of the OGD and the North Korean regime, Collins also identifies some of the vulnerabilities of North Korea’s control tower of human rights denial, including its cumbersome reporting system and the dominance of ideology over subject-matter expertise in the decision-making cycle.

The North Korean regime preserves itself through domestic oppression, aggressive behavior, and international deception. Understanding the inner workings of the Kim regime, particularly the OGD, is key to scrutinizing the chain of command, mechanisms, and lines of responsibility behind the crimes against humanity and other egregious human rights violations perpetrated against the people of North Korea.

Throughout multiple rounds of U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean summit diplomacy, human rights have again been outcompeted by political, security, and military concerns. However, triggered by the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry report, the process of inducing change through action has begun. A targeted U.S. sanctions regime, linked to North Korea’s human rights violations, and not only to counter-proliferation efforts, has now become law. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are campaigning for accountability measures including: UN Security Council referral of North Korean crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court; the UN General Assembly’s establishing an investigative and prosecutorial body; and concerted national platforms involving governments, parliaments, and civil society NGOs. International NGOs have continued to implement information campaigns.
Understanding the OGD and its central role in the mechanism of human rights denial is key to fully establishing and effectively implementing such measures. As it seeks a cure to North Korea’s congenital malaise, HRNK aims to break down its DNA. *North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial* by Robert Collins is the centerpiece of that puzzle.

Greg Scarlatoiu  
Executive Director  

September 10, 2019
Executive Summary

Nowhere is there more information on the heart of the Kim regime’s ideological operations than in this report, North Korea’s Organization and Guidance Department: The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial. Robert Collins masterfully organizes and guides us through the leadership of the regime’s most influential and secretive organization in existence today—the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). The report provides an exemplary look at the central role of the OGD in suppressing human rights in North Korea in order to serve Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and enforce the Monolithic Guidance System (MGS) and the Monolithic Ideology System (MIS).

Section 1 lays a foundation for understanding the OGD and its importance to and within the Kim regime. Not only is the OGD vital to carrying out Kim Jong-un’s guidance, it is also responsible for denying basic human rights for all individuals in North Korea—and does this to maintain the Kim family’s grip on power.

Section 2 provides a historical background of the OGD beginning in 1945. The author explains the history of the organization and its varying influence and power over time, starting with Kim Il-sung. Under Kim Jong-il’s direct control, the OGD grew drastically, playing a critical role in establishing the MGS and MIS, and eventually controlling the private and work lives of Party cadre and Party workers. At the direction of Kim Jong-il, the OGD also significantly contributed to securing Kim Jong-un’s accession to power, as seen in the organization of the Third KWP Delegates Conference in September 2010.

Section 3 examines the ideology, missions, and tasks of the OGD, stating that North Korean ideology focuses on the exclusive superiority of the Supreme Leader supported by the KWP. As such, the author provides an overview of this ideology and ways the OGD supports and enforces it, typically by formulating policy to be consistent with ideology. As the regime’s control tower, the OGD ensures obedience by every North Korean citizen to Party ideology. Juche ideology, the MIS, the TPMI, and military-first politics are the primary ideological lines in North Korea, as led by the KWP. The primary missions of the OGD are as follows:
• Securing the MGS and the MIS for the whole Party and all of society.
• Controlling the Party life of all cadre, Party members, and North Korean citizens.
• Maintaining, expanding, and improving the quality of all cadre and Party members.
• Overseeing Party guidance, which allows the OGD to interfere in any government or military matters.
• Overseeing all surveillance powers, which allows the OGD to monitor even the most senior-level officials, including the most senior military officers.
• Supervising the protection of the Kim family.

Section 4 outlines the internal organization of the OGD, discussing the secrecy and the crucial role the organization has in policies and practices that violate human rights. The author makes the case that individuals in this very organization are responsible for crimes against humanity committed in North Korea, crimes which were found to be occurring as outlined in the UN Commission of Inquiry’s Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The author analyzes the following internal sections of the OGD: Party Headquarters Committee; Mass Party Directorate; Party Life Guidance Section; Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat; General Affairs Section; Cadre Section; Inspection Section; Party Member Registration Section; Petitions Section; Reports Section; Section 65; Military Directorate; and Other Sections. Of note is the OGD Inspection Section, as it is the most feared institution in North Korea. This section can investigate any organization or office for anti-Party activity, corruption, violations of Party rules, or political infractions.

Section 5 provides a brief comparison of the KWP OGD with the Organizational Department (OD) of other communist parties, focusing on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party.

Section 6 assesses the role of the OGD with respect to the KWP. The author highlights the following: Party Congress Central Committee; Executive Policy Bureau; Politburo; Central Military Committee; Korean Workers’ Party Political Committees; Party Cells; and the Policymaking Process. This section lists the respective leaders as of April 2019 with detailed organizational charts.
Section 7 examines the unique relationship between the OGD and the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), the organization that oversees the distribution of all information. Combined, the OGD and the PAD form a symbiotic relationship to violate fundamental human rights in North Korea, as they determine the information that can be seen and accessed by the population, and disseminate this information using the media, art, and group indoctrination sessions.

Specific tasks carried out by the PAD include the following:

- Translating foreign language articles for the North Korean elite.
- Disseminating propaganda materials and indoctrinating both Party members and non-members.
- Employing both formal and informal settings during indoctrination sessions.
- Censoring all written publications.
- Supporting the North Korean military’s General Political Bureau’s (GPB) Propaganda Department with themes, messages, and propaganda materials.
- Using the Ministry of Culture as a front organization.
- Deploying propaganda action officers as vice-chairmen for propaganda at all regional and agency Party Committees to supervise propaganda activities in their jurisdiction.

The author also reviews five key personnel of the PAD. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has thus far sanctioned three of these five individuals for their roles in human rights abuses and censorship activities.

Section 8 analyzes the Party–military relationship with an emphasis on the role of the OGD. The author reviews Kim Jong-il’s military-first politics and analyzes the relationship to the Central Military Committee, the Korean People’s Army Party Committee, the General Political Bureau, and the Military Security Command.

Section 9 illustrates the role of the OGD at the regional and local level, while examining the regional party structure, local organization departments, and implementation committee.
Section 10 discusses the OGD’s mechanisms of societal control in the form of controlling North Koreans’ “organizational life,” particularly the mandatory self-criticism sessions that all North Koreans must endure. The author makes the point that the Kim regime’s elite, although enablers of societal control, are also subject to more societal control because of their rank and status.

Section 11 illustrates details of life as an OGD cadre, members of the most elite political group under the Kim regime. The author states that OGD personnel stand at the forefront of designing, supervising, and implementing policies and practices of human rights denial. It is the day-to-day responsibility of OGD officials to promote the Supreme Leader and the dominant ideology of the TPMI that support the Supreme Leader and the Party. In return for their service, OGD cadre receive some of the best privileges bestowed by the regime—yet undergo constant and intense surveillance and restrictions.

Section 12 provides biographies and photos (when available) of past and present leaders of the OGD from the 1940s to present. While the ultimate leader of the OGD is unquestionably the Supreme Leader (i.e. currently Kim Jong-un, previously Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il), there have been several other lower-tier leaders within the OGD, particularly those who served as first vice-directors. These OGD officials acted as the “second-tier” leadership of the regime and are highlighted in this section. The author also provides details—to the extent possible—on those OGD leaders about whom little is known.

Section 13, the final section, examines the role of the OGD in potential contingencies and implications for the Kim regime’s survival. The author notes that the OGD’s evolution, especially under Kim Jong-il, cemented the policies and practices of human rights denial in North Korea. The OGD, as the regime’s control tower and citadel of political terror, is critical to the continued security of Kim Jong-un. Put another way, the survival of the Kim regime and the security of the Supreme Leader depend on the effectiveness of the OGD and continued societal loyalty to the Monolithic Guidance and the Monolithic Ideology.
Section 1: Introduction

A Western diplomat once surmised that “we know more about distant galaxies than we do about North Korea.” The same could be said about the average North Korean’s knowledge of their human rights. As witness to these conditions, the vast majority of North Korean defectors are unable to explain their country’s position on human rights based on official state or Party documents. North Korea’s education system simply does not teach such lesson plans according to more than one hundred defectors that this author has interviewed.

Though the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) Constitution outlines human rights in Articles 62-86, these rights are not shaped by legislative or judicial paramount. Indeed, the Kim regime’s system of human rights denial is shaped by ideology, the implementation of policies and practices at the central and regional levels, and through the centralized political control of leaders of all institutions in the Party-state.

At the heart of this system is the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). No other institution in North Korea comes close in terms of its role in human rights denial. This report seeks to explain the central role of the KWP OGD in suppressing human rights in favor

of the Supreme Leader and Party interests. The OGD exists to further the interests of the Supreme Leader (Suryong) through enforcing the Monolithic Guidance System (MGS) and the Monolithic Ideology System (MIS), both of which are antithetical to human rights.

According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “North Korea prosecutes political crimes labelled as ‘crimes against the State’ or ‘crimes against the nation.’ These encompass extremely broad, vague, and indeterminate categories of conduct that effectively make the criminal justice system subservient to political objectives, including the preservation of the State’s ideology.” However, the OHCHR has assessed that the command structure of the North Korean regime is “highly complex,” which limits the OHCHR’s ability to monitor human rights in that country.

This report shows that while the command structure may appear complex at first, it is possible to understand the leadership through a study of the OGD—the core leadership of the KWP. The OGD is directly responsible for not only overseeing the KWP, but also denying human rights at every level of North Korean society.

On the surface, the OGD appears to be just one of several departments under the KWP Central Committee (CC). However, its influence far exceeds all other departments within the Party. The OGD is the heart of the KWP. No other element within the KWP is designated with the terminology “guidance” or “lead.” There is an Organization Section in every Party Committee at lower levels, but the term jido (guidance) is only associated with the OGD at the central Party level. The OGD is highly secretive, and its authority is absolute. It establishes ironclad rules intended to move all people as one person under the monolithic guidance of the Party center, a term used in

3 Ibid., 9.
North Korea in the 1970s to indirectly refer to Kim Jong-il. The KWP OGD is considered the heart of the KWP and the “party within the party.”

Since Kim Jong-il and his appointment as the OGD Director in 1973, the overwhelming dominance of Supreme Leader and Party interests over individual rights has grown into the totalitarian system that exists today under Kim Jong-un. The OGD was the most powerful political organization in North Korea during the Kim Jong-il era, rivaling the Personal Secretariat of Party General Secretary Kim Il-sung during his rule. It is not an exaggeration to say that through the OGD, the Party Chairman is able to control all of North Korea.

At the Fourth Session of the expanded Third Meeting of the KWP CC in March 1962, Kim Il-sung gave a speech entitled “On Improving and Intensifying Party Organizational and Ideological Affairs.”

What is the element that primarily handles the actions that move the Party? That would be the Organization Department [OD] and the Propaganda and Agitation Department [PAD], but particularly the OD. Whether Party tasks go well depends on the activities of the Party Committee chairman and the Party Committee, but it also depends upon the OD’s role in particular. The OD guides the organizational life of the Party members as well as the activities of Party organizations from the Party Committee to the Party cells. One can call the OD the Party Life Guidance [PLG] Department as it maintains and strengthens the Party rank and file and fortifies Party life.


These words, though decades old, were delivered in a speech to Party bureaucrats. They continue to exist as law in North Korea merely because the Supreme Leader uttered them.

After becoming the KWP Secretary for Organization and Director of the OGD in 1973, Kim Jong-il defined the OGD as follows:

The Organization and Guidance Department is the Party life guidance element that guides the Party life of all Party members and is the staff of the KWP CC. The OGD must smoothly carry out its function and role in order to solidly establish the MGS and the MIS throughout the Party. In Party tasks, the OGD must identify all problems and thoroughly resolve them. As if they were a social class knife, all Party workers, particularly those that work organizational issues, must oppose all types of anti-Party elements that are out of step with the MGS and the MIS. They must uncompromisingly struggle for our Party and surround the Supreme Leader and the Party center as one while strongly managing the undefeated revolution with an iron-like ideological will. The Party’s leadership role in the revolution and construction must be held high by all possible means.\(^\text{10}\)

Just as the KWP is the staff element of the revolution, the OGD is the staff of the Party. Both are dedicated to serving only the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader leads both the Party and the government, and the Party establishes the regime’s revolutionary tradition, ideology, and doctrine. However, it is the OGD that oversees the institutionalization of the Supreme Leader’s revolutionary ideology and the KWP’s doctrine and policy. The OGD is employed by the Supreme Leader to solidify the rule of the Suryong.

As the Kim regime’s political staff, the OGD is deliberately positioned between the Supreme Leader and all other organizations in North Korea. On a daily basis, the OGD assesses the function, performance, and role of national ruling organizations at every level. It also evaluates and judges

the capabilities, strategies, and tactics of those organizations. Furthermore, it judges the ability, activities, and methods of every North Korean individual. It has influence over every North Korean citizen by virtue of its role in supervising every organization in the country and monitoring the political and personal life of every North Korean citizen—regardless of whether they work in the Party, government, military, security services, or an economic or social organization.

This involves the strict monitoring and control over the political and personal lives of leaders in all organizations. In carrying out these duties, the OGD is the lead organization for maintaining the regime’s ability to rule. The Supreme Leader personally supervises the OGD, and is thus able to hand out guidance to high-ranking cadre and all other cadre below them. The OGD also serves as the staff for the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, KWP CC meetings, the KWP CC Executive Policy Bureau (EPB; formerly the KWP Secretariat) meetings, the KWP Central Military Committee (CMC), the Inspection Committee, and ensures obedience to the Supreme Leader’s instructions.

The figure on the next page depicts the Kim regime’s ruling primacy structure.

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The report is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the OGD’s history. Section 3 explains the mission and tasks of the OGD, and Section 4 outlines the internal organization of the central Party OGD. Section 5 provides a brief comparison of the KWP OGD with the OD of other communist parties. Section 6 assesses the role of the OGD with respect to the KWP, and Section 7 examines the relationship between the OGD and the KWP PAD. Section 8 analyzes the Party-military relationship, with an emphasis on the role of the OGD. Section 9 illustrates the role of the OGD at the regional and local level, and Section 10 discusses the OGD’s mechanisms of societal control in the form of controlling North Koreans’ “organizational life.” Section 11 illustrates details of life as an OGD cadre, and Section 12 provides biographies of past and present leaders in the OGD. The final section examines the role of the OGD in potential contingencies and implications for the Kim regime’s survival.
Section 2:
Historical Background

In its original form, the OGD was founded at the Responsible Cadre Assembly of the North Korean Communist Party of the Five Northwest Provinces, which was the predecessor of the KWP. This conference took place from October 10 to 13, 1945. For this reason, October 10 is officially commemorated as the founding date of the KWP.\textsuperscript{15} The KWP OGD was originally formed as part of the KWP General Affairs Department. However, it eventually became an independent Party element designated as the Organization Committee, as determined at the Third Plenum of the KWP Second CC from September 24 to 25, 1948. Kim Il-sung was elected as the Chairman, and other members included Ho Ka-i, Kim Yol, Pak Chang-ok, and Pak Yong-son of the Soviet faction.\textsuperscript{16}

At the Fourth Plenum of the KWP CC in November 1951, Kim Il-sung attacked the OD for being too leftist in developing a “closed-door tendency” or “exclusionism” when excluding farmers in favor of laborers with respect to Party membership. Ho Ka-i, who had a Soviet background and was responsible


for the organizational design of the KWP, had favored such a policy as the Director of the OD.

Kim Il-sung frequently criticized the OGD. He denounced ODs at the regional level and, in particular, the OD of the North Pyongan Province Party Committee for their conduct.

The organizational department of the Party must keep the Party members under control, educate them and always have a good grasp of their thinking, organize and guide them in their work and conduct. This is fundamental to the organizational work of the Party. The organizational work of the North Pyongan provincial Party organization, however, leaves much to be desired in this respect. This is why I deem it essential for the organizational departments of the Party Committees of various levels to further improve and strengthen their work in future in line with what has been mentioned above.

Kim Yong-ju, Kim Il-sung’s younger brother, eventually became the Director of the OGD in September 1960 while also serving as the First Vice-Chairman of the KWP. He was born in 1921 and studied at a university in the Soviet Union and was educated in the Party between 1945 and 1952. Upon his return, Kim Yong-ju was assigned to the OD. At the 1961 Fourth Party Congress, Kim Yong-ju’s protocol rank was only 41st. He then rose dramatically at the 1966 Second Party Delegate Conference to sixth on the CC protocol list. Reflecting this rise in influence, he also was appointed to the Political Committee, the predecessor to the Political Bureau. This gave credence to the rumors that Kim Yong-ju was being groomed to be the successor to Kim Il-sung. However, Kim Yong-ju began to suffer from depression and by 1972 rumors of succession began to shift to Kim Jong-il.

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19 Lee, Korean Workers’ Party, 111-112.
The DPRK Constitution was amended before Kim Jong-il was officially designated as the successor to Kim Il-sung. At the Fifth Session of the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) in December 1972, the presidential position was solidified by the constitutional change, reflecting the Soviet-style approach of the leader holding dual positions of party general secretary and president of the state. This codified Kim Il-sung’s total control of North Korea from all political and national security aspects. Following this, Kim Jong-il was appointed KWP Secretary for Organization in September 1973 at the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Fifth Session of the KWP CC. Hwang Jang-yop, a former KWP secretary and the highest-ranking North Korean defector to South Korea, stated that the succession issue became mute after this appointment.

The OGD came under Kim Jong-il’s direct control, and he set up the OGD to direct all other Party elements. From his position as the Secretary for Organization, Kim Jong-il began to take control of the regime through his leadership of the OGD and the PAD. He was elected to the KWP Politburo in February 1974 at the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Fifth Session of the KWP CC, and he was also designated Kim Il-sung’s successor. This marked the beginning of the power transition from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il.

After being designated successor, Kim Jong-il used his authority to conduct a complete overhaul of the Party so that it would adhere to new standards. He reorganized the Party structure, the Party life guidance system, the cadre affairs system, the guidance inspection system, and the propaganda and agitation affairs system. From this point onwards, Kim led the OGD in controlling cadre issues, personnel issues, and external and internal issues.


The OGD and PAD grew dramatically as part of the succession of power to Kim Jong-il, who established the MTS and the MGS to exercise control over the Party and North Korean society. The OGD and PAD were critical to this process. Their power and influence greatly expanded as they became the core of the Party. In particular, the OGD’s PLG Section began to exercise authority over the “organizational life” of Party members and workers. Kim created sub-sections of the PLG Section designed to serve separate government, military, social, and Party entities. From this point on, the OGD began to control the private and work lives of Party cadre and Party workers. Beginning in 1978, Kim Jong-il personally handled recommendations to Kim Il-sung about appointments to the Politburo and other high-ranking positions. This gave Kim Jong-il enormous authority over personnel matters at the highest level. He was in a position to create a structure that would secure the succession system through controlling cadre selection and appointments, personnel promotions and dismissals, decision approval procedures, the cadre training system, and personnel regulations. He also wrote the Party’s “Cadre Affairs Guidance Manual.”

All personnel issues came under Kim Jong-il’s strict control. While lower-level agencies still handled their own personnel matters, their decisions were ultimately subject to the OGD’s oversight. For example, after taking over personnel issues, agencies such as the Heavy Industry Ministry, the Light Industry Ministry, and the Trade and Finance Ministry lost control over their own people and policies.

Kim Jong-il had gradually increased his control over the regime without those outside the central Party realizing it. The transition from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il changed the regime’s political strategy from mobili-
zation to regime security. There was emphasis on increasing the solidarity and loyalty of those close to Kim Jong-il on the domestic side, and increasing military capabilities to protect against external threats. Kim Jong-il transformed Party life and political surveillance to refocus the loyalty of all Party members to himself. This was especially true for the military and internal security agencies. That same system exists today, with the OGD managing every aspect of that system.

Before his death, Hwang Jang-yop insisted that the OGD would determine who would be the successor and work to that effect. Kim Jong-il accelerated preparations for the transfer of power to Kim Jong-un after suffering a stroke in 2008. The most important of the steps he took was convening the Third KWP Delegates Conference in September 2010, the first of its kind in 44 years. This meeting was organized by the OGD. First and foremost, Kim Jong-il publicly declared that his third son, Kim Jong-un, would be the official successor. Secondly, he appointed his son as the Vice-Chairman of the KWP CMC, despite having minimal military experience. Kim Jong-un was then appointed a four-star general the next day. All of this was by decree, not by Party vote. When Kim Jong-il died in December 2011, Kim Jong-un was named by the KWP Politburo as the KPA Supreme Commander.

Kim Jong-un has stepped onto the international arena through multiple summits with President Trump, President Xi Jinping, and President Moon Jae-in. The OGD remains as important as ever. While holding summits with President Moon Jae-In, Kim Jong-un instructed the OGD to strengthen ideological training and to increase internal surveillance of the Party. Kim also expressed the

30 Hyun, North Korea’s National Security Strategy and Power Elite, 296.
31 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, iii-xv.
need to prevent ideological degeneration within the Party. 35 Though some observers see Kim Jong-un as a puppet of the leadership of the OGD, this appears to be highly unlikely as Kim Jong-un marks his eighth year in power.

Section 3:
Mission & Tasks of the Organization and Guidance Department

The OGD’s policies and practices ensure that no Party, government, military, economic, or social organization compels the observance of human rights as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. *It is this combination of ideology and policy within the Kim regime that is the foundation for human rights denial.* Although it is not stated in any Party or state document, these missions and tasks are alluded to in the numerous speeches recorded in the collected works of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. This section provides an overview of the North Korean regime’s ideology and how the OGD supports and enforces this ideology.  

Ideology

North Korean ideology focuses on the exclusive superiority of the Supreme Leader supported by the KWP. Policies are formulated to be consistent with ideology. Employing this combination of ideology and policy, the OGD is responsible for facilitating the Supreme Leader’s decision-making through

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the provision of countrywide reports and targeted recommendations garnered from all institutions in North Korea. The information employed for this process is channeled from the vice-chairmen for organization at all regional organizations and agencies to the OGD.

Through its policies of guiding the Party and the entire population as well as its practices of monitoring the same to ensure compliance with those policies, the OGD enforces the obedience of every North Korean citizen to Party ideology. *Juche* ideology, the MIS, the Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology (TPMI), and military-first politics are the primary ideological lines in North Korea, as directed by the KWP.\(^{37}\)

Of these ideological concepts, the document that most accurately shapes the political life of each North Korean is the TPMI, and the document that most accurately reflects political power is the Party charter. The document that impacts a North Korean’s way of life the least is the state constitution.\(^{39}\) As one high-level defector explains, the constitution and Party charter are “advertisements” and the real law of the land is the TPMI.\(^{40}\)

The Party’s political dictionary describes the TPMI, divided into ten principles and 65 sub-principles, as “the ideological system by which the whole Party and people are firmly armed with the revolutionary ideology of the *Suryong* [Supreme Leader] and united solidly around him, carrying out the revolutionary battle and construction battle under the sole leadership of

\(^{37}\) Also translated as the Ten Great Principles Establishing the Monolithic Ideology as well as other similar variations. See translation by Joanna Hosaniak, Kyung-Eun Ha, Markus Simpson Bell at the Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, June 29, 2012. https://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr:444/board/bbs_view.php?no=3&board_table=bbs_literature&page=1&word=&searchItem=&cate_id=

\(^{38}\) The international media and intelligence agencies mistakenly use the term “military-first policy.” North Korea does not use the term “military-first policy.” Moreover, the concept of *byungjin*—the simultaneous development of the economy and the nuclear program—is not an ideology, but a policy line. Military-first politics is designed to secure the regime and prioritize national resources to the military, and, therefore, military-first politics is more of a ruling strategy than an ideological doctrine.


the Suryong. “These ten principles are designed to govern the daily life, activities, consciousness, and personal management of all North Koreans.” The TPMI carry the weight of absolute law in North Korea. All Party meetings are preceded by a review of the TPMI."

The TPMI, not juche, are the KWP’s core mantra for daily thought and behavior for every North Korean, regardless of rank and place in society. These guiding principles of conduct for every citizen from the lowest field hand to the highest general or Party bureaucrat demand not only complete allegiance to Kim Il-sung, but also to his successor and son, Kim Jong-il as well as Kim Jong-un.

Though individual North Koreans may not truly believe the TPMI, they have no choice but to comply. Even if they are profiting from market activity, they must demonstrate loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the TPMI during required Party-led organizational life sessions and saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions or buy their absence through bribes. The entire North Korean population must swear allegiance. TPMI essentially establishes loyalty to the Supreme Leader as the coin of the realm and law of the land."

**Missions**

The primary missions of the KWP OGD include:

- Securing the MGS and the MIS for the whole Party and all of society.
- Controlling the Party life of all cadre, Party members, and North Korean citizens.
- Maintaining, expanding, and maximizing the quality of all cadre and Party members.

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42 Author’s notes on public briefing by Hyun Seong-il, a former North Korean diplomat who defected to the Republic of Korea.


• Overseeing Party guidance, which allows the OGD to interfere in any
government or military matters.\textsuperscript{45}
• Overseeing all surveillance powers, which allows it to monitor even
the most senior-level officials, including the most senior
military officers.\textsuperscript{46}
• Supervising the protection of the Kim family.\textsuperscript{47}

The purpose of securing the MGS is to provide the foundation of the Supreme
Leader’s rule. The MGS is applied throughout the Party and all of North
Korean society to control the Party life of all cadre, Party members, and
North Korean citizens.\textsuperscript{48} The KWP Charter stipulates that the duty of all
Party members is unwavering loyalty to the Party and the Supreme Leader as
well as to move as one under the Supreme Leader’s MGS to establish revolu-
tionary principles.\textsuperscript{49}

Kim Jong-il developed the process of instituting the MGS, which included
the following practices:

• controlling information—all decisions go through him;
• using inspections to control Party cadre and government officials;
• using surveillance networks by the Party and security services to
employ the politics of terror;
• and using “carrots” to motivate loyalists in the Party, military,
and government.\textsuperscript{50}

The Supreme Leader’s authority is based in the Party, and all activities
are carried out under the MIS.\textsuperscript{51} The purpose of the MIS is to ensure ideo-

\begin{itemize}
\item Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 401-402.
\item Cheong, The Contemporary North Korean Politics, 310-11.
\item Ibid.
\item Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 78.
\item Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD”; see also Park et al., North Korea’s Po-
\end{itemize}
logical unity based on the TPMI. The TPMI’s tenth principle, specifically sub-principle 60, systemizes the Supreme Leader’s monolithic leadership and monolithic rule. The Party and internal security agencies punish those who violate the TPMI. Punishment, which can be as severe as being sent to a political prison camp. This is intended to suppress the development of political factions that could oppose Kim Jong-un.52

The MIS complements the MGS by providing the rationalization for guidance authority. This process is a primary responsibility of the OGD. The MGS ensures that all government agencies, Party elements, the military, economic and social organizations, and educational institutions follow the guidance of the Suryong exclusively and do so “absolutely and completely.” Kim Jong-il “constructed the monolithic guidance system methodically, beginning with the Party, continuing with the military, and then expanding into other governmental sectors.”53

Tasks

Subject to the missions specified above, the OGD performs the following tasks, which are all critical to the Kim regime’s ability to maintain its hold on power:

- Manages all Party cadre as well as the Party rank and file; manages the selection and dismissal of every North Korean official, including KWP CC members and candidates for membership (candidate members), Politburo members and candidate member, government leaders, regional Party leaders and central Party personnel as well as state agency and government administration cadre, central Party and regional Party cadre.54

- Maintains all personal and songbun (socio-political background) records of core element cadre and it has inspection authority over those personnel in addition to controlling their Party organization-

52 Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”
53 Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 66.
al life.\textsuperscript{55} To get promoted, OGD evaluators must affirm an individual’s loyalty and ability.\textsuperscript{56} This includes social groups, regional parties, and all other institutions.\textsuperscript{57}

- Guides military and government policies and organizational life within those agencies;\textsuperscript{58} inspects and punishes those in the military who carry out anti-Party activities or corrupt practices.

Appointments of Party cadre are made at four different levels, with significant involvement from the OGD for a large number of key positions.

- Supreme Leader approval is required for section chiefs and higher at the central Party level, all OGD cadre, chairmen of provincial Party Committees, chairmen of military Party Committees, bureau chiefs and higher of government agencies, all diplomats abroad, all generals of the military and the internal security services, front-line Korean People’s Army (KPA) regimental commanders, political commissars within the KPA at the regiment level and above, internal security deputy chiefs and bureau chiefs at the provincial level, senior military security officers, and KWP CC members and candidate members.
- OGD approval is required for central Party cadre who serve as section chiefs and below, provincial Party Committee chairmen and vice-chairmen, and military cadre who serve as section chiefs.
- OGD agreement is required for local Party Committee leaders as recommended by those committees.
- Local Party Committee and lower military Party Committee agreement is required for section chiefs and below of lower-ranked Party leaders at the local level.\textsuperscript{59}

One of the most important tasks of the OGD is its staff work in support of the KWP. The OGD serves as the staff for the KWP Politburo Standing Com-

\textsuperscript{55} Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 22-24.
\textsuperscript{56} Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”
\textsuperscript{57} Cheong, The Contemporary North Korean Politics, 310.
\textsuperscript{58} Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”
According to Kim Jong-il’s writings, the Party task system circulation procedures are as follows. First, establish a guidance and organized work system from the CC down to the local parties. Second, establish an orderly fashion of sending guidance documents and teams down to the lower Party organizations. Third, teach OGD cadre how to be “proper” cadre. Fourth, improve the Party work system realistically. Fifth, emphasize OGD-PAD combined operations and organize internal Party tasks. Sixth, continuously improve OGD tasks. Seventh, struggle against the negative impact of anti-Party elements not following the MGS or MIS. Moreover, establish a work system and shape work implementation through self criticism. The OGD’s responsible section—whether the Local Guidance Section, the central Party Guidance Section, Cadre Section, or Reports Section—must substantially carry out work task improvements.

Kim Jong-il pointed out that it was important for Party vice-chairmen to set a good example at the cabinet Party Committee and agency Party Committee level. He emphasized political struggle wherever Party life did not go according to regulations. Higher-level organizational vice-chairmen must visit lower-level organizations and participate in their meetings. ODs of local Party elements must perform the same tasks as the OGD.

To direct the organizational vice-chairmen at lower levels on current directives and guidance, the OGD established guidance points on four primary areas of focus.

1. **Concentrated guidance.** This guidebook has 30 chapters and 150 guidance points that focus on personnel evaluations, punishments,
and detailed guidance methodology. A focused target would be an individual who is under surveillance and reported on. This would be any Party chairman or a person whose appointment requires KWP EPB approval. Such personnel are appointed to high positions after consultation within the OGD. This is a core characteristic of regime maintenance. Targeted personnel are re-evaluated monthly and consolidated investigative reports are the basis for such re-evaluation.63

2. Management of all Party personnel matters. This is supported by a guidebook that has 28 chapters and 120 guidance points employed by the OGD’s Party Registration Section, PLG Section, Internal Affairs Section, and the Reports Section. This guidance establishes rules and procedures for Party personnel in the areas of punishment; Party entrance and dismissal; Party rules and regulations; authority; rules; indoctrination; Party membership selection process; inter-Party transfers; Party expulsion; Party card issue or renewal, and punishment for loss; former Party member surveillance; background investigations, methods, and procedures; missing Party personnel (referred to as Party “pumpkins”); Party membership expansion and reduction; low-level Party punishment and fines; Party member statistics; procedures for special Party members (those working in nuclear science, the munitions industry, anti-South Korea operations, or Party members deployed overseas); and management of candidates for Party membership.64

3. Managing the masses. This guidebook has 40 chapters and 180 guidance points on handling core class registration and procedures; core class benefits and considerations; managing children of survivors of the anti-Japanese partisans; rules on favorable treatment concerning persons of merit as well as heroes, patriots, combatants, and those that participated in the Korean War; managing surveillance of the hostile class, families of political criminals, and other disaffected elements; surveillance of family members of those imprisoned in political prison camps; emergency surveillance systems during times of crisis such as the death of the Supreme Leader, natural disasters,

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64 Ibid.
semi-war conditions, or other situations where there is a potential loss of law and order; methods to evaluate the masses, to include loyalists and persons of merit. Those targeted for indoctrination or punishment, indoctrination of those formerly held in political prison camps, re-evaluation and registration of the same as decided by an expanded session of the Safety Committee; methods of managing surveillance of those that left the Party or their positions; and methods of re-evaluating and surveillance of high-level cadre who lose their positions.65

4. Managing cadre leaders. This guidebook has 25 chapters and 120 guidance points on regulations concerning personnel matters, including personnel selection. Selection of Party cadre is very strict. Criteria include college graduation, nine years of military service, three years of administrative experience, one year of on-site labor, and no criminal record. To be selected for the OGD PLG Section, one must have worked in the Party for three years or more and possess exceptional analytical skills, writing abilities, high scores in college, and pass an examination on the four main points of guidance as addressed above.66

65 Ibid., 89-90.
66 Ibid., 90.
Section 4: Organization

Since 1982, the OGD has been located on the grounds of the former Namsan School, which was originally founded to serve the children of KWP officials. The CC #1 Office Complex and the OGD’s offices are located at this site, which is in Haebangsan-dong, Jung-guyok, Pyongyang.67

Kim Jong-il once declared in a speech to KWP OGD and PAD cadre that Party discussions are secret and Party organization issues are “super-secret.”68 To a large extent, this enables the KWP OGD to deny and avoid responsibility for policies and practices of human rights denial. However, as the Kim regime’s control tower for all policy ratification, the OGD is ultimately accountable for the current state of human rights violations as described


in the UN’s “Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”  

By maintaining a high degree of secrecy about its inner workings, the OGD is generally successful in achieving its tasks. It checks the power of other organizations and leaders through an overlapping surveillance system designed to protect the Supreme Leader.  

Such secrecy presents significant problems in assessing certain aspects of the OGD, particularly with respect to its internal organization. South Korea’s Ministry of Unification does not publicly provide details about the OGD’s structure. 

Although there are testimonies by North Korean escapees about the OGD, none have actually served in the central OGD apparatus. To the author’s knowledge, there is only one escapee who served as an OD officer at the provincial level. A provincial-level OD vice-chairman is only one step removed from being in the OGD and works with the OGD on a daily basis. 

Despite the relative lack of detailed information about its internal structure, the OGD’s mission and tasks are well understood. Most importantly, the practices, policies, and ideology promoted by the OGD have the most direct negative impact on human rights within the Kim regime. 

As stated in the previous section, the most important mission of the OGD is to establish the MGS and the MIS. Implementing these two systems is critical to promoting respect for the Supreme Leader and his directives, the regime’s societal control, and its political survival. In doing so, human rights are systemically suppressed due to the requirements of the MGS and the MIS. The MGS states that all directives must come from the Supreme Leader, and the MIS instructs that all political and ideological initiatives must serve the interest of the Supreme Leader. Consequently, the structure of the OGD is designed to do just that. 

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71 See Ri, “Nodongdang naebu saeob silsang-gwa jojik-jido-bu 65-gwa.”

Below is one interpretation of a KWP OGD organizational chart.\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{73} Cheong, The Contemporary North Korean Politics, 312.
Overview

The KWP has a personnel ranking system, just as the military does. In the central Party, from top to bottom, it is the Party Chairman (formerly the General Secretary and First Secretary) (당위원장), vice-chairman (부위원장), department director (부장), first vice-director (제1부부장), vice-director (부부장), section chief (과장), deputy section chief (부과장, but also frequently referred to as 과장), responsible guidance officer (책임지도원), lead guidance officer (담당지도원), and lowest rank of staff action officer (부원). In the regional Party, the rank system is Party Committee chairman (formerly responsible secretary), vice-chairman, vice-director, section chief, deputy section chief, responsible guidance officer, lead guidance officer, guidance officer, and staff action officer. At the elemental Party Committee level, the rank system is the committee chairman, vice-chairman, lead guidance officer, and staff officer.74

Correspondingly, personnel ranks within the OGD itself are director, first vice-director, vice-director, section chief, deputy section chief, responsible guidance officer, guidance officer, and basic action officer.75 There is usually one basic action officer per medium-level organization. For instance, the OGD has one action officer per army corps, one action officer for an economic enterprise, and so on. The personnel of these organizations regard the OGD action officers as “very powerful” despite their low rank.76

The OGD is the largest department in the KWP EPB.77 Though it only had 300 personnel in 1989, the OGD has expanded to approximately 25 vice-directors and 1,000 personnel divided among the Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat, the Party Headquarters Committee (PHQC), the Mass Party Directorate, the Military Directorate, and the former Administration Directorate. The personal secretariat is staffed by ten vice-directors and 70 personnel. The

74  Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 29.
75  Interview with retired Republic of Korea intelligence official who specialized on the KWP.
76  Author interview with Mr. K, who was a KWP member in North Korea.
Party Headquarters is staffed by three vice-directors and 300 personnel. The Mass Party Directorate has three vice-directors and 200 personnel. The Military Directorate has five vice-directors and 300 personnel. The former Administration Directorate had three vice-directors and 150 personnel. The OGD’s Seventh Section, which assumed the responsibilities of the Administration Directorate, likely maintains a similar number. All numbers fluctuate periodically based on changes to the Supreme Leader’s security and Party policies and practices.

The OGD also has approximately 230 personnel that oversee Party life countrywide. According to one defector who served in the OD of a provincial Party Committee, the OGD oversees the PLG Section, the Reports Section, the Factory Guidance Section, 65th Section (Guards Command selection), Third Section, the Party Registration Section, the Cadre Registration Section, the Personnel Section, the Customs Section, the Internal Affairs Section, the Provincial Guidance Section, and the 24th Section (Liaison Department and United Front Department).

**Party Headquarters Committee**

Embedded in the OGD is the PHQC, which guides and directs all central Party elements. The OGD PHQC monitors all KWP CC workers and their families and their Party life. From this perspective, the Party organizational guidance system of PHQC is the highest core element of the Party. Each element of the PHQC is located in Building #3, next to the Supreme Leader’s office.

The PHQC cadre work in the departments of the KWP EPB. The responsible vice-director oversees Party life guidance, inspections, Office 10, and the Petitions Section. There is an internal affairs vice-director who

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79 Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 86.


is responsible for cadre, Party registration, reports section, petition section, general affairs section, and the finance section. Lastly, there is a vice-director responsible for the PAD, who also serves as the PHQC propaganda secretary. Overall, the OGD PHQC has three vice-directors and 300 core cadre.\(^{82}\)

The PHQC also organizes the training and education of all Party members other than the Supreme Leader. There are about 13,000 central Party members, all managed by the PHQC.\(^{83}\)

The PHQC carries out the role of surveillance and intelligence collection of the KWP CC workers and their families as well as overseeing their Party life. Those that make major mistakes are confronted at committee meetings, which are monitored via CCTV by the Supreme Leader.\(^{84}\)

Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking defector from North Korea, testified that the OGD PHQC controls the Party life of all Party headquarters personnel.\(^{85}\) The PHQC carries out surveillance and intelligence collection of central Party workers and their families. If anyone commits major mistakes, they are confronted in the Party headquarters saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions. Kim Jong-il reportedly monitored this meeting by CCTV from his office and made necessary decisions through the Party headquarters chairman. The Supreme Leader plays a critical role as the manager of Party headquarters’ self-criticism sessions.\(^{86}\)

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82 Ibid., 35.
84 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 38.
85 Ibid., 41.
86 Ibid., 38.
The chart below depicts the OGD PHQC OD structure, functions, and personnel.\(^{87}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Function and Activity</th>
<th># of Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHQC Organization Department</td>
<td>Most powerful element of the OGD, organizes and guides Party life of KWP CC personnel, responsible secretary, 3 secretaries, 10 section chiefs each of which also serves as section party cell secretaries; PHQC Organization Department Chief serves as cadre section chief</td>
<td>300 total in PHQC, 100 in Org Dept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Life Guidance Section</td>
<td>Guides Party life of elemental Party committees of KWP Secretariat departments; writes Party task logs; conducts self-criticism sessions every other day; two sections conduct Party-life guidance under PHQC Organization Department</td>
<td>Aprr. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Registration Section</td>
<td>Records Party life trends of all KWP CC workers; updates investigations files; maintains all records on Party registration for KWP CC workers</td>
<td>Aprr. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspections Section</td>
<td>Has authority to inspect any KWP member and also conduct special inspections for the Supreme Leader; personnel given special authority for regular tasks; prepares inspection reports</td>
<td>5-0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadre Section</td>
<td>Rates loyalty to Supreme Leader; family background; personal expertise of party members and prepares personnel files accordingly; special handling of staff bureau (Supreme Leader protection); conducts selection, assignments, transfers, firing, training of all OGD members</td>
<td>10 (not counting Section 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reports Section</td>
<td>Prepares combined reports with Party Life guidance section on each organization and sends to Supreme Leader through phone or fax</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Affairs Section</td>
<td>Conducts combined planning according to direction, oversees OGD command, control, and communications</td>
<td>Aprr. 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petitions Section</td>
<td>Addresses false accusations and mismanagement (analogous to Inspector General in the U.S. context); handles related documents; has authority to report directly to Supreme Leader on critical issues</td>
<td>3-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents Section</td>
<td>Document storage for OGD</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office 10</td>
<td>Handles issues directly related to the Supreme Leader</td>
<td>Aprr. 8-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mass Party Directorate\(^{88}\)

The Mass Party Directorate’s first vice-director is in charge of three vice-directors and 200 personnel. There is a vice-director who was formerly responsible for central organizations, including the State Council, the KWP CC, and central agencies under the cabinet. There is also a vice-director responsible for regional and local organizations at the province-city-coun-

\(^{87}\) Ibid., 45.

\(^{88}\) This entity is also referred to as the Regional Party Directorate.
ty level. Lastly, there is a vice-director responsible for local factories and enterprises.89

Kim Jong-il stressed that all problems within government agencies needed to be reported to the OGD. He also demanded that OGD and PAD action officers responsible for regional Party organizations deploy to those areas for twenty days per month to assist local responsible guidance officers in resolving outstanding issues.90

**Party Life Guidance Section**

As the KWP Secretary for Organization, Kim Jong-il controlled Party life guidance, which is arguably the most critical function of the KWP.91 This remains so today under Kim Jong-un. The PLG Section is the most critical element of the OGD and has 150 personnel. Kim Jong-il, who began his career in the PLG Section, referred to it as the eyes, ears, and heart of the KWP.

The PLG Section has three vice-directors and one section leader, a daily reports guidance officer, a policy guidance officer, a general affairs guidance officer, an internal affairs guidance officer as well as province, city, and county guidance officers. The vice-directors include a first vice-director, a military vice-director, and an internal affairs vice-director. As the lead supervisor within the section, the first vice-director manages, guides, and controls all responsible guidance officers dispatched to regional Party elements and also receives all reporting from those guidance officers. The military vice-director performs the same mission within the military, and the internal affairs vice-director does the same for central Party elements.92

The PLG Section is responsible for guiding the Party life of all cadre, Party members, and the general population. It monitors trends and pat-

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89 Jung et al., *Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea*, 35-36.


92 Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 86.
terns in individual behavior, particularly those trends that may harm the interests of the Supreme Leader. The First Sub-Section is responsible for provincial Party Committees, and the Second Sub-Section is responsible for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all foreign trade organizations. The Fourth Sub-Section is responsible for the Guards Command, and the Thirteenth Sub-Section is responsible for the military.93

Through the PLG Section, Kim Jong-il departmentalized Party life guidance in every sector of society, including all central government agencies, the military, and the security agencies. Party life guidance practices changed from monthly saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions to daily or weekly sessions, enabling tighter control over the Party.94

The PLG Section’s Investigation Office searches for the weak point of every targeted individual regardless of socio-political class or official position to find a reason for their behavior. This brutal approach often drives the suspect to despair. Not even suspected members of the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) or the Ministry of State Security (MSS) are spared this type of treatment.95 North Koreans are afraid of the OGD PLG Section because all of its activities are secret. Even though other office personnel may work with PLG Section members, they do not know exactly what the PLG Section members do.

The PLG Section maintains its own Party cells. Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il conducted their Party life from the central Party, as Kim Jong-un does today. In regional Party elements, committee, chairmen, and vice-chairmen for organization conduct their Party life and self-criticism from within their respective Party cells.96

The PLG Section controls North Korean society through its “guidance points.” Guidance officers responsible for specific provinces deliver “main guidance points” to their respective geographical or organizational area of responsi-

95 Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 87.
96 Ibid., 86.
ibility and monitor the implementation of this guidance, thereby controlling their assigned area. When these guidance officers deploy to cities and counties to deliver “ten-day guidance points” each month, the guidance points are adjusted for the situation and times. The guidance officer has the local enterprise or organizational leader sign off on the points, and the local leader immediately begins implementation.

From early in the month to the 15th of the month, the guidance officer observes and evaluates this implementation process. From the 17th to the 22nd of the month, the guidance officer returns to the PLG Section offices and writes the assessment of guidance implementation for the record. From the 22nd to the 27th of the month, the guidance officer studies the new guidance points for the coming month for the given area of responsibility. Main guidance points typically focus on securing the authority of the North Korean leadership, propaganda praising the Supreme Leader, carrying out directives and Party matters, anti-socialism causes, and economic management.97

Every Friday at 2:00 p.m., the PLG Section verifies the attendance of all Party chairmen and vice-chairmen as well as the personnel of central Party elements at their respective “policy permeation day” sessions. In the provinces, these meetings are held at 3:00 p.m. by local Party organization vice-chairmen, who oversee local saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions on weekly tasks and distribute new tasks for the following week. The cabinet conducts these meetings at 4:00 p.m. on Wednesdays. Party elements conduct plenary meetings every quarter, and there is also a monthly Party internal affairs conference, which all province, city, and county chairmen and vice-chairmen are required to attend.98

Failure to attend any “policy permeation day” session or Party internal affairs conference results in severe consequences. In case of illness, the vice-chairman or vice-chairman for organization must attend. This is because main guidance points regarding the OGD on Party tasks guidance and directives are regarded as top secret. OGD guidance points cannot be read by other Party workers. Authorized OGD workers must read these guidance points under secure conditions. These guidance points must be memorized as

97 Ibid., 88.
98 Ibid.
they are read in the OGD General Affairs Section reading room. The reading date and time must be recorded, and under no circumstances can the guidance points be carried around on one’s person. Vice-chairmen and chairmen of lower Party elements can receive photocopies, but these copies must be stored in locked containers that must be inspected to ensure security.  

Many of the Supreme Leader’s guidance points originate from on-site inspections. As was the case with Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un provides opinions and guidance during these visits. Almost all of the senior officials who accompany Kim Jong-un can be seen taking notes as he speaks. The Supreme Leader’s intellect is deemed to be unsurpassed, and his words represent law and doctrine. The two photos below show senior officials recording every detail of Kim Jong-un’s guidance, even in inclement weather.

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99 Ibid.

100 For an example, see the YouTube video entitled “Kim Jong Un rides new Pyongyang subway,” where Premier Pak Pong-ju accompanies Kim in his inspection of a new subway train at Kaeson and Ponghwa stations. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qcfmx8X-LMg.

Office 10, which belongs to the PLG Section, reports directly to the Supreme Leader. Office 10 guidance officers are responsible for the MSS and also monitor high-level Party officials who have been dismissed from their positions. Daily reports guidance officers oversee the reporting on those appointed to the KWP EPB, which requires the Supreme Leader’s approval.

In sum, the daily reports guidance officer reports, receives, and manages surveillance schedules on every key leader in the Party, cabinet, prosecutor’s office, judicial system, and key MPS and MSS leaders. Policy guidance officers report on the tasks of sending Supreme Leader and central Party orders to regional Party elements while examining and reporting on recommendations from the lower Party elements. General Affairs Section guidance officers combine all

102 Since Kim Jong-il became the KWP Organization Secretary in 1974, this secretary position and the position of OGD Director have been reserved for the Supreme Leader.
reports and conduct an assessment. The PLG Section screens issues in a way that is only paralleled by legal and investigative institutions.103

The OGD also involves itself deeply in electoral processes. During government elections, it is the OGD at the regime center and the vice-chairman for organization at the local levels that “draw up the slate” of candidates for elected positions. Citizens may only vote yes or no on that district’s candidates as there is only one candidate provided by the OGD.104 The OGD PLG Section is deeply involved in selecting the participants for major Party events such as Party Representatives Conferences.105

**Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat**

The Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat, attached to the OGD, maintains approximately 70 personnel. This includes the director, who holds the rank of first vice-director, and ten section chiefs.106 Each section chief has distinct responsibilities, such as protocol, Guards Command and the Sixth Bureau, Kim family education, and Kim family finances.107 For example, the personal tutors of Kim Jong-il’s children belonged to the Personal Secretariat. Reports indicate that a “Mr. Jong” has been serving as a tutor for computer-related subjects since 2010.108 The Personal Secretariat receives all reports for presentation, maintains the Supreme Leader’s daily calendar, prepares his workload, oversees protocol issues, manages his personal life and various gatherings, and oversees his finances. It does not possess meaningful influence over policy.109

103 Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 86-87.
106 Jung et al., *Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea*, 30.
107 Ibid., 37.
108 Ibid., 23.
Pictured below is the Supreme Leader’s three-story Personal Secretariat office building.\textsuperscript{110}

![Supreme Leader's Personal Secretariat Office Building](image)

**General Affairs Section**

This section handles general administrative matters for the OGD.\textsuperscript{111} It leads and manages event and conference planning and execution. It also coordinates OGD tasks, activities, and OGD officials’ duties.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} Photo from *Rodong Sinmun* and included in Song Hong-Geun, “김정남도 ‘서기실 실력자’ 들이 김정은 설득해 암살” [Secretariat’s Influential Personnel Convinced Kim Jong-un to Assassinate Kim Jong-nam], *Shindonga*, March 2017. http://shindonga.donga.com/3/all/13/853891/1.

\textsuperscript{111} Cheong, *The Contemporary North Korean Politics*, 311.

\textsuperscript{112} Hyun, “KWP’s Control System Over North Korean Society,” 10.
Cadre Section

The OGD’s greatest power is over personnel matters. Before Kim Jong-il became the OGD Director in 1973, the KWP Cadre Department handled all personnel issues. Every institution maintained a Cadre Section that was under the Cadre Department’s oversight. Kim Jong-il, however, created a Cadre Section in the OGD to control the leaders of every institution in North Korea.113 Through the Cadre Section, the OGD directly manages the 3,000 highest-ranking officials in North Korea.114

The Cadre Section oversees the selection, appointments, and personnel matters of KWP CC members; candidate members, cadre, and workers; politburo members and candidate members; all government leaders; all military generals; all Guards Command leaders; all MSS and MPS leaders; and all central and regional Party leaders. It does the same for the Supreme Leader's personal staff, including clerks, typists, barbers, drivers, tailors, personal physicians, nurses, and kippumjo (“Joy Brigade”) members.115

Furthermore, the Cadre Section handles, under the Supreme Leader’s direct supervision, the personnel issues of all KPA division commanders and frontline regimental commanders and above as well as their political officers, all bureau chiefs and above in state agencies, and economic enterprise equivalents. It is also responsible for all Party personnel in high-ranking positions. The KWP Secretariat’s Cadre Department oversees personnel matters for mid- and low-level cadre.116

The KWP maintains cadre training schools at every level of society. In every province, the KWP maintains Party colleges that train cadre from counties and villages. At the central Party level, the Kim Il-sung Higher Party

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113 An, North Korea’s Governing System, 175-79; see also Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 27.

114 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 24.


116 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 28.
School is the most prestigious Party training institution and serves under the KWP CC.\textsuperscript{117} This means it is controlled by the OGD.

Before Kim Jong-il gained control of the Party, the KWP Cadre Department handled all personnel matters in the Party and the government. The Cadre Department submitted findings to the KWP Secretariat for deliberation and then to the Politburo for final consideration. More than anything else, Kim Jong-il’s succession process required the control of personnel issues to ensure the effectiveness of the MGS. By establishing the Cadre Section within the OGD, Kim was able to control all cadre at the bureau director level and above. Now, the Cadre Department only handles mid-level and low-level cadre and civil employees, and it assigns college graduates to their initial employment positions.\textsuperscript{118}

Kim Jong-il turned personnel management into a tool of political control. Combined with internal security surveillance, personnel management under his direction became a double-edged sword that was used to promote North Korean officials or doom them and their families to political prison camps, never to return. Through the assessment of an individual leader’s political loyalty, the OGD controlled every leader in North Korean society, including those in the military. This has not changed under Kim Jong-un.

The Cadre Section is organized into several sub-sections, each with a focus on different areas of Party, government, military, and other regime institutions. The Supreme Leader appoints and dismisses senior officials, but the Cadre Section handles all records, assesses all activities, and manages surveillance records regarding each official and their families, reporting to the Supreme Leader as necessary.\textsuperscript{119}


\textsuperscript{119} Hyun, “KWP’s Control System Over North Korean Society,” 33.
The organization of the OGD Cadre Section is as shown in this chart.\textsuperscript{120}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 1} Central Cadre A
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 2} Central Cadre B
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 3} Provincial Cadre
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 4} Military
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 5} Guards Command
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 6} Ministry of State Security
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 7} Ministry of People’s Security
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 8} Judiciary
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 9} Government
\item \textbf{Sub-Section 11} Inter-Korean Related Personnel
\end{itemize}

Inspection Section

The OGD Inspection Section is the most feared institution in North Korea. This section can investigate any organization or office for anti-Party activity, corruption, violations of Party rules, or political infractions. It prepares investigative reports for the Supreme Leader.121 Its mandate exists above that of the KWP Inspection Committee, a different Party element that is responsible for monitoring Party organizations and cadre at lower levels nationwide. Both the Inspection Section and the KWP Inspection Committee ensure that all of society adheres to the TPMI and Party Charter, conducting investigations as needed.122 Through its Inspection Section, the OGD maintains the authority to orchestrate and execute all purges of senior Party personnel regardless of their institutional affiliation, including the military and the internal security agencies.123

Kim Jong-il established the Inspection Section to inspect all sectors of society regarding their adherence to the MGS and MIS.124 No institution is beyond its limits. For example, the MPS cannot arrest an MSS member for corruption, but the Inspection Section can.125 The Inspection Section’s action officers routinely root out anti-Party elements, corruption, and other lesser violations. These inspections frequently lead to purges or worse.126 This section is comprised of the First Sub-Section (responsibility for the cabinet), the Second Sub-Section (military), Third Sub-Section (special elements), Eastern Sub-Section, Western Sub-Section, and Regional Sub-Sections (numbered 1 to 4). Inspections are categorized as general, concentrated, or special.127

122 Ibid., 13.
123 Cheong, The Contemporary North Korean Politics, 311; see also An, North Korea’s Governing System, 175–79.
126 Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 68.
127 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 25, footnote 37.
Inspections of lower-level Party organizations are conducted by political action officers from the OGD Inspection Section, the OGD PLG Section, or a combination of the two. Inspections last anywhere from one to three months. All ideological evaluations are based on the TPMI. The authority of the lowest ranking OGD officer is undeniable, and when an OGD action officer conducts Party life guidance or general Party guidance, even vice-ministers must obey. The Inspection Section’s interrogation is known to be especially severe, with reports of high-ranking cabinet officials committing suicide as a result. The Inspection Section has the final word on all inspections.

**Party Member Registration Section**

Party membership is the most important path to success for North Koreans, which gives this section great influence over North Korean society. The Party Member Registration Section, through the vice-chairman for organization at every local Party Committee, handles registration planning, development, quality of progress, Party entrance, occupation within the Party, intra-Party transfers, overseas dispatch, and the de-registration of personnel who are expelled from the Party. It maintains thirteen sub-sections. This section is also responsible for issuing Party membership cards. When Party members go overseas, it confiscates Party membership cards and issues separate Party movement cards for overseas use.

The OGD Party Registration Section’s role vastly increased during Kim Jong-il’s rise to power within the regime. Lower-level entities have no authority over this area of responsibility. Kim Jong-il also ensured that

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129 Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 87-88.
130 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 26.
132 Ibid.; see also Cheong, The Contemporary North Korean Politics, 311.
134 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 26.
the issuance of all Party identification cards was centrally controlled in this section.135

**Petitions Section**

The Petitions Section collects petition letters and documents from all Party cadre, Party members and ordinary citizens regarding their opinions, accusations, dissatisfactions, personal problems, and complaints. This section assesses these reports and directs them to the Supreme Leader as needed.136 It maintains six sub-sections.137 Submitting questionable appeals to the Petitions Section to avoid being judged as an anti-regime individual is a grave mistake for North Koreans.138

**Reports Section**

Kim Jong-il created this Section to centralize all reporting within the Party to him and thereby exert greater control over the Party.139 The OGD Reports Section collects both positive and negative reports from every central- and lower-level Party Committee at every level across the country on a daily basis. These reports are consolidated and submitted to the Supreme Leader. This Section acts as the eyes and ears of the Party. The Supreme Leader can monitor the effectiveness of Party life guidance through this Section, which complements the internal security services’ mission of

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135 Ibid.
139 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 26.
monitoring society. To further enhance this process, Kim Jong-un recently instructed the OGD to move to an hourly reporting system.

The reality in North Korea is that all Party elements must report on all political and private actions. All such reports from lower-level Party Committees are forwarded to the Reports Section, enabling the Party’s upper echelon to exert control over lower-level entities. No other organization or institution in North Korea can compete in this regard.

The Reports Section also receives situational reports from Party Committees embedded in the military, including the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), the Reconnaissance General Bureau, intelligence and anti-South Korea organizations, and the General Political Bureau (GPB). These reports are also consolidated and provided to the Supreme Leader.

Section 65

Section 65 controls the selection of kippumjo (“Joy Brigade”) and members of the Guards Command. Even Party officials are often unaware of this Section’s existence. People are typically only aware of Section 5 or Section 6 at the provincial Party level. Section 5 selects and manages the kippumjo. In 2006, Section 65 was subordinated to the OGD Cadre Section to increase security and the Section leaders’ rank was lowered from vice-director to section chief. Before then, the OGD’s Section 5 and Section 6 each operated independently and was each led by a vice-director. Kim Jong-il was convinced that “impure elements were attempting to do away with the leaders of the revolution” through subverting the selection process of the Guards Command.

142 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 24.
143 Ibid., 26; see also Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 426-34.
He thus ordered the combining of the two Sections into one under the OGD Cadre Section and rewrote the guidance points for the selection process.\textsuperscript{144}

After 2007, Section 65 chose “Joy Brigade” members under new selection criteria. The selection process focused on women between the ages of 21 and 23, exceeding 162 cm in height, and weighing between 46 and 50 kg. Candidates must possess good socio-political backgrounds and have good academic and social evaluations, as determined by examinations. If they meet these and other criteria, the candidates undergo a medical test and a final examination at either the Ponghwa Clinic or Namsan Hospital.\textsuperscript{145} They then undergo training for three years under the supervision of Section 65 before being dispatched to their assignments. Their training is varied and includes horticulture, hairdressing, and masseuse training. One woman selected by Kim Il-sung who had worked in horticulture for fifteen years was eventually assigned as a guidance officer.\textsuperscript{146}

Those who work in Section 65 do so under strict security. OGD Section 6 recruits for both the “inner circle” and “outer circle.” The inner circle (also referred to as “kin unit” and “self-exploding unit” for their dedication) consists of female Guards Command soldiers or uniformed female personnel. The outer circle consists of females who marry male Guards Command soldiers or become technicians in the Guards Command. Female Guards Command soldiers are recruited one year before graduation from high school and undergo fifteen months of intense training and scrutiny. They are assigned in April of each year. Recruits must be at least 170 cm tall, weigh between 46 and 51 kg, and possess good academic records and socio-political backgrounds.\textsuperscript{147}

\textsuperscript{144} Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 90-91.
\textsuperscript{145} These are the top hospitals in North Korea, both located in Pyongyang.
\textsuperscript{146} Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 91.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
Military Directorate\textsuperscript{148}

The Military Directorate has one first vice-director, five vice-directors, and 300 personnel. This element handles the KWP committees and political sections of the KPA General Staff Department, the MPAF, the Military Security Command (MSC), the Guards Command, the Pyongyang Defense Command, the General Training Bureau, the Military Logistics Mobilization General Bureau, the 131st Guidance Bureau (nuclear program support unit), the First Brigade (Kim family support unit), and the Railroad General Bureau.

This is done by controlling these units’ leaders as well as their Party life and the activities of each Party Committee in those units. The Guards Command and the KWP CC’s Sixth Bureau are subordinate to the Supreme Leader through the first vice-director due to their responsibility of protecting the Supreme Leader.\textsuperscript{149} Leaders of OGD sections associated with the military are given the military rank of lieutenant general for the purpose of association with active duty military personnel.\textsuperscript{150}

The OGD Military Directorate has the most vice-directors in the OGD. Of all the elements in the KWP CC, this is the element with the most authority. There is:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a vice-director responsible for the GPB;
  \item a vice-director for the General Logistics Bureau;
  \item a vice-director for the First Brigade (Kim family support unit), the 131st Guidance Bureau (nuclear program support unit), and other special units;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{148} See section on Party-Military Relations in this report.

\textsuperscript{149} Jung et al., \textit{Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea}, 36.

• a vice-director for civil defense training units and Worker-Peasant Red Guard; and
• a vice-director responsible for the Guards Command political division.151

The Guards Command is responsible for the Supreme Leader’s personal security. The vice-directors of the Guards Command and the Political Section of the Sixth Bureau of the Guards Command work directly under the Supreme Leader and not for the OGD.152

Under the OGD Military Directorate, the GPB Guidance Section oversees the GPB and provides guidance to the GPB OD’s PLG Section to control the Party life of military commanders and military political officers.153

The GPB Guidance Section coordinates with the OGD PLG Section’s Thirteenth Sub-Section to ensure that Party life guidance, directives, and reports are strictly adhered to by military commanders and military political officers at the battalion level and above. The GPB Guidance Section also coordinates with the OGD Cadre Section’s Fourth Sub-Section to oversee all personnel issues related to military commanders and GPB political officers at the brigade level and above.154

The PLG Section’s Thirteenth Sub-Section is responsible for the Party organizational life of everyone in the KPA. In doing so, it ensures that the military actualizes the leadership and ideology of the Supreme Leader. This Sub-Section also guides and controls the implementation of the political tasks of the GPB and the KPA’s embedded Party Committee at every level. To

151 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 36.
152 Ibid., 31.
ensure a close working relationship, the Thirteenth Sub-Section is located in the MPAF headquarters building, alongside the GPB.155

The OGD PLG Section’s Thirteenth Sub-Section is overseen by an OGD vice-director. Every year, a senior OGD PLG Section cadre supervises a 15-day political retreat for general-grade officers. Every KPA commander and GPB political officer from independent regiment, brigade, and above must attend one of these retreats every year.156 The Thirteenth Sub-Section also receives all GPB reports, which cover all political evaluations of KPA activities. These reports are consolidated and communicated to the Supreme Leader. This chain of reporting and evaluation enables the Thirteenth Sub-Section to control the GPB, which exerts political control over the KPA. It should be noted that GPB political officers cannot directly transfer into the Thirteenth Sub-Section. They must first undergo six months of training prior to doing so.157

The OGD Cadre Section’s Fourth Sub-Section is responsible for determining personnel decisions for all senior KPA cadre. This includes personnel matters for every corps, division, brigade, and regimental commander and political officer as well as overseas military attachés.158 The OGD approves every personnel decision for these officers. Upon OGD approval, these officers’ assignments and promotions are made in the name of the KPA Supreme Commander. This process is a key element of political control over each of these officers.159

The OGD Military Directorate maintains the exclusive authority to approve two-star personnel. Based on the Military Directorate’s recommendations,

155  “선군정치와 노동당-인민군 어떤 관계?” [Military-First Politics in North Korea – What is the Relationship Between the Labor Party and the KPA?], Daily NK, October 9, 2008. https://www.dailynk.com/5b1010-%ED%8A%B9%EC%A7%91%E2%91%A3%5d%EC%84%A0%EA%B5%80%EC%A0%95%EC%99%84-%ED%8E%B4%EB%8A%94-%E5%8C%97%EB%85%8B%EB%8F%99%EB%8B%99/.

156  Ibid.


158  “Military-First Politics in North Korea – What is the Relationship Between the Labor Party and the Korean People’s Army?,” Daily NK, October 9, 2008.

159  Im Gang-Taek, Im Soon-Hee, and Im Ul-Chul, Bukhan-ul eotokkye e-hae haeya halkka? [How to Understand North Korea?] (Seoul: Committee for the Reconciliation of the Korean People, 2009), 37-38.
the Supreme Leader provides orders to appoint and promote all general-grade officers.\textsuperscript{160}

The chart below depicts the OGD’s control over the military.\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{itemize}
  \item KWP Military Department
  \item KWP OGD (GPB Guidance Department)
  \item KWP OGD (Cadre Department)
  \item KWP OGD (Admin Department)
  \item KWP PAD
  \item KWP Cadre Department
  \item KWP Laborer Department
  \item GSD, MPAF
  \item GPB Org. Department
  \item GPB Org. Department Party Life Guidance Section
  \item GPB Org. Department Cadre Section
  \item GPB Org. Department Admin Section
  \item MPAF Party Committee
  \item Each Command Party Committee
  \item MSC Party Committee
  \item Each Corps Party Committee
  \item KPA Military Security Command
  \item Division Party Committee
  \item Regiment Party Committee
  \item Battalion Party Committee
  \item Company Party Cell
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{160} "Military-First Politics in North Korea — What is the Relationship Between the Labor Party and the Korean People’s Army?,” Daily NK, October 9, 2008.

\textsuperscript{161} Cheong Seong-Chang, 
Seventh Section

In 1990, Kim Jong-il moved the KWP Administration Department (AD) under the OGD. The AD maintained enormous power within the regime due to its mission of politically controlling all personnel in the criminal justice system, including police, secret police, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and the SPA. Due to a major corruption scandal in the SPA and the police, the AD was moved and its director, Kim Si-hak, was sent to the Kim Il-sung Party School for ideological re-education. Upon his return, Kim Si-hak was appointed an OGD first vice-director with responsibility for the AD.162

Two OGD First Vice-Directors, Ri Je-gang and Jang Song-taek, maintained a confrontational relationship. To resolve the internal conflict, Kim Jong-il removed the AD from the OGD in 2007 and reappointed Jang to be its Director after Kim rehabilitated him from “revolutionary study” due to a previous transgression. However, this became a constraint on the OGD and lessened its influence.163 The AD’s authority grew significantly under Jang.

After his execution in 2013, Jang’s AD was dismantled and lost its authority. Political tasks were subordinated to the OGD and then First Vice-Director Jo Yon-jun under the newly established OGD Seventh Section. The OGD’s authority over all law enforcement agencies and institutions responsible for counter-regime investigations has grown since then. This includes the MSS and the MPS.164

When the KWP AD was disbanded, nearly all senior personnel were demoted to society’s “lowest class,” banned from all future promotion, and sent to work on construction teams. Those that complained about their reassignment were sent to rural mining villages.165

163 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 33–34.
Other Sections

- **Three Revolutionary Teams (TRT):** This section within the OGD oversaw the TRT, which Kim Jong-il founded to further North Korea’s version of China’s cultural revolution but whose mission was to support Kim Jong-il’s succession as North Korea’s Supreme Leader. Teams of twenty to fifty newly graduated college students serving the ideological, cultural, and technical revolutions of the TRT movement were deployed to most factories, cooperative farms, and other economic enterprises throughout the country. The TRT teams and the TRT Section of the OGD no longer play a major role in North Korean society.\(^{166}\) In the late 1980s, this section was reduced in size and its title was changed from the Three Revolutions Teams Section to the Three Revolutions Teams Guidance Section. In 2002, this section was reorganized to monitor North Korea’s open market activity.\(^{167}\)

- **Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology Section:** This Deputy guides and manages the implementation of the TPMI Party-wide.\(^{168}\)

- **Overseas Guidance Section:** This Deputy is responsible for supervising and guiding North Korea’s overseas organizations.\(^{169}\)

- **8.9 Section:** This Deputy is in charge of managing Mansudae Palace as well as guiding the Financial Management Department.\(^{170}\)

- **Treaty Section:** This Deputy monitors and oversees strategy for North Korea’s participation in international treaties.

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166  “김정일 친위대 3대 혁명 소조 부활하나” [Re-emergence of Kim Jong-il’s Support Group, Three Revolutionary Teams?], *Daily NK*, May 26, 2005. https://www.dailynk.com/%EA%B9%80%EC%A0%95%EC%9D%BC%EC%B9%9C%EC%9C%84%EB%8C%80-%3EB%8C%80%ED%98%81%EB%AA%85%EC%86%8C%EC%A1%B0-%EB%B6%80%ED%99%9C%ED%95%98%EB%82%88/.

167  Author interview with former TRT member; see also Jang, “Exposing North Korea’s Monster That Led the Execution of Jang Song-taek, the Party’s OGD,” *Chogabje.com*, December 16, 2013.


169  Ibid.

170  Ibid.
Section 5:
Comparative Perspective of the Organization and Guidance Department

Nearly all communist, socialist, or revolutionary political parties have, or have had, an organization department to conduct organizational issues and personnel affairs. The KWP renounced communism in 2009 for “socialism of our style” in a revision of its constitution. Nevertheless, its operational principles and internal organization remain similar to that of other current or former communist parties. And while the Politburos of the vast majority of former and current communist parties represent the apex of power within those parties, the organization departments of these parties have also wielded substantial political power and influence.

The father of all communist parties was the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Beginning in March of 1919, the CPSU maintained an “Orgburo” or Organizational Bureau. Initially responsible for CPSU organizational matters, it was highly secretive in its activities and was led by a Committee of twelve individuals. However, the CPSU Politburo soon overtook much of the Orgburo’s power and influence. Organizational matters began to be run by a variety of “Otdel”—meaning “department.” The leading otdel was known as the Otdel of the Party, Trade Unions, and Komsomol Organs. It handled personnel and organizational matters of production entities operating under

the umbrella of this otdel.\textsuperscript{172} The Orgburo was disbanded in 1952 and its function was transferred to the CPSU Secretariat.\textsuperscript{173}

The communist party that is closest to the KWP in structure and mission in terms of the organization department is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP Organization Department oversees the nearly 87 million members of the CCP. It is an extremely secretive institution. A word from the CCP OD is taken as policy by regional Party Committees. The CCP OD (组织部 or zǔzhībù) is in charge of all party operations—membership, personnel, job assignment, and intra-party affairs. In addition, it provides policy directives and implementation guidance to various Party ODs at the provincial and city levels. Unlike the KWP OGD, it does not formulate policies on areas such as foreign relations, economic planning, or leadership succession. It also does not have a mandate for intra-party discipline and investigation. On the other hand, because China is a party-dominant political system, the CCP OD exercises significant \textit{de facto} influence over all functions of the Party, state, and the military due to the fact that Party membership is usually a prerequisite for leadership positions beyond the district level in China.

According to the \textit{Financial Times}, the CCP OD equivalent in the United States would be an organization that:

\begin{quote}
Oversees the appointments of US state governors and their deputies; the mayors of big cities; heads of federal regulatory agencies; the chief executives of General Electric, ExxonMobil, Walmart and 50-odd of the remaining largest companies; justices on the Supreme Court; the editors of The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, the bosses of the television networks and cable stations, the presidents of Yale and Harvard and other big universities and the heads of think-tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Heritage Foundation.\textsuperscript{174}
\end{quote}


An organizational chart of the CCP OD as of 2012 is shown below.\textsuperscript{175}

leadership Organs of the Chinese Communist Party 18th Central Committee, 2007–2012

Note: The seven CCP departments shown (bottom right) are formally subordinate to the Central Committee, but normally receive policy directives from the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, as channeled through the Secretariat.

The head of the CCP OD is always a member of the Politburo and an insider of the CCP’s core leadership. His views and actions have a direct impact on party succession of senior leaders. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Yaobang all served as heads of the central organization. Senior leaders have also served in that capacity, such as Zhou Enlai in the late 1920s and 1930s. Another example is Chen Yun, who was the head of the CCP OD until the early 1940s, when Mao asked him to take the lead on economic issues. This is the reason that Chen Yun is normally known among China scholars as the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) point person on central planning, an economic approach which started in the Red Area (under CCP control) in the 1940s and continued after the founding of the PRC in 1949. On the other hand, Chen Yun should be recognized as the CCP’s chief ideological enforcer during his tenure as the head of the CCP OD. He established the basic tenets of the CCP’s ideological framework, centered on Mao Zedong thought, and built the CCP’s extensive hierarchical apparatus.

Among the most important tasks of the CCP is leadership succession. Although the ultimate decision rests with the Politburo Standing Committee, the OD exercises a great deal of influence since it is responsible for grooming potential next-generation leaders and building their personnel portfolios with recommendations to the Politburo Standing Committee. While the internal dynamics of the CCP OD on this matter are not widely known, the information presented below has been verified through numerous academic articles and memoirs by Party elders.

The Politburo conducts the initial selection of potential candidates based on a list provided by the CCP OD. Politburo members’ individual views are then presented and debated at regularly scheduled meetings. Consensus is essential in deciding who the next CCP chairman will be. If there is dissent, discussions will continue until the dissenters change their positions. It is possible for dissenters to be purged in extreme cases. The views of Party elders, who have retired, are also critical since there are factions within the CCP, such as former Chairman Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Clique.

There are prerequisites that a future leader typically needs to fulfill, such as tenure as a provincial party boss from key locations such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang Province. That candidate will first be appointed to one of the critical positions such as the Director of the CCP Secretariat, Vice President of the PRC, or Vice Chairman of the CMC. Based on these
appointments, the identity of the next CCP leadership is often publicly known in advance. Consequently, the CCP Politburo and the CCP OD split the influence over leadership succession. This is a key difference between the CCP OD and the KWP OGD, which reflects the unique style of control exercised by the Kim family regime.\textsuperscript{176}

Overall, the KWP OGD is arguably much more powerful than its counterparts in other socialist countries. This is because the mission and focus of the KWP OGD goes far beyond the typical mandate of organizational departments due to Kim Jong-il's reorganization of the OGD in the succession process. Thus, the OGD Director position, which Kim Jong-il assumed in 1973, became all-powerful in terms of leadership control, policy control, reward and punishment of Party members, Party membership, and position selection.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{176} Author interview with renowned subject matter experts who wish to remain anonymous. Further discussion available upon request.

North Korea is a totalitarian Party-state. The KWP leads the state, the military, and all social and economic organizations. Article 46 of the KWP Charter states that “the people’s government agencies act under the Party lead. Article 11 of the DPRK Constitution states that the DPRK Government acts under the lead of the KWP. The Kim regime is based on the Supreme Leader and the KWP, not the state. High-ranking Party cadre serve simultaneously in government and in military positions; all cadre carry out Party lines and policy.

The OGD plays a critical role in this Party-state. The OGD ensures loyalty to the Party and the Supreme Leader through inculcation of each North Korean with the TPMI more than any other doctrine. OGD officials must also rigorously study the TPMI, following these principles even in the face of

178 This section draws on content previously published in Collins, Pyongyang Republic, 30-56.
179 Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”
180 Ibid.
adversity. The OGD is the right arm of the Supreme Leader; through it, the Supreme Leader is able to control all of North Korean society.

Party Congress

The highest-level organization in the KWP is the Party Congress. However, it is not a standing organization and is only convened as necessary. The latest session was the Seventh Party Congress in May 2016, when 129 members and 106 candidate members were voted in to the KWP CC. Among those, there was a 55% turnover rate among the members, and the three-member KWP Politburo Presidium was expanded to five members.

As the Seventh Party Congress took place, KWP membership stood at 3,467,000, or 13% of the population. Led by Kim Jong-un, Kim Yong-nam, and Hwang Pyong-so, the Congress was held at the April 25th Cultural Hall, with 3,467 representatives, 200 speakers, and 1,387 audience members in attendance. This included 1,455 political workers, 719 military personnel, 423 state administrators, 52 labor union representatives, and 112 scientists, health specialists, culture and arts representatives, and publishing per-

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186 April 25, 1932 is the day the DPRK celebrates the establishment of the KPA with respect to the beginning of Kim Il-sung and the anti-Japanese partisans efforts against Japan’s colonial government in Korea. The KPA Foundation day was formerly February 8th and the hall was named the February 8th Cultural Hall at its founding in October 1975. The hall property covers 124,000 square meters. The seven-story hall itself is about 80,000 square meters and houses 6,000-seat viewing hall, a 1,100-seat theater, and a 600-seat movie theater. The Sixth Party Congress of October 1980 was also held there. Photo below of the Congress meeting from Korean Central News Agency, Jo, “Kim Jong-un in a Western Suit…13% of the Population are Party Members,” Tongil News, May 7, 2016.
sonnel. One representative for every 1,000 Party members participated in this Congress.\(^{187}\)

In preparation for the Seventh Party Congress, the OGD employed its regional affiliates to coordinate with the MSS and MPS to conduct background investigations of regional representatives who were selected to attend.\(^{188}\) The OGD and its sub-elements at the provincial, city, and county levels under the local Party Committee’s vice-chairman for organization vetted each and every delegate to ensure that only the most loyal Party members participated in the Seventh Party Congress.\(^{189}\)

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187 Jo, “Kim Jong-un in a Western Suit...13% of the Population are Party Members,” Tongil News, May 7, 2016.


Though the stated practice of choosing representatives at major KWP con-
ferences is participation by KWP cell representatives from the central,
provincial, and county-level Party bodies, the actual representatives are
dominated by members from the central Party, the Pyongyang City Party
members, and high-ranking individuals from cabinet ministries. These rep-
resentatives include women, workers, and farmers. They also include Party
section chiefs from the central Party, vice-directors from the provincial
level, core Party members from city and county Party Committees, and cell
chairmen from economic enterprises. From the military, this includes regi-
mental commanders, regimental political officers, and above.

Besides the Party Congress, there are also non-standing meetings of the
Party Delegate Conference. Article 30 of the KWP Charter states that a
delegate conference can change Party leaders, hold elections for high Party

190 Park, “Are Secretariat-appointed Cadre Dominating North Korea’s Party Representatives?,” Daily
NK, August 27, 2010.

191 Ibid.
officials, amend the Party charter, and discuss or debate Party doctrine, policy, and strategy.\textsuperscript{192}

\section*{Central Committee}

When a Party Congress is not in session, the highest element of the KWP is the CC. The KWP CC is supposed to convene at intervals of no more than six months. However, under Kim Jong-il, the committee did not meet between December 6, 1993 and March 2010.\textsuperscript{193} CC members are comprised of senior leaders within the Party, the government, the military, and other socio-economic institutions. They include the Party chairman and vice-chairmen, KWP Politburo members and candidate members, Party department directors, premier and vice-premiers, government ministers and vice-ministers, and the highest-ranking military officers.\textsuperscript{194} Article 24 of the KWP Charter states that a plenary session of the KWP CC at the delegate conference can decide issues of the day, elect Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee members, elect vice-chairmen (formerly secretaries), organize the CMC, and elect Inspection Committee members.\textsuperscript{195} The most recent session of the CC meeting took place on April 10, 2019, when numerous changes were made to Party leadership organizations.\textsuperscript{196}

The KWP CC should not be viewed as an exact list of the power elite, as many of its members are there with honorary status for their service to the Party. When assessing who the core leaders are within the regime, membership in the KWP CC should be seen in relation to membership in other influential Party, military, or government organizations. There are no dominant social characteristics in terms of regional origin, alma mater, age, or blood ties. Less than five

\textsuperscript{194} KWP Charter (2010); see also Hyun, “KWP’s Control System Over North Korean Society,” 26.
\textsuperscript{195} Article 24, KWP Charter (2010).
percent are female. Most CC members are over 70 years old and have witnessed the North Korean revolution first hand from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-un is the youngest member of the KWP CC, with the exception of his sister Kim Yo-jong.  

Some KWP vice-chairmen are also appointed department directors. Ri Man-gon is the primary example because he is not only a KWP Vice-Chairman, but also the OGD Director. The difference between Politburo members and candidate members is that the former both votes and participates in policy debates and discussions, while candidate members cannot vote.

Other major standing organizations within the KWP include the EP (formerly the Secretariat), the Politburo, the CMC, and the State Affairs Commission.  

The OGD serves as the staff for all of them. The OGD is also considered the staff of the CC, and it leads the Party life of all Party members based on instructions from the Supreme Leader.

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An organizational chart of the KWP CC is shown below.²⁰¹

Executive Policy Bureau

The KWP has 42 departments and 132 sections. The KWP has 50 vice-directors in various departments. There are 3,000 personnel in the KWP CC and 10,000 in the KWP CC agencies. This includes all departments under the KWP EPB. The KWP CC is housed in more than twenty buildings in Changgwang-dong, Jung-guyok, Pyongyang, and the No. 3 Party Complex in Jeonseung-dong, Moranbong-guyok.

The tasks of the KWP CC are:

- Regulating the Party task of establishing juche philosophy throughout the Party and all of society;
- Establishing the MI and the Monolithic Leadership System;
- Organizing the Party and the revolutionary ranks into “combat units” to protect the Supreme Leader;
- Establishing Party doctrine and policy through juche and military-first ideologies;
- Politically guiding the revolutionary struggle and construction tasks;
- Overseeing all tasks of every Party element at home and abroad;
- Managing Party finances (Article 23).

The KWP EPB oversees 20 departments, including the following offices and their directors:
- Organizational and Guidance Department
- PA
- Cadre Department

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202 As in any organization, exact numbers evolve over time. See Ri, “KWP’s Intra-party Affairs and OGD Section 65,” 85.


204 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 42.


• Light Industry Department
• Economy Department
• International Department
• Military Department
• Civil Defense Department
• Unification Front Department
• Munitions Industry Department
• Science and Education Department
• Laborers OD
• Finance Management Department
• Office 39
• Financial Planning Department
• Party History Institute
• Document Management Office
• Petitions Office
• General Affairs Department

The KWP EPB is responsible for policy guidance in all sectors. There are no active-duty military personnel, although there is one former military intelligence officer, Kim Yong-chol. Kim Jong-un acts as the Chairman, and there are 14 vice-chairmen:

• Choi Rong-hae, President of the Presidium, SP; KWP Vice-Chairman; Vice-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission
• Pak Pong-ju, KWP Vice-Chairman; Vice-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission
• Pak Kwang-ho, Director, KWP PA
• Ri Su-yong, KWP Vice-Chairman and Director, KWP International Department
• Kim Pyong-hae, Director, KWP Cadre Department
• Tae Jong-su, Chairman, South Hamgyong Province Party Committee
• O Su-yong, Director, KWP Economics Department
• An Jong-su, Director, Light Industries Department
• Pak Tae-song, Chairman, South Pyongan Province Party Committee
• Kim Yong-chol, formerly Director, United Front Department

The Control Tower of Human Rights Denial

- Choi Hui, First Vice-Director, KWP OGD
- Pak Tae-dok, Vice-Chairman, EP and Minister of Agriculture
- Ri Man-gon, KWP OGD Director
- Kim Jo-guk, OGD First Vice-Director (military issues)

**Politburo**

The KWP Chairman, Kim Jong-un, is a member of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee and has authority over policy decisions in all fields. The EPB is responsible for implementing policy. According to the KWP Charter’s Article 26, the EPB organizes and guides the implementation of decisions, and issues regarding Party tasks and real problems. To assist the Chairman, there are nine vice-chairmen within the EPB. Each vice-chairman is a Politburo member or candidate member.

The KWP Politburo is the highest decision-making body in the Party that is also a standing organization. The KWP Politburo is staffed with a three-member presidium, seven full members, and 12 candidate members. The Politburo focuses on internal Party and personnel matters. There are only three military members: one political officer, one minister of people’s armed forces, and one chief of the general KPA staff.

Known as the Party Political Committee under Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il never held a meeting of the Politburo while he was KWP General Secretary. Kim Jong-un resumed meetings of the Politburo after he was appointed as the KWP First Secretary in 2012.

An expanded session of the Politburo meeting refers to meetings that are also attended by department directors, first vice-directors and vice-directors, and cabinet deputy premiers as well as Politburo standing committee members and candidate members.

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209 Yoo, “If One Knows the OGD, One Knows the KWP,” Tongil News, April 10, 2012.

The current KWP Politburo as of April 2019 is comprised of the following individuals.211

- Politburo Presidium:
  » Kim Jong-un (also Chairman of the State Affairs Commission)
  » Choi Ryong-hae (also President of the Presidium, SP; KWP Vice-Chairman; Vice-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission)
  » Pak Pong-ju (also KWP Vice-Chairman; Vice-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission)

- Politburo full members:
  » Kim Jae-ryong, State Premier
  » Ri Man-gon, KWP OGD Director
  » Choi Hui, Vice-Director, KWP PA
  » Pak Tae-dok, Vice-Chairman, EP and Minister of Agriculture
  » Kim Su-gil, Director, KPA GPB
  » Tae Hyong-chol, President, Kim Il-sung University
  » Colonel Gen. Jong Gyong-taek, Minister of State Security

- Politburo candidate members:
  » Jo Yon-jun, Chairman, KWP Inspection Committee
  » Ri Pyong-chol, First Vice-Director, KWP Munitions Industry Department
  » Kim Nung-o, Chairman, Pyongyang City Party Committee
  » Im Chol-ung, State Vice-Premier
  » Gen. No Kwang-chol, Minister of People’s Armed Forces
  » Gen. Ri Yong-gil, Chief of KPA General Staff
  » Jo Yong-won, Vice-Director, KWP OGD
  » Kim Tok-hun, State Vice-Premier
  » Ri Ryong-nam, State Vice-Premier
  » Pak Jong-nam, Chairman, Kangwon Province Party Committee
  » Ri Hi-yong, Chairman, Hamgyeong North Province Party Committee
  » Jo Chun-ryong, Director, Second Economic Committee
  (weapons production)

Central Military Committee

The KWP CMC is comprised of one chairman, Kim Jong-un, and 12 members. It is responsible for oversight of military policy. There are only two combatant commanders within this group: Vice-marshall Ri Myong-su and General Ri Yong-gil. The previous CMC had eight military officers. The other military officers include political officers, security officers, and one logistical officer. The CMC is now focused less on military expertise and more on carrying out policies associated with the regime’s byungjin line, which refers to the dual development of the nuclear program and the economy. Premier Pak Pong-ju is a member of the CMC. This is the first time since the 1960s that the premier has belonged to the CMC.

In April 2019, at the Fourth Session of the Seventh KWP CC, the following regime leaders were appointed or reappointed to the KWP CMC:

- Chairman: Kim Jong-un
- Members:
  » Vice Marshal Ri Myong-su, senior KPA combatant commander
  » General Ri Yong-gil, Chief of KPA General Staff
  » General No Kwang-chol, Minister of People’s Armed Forces
  » Kim Jae-ryong, State Premier
  » Ri Mann-gon, Director, KWP OGD
  » Kim Yong-chol, former Director of the KWP United Front Department and KPA General Reconnaissance Bureau
  » Col. Gen. Jong Kyong-taek, Minister of State Security
  » Gen. Choi Bu-il, Minister of People’s Security
  » Ri Pyong-chol, Vice-Director of KWP Munitions Industries Department
  » Gen. So Hong-chan, Director of the KPA General Logistics Department

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212  Ri was promoted from three-star to four-star on April 15, 2017.

Every agency in government, military, economy, social organization, factory, farm, and geographic area has an embedded KWP political committee, although each is slightly different in its structure. The OGD controls all of these elements, which, in turn, strengthens the Monolithic Leadership System (MLS) and the MGS, both of which are core to the ruling system of the Supreme Leader.

The KWP Charter states that “Every Party committee at every level is the highest guidance element in any organization and serves that organization as its political staff.” The regional Party Committee Secretariat, as a standing committee, parallels the central Party EPB. The regional secretariat is made up of a local Party responsible chairman and a varying number of other vice-chairmen. The exact number of members in the secretariat varies by region. Typically, provincial Party Committees have three to five vice-chairmen and city or county committees have two or three chairmen. The vice-chairman for organization and the vice-chairman for propaganda and agitation play a critical role in every provincial, city, county, and city district Party Committee. In most cases, the vice-chairman for labor organization is also present. There is usually no vice-chairman for economic issues at these levels, but South Pyongan Province has a vice-chairman for industry and South Hwanghae Province has a vice-chairman for agricul-


216 Yoo, “If One Knows the OGD, One Knows the KWP,” Tongil News, April 10, 2012.

Subordinate to the Secretariat at the provincial Party Committee is the OD, the PA, the Education Department, the vice-chairman for agriculture, the vice-chairman for light industries, the vice-chairman for administration, the vice-chairman for finance, the vice-chairman for construction and transportation, vice-chairman for military and the vice-chairman for fisheries for a total of ten vice-chairmen. At the city, city district, and county-level secretariat there is a vice-chairman for organization, a vice-chairman for propaganda and agitation, a vice-chairman for education, a vice-chairman for industries, a vice-chairman for military issues, a vice-chairman for transportation, and a vice-chairman for finance for a total of seven to eight vice-chairmen. According to Kim Il-sung, the county Party Committee does not need a vice-chairman for industries or fisheries as the vice-chairman for economic issues is able to handle those tasks.

A provincial responsible chairman holds the rank of central Party director. The vice-chairman for organization has the most influence in the provincial secretariat, just as the OGD does at the central Party level. The provincial Party vice-chairman for organization is two to three ranks below the provincial responsible chairman, but wields much more political power. The vice-chairman for organization serves as the responsible chairman’s chief of staff and is second only to the responsible chairman. The vice-chairman for organization is more influential than the local MPS bureau chief, the MSS bureau chief, the People’s Committee chairman, and any other high-ranking local official. The provincial vice-chairman for organization is second to no one when it comes to assessing the Party life guidance of provincial personnel.


219 Ibid., 129.


Many political organizations in major agencies are referred to as the political bureau. For example, there is the GPB in the military. The MPS has its own political bureau, as does the Railroad Department. The MSS and the Culture and Arts Department are instead served by a political committee. Bureau directors and political committee chairmen are at the same level of responsibility at these types of agencies or departments.\footnote{222}{Hyun, “KWP’s Control System Over North Korean Society,” 15.}

For these political committees, subordination and guidance structures vary. Each political committee’s system for Party entrance, registration, intra-Party transfers, military training, and other tasks are conducted by the local political committee. However, the OGD directly oversees Party life guidance and Party policy guidance, and personnel matters of these local committees.\footnote{223}{Ibid., 15-16.}

For example, the Foreign Ministry’s political committee members are also members of the Pyongyang City Jung-guyok political committee, but their Party life guidance and control is carried out by the Central Agency Sub-Deputy of the OGD’s PLG Section. Its policy formulation and activity guidance are controlled by the KWP International Department. The personnel affairs of Foreign Ministry cadre and government officials are handled jointly by the KWP CC Cadre Department and the Foreign Ministry’s Cadre Section.\footnote{224}{Ibid., 16.}

The Party political organizations of embassies, trade representative offices, joint ventures, North Korean students abroad, and others deployed overseas belong to the local embassy’s political committee. The DPRK’s Beijing and Moscow embassies are large, but most are relatively small. The ambassador serves also as the local Party political committee chair and directly receives guidance from the Overseas Party Life Guidance Sub-Deputy of the OGD’s PLG Section, regardless of the size of the embassy. All personnel who serve overseas are directly chosen by the OGD.\footnote{225}{Ibid.}
The political committees of economic and social organizations are all subordinate to the local city or county political committee. For example, major organizations in this category such as Kimchaek Iron Works in Kimchaek City, Kim Il-sung University, and other high-level colleges in Pyongyang as well as the Red Cross Hospital in Pyongyang all are locally subordinate under the same structure. Also, the political committees of first-, second-, and third-level factories, enterprises, regional factories, second class or below colleges, and every level education organization as well as social and health organizations are all subordinate to the locality’s Party political committee.  

Party Cells

There is a Party cell in every workplace. Depending on the workplace and the regional area, Party cell membership consists of five to 30 personnel. The Party cell, guided by the cell chairman, is the lowest organizational level within the Party. If a workplace does not have five Party members, two or more workplaces can be combined to make a cell.

Every Party member must be part of a local Party cell, regardless of rank or position. Every Party cell must organize saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions every other day or every Saturday. The meetings are led by the Party chairman who is not necessarily the senior-ranking local official. Most North Koreans want to be a Party member because it contributes significantly to social mobility. However, with that comes the requirement to do Friday labor as designated by local or central Party leaders as well as daily study of Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s teachings.

Those who do not enter the Party enter a Party-led labor organization at the age of 30. These organizations include Party unions based on profession. All labor unions fall under the control of the Party-led General Federation of Unions, and housewives join the Democratic Women’s League. There is no

226 Ibid., 16-17.
227 Lee Kwang-Bo et al., Bukhan-hak [North Korea Studies] (Seoul: Jinyoung Publishing, 2010), 141.
228 Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 68-69.
one who does not experience Party life in some form. Party organizational life includes Party lectures, study sessions, and saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions. Party lectures focus on the Party’s MI and propaganda about Party policy.229

**Policymaking Process**

Kim Jong-il gave direct guidance on the role of the central agency Party Committees. He stated that high-level cadre, beginning with ministers and committee chairs, must prepare the work of lower-level entities and monitor cadre policy and technical inspections. Moreover, those leaders must control policy implementation standards, particularly in economic and production elements. In accomplishing Party policy, those leaders must unconditionally and absolutely adhere to principles and the implementation of national decisions and directions according to national plans without fail, thus demonstrating revolutionary character. To prohibit Party chairs’ interference in administrative and economic tasks, those leaders must carry out the establishment of an orderly administrative task system, the standardization and normalization of tasks, and the normalization of issuing administrative directions.230 This means that the KWP has total control over North Korea’s planned economy and its implementation process by carrying out Party leadership within national government agencies. This leadership is from the KWP CC’s OGD.

The OGD does not make policy, but it approves policy under the Supreme Leader’s guidance and oversees its implementation. The KWP EPB, the KWP Politburo, the KWP CMC and the State Affairs Commission are the primary policymaking forums in the Kim regime. The OGD serves as the staff for these forums and, therefore, is deeply involved in the policy process.

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229 Lee et al., *North Korea Studies*, 141-42.

Policy decisions are made in the interest of the Supreme Leader. Those who do not agree with the Supreme Leader are branded anti-Party and anti-revolutionary.\textsuperscript{231} In this context, the OGD serves as a conduit for the policy recommendations from lower Party elements and government or military agencies. Officials who forward recommendations are held accountable if these proposals are inconsistent with the Supreme Leader’s guidance or the regime’s ideology.

The Kim regime’s policy recommendation process is depicted below.\textsuperscript{232}

\begin{itemize}
\item Policy recommendation
\item Confirms consistency with party lines / doctrine
\item Confirms recommendation consistent with Supreme Leader guidance and directives
\item Approval / disapproval
\item Confirms consistency with party lines / doctrine
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{231} Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 404.

\textsuperscript{232} Author’s rendition from multiple sources: Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 21; see also Lee Dae-Geun, Bukhan gun chongjeongchiguk [North Korean Military’s GFB] in Jeon Yeon-Joon et al., Bukhan-ui goonsa [North Korea’s Military] (Seoul: Kyongin Munhwa Publishing, 2006), 169-205; see also KWP Charter (2010).https://www.northkoreatech.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/WPKCharter28SEP10.pdf.; see also Park et al., North Korea’s Political System in the Kim Jong-il Era, 52; see also Lee et al., Study on the Power Elite of the Kim Jong Un Regime, 26-29; see also Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 66; see also Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 400-403.
Under the Kim regime, policy is not referred to as government policy or national policy, but as Party policy. This does not mean that other sectors of society cannot contribute to policy proposals. It does mean, however, that the Party makes the final decision on policy formulation and strictly oversees policy implementation. Policy implementation is monitored by the OGD PLG Section. Therefore, policy formulation can be divided into the stages of leadership establishment of policy goals, policy proposal and agreement, proposal ratification, and policy implementation.

Those with dissenting opinions cannot participate in policy-making due to the doctrine of the MGS. No institution, leader, or individual North Korean can oppose this doctrine. The policymaking process provides no room for the input of the people and is not designed to serve the interests of the people. Those that openly do not agree with the Supreme Leader are branded anti-Party and anti-revolutionary. Policy is formed first and foremost with information collected by the security agencies and the Party to ensure the security of the Suryong. Policy is not made by informed opinion, by the masses, or based on what benefits the people. Conversely, policy is formed first and then the environment is then shaped to fit the policy.

The Party even decides on the final disposition of legislation. After the Party makes a final decision on a specific policy, the SPA ratifies that policy as a rubber-stamp. SPA members cannot debate an issue or a bill. The SPA is intended to provide the appearance of procedural legitimacy. While the SPA has a subordinate Legislation Committee, it has no enforcement branch or auditing function. The same holds true for the SPA’s Budget Committee, Foreign Relations Committee, and all other SPA Committees.

Under Kim Il-sung, the KWP Political Committee (now Politburo) initiated the MGS. From the early 1990s, Kim Jong-il and other CC secretaries (now vice-chairmen) formulated policy at their own secretory conferences. All

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233 Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 401.
234 Ibid., 400-401.
236 Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 401.
237 Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 402-403.
OGD first vice-directors participated in important meetings and they had decision authority.

Under Kim Jong-il, the MGS became more critical and the KWP Politburo existed in name only. All policy decisions were made in “ratification politics” or “report politics,” which focused on Kim Jong-il’s personal approval of recommendations that were forwarded to the OGD. Though policy recommendations and reports were sent to Kim Jong-il for approval, he did not hold meetings on the issue. Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat handled all policy recommendations for forwarding to Kim. He gathered further information by inviting those who forwarded the policy recommendations to evening gatherings before making a decision. In doing so, Kim Jong-il was able to so centralize all senior personnel and control over policy.

However, Kim Jong-un’s style has been to hold meetings of relevant decision-making bodies, no doubt due to his lack of experience. As an example, see the photo below of Kim Jong-un chairing a 2015 crisis decision-making meeting of the KWP CMC.238

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238 Photo by Korean Central News Agency of Kim Jong-un leading a crisis-action meeting of the KWP CMC to determine policy response to South Korea in August 2015 following the explosion of a mine in the DMZ, which injured two South Korean soldiers. Identified (at the time of the photo) from Kim’s left is Choe Bu-il, then and current Minister of People’s Security; Kim Won-hong, then Minister of State Security; Pak Yong-sik, then Minister of People’s Armed Forces, Hwang Pyong-so, then Director of the GPB; Kim Yong-chol, then Director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau; Pak Jung-chun, then KPA Deputy Chief of General Staff and Director of Firepower Command Bureau; and Kim Yang-gon, now deceased but then Director of the KWP United Front Department and KWP Secretary for South Korean Affairs. See Lee Seung-Yeol, “의문투성이 김양건의 죽음” [The Suspicious Death of Kim Yang-gon], Weekly Dong-A, January 5, 2016. http://weekly.donga.com/3/all/11/174943/1.
The photo below depicts a 2018 KWP Politburo meeting chaired by Kim Jong-un.\textsuperscript{239}

On the next page is a graphic of the KWP national organization as of 2012. Note that the Secretariat is now the EPB.\textsuperscript{240}

\textsuperscript{239} Kim Jong-un chairs an April 2018 KWP Politburo meeting. Kim with raised hand and to his left is Choi Hyong-hae, OGD Director; Pak Kwang-ho, PAD Director; General Pak Yong-sik, Minister of People’s Armed Forces; Ri Su-yong, KWP Vice-chairman; Tae Jong-su, KWP Munitions Industry Department Director; Kim Yong-pae, KWP Cadre Department Director; Yang Hyong-sop, Vice-President of SPA Presidium; General Ri Myong-su, KPA Chief of the General Staff; Pak Pong-ju, DPRK Premier; and Kim Yong-nam, President of the SPA Presidium. The inner circle at the table are the full members of the Politburo and those outside the circle are candidate members. Full members can debate and vote, while candidate members can only debate. Photo by Korean Central News Agency. See Go Soo-Seok, “장성택 숙청했던 북한 정치국회의…이번에는?” [North Korea’s Politburo Meeting that Purged Jang Song-taek – what about this time?], Joongang Ilbo, April 10, 2018. https://news.v.daum.net/v/2018041009191912509.

According to the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) Charter, party members shall be subordinate to their party organization, the majority to the minority, lower-level party organizations to upper-level party organizations, and all party organizations absolutely to the Party Central Committee. It states, "the party's supreme leading organ is the party congress, and between party congresses, it is the party CC elected by the party congress. The supreme leading organ of provincial (municipality directly under the central authority), municipal, and county party organizations is the respective party conference, and between party conferences, it is the respective party committee elected by the party conference."

Basic Party Organizations
Understanding the significance of the relationship between the OGD and the PAD is critical to understanding how the regime controls the North Korean population at every level. This relationship is a critical component of human rights denial under the Kim regime. In North Korea, the KWP exercises control over all forms of speech within its territory. The organization that oversees the distribution of all information is the PAD. The OGD and the PAD determine what information can be seen and accessed by the population, and disseminate this information using the media, art, and group indoctrination sessions.

The relationship between the OGD and the PAD is unique. Kim Il-sung referred to the OGD as the doctor and the PAD as the medicine. The OGD must assess the Party members’ Party life, and the PAD must provide the appropriate indoctrination. These two departments remain key elements of the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-un. The OGD serves as the “center of gravity” for the Supreme Leader and Party rule, as it controls all Party, military, and state elements. It is the role of the PAD to follow the guidance and

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242 Song Bong-Seon, “A Study on North Korean Theocracy Model” (PhD diss., Inha University, 2007), 169.
243 Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”
objectives of the OGD, and then to develop themes and messages that serve those objectives. These themes and messages are designed to highlight the leadership and capability of the Supreme Leader and the KWP. The OGD controls the overarching activities of the PAD, and the PAD reports on all of its activities to the OGD.244

The Party’s primary roles are Party life guidance and policy guidance. Party life is divided into organizational life guidance and ideology life guidance. The OGD is responsible for the former for all Party personnel, and the PAD is responsible for the latter. Specific Party elements are responsible for detailed policy guidance.245 The OGD is the leading actor in controlling Party life and Party policy, and the PAD plays a supporting role by conducting ideological guidance. The OGD dominates Party life, and the PAD conducts ideological training to that effect.246

As one of several departments under the control of the KWP EPB, the OGD provides guidance to the PAD. Every institution in North Korea has a PAD representative on its staff. The PAD provides oversight of all ideological training for the entire population, regardless of position, and it also ensures ideological continuity by controlling all of North Korea’s information agencies, press, broadcast media, literature, and cultural performance groups. This includes parallel information organizations within the military.247

The PAD establishes and manages propaganda direction, content, policy, and methods. To justify the Kim family’s rule, the PAD glorifies Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il. To justify that, the PAD glorifies Kim Jong-un. It emphasizes the TPMI to secure the Supreme Leader’s Monolithic Ideological System (MIS). As paragraph four of the TPMI states, “one must be armed with the

244 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 19.


246 Ibid.

revolutionary ideology and their Party lines and policies of comrades Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.”

Kim Jong-il, who placed a strong emphasis on ideological tasks, saw the PAD as having an important position in his ruling philosophy. He emphasized that, “In order to strengthen the Party leadership function, in guiding the Party members’ party organizational life and party ideological life, the OGD and the PAD must integrate their operations. Based on data collected by the OGD and subordinate organization sections at regional and agency committees, the PAD and its subordinate sections should carry out proper training measures.”

Specific tasks carried out by the PAD include the following:

- Translating foreign language articles for the North Korean elite.
- Disseminating propaganda materials and indoctrinating both Party members and non-members.
- Employing both formal and informal settings during indoctrination sessions.
- Censoring all written publications.
- Supporting the North Korean military’s GPB’s Propaganda Department with themes, messages, and propaganda materials.

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248 Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”
251 Jang, Dear Leader, 32.
252 Lee, Bukhan gun chongjeongchiguk [North Korean Military’s GPB] in Jeon et al., Bukhan-ui goonsa [North Korea’s Military], 175.
• Using the Ministry of Culture as a front organization.  
• Deploying propaganda action officers as vice-chairmen for propaganda at all regional and agency Party Committees to supervise propaganda activities in their jurisdiction.

The chart below shows the internal organization of the PAD.
There are reports that the general population is beginning to ignore Party meetings, including study sessions and indoctrination lectures by the local PAD representative. Bribes are often used to skip such events. Unsurprisingly, this has become an issue of concern for OGD and PAD officials.

Key Personnel

Pak Kwang-ho is the current Director of the PAD, following Kim Ki-nam, the former long-time Director who led the PAD since 1990. Choi Hui has been reported as being a PAD First Vice-Director. He is also a KWP OGD First Vice-Director. Kwon Hyok-bong and Kim Byong-ho are Vice-Directors, as is Kim Yo-jong.

Key PAD officials today include the following:

Pak Kwang-ho is the newest Vice-Chairman of the KWP and member of the KWP Politburo. He is also the Director of the PAD. He was appointed the Director of the PAD at the second session of the Seventh Party Congress in October 2017. Knowledge of Pak’s background is very scarce prior to his appointment as the KWP Vice-Chairman. The U.S. Department of the Treasury added Pak to its list of Specially Designated Nationals on December 10, 2018.

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259 Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”


Kim Ki-nam has been the primary propagandist of the Kim regime for decades. In his long-time role as Secretary for Propaganda and Agitation and Director of the PAD, it was his responsibility to inculcate the masses on loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the Party and dedication to the TPMI.

Born on August 28, 1929 in Kumya County, South Hamgyong Province, Kim graduated from the prestigious Mangyongdae Academy, Kim Il-sung University, and the Moscow International College. Kim is a life-long propagandist, having risen through the ranks since the 1960s. He was the editor of the “Worker” Newspaper and then the Rodong Sinmun and served as Chairman of the Korea Reporters League in the 1970s. He became the Vice-Chairman of the International Reporters League in 1981. He was awarded the Kim Il-sung Medal in 1982, and he has been a member of the KWP CC since 1980. He was appointed to the KWP Politburo in 2010 and reappointed in May 2016. He has also served as the director of the KWP History Research Center. He has been a member of the 6th through the 13th SPA, and was also a member of the Politburo. Kim was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in July 2016 for his role in human rights abuses. Though Kim was absent during much of 2017 and 2018 as Kim Jong-un’s sister surfaced as a leader in the PAD, Kim Ki-nam returned as a key PAD official in January 2019, no doubt because of his extensive experience. He is now retired.
Kim Ki-nam (indicated with the red circle) and other high-ranking propagandists at a propaganda museum. Photo from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Kim Yo-jong is a vice-director within the PAD. She accompanies Kim Jong-un to on-site visits of all kinds outside of the military field. She spent two years being educated in Switzerland along with Kim Jong-un. She has been rumored to have married a college professor with a science background. Another rumor has her marrying Choi Ryong-hae’s second son. She represented the DPRK at the 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyongchang, Republic of Korea. Kim was designated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on November 1, 2017 for censorship activities.

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**Choi Hui** was born in 1954 and is the son of Choi Jae, who was Construction Minister under Kim Il-sung. Choi Hui was educated at Kim Il-sung University and was active in the Socialist Labor Youth League in the 1990s. He escorted a youth league band to Seoul in 2002. After attending the Kim Il-sung High-Level Party School, Choi became a Section Chief within the OGD and then Deputy Director for the OGD PLG Section. In 2013, he was promoted to a First Vice-Director in the OGD and was also elected to the 13th SPA. In several media reports, Choi is listed as a Vice-Director of the PAD. It is likely that he served as the PLG Section Action Officer for the PAD.

**Ri Jae-il** is the First Vice-Director of the PAD, having served in that position since 2004. He is the regime’s primary implementing supervisor of all propaganda supporting the cult worship of the Supreme Leader. He orchestrates the pictures, videos, and articles that praise Kim Jong-un and the Kim family’s legacy. He is a member of the KWP CC and the 13th SPA. Born in 1934, he began his career as a writer and became the editor of the Pyongyang Newspaper. In 1992, he was promoted to KWP Vice-Director. In 2001, he was appointed the Director of the Publishing Guidance Bureau. He was a member of the 12th and 13th SPA. He was awarded the Kim Jong-il Medal in 2012.

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Section 8: Party-Military Relations

The KPA is, by far, the most physically powerful institution in North Korea. Consequently, each of the three Supreme Leaders have devised strict mechanisms of control to exercise authority over the military and its leaders. The primary methods of Party control over the KPA are: Party dominance of military policy; embedding Party-led political officers in every military unit at every level; restricting the authority of unit commanders; daily surveillance of unit commanders at the battalion level and above by military security staff officers; and control of each military officer’s Party organizational and ideological life.

The KWP’s control over the military has evolved over time. The regime has replaced the internationally accepted concept of “command and control” with a virtual “control and command” system due to the overwhelming policies, practices, and ideological justification of the KWP, limiting the authority of military commanders. In this regard, the OGD’s role is to ensure the military’s loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the KWP above all else.

Kim Jong-il & Military-First Politics

Kim Jong-il made it clear that the Party leads the military in a 1969 speech that has been immortalized in his collected works. He stated that the Party is “the staff of the Korean revolution and the right vehicle for our people’s road to victory. All society and political organizations must follow the leadership of the Party and the military cannot operate outside this concept. The KPA must follow the Party and the Supreme Leader.”

In late 1974, Kim Jong-il directed the OGD to begin inspecting the Party organizations of the KPA. The focus point of the inspection was whether the army was following the MGS. In other words, the OGD ensured that the KPA followed the Party’s orders. Kim Jong-il followed up by pushing the ideological practice of “Kim Il-sung-ization of the whole military.” Kim demanded that all important issues must be approved by the successor, which, of course, was Kim Jong-il.

In 1975, Kim Jong-il ordered that his picture be hung next to that of Kim Il-sung in all military offices. This did not happen at the KWP CC or the cabinet at that time. To secure control of the military, he established a section within the OGD that gave Party directives to the GPB. Kim fully established the MGS in the KPA by 1985; he began to oversee KPA-related reports and reviewed these reports before Kim Il-sung.

Relations between the KWP and the KPA have not always been straightforward. During the Korean War, the Cultural Department—the predecessor of the GPB—was blamed by Kim Il-sung for the KPA’s disorganized withdrawal after the Incheon Landing three months into the war. Kim Il-sung then reorganized the Cultural Department into the GPB. It took several revisions of the GPB’s missions and tasks to establish the control it now possesses. Within the


273 Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 70.

North Korean military today, the GPB carries out all political tasks, the KPA General Staff Department carries out all military tasks, and the MPAF carries out non-operational administrative and logistical tasks.

Kim Jong-il instituted military-first politics after the death of his father. This was introduced to ensure the military’s support for Kim Jong-il’s leadership.\(^{275}\) The OGD’s power over the military was reinforced during this time to thwart military commanders’ abilities to influence politics or launch a coup d’état. Indeed, the OGD’s surveillance of senior military leaders was increased to ensure that loyalty was demonstrated by those leaders above all else; this system remains in place today.\(^{276}\) Although Kim Jong-il placed more importance on the military during his rule, he did not lessen the OGD’s political control over KPA leaders and cadre.\(^{277}\) Indeed, he insisted that the KPA must follow the Party and the Supreme Leader.\(^{278}\)

Overview

The KWP defines the KPA as the Party’s armed force that carries on the revolutionary tradition of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and is the KWP’s revolutionary armed force. This is the same meaning as the often-used term, “military of the Party.” The Party also stipulates that the Party provides the army with control and guidance.\(^{279}\) Article 46 of the KWP Charter states that the KPA is the revolutionary force created by Supreme Leader Kim Il-sung, in the spirit of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle and that the KPA is the military of the Supreme Leader that preserves and protects the juche revolution and the Party’s great achievements. It also states that

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276 Choi, “Power of KWP OGD,” Yonhap News, March 22, 2001; see also Park et al., North Korea’s Political System in the Kim Jong-il Era, 77.


the KPA stands at the forefront of the military-first revolution and is the core armed force of the Party, and that the KPA carries out all political activities under the leadership of the Party.\textsuperscript{280}  
The KWP oversees six organizations that exercise some form of political control over the North Korean military.

- The KWP CMC decides military policy.
- The KPA Party Committee exercises political control of unit missions and tasks.
- The GPB assigns political officers to the staff of every military unit at the battalion level and above to verify the commander’s and unit’s loyalty to the Supreme Leader.
- The KPA MSC assigns a security officer to the staff of military units to ensure there is no anti-Supreme Leader, anti-Party, or anti-state activity taking place within the unit.
- The KWP PAD oversees all propaganda lectures and materials designed to indoctrinate every soldier, regardless of rank.
- Most importantly, the OGD receives all reporting from the aforementioned organizations to assess, on a daily basis, the loyalty of every single general, front-line regimental commander, and equivalent political officer.

The OGD sections that are responsible for the military include: the OGD Military Directorate that oversees the KPA GPB; the OGD PLG Section’s Sub-Section 13, which is responsible for the military’s Party life guidance; the OGD Cadre Section’s Sub-Section 4, which is the final authority for personnel matters in the KPA; and the OGD Reports Section. The PLG’s Sub-Section 13 guides and controls the tasks of the KPA Party Committee and the GPB. It determines whether the military is following the ideology and leadership of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un. It also guides, controls, and inspects how effectively the military follows the KWP’s leadership. Sub-Section 13’s section chief holds the rank of OGD vice-director.\textsuperscript{281}


\textsuperscript{281}  Kwon, The Comprehension of North Korean Military, 185- 86; see also Im, Im, and Im, How to Understand North Korea?, 37-39.
The OGD receives reports from the GPB and the MSC on an individual’s political and professional matters, prepares personnel recommendations, and reports this to the Supreme Commander for review.\textsuperscript{282} It also has the authority to inspect the military. Indeed, the military fears the OGD’s inspection authority above other types of inspection.\textsuperscript{283} The OGD Inspection Section usually only inspects the military if there is a major problem, which may result in the punishment of several generals.\textsuperscript{284}

Central Military Committee

The KWP CMC was established as the KWP Military Committee in December 1962 at the Fifth Session of the Fourth KWP CC meeting. This was concurrent with the establishment of the regime’s “four military lines.”\textsuperscript{285} In November 1982, the KWP Military Committee was redesignated as the KWP CMC.\textsuperscript{286}

According to KWP Charter Article 27, the CMC leads Party efforts in deciding military lines and policy, fortifying the revolutionary armed forces, and developing military industries. It also guides national defense tasks that advance military industry.\textsuperscript{287} Through this process, the KWP CC and the KWP CMC exert enormous influence over the North Korean military and its supporting agencies. The OGD serves as the staff for both.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{282} Im, Im, and Im, \textit{How to Understand North Korea?}, 37-39.
\item \textsuperscript{283} Kwon, \textit{The Comprehension of North Korean Military}, 185-86; see also Im, Im, and Im, \textit{How to Understand North Korea?}, 37-39.
\item \textsuperscript{284} Im, Im, and Im, \textit{How to Understand North Korea?}, 37-39.
\item \textsuperscript{285} This refers to arming the populace, turning the entire country into a fortress, converting the entire army into cadre, and modernizing the entire army.
\item \textsuperscript{286} The KWP CMC is not the same institution as the former government Military Committee. On June 26, 1950, the day after the Korean War started, the Presidium of the DPRK SP established the Military Affairs Committee, appointed Kim Il-sung as the chairman, and ordered all North Korean entities to support the committee’s war efforts. See Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, \textit{Communism in Korea}, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 411.
\end{itemize}
Korean People’s Army Party Committee

A major means of Party control over the KPA is the KPA Party Committee. The KWP controls the military through the KPA Party Committee and embedded political organizations. Sub-Section 13 of the OGD PLG Section directly guides and controls KPA Party Committee tasks and GPB tasks.288

There are no regulations concerning the KPA Party Committee in the Party charter, but in Article 47, it states that there will be a Party organization at every level of the KPA and that the KPA will be under the Party’s lead.289 Accordingly, the KPA Party Committee operates under the guidance of the KWP CC.290 Therefore, a Party organization parallels the KPA chain of command at every echelon, thus creating two branches of a three-tiered control system. This enables the KWP CC to control the KPA through the KWP CMC and the KPA Party Committee.291 Consequently, each Party organization and political element within the KPA carries out its tasks according to the KWP Charter and the Party’s political guidance to the KPA.292

The Party elements at every level of the KPA instill juche and TPMI ideology throughout the military and carry out all tasks relevant to that end. Moreover, they resolutely secure the Party’s monolithic ideology and leadership through firmly establishing the Party’s monolithic military leadership system. All Party members and soldiers must become human explosives that protect the Supreme Leader to the death, and must be prepared to protect the motherland and the people to the last breath. In this manner, all soldiers must defend the motherland and the people to their last breath.293

The KPA Party Secretariat is comprised of the MPAF, the chief of the KPA’s General Staff, the GPB director, the KPA General Staff Operations Bureau director, and the KPA Cadre Bureau director. As required, the MSC commander

288  Im, Im, and Im, How to Understand North Korea?, 37-39.
289  Article 47, KWP Charter (2010).
290  Ibid.
291  Im, Im, and Im, How to Understand North Korea?, 37-39.
292  Article 51, KWP Charter (2010).
293  Ibid., Article 48.
also participates in KPA Secretariat meetings. These positions within the KPA Party Committee’s Secretariat oversee all military promotions and assignments, and determine all promotions at the lieutenant colonel rank and below. Personnel matters at the rank of major and below are handled by the corps-level Party Committee Secretariat.  

The chart below depicts the structure of the KPA Party Committee:\[295\]

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294  *Im, Im, and Im, How to Understand North Korea?, 37-39.*  
The lowest-level Party organization in the military is the Party cell. The minister of people’s armed forces is his Party cell’s chairman and conducts his saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions there. All members of the cell must be Party members. One cannot be a key member of the military (officer rank) or the government without being a Party member. In this forum, the minister is not referred to as minister but as “comrade.” Throughout every echelon, the military is under the control of the KPA Party Committee, a number of OGD sections responsible for the military, and the GPB.

General Political Bureau

The GPB implements the KPA Party Committee’s decisions. All Party directives to the KPA are transmitted by the GPB director. The OGD controls the GPB, and the GPB exercises political control over the military. The OGD manages the Party operations within the KPA through the GPB, which possesses the same authority as the KWP CC. In this structure, the OGD manages personnel matters for all high-ranking KPA officers and the GPB does the same for middle- and lower-level officers under OGD guidance. Under the KPA GPB, there is a Political Department staffed by GPB officers at every level of the KPA that implements KPA Party Committee tasks.

The GPB assigns political officers to KPA units at every level. Those political officers are deployed as KWP representatives and are responsible to the Party for all political tasks of each unit. They must control such tasks so that they correspond with KWP doctrine and policies.

296 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 24.
297 Im, Im, and Im, How to Understand North Korea?, 37-39.
298 Lee Dae-Geun, Bukhan gunbu-neun wae koodeta-reul haji anna [Why Doesn’t the Korean People’s Army Launch a Coup?] (Seoul: Hanul Publishing, 2003), 144.
299 Kwon, The Comprehension of North Korean Military, 185-86.
300 Cheong, The Contemporary North Korean Politics, 310; see also Kwon, The Comprehension of North Korean Military, 186.
302 Ibid., Article 50.
The OGD guides and controls the KPA through its subordinate offices of the GPB Guidance Section of the OGD’s Military Directorate. This Section controls the Party life of KPA commanders through the GPB OD. The OGD’s Seventh Section controls the military court system and the MSC. Moreover, the OGD Cadre Section controls all senior GPB political officers through controlling personnel matters. The OGD and its GPB Guidance Section guides and controls the Party life of all KPA commanders and political officers through the GPB OD. The KWP Military Department is responsible for exercising political control over the MPAF and the KPA General Staff Department.

The OGD instituted its supervision of the GPB in 1977. The primary tasks of the GPB are:

- Arming the entire military with the juche ideology.
- Establishing the MI within the military.
- Organizing and guiding Party life activities for military cadre and Party members.
- Carrying out education in Party ideology.
- Carrying out organizational and ideological education for Party and Socialist Labor Youth League members.
- Managing all activities on the red flag competition of the three revolutionary teams.
- Promoting military morale.
- Managing all military officer recruitment, assignment, transfer, promotion, and discharge issues.
- Periodically reporting on all of the above to the KWP CC.

303 Kim Seon-Ho, “북한군 총경제국의 위상 및 역할” [North Korean Military’s GPB’s Rise and Role], Konas.net, July 12, 2013.
305 Ibid.
307 Cheong, The Status of the GPB and its Role in Power Succession, 26-33.
The GPB is organized as follows:

- The Organizational Planning Department plans and implements all organizational tasks.
- The Party OD oversees the expansion, guidance, and inspection of all organizational tasks.
- The Youth League Guidance Department organizes, guides, and supervises all Youth League tasks within the military.
- The Propaganda and Education Department organizes and guides political ideology and propaganda tasks throughout the military.
- The Cultural Liaison Department is in charge of tactical psychological operations within the military.
- The Cadre Department is in charge of all personnel matters regarding political officers within the military.
- The Information Affairs Department organizes and implements public information tasks within the military.
- The Accounting Department collects, stores, and prepares all accounting materials within the military that are related to political tasks.
- The KPA Publishing Company oversees the publishing and printing of all print materials within the military including the military information paper, *Korean People’s Army*.
- The April 25th Art Movie Studio produces movies related to the military and delivers them to each military component and their lower echelon units.
- The April 25th Athletic Group organizes and trains a professional athletic team that performs at every major function in North Korea.
- The KPA Symphony is an entertainment troupe for the military.
- The Inspection Department inspects all Party matters within the military.
- The Enemy Suppression Department is generally referred to as the 563rd Unit. Its mission is to recruit or kidnap South Korean soldiers or encourage them to defect. During peacetime, the unit also conducts propaganda broadcasts and distributes propaganda leaflets. During wartime, it vets the population in the occupied territory for “reactionary elements” and gauges the population’s capacity for support to North Korea.\(^\text{308}\)\(^\text{309}\)

\(^{308}\) Ibid.

\(^{309}\) Ibid.
The GPB Director is the most influential position within the North Korean military. Power elite personnel frequently hold positions in the Party, government, and military, but it is their positions in the Party that are the most powerful and influential with the Kim regime structure. It is this factor that enables the GPB to control the KPA General Staff Department and the MPAF.  

The OGD PLG Section’s Sub-Section 13 cannot independently organize all of the tasks of the KPA Party Committee and the GPB. Instead, it requires those two organizations to coordinate with Sub-Section 13. Due to this Section’s close working relationship with the GPB, it maintains an office in the MPAF’s main building. The GPB prepares all political meetings within the KPA, beginning with the KWP CC’s KPA Party Committee plenum sessions. The KPA Party Committee and the GPB guide the tasks of corps-level Party Committees and related political organizations within each KPA corps. OGD PLG Sub-Section 13 participates in all KPA political meetings beginning with ideology struggle assemblies.

Purges are a major tool to cull senior military leaders deemed disloyal from the KPA. The OGD PLG Section’s Sub-Section 13 leads a 15-day indoctrination session every year for every KPA general officer including independent regimental commanders and political officers, brigade and division commanders and political officers and above. Every participating officer is billeted in a room for four. Each seminar has twenty participants, and a GPB officer leads the discussions. The initial discussions are based in saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions. The purpose is to instill terror among the generals. At the end of the session, the chief of the OGD Cadre Section’s Sub-Section 4 chairs a meeting where one or more of the generals are purged.

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310 Kim Seon-Ho, “북한군 총정치국의 위상 및 역할” [North Korean Military’s GPB’s Rise and Role], Konas.net, July 12, 2013.

311 Kwon, The Comprehension of North Korean Military, 185-86; see also Im, Im, and Im, How to Understand North Korea?, 37-39.

Military Security Command

The OGD also controls the KPA’s MSC through the OGD Military Directorate and the Seventh Section. What started as the KPA Political Security Bureau became independent from the State Security Department (now the MSS) in 1968. In the mid-1970s, it changed its name to the KPA Security Bureau. After Kim Il-sung died and Kim Jong-il instituted military-first politics, the bureau expanded greatly and was renamed the MS in 1995.313

The MSC receives direct orders from the Supreme Leader, and its headquarters are located in Ryongbuk-dong, Daesong-guyok, Pyongyang near the Pyongyang Foreign Language University.314 It conducts surveillance of military personnel and personal movement control of every KPA unit for the purpose of actualizing the MGS.315 The intent is for the MSC to detect and eliminate anti-regime elements within the military. During the “Arduous March” of the 1990s, the MSC was also authorized to investigate civilian issues.316 The Party life of MSC personnel is controlled by the MSC’s Political Section.317

The responsibilities of each department within the MSC are as follows:

- The 1st Department conducts central planning for the MSC and collects all reports from corps-level MSC elements.
- The 2nd Department conducts field investigations.
- The 3rd Department handles pre-trial investigations and interrogations.
- The 4th Department conducts inspector general duties as well as investigates murders and corruption.
- The 5th Department performs incident integration and analysis.

314 Ibid.
315 Kim Seon-Ho, “Bukhangun bowi saryeongbu-ui immu mit yeokhal geomto” [Examining the Responsibilities and Role of North Korea’s MS], Jayu, 387 (2005).
317 Kim, “Examining the Responsibilities and Role of North Korea’s Military Security Command.”
• The 6th Department conducts wiretapping against suspects and foreign personnel.
• The 7th Department performs technical services.
• The 8th Department is responsible for the military industries.
• The 9th Department is the special unit branch responsible for investigations in special units.
• The 10th Department conducts citizen registration, office and family registration, and handles personnel data.
• The 11th Department is the foreign affairs branch. It monitors foreigners and conducts overseas intelligence collection.318

The organizational structure of the MSC, as deployed throughout the KPA, is depicted below.319
The KPA maintains a triple reporting system that flows through the standard commander’s chain of command, the GPB political officer’s chain of control, and the MSC’s anti-coup chain of commander surveillance. The reports of all three chains go through the OGD’s Military Directorate. The potential for miscalculation due to contrary reporting demonstrates a significant vulnerability within the KPA chain of “command and control” (C²).

The chart below depicts the relationships between the KPA Supreme Commander, subordinate KPA unit commanders, GPB officers assigned to each unit, and the KPA MSC security officer assigned to each unit. The GPB officer directly reports to the OGD on the activities of all others.

320 Author’s rendition of “political” chain of command paralleling the standard military chain of command based on several references, including Lee, Why Doesn’t The Korean People’s Army Launch a Coup?, 146.
All administrative districts—province, city, county, and village—maintain a permanent embedded KWP Committee. This is true for all institutions serving within those districts, such as government agencies, military units, economic enterprises, and social organizations. These Committees vary in size and organization, depending on the various social, political, and economic functions within that administrative district. However, every one of them has an OD embedded in the Committee.

The OGD controls all lower-level ODs at the provincial level and below.\textsuperscript{321} The OGD’s ability to control local Party Committees at the provincial, city, county, and village levels countrywide ensures that the OGD’s human rights denial policies and practices impact every North Korean, no matter where they are.

\textsuperscript{321} Jung et al., *Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea*, 18.
Section 9: Regional Roles

Regional Party Structure

Party Committees control the Party life and personnel matters of all but the most senior cadre and Party members in their area of jurisdiction. They also oversee and control policy implementation in that jurisdiction.322

The structure of regional Party organizations is modeled after central Party organizations. Provincial Party regional conferences serve the same function as central Party congresses. The regional conference meets every three years. The Party Committee and the Inspection Committee critique tasks and choose new members.323 Each of these Party Committees is led by a chairman (formerly known as the “responsible secretary”) who is supported by a vice-chairman for organization, a vice-chairman for propaganda, a vice-chairman for labor organization, a vice-chairman for industry or agriculture (depending on the predominant economic activity in that jurisdiction) as well as required department directors, vice-directors, section

chiefs, and Party action officers. There are differences between each jurisdiction in the precise number and type of officials.\textsuperscript{324}

The chairmen of Party Committees in counties and medium-sized cities and supporting Party vice-chairmen are selected by the OGD Cadre Section and approved by the Supreme Leader.\textsuperscript{325} Once appointed, they receive the same treatment as department directors under the KWP CC. The chairman of each local Party Committee reports directly to the KWP CC, and is responsible for political, economic, and socio-cultural issues as well as local civil defense.

Provincial Party plenary sessions take place in April and their county-level counterparts are held in March. At these sessions, members discuss and decide Party lines and policy, elect a Party Committee chairman, and organize a local secretariat. The plenary session also elects a Party Committee, a Military Committee, and an Inspection Committee.\textsuperscript{326} At the village and dong level, which may have 500 members or more, the Party Committee convenes once every three months. Committees at lower levels convene once per year, while Party Committees at the county level or above meet three times per month. At the provincial and county level, the Implementation Committee is the highest policy decision organization in that region and it meets twice a month.\textsuperscript{327} In an agricultural village, which normally produces livestock and agricultural products, the village Party Committee is essentially the cooperative farm Party committee. The village’s administratively responsible officer is the cooperative farm management committee chair.

At the village- and dong- (urban sub-district) level, the Party Committee is a low-level Party Committee that does not have a secretariat or specific sections. The Committee is led by a Committee chairman supported by two to three vice-chairs and between three and five Party action officers. This includes the Committee chairman, the vice-chairman for organization, the vice-chairman for propaganda, and other Party action officers. Vice-chairmen are responsible for organization, propaganda, and workers’ organizations. Action officers focus on tasks, such as construction and production. Many

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{326} Choi, “Organization and Operation of the Administration System,” 128.
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid., 130; see also Hyun, “KWP’s Control System Over North Korean Society,” 14.
\end{flushleft}
of these action officers are an OGD buwon (부원 or lowest Party cadre rank). OGD buwon who work at the province Party level can be promoted to section leader and be stationed at the county level. A buwon at the county level could become a section leader and move to the province level. These local Party officers control the Party life of all local residents.

Subordinate to the village Party Committee are Party cells of each work team. At the dong-level Party Committee there is a Party cell for each in-minban (neighborhood watch unit). The Party cell chair is the lowest-level Party leadership position in the KWP and the Party cell he or she leads is comprised of five to 30 personnel.

As an example of Party manpower at the regional level, the North Hamgyong Provincial Party OD has 60 personnel and the Military Department and Workers’ OD each have 30 to 40 personnel. However, the provincial equivalent to the OGD Seventh Section, which is responsible for internal security and legal institutions, has about 80 personnel. The OGD Seventh Section has 150 to 200 personnel. North Korea has nine provinces and independent cities, which include around 700 personnel, and the 230 city and county parties each have 15 to 20 personnel. North Korean defectors state that “a lot of people means a lot of work.”

Local Organization Departments

Kim Jong-il instructed that the OGD must provide strict guidance to regional Party organizations, beginning with Party cadre tasks. Regional Party organizations are required to adhere to the Supreme Leader’s directives and

328 Author interview with Mr. K., July 15, 2015.
the Party line for the purpose of shaping society.\textsuperscript{331} Consequently, the OGD leads the OD of every Party Committee countrywide.\textsuperscript{332}

Kim explained the mission of every regional Party Committee’s OD as follows. First, they must struggle against misapplications and misinterpretations of the MIS and the MGS. Second, they must grasp all tasks of the Party Committee and each element and each interest must focus on grasping Party policy direction. Third, they must establish, in an orderly fashion, a Party life guidance system and focus on the Party life guidance of cadre and Party members. Fourth, through collaboration with the PAD, they must prepare evaluation reports on cadre Party life. Fifth, they must concentrate on an effective reporting system to the Party center (Kim Jong-il). Sixth, the OGD, PAD, and their lower-echelon equivalents must conduct collaborative operations and basic elements and economic elements must cooperate. Seventh, every document from Implementation Committee and Secretariat meetings that are sent to lower echelons should have prior review, guidance team visits, meetings, and lectures.

Kim also established a reporting system that ensured that he remained well-informed, furthering his control. This system remains in place today, and is referred to as the “three-line and three-day” system. The three lines are the Party, the government (including the military), and the security services. Relevant briefings are held every three days. The system is backed up by telephone calls to ensure promptness.\textsuperscript{333}

The OD of each local Party Committee is overseen by a vice-chairman for organization. Each of these vice-chairmen monitors local Party members and sections as well as the local citizenry, and reports on such activities daily to the central KWP OGD. Such local oversight includes personnel management and vetting, and related investigations.\textsuperscript{334} These reports are


\textsuperscript{333} Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 68.

\textsuperscript{334} Jang, “Why Choe Ryong-hae is not North Korea’s No. 2,” New Focus International, November 12, 2014.
NORTH KOREA’S ORGANIZATION AND GUIDANCE DEPARTMENT
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compiled and briefed to the KWP CC. The objective is to control regional Party organizations through a strict reporting procedure.\(^{335}\)

Each OD possesses the real political power within every KWP Committee due to its link to the central KWP OGD.\(^{336}\) It is from this platform that the policies and practices of human rights denial are carried out at the local level. As an example of the order of influence within any organization, North Korean phonebooks list the phone numbers of economic organizations in the order of the Committee chairman, vice-chairman for organization, vice-chairman for propaganda, Party guidance officer, and then plant manager.\(^{337}\)

It is through the regional KWP Committee vice-chairman for organization that the central KWP OGD maintains local control and the ability to monitor local conditions through task direction, reporting, and surveillance. This centralization establishes a monopoly of surveillance networks and enforcement of guidance.\(^{338}\) This process keeps the OGD aware of all activities and problems down at the Party’s regional levels. The size of the province- and county-level ODs are generally the same due to their similar responsibilities.\(^{339}\)

The vice-chairman for organization is essentially the chief of staff for the Party Committee chairman at the province, city, and county levels. However, he reports to his senior vice-chairman for organization at the next higher Party Committee level (i.e., county to province, sub-agency to agency).\(^{340}\)

In the military, this would be the unit’s senior political officer to the next political officer at the next senior unit. Emulating OGD cadre at the Party center, vice-chairmen for organization intentionally maintain a low

\(^{335}\) Collins, Denied from the Start, 29; see also Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 26-27.

\(^{336}\) Jang, "Why Choe Ryong-hae is not North Korea’s No. 2," New Focus International, November 12, 2014.


\(^{338}\) Jang, "Why Choe Ryong-hae is not North Korea’s No. 2," New Focus International, November 12, 2014.

\(^{339}\) Author interview with Mr. K. on July 15, 2015.

profile for operational reasons and to protect their authority. They also concurrently serve as chair to the KWP Committee’s lead Party cell.  

The reports and directives of the local vice-chairman for organization do not go through the applicable Party Committee chairman, and this even applies to the Pyongyang Party Committee. Kim Jong-il ordered that internal Party business be transmitted only through the vice-chairman for organization. The most important business of the vice-chairman for organization is personnel matters. The local Party Committee chair can recommend new Party members and Party member promotions, but the final word is reserved for the Party Committee vice-chairman for organization. In that the primary duties of the vice-chairman for organization incorporate accumulating daily reports of local internal trends and management issues, this also includes final assessments of that Committee, which are then forwarded to the OGD.

**Implementation Committee**

Just as the top national leaders in the Party, government, and military make up the central Party Politburo, the same type of core leaders make up the regional Implementation Committee. This includes the regional Party secretary, the MPS bureau chief, the MSS bureau chief, the regional People’s Committee chairman, the chief prosecutor, and the chief judge. No group of individuals has a greater impact on human rights denial policies at the local level than those assigned to the Implementation Committee.

The Implementation Committee is the dominant functional Committee under any given Party Committee at the county or agency level and above. Because regional Party plenary sessions only meet once every few months, the Implementation Committee carries out important tasks. In reality, Implementation Committees are to regional parties what the Politburo is to the central Party. According to the Party Charter, the Implementation Committee

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organizes and guides Party, administrative, and economic affairs between provincial Party conferences. It meets twice a month or more. The Implementation Committee is comprised of the most influential leaders in that administrative district other than the vice-chairman for organization. At the provincial, city, and county levels, the vice-chairman for organization and the vice-chairman for propaganda are the core cadre of the local Party Committee. The vice-chairman for the Kim Il-sung Kim Jong-il Socialist Labor Youth League is also influential.

344 Ibid.
345 Choi, Modern North Korean Administration Theory, 126.
346 Ibid., 127.
Section 10: Societal Control

The KWP’s most important role is to guide the Party life of its members. Its system of societal control targets the organizational life of every North Korean from elite to commoner. All citizens of the DPRK are controlled and monitored through their Party life whether they are Party members or not.\(^{347}\)

Kim Il-sung set the tone for the organizational life of North Koreans early in his rule, and established the KWP as the foundational institution for that effort. A primary example of the many guidance points that he articulated over the years was in a speech to the KWP CC in 1977 in which he stated, “Organized life is a furnace for ideological training and a school for revolutionary education.” This aided in establishing organizational life for all North Koreans early in their lifetime to become “warriors for the revolution.”\(^{348}\) In this socio-political context, there is no room for basic human rights in the daily life of each North Korean.

\(^{347}\) Collins, Denied from the Start, 29-30.

Party Organizational Life

Party life consists of two parts: 1) Party organizational life and 2) Party ideological life. The OGD is responsible for guiding the organizational life of all Party personnel and the PAD is responsible for their ideological life. The KWP CC’s OGD and the Party Committee ODs at every regional level control the organizational life guidance of every Party member. The PAD is a core element of the KWP CC, but it still reports to the OGD.

All Party members participate in regular organizational activities, where they address issues and decide solutions. They are evaluated on their commitment to this process. Participation in saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions is required to demonstrate loyalty, and all those who fall short are punished. Lesson materials at Party-led study sessions include the works of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, poems and songs praising the two, the TPMI, juche ideology, and other material that praise the Supreme Leaders. Party ideology teaches that the most important thing is that no matter the problem in the Party organization, the Party is like the mother’s bosom and loyalty is required.

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350 Yoo, “If One Knows the OGD, One Knows the KWP,” Tongil News, April 10, 2012.

351 Oh, “Nucleus of Regime Maintenance, KWP OGD and PAD.”


This graphic shows the KWP’s approach to Party life for Party members and non-members.\textsuperscript{354}

Every North Korean conducts Party organizational life from their earliest years in school and until the end of their life. While in school, students become members of Party-led youth groups, where they are assessed by a Party official who supervises political activities. Between ages 14 and 30 years old, North Koreans are compelled to be members of the Kim Il-sung Kim Jong-il Socialist Labor Youth League, even if they are in the military. After that, they must belong to a labor union that is led by the KWP or the Democratic Women’s League. Older individuals are part of inminban (neighborhood watch units) that cover 20 to 40 households in rural areas or each apartment building in cities. The inminban conduct study sessions, lectures, and saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions, which are difficult to avoid.\textsuperscript{355}


\textsuperscript{355} Lee et al., North Korea Studies, 138-41, as cited in Collins, Denied from the Start, 29-30.
Below is a diagram depicting how Party organizational life is designed by the OGD to control every KWP member.\footnote{Jang Jin-Sung, “주연은 김정은, 연출은 당 조직지도부” [Directed by the OGD, and Kim Jong-un as the Lead Actor], Chogabje.com, May 18, 2015. http://www.chogabje.com/board/column/view.asp?C_IDX=61367&C_CC=BC.}

The OGD leads the organizational life of all persons in North Korea. It guides the Party life of all Party Committees down to the county level, and there is also a Local Agency Guidance Section within the OGD that guides factories and economic enterprises. Within the OGD, the PHQC leads organizational life for all CC cadre.\footnote{Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 23.}

Cells of Party Committees of cabinet-level ministries and agencies meet twice a week for Party life criticism sessions centered on political ide-
ology. Tuesdays and Saturdays focus on study, while Wednesdays focus on lectures and Fridays focus on some form of labor. This is institutionalized, standardized, and regulated. The OGD directly manages the Party Committees of the cabinet and its subordinate agencies. These Party Committees at the cabinet level and below improve their work through Party inspections. Party Committee chairmen are responsible for Committee operations, organization, Party life guidance, cadre investigations, and reporting.\footnote{Kim Jong-il, “On Improving and Strengthening the Tasks of the State Administrative Council’s Party Committee and Subordinate Agency Party Organizations,” in Collected Works of Kim Jong-il, Vol. 4 (Korean Workers’ Party Publishing Company, Pyongyang, 1994). Speech delivered on June 10, 1974 to State Administration Council Party Committee Responsible Workers’ Conference.}

**Self-Criticism Sessions**

Perhaps the most powerful tool of the KWP’s control over North Korean society is the *saenghwal chonghwa* (self-criticism) session.\footnote{This section draws on content previously published in Collins, Denied from the Start, 78-85.} The PLG Section of the OGD leads all *saenghwal chonghwa*.\footnote{Kim, “The OGD, which Arrested Kim Won-hong, Controls Party Organizational Life,” Joongang Sunday, February 12, 2017.} As stated in principle 8, sub-principle 5 of the TPMI, every individual must “actively attend the Party’s regular evaluation meetings that are held every other day or every week in order to train oneself to become a revolutionary and to continuously rebuild oneself through criticism using the standards of the Leader’s teaching and the Party’s policies as a guide.”\footnote{See Joanna Hosaniak, Ha Kyung-Eun, and Markus Simpson Bell, “Ten Great Principles of the Establishment of the Unitary Ideology System,” Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, June 29, 2012. \url{https://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr:444/board/bbs_view.php?no=3&board_table=bbs_literature&page=1}.}

All North Koreans are ultimately evaluated by the OGD through their confessions during these sessions. The OGD then prepares summary reports on the results of these sessions regarding both one’s personal and political life, and presents them to the Supreme Leader. The judgments rendered from the evaluations of these reports carry the weight of court decisions.\footnote{Namgung, “Kim Jong-il’s Ten Principles: Restricting the People,” Daily NK, October 13, 2008.}
The concept of *saenghwal chonghwa* emphasizes that one can ideologically struggle to revolutionize oneself through self-criticism. One must critique oneself on mistakes of words, deeds, and thoughts while addressing or analyzing its causes, and do so openly. One must also recommend corrective action. Party members participate in Party *saenghwal chonghwa* sessions and non-Party members participate in workers’ organization meetings. No North Korean is exempt from this requirement, and all North Koreans are accustomed to this self-criticism.\(^{363}\)

At a Party cell’s self-criticism session, each member speaks for two to three minutes. The cell chairman records all issues discussed and necessary corrective actions. At the following week’s meeting, the cell chairman determines appropriate punishment and divides and assigns tasks. According to the TPMI, these tasks must be carried out faithfully.

At the start of one’s *saenghwal chonghwa*, one must quote the directives or teachings of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il, which is usually some portion of the TPMI that applies to one’s self-criticism. The individual then explains his or her mistakes and ideological shortcomings, followed by the proposed corrective action. The session leader expects the self-criticism to be sharp and to the point.\(^{364}\)

After the first individual conducts self-criticism, a few of the meeting participants criticize that individual. This may include ordinary workers criticizing a higher Party official. Party regulations state that Party cadre must be held accountable by subordinates to prevent a reoccurrence of mistakes.

After all speakers are finished, the cadre of the higher Party Committee provides OGD ratification. In determining punishment, those that gave self-criticism are given a warning, a severe warning, or even Party disqualification. They could be punished with labor with no pay for a month or several months. They may even receive revolutionary re-education, be demoted or banished to the countryside, face legal sanctions, or even be arrested by the MSS. In extreme cases, individuals may be denied access

\(^{364}\) Ibid., 19.
to food ration privileges or the medical system. Their children can lose special considerations for college entrance. One can even be sent to a political prison camp.365

There are four types of saenghwal chonghwa sessions: weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually. However, those in the arts must conduct a session once every two days because they are allowed to express themselves more than ordinary citizens. Party members conduct their self-criticism at their Party cell under the supervision of the Party cell secretary. The last weekly self-criticism session at the end of the month is the monthly saenghwal chonghwa session, where an overall assessment is made of the month’s discussions. All participants must prepare written confessions for these saenghwal chonghwa meetings.366

In every-other-day or weekly saenghwal chonghwa sessions, one must criticize oneself in the context of political ideology designed to elevate one’s life and work based on the Supreme Leader’s directives and Party policy. All Party members must attend saenghwal chonghwa sessions for the purpose of becoming a “revolutionary” by matching the Supreme Leaders’ standards.367

Every quarter, the local Party Committee or agency Party Committee holds a Committee saenghwal chonghwa meeting to discuss challenges. Quarterly self-criticism sessions last several days. An OGD representative attends the meeting to help resolve problems and ensure loyalty. At the quarterly saenghwal chonghwa meeting, a Party leader from a higher Party level discusses issues relative to the TPMI for about 30 minutes. The Party cell chairman then discusses successes and failures within the cell. The cell secretary then selects between five and seven cell members who, one-by-one, stand on a stage and deliver a prepared self-criticism. If the individual attempts to hide his or her mistakes or downplay their severity, or is unable to give an accurate ideological assessment, the remarks must be corrected and delivered again. He or she must demonstrate sincere remorse to the point of crying to demonstrate one’s sincerity.368

365  Ibid., 22, 24.
366  Ibid., 19.
Societal Control

Surveillance and monitoring take place at all levels of society, and have physical, ideological, and political components. In every case, reports resulting from this surveillance and monitoring are ultimately forwarded to the OGD.

The individuals that enable the regime’s societal control are the regime’s elite. The bonds that bind the regime’s highest-level elite are the Paekdu line, the Palchisan line, and the original revolutionaries and their survivors. They are all Party members. There are no non-Party members amongst the government or military elite. Other than the Supreme Leader, all elite carry out their Party life in their Party organization. Their activities are continuously reported to the OGD, and the OGD decides all personnel matters for the elite. Those that serve in the OGD and the elite are essential to societal control.

The elite, however, are trusted no more than the commoner. The higher one’s rank and political power, the greater the societal control. The OGD’s PLG Section conducts surveillance on the regime’s elite. Regardless of whether one is a Politburo member or state premier, they are treated the same as every other cell member in front of the cell secretary. Even Kim Yong-nam, the SPA Presidium Chair, is the same as every other member of his Party cell. Furthermore, the OGD’s Inspection Section monitors those given the privileges to ensure loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the Party. The OGD Inspection Section is the only entity allowed to monitor the Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat.

Physical surveillance is primarily conducted by three internal security agencies—the MSS, the MPS, and the MSC. Among these security agencies, the MSS serves as the political police of the Kim regime, as it safeguards and ensures total adherence to the TPMI. These institutions all recruit

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surveillance agents among the civilian population to watch and report on their neighbors and co-workers. Everyone is aware of this practice, which strains relations within all groups. Distrust has become a normal part of everyday life in North Korea. All of the security agencies report to the Seventh Section of the OGD.

Consistent with the regime’s distrust of the elite, there is significant overlapping control among the security agencies. As discussed in Section 4, the OGD Inspection Section has authority to investigate MSS officers. On the Supreme Leader’s orders, the MSC is authorized to investigate the MSS and the MPS.372 The MPS’s Changgwang Police Bureau, responsible for central Pyongyang, has the authority to inspect the leaders of the other internal security agencies and reports directly to the OGD instead of MPS headquarters. All of the security agencies are under the control of the OGD, a structure that maximizes societal control.373

372  Lee, The Might That Moves North Korea, 68.

373  Hyun, North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite, 284; see also Lee Jong-Seok, Saero ssseun hyeondae Bukhan-ui e-hae [New Writings on Understanding Modern North Korea] (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyeong Publishing, 2000), 265-66.
It goes without saying that OGD members must be Party members. There are no workers in core regime positions who are not Party members. Even the lowest OGD action officer has more political power than vice-ministers in the government. Being part of the central cadre of the KWP requires un-wavering loyalty to the Supreme Leader and the Party. Consequently, OGD personnel stand at the forefront of designing, supervising, and compelling the implementation of policies and practices of human rights denial. It is the day-to-day responsibility of OGD officials to promote the Supreme Leader and the dominant ideology of the Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology that support the Supreme Leader and the Party.

Dominant factors in the recruitment of OGD action officers include family background, loyalty, and ability. The latter two are usually assessed based on one’s performance in the military or at university. The appropriate family background is reflected in one’s socio-political status (songbun) as assessed by the KWP. A common route of recruitment for service in the OGD is through successful performance at county, city, and provincial Party offices.

374 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, 24.


Promotion for assistant guidance officers, guidance officers, and responsible guidance officers is every three years. Promotion for section chiefs is every five years. There is no time limitation on promotion for grades above section chief. In return for their service, OGD cadre receive some of the best privileges bestowed by the regime. These include food security, superior housing, opportunity, healthcare, and education. The children of senior OGD officials benefit from their family ties and are assigned to the OGD, where they also receive important privileges and benefits that come with the position. Perhaps the greatest privilege in the regime is that of being a member of the OGD, as it demonstrates the Supreme Leader’s trust. Each OGD member’s identity papers are considered an “all-powerful document.”

However, OGD cadre have several restrictions despite holding powerful positions. They are restricted in their personal activities, private relationships, and travels. They are under constant surveillance, which is the price of privilege for membership in the most elite political group under the Kim regime. OGD members and their lesser associates at local Party Committees serving as vice-chairmen for organization at every level across the country must maintain a low profile. Bragging about one’s own power is grounds for dismissal.

Intense monitoring of one’s personal activities is the standard for those Party members who hold positions as powerful as in the OGD. The PHQC embedded in the OGD carries out surveillance and intelligence collection of Central Party workers and their families, particularly with respect to

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their Party life guidance. This is supported by the OGD Inspection Section and the Changgwang District Police Station of the MPS. The latter reports directly to the Supreme Leader as a counter-balance to other internal security agencies. This surveillance also targets the members of the OGD and their family members. If a KWP CC cadre member poses problems, it is dealt with in PHQC saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions.383

Party life is a critical component of every OGD member’s professional life. This consists of handling “Number 1 materials” (those that have anything to do with the Supreme Leader); expressions of loyalty to the Supreme Leader; participation in ideological sessions on Wednesdays and Thursdays; political study classes on Saturdays; weekly self-study; loyalty sing-alongs; and “harmonious life” sessions.384 While the OGD dictates ideological objectives for the KWP PAD, which supports those objectives with themes and messages for distribution to the North Korean population, OGD cadre themselves must study the same material to support those objectives.

The reports of the First Sub-Section of the PHQC PLG Section are sent to the Supreme Leader daily through his Personal Secretariat. Prepared jointly by the PLG Section and the Party Registration Section, reports on the activities of each OGD member and that of their families out to third cousins are reported every six months.385

Consistent with the above, the PHQC checks with the gate guards at the two apartment buildings in front of the KWP CC offices regarding family members’ activities to determine the when, who, and why of their visitations and meetings. Friends must obtain prior approval to enter. All of this is reported to the PHQC Organization Division’s PLG Section and the sub-section responsible for the families. Furthermore, reports are made internally about how each KWP CC family maintains themselves economically. These reports are sent directly to the Supreme Leader’s office.


384 Jung et al., Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea, xii.

385 Ibid., 44.
Additionally, the OGD does not permit its members to travel overseas. The only exception is the son of longtime OGD First Vice-Director Ri Je-gang (1930–2010), Ri Yong-nam, who served as the Party secretary at North Korea’s embassy in Moscow. He was only able to do so thanks to his father’s position and influence.\(^\text{386}\)

The above restrictions are due to efforts to isolate the North Korean population from the regime’s chief decision-makers. Therefore, the identity of most OGD personnel is unknown to the outside world. Only the leaders of the OGD are publically known.\(^\text{387}\) Moreover, OGD personnel are not openly criticized in front of those from other regime institutions. The *saenghwal chonghwa* (self-criticism) sessions for OGD personnel are separate from that of PHQC personnel.\(^\text{388}\)

However, Kim Jong-un is known to have publicly criticized the OGD. OGD cadre are just as guilty of corruption as anyone else in North Korea, undoubtedly drawing the wrath of the Supreme Leader. Some are purged or sent for re-education, just as cadre and Party members are from other Party elements.\(^\text{389}\) Former OGD First Vice-Director Yoon Sung-kwan often forgot his place and treated high-ranking government officials with disrespect, including the state premier, for which he was dismissed from his position by Kim Jong-il.\(^\text{390}\)

Due to the extreme power, influence, and privilege that come with being an OGD cadre, the temptation to abuse that power and influence to further one’s career and personal wealth frequently leads to internal competition. For example, those who work in the OGD are pressed to pay “tax money” to superiors, and mid-level OGD action officers pressure junior OGD action officers for the same. Since an OGD Party life guidance order impacts one’s career prospects, the burden to do so is great. The “tax money” issue is

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the biggest burden for OGD cadre. It is common for OGD cadre to wonder what “tax” is in store for them the next day as they head home from work.391

Reflecting on the severity of this problem, the OGD distributed an internal document entitled “On the Situation of Abnormality among the Party and the People Concerning the Burden from Lower Organizations” in 2007. In May of that year, Kim Jong-il personally directed a “Party Conference Proposal to Ban Extra Tax from All Party Organizations at All Levels.” This proposal also recommended punishment procedures.392

Nevertheless, Party leaders promote a “fund contribution team” whereby Party Committees pressure the organizations in which they are embedded to permit workers to leave the workplace to go out and make money, usually at the jangmadang (local market). Some of these funds are funneled into the “fund contribution team” and are directed upwards to OGD leaders. Those making the money are even excused from Party organizational life activities. The burden of this “tax money” impacts not only workers in the families, but also the workplace organization and the inminban (neighborhood watch unit). Depending on the organization, if the demand from superiors is 1 million North Korean Won, the team targets 1.5 million Won for collection. The team divides collection goals according to the number of families. Inminbanjang (neighborhood watch unit chiefs), who are appointed by the village or dong (city sub-district) Implementation Committee, keep coming to the door until they get the money.393 This OGD-led “tax money” burden impacts every village. The chairman of each village Party Committee and the local Democratic Women’s League representative partner with local Party leaders to collect “taxes.”394

392 Ibid.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
Today, the ultimate leader of the OGD is unquestionably Kim Jong-un, just as it was for Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.\textsuperscript{395} However, there have been several other second- and third-tier leaders within the OGD, particularly those who served as first vice-directors. These OGD officials acted as the “second-tier” leadership of the regime, to the extent that such a concept is meaningful under the MGS.

The following is a list of OGD directors over the decades:

- 1945–1948: Ho Ka-i
- 1949–1951: Kim Il-sung
- 1952–1959: Pak Yong-bin
- 1960–1973: Kim Yong-ju (younger brother of Kim Il-sung)
- 1973–2011: Kim Jong-il\textsuperscript{396}
- 2012–2018: Kim Jong-un

\textsuperscript{395} Some of the biographical information presented in this section draws on content previously published in Collins, \textit{Pyongyang Republic}, 46–56 and is also presented in Section 2 of this report on the OGD’s history.

\textsuperscript{396} There is debate over whether Kim Jong-il ever took the title of OGD Director or merely supervised the OGD as the KWP Secretary for Organization.
Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un used numerous OGD first vice-directors to supervise the OGD without designating those individuals as the OGD director. Those first vice-directors had the Supreme Leader’s trust and were politically the most influential members of the regime outside the Supreme Leaders themselves.398
other factions were subdued. At the bottom of the spectrum, North Korean revolutionaries began to identify and purge North Koreans who worked for Japanese colonialists, landowners, businessmen, capitalists, and religious institutions. This began long before the regime was identifiable as the “Kim regime.”

Kim was born as Kim Song-ju in 1912. He is famous for being the leader of the Palchisan anti-Japanese partisans in the late 1930s and was the Commander of the First Battalion of the Soviet Union Far East Army’s 88th Reconnaissance Brigade (1941–1945). He returned to Korea through Wonsan in the fall of 1945 and became the domestic political favorite of the Soviet 25th Army, which occupied the northern half of Korea above the 38th parallel after Korea’s liberation from Japan in August 1945. Kim served as a member of the Organization Committee, the OGD’s predecessor, in 1945 and was the OGD Director (1949–1951). He led the KWP from 1949 until his death in 1994, and was the DPRK Premier (1948–1972). At the Fifth Session of the SPA in December 1972, the presidential position was established by constitutional amendment, reflecting a Soviet-style approach to government of the leader having the dual positions of Party General Secretary and President of the state. Kim held those two positions until his death in 1994. He continues to be honored as “President for Life” by state decree.399

Kim Jong-il (김정일)

After graduating from Kim Il-sung University in 1964, Kim Jong-il immediately began his political career in the OGD on June 19, 1964. His first assignment was in the OGD Central Guidance Section, which was then responsible for political oversight of the cabinet, the State Security Department (now the MSS), and the Ministry of People’s Security. He then moved to the General Guidance Section, which had oversight of the military and the Railroad Department. He also oversaw the Supreme Leader’s Security Section, which was and remains under OGD supervision. He was then as-

Kim Jong-il was appointed as the Secretary for Organization in September 1973 at the Fifth Session of the KWP CC’s Seventh Plenary Meeting. Once Kim Jong-il was appointed to this position by his father, the OGD began taking on more and more power as he transformed the OGD into what it is today. From the position of KWP Secretary for Organization, Kim Jong-il began to take control of the regime through his leadership of the OGD and PAD.402

He was elected to the KWP Politburo in February 1974 at the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Fifth Session of the KWP CC and he was privately designated Kim Il-sung’s successor. That meeting marked the beginning of the Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il succession system.403 Kim Jong-il was officially designated Kim Il-sung’s successor at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. At the same Party Congress, Kim was designated a member of the KWP Politburo, a member of Politburo Standing Committee, a member of the KWP CMC, and re-designated a member of the KWP CC. He was designated Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) in May 1990 and the Supreme Commander of the KPA in December 1991 at the Sixth Session of the Nineteenth Plenary Session of the KWP CC. As a result, he was promoted to the military rank of Marshal of the Republic (six stars) in April 1992. In September 1998, he was elected as the Chairman of the NDC. He was also elected to the 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th SPA. Kim Jong-il died on December 17, 2011. He was posthumously awarded the rank of Generalissimo (seven stars) of the KPA.404

400 Lim, Kim Jong Il’s Leadership of North Korea, 36.
401 Ibid., 42-43.
404 2019 Bukhan juyo insa inmul jeongbo, 725.
Kim Jong-un (김정은)

Kim Jong-un’s leadership style is composed of nationalistic, ideological, and institutional elements that shape regime decision-making in policy formulation and implementation. Other contributing factors include Kim’s own youth and inexperience, internal politics dominated by Kim Jong-un-led terror tactics, and a leadership control system based within the KWP and the internal security services.

Core to demonstrating this leadership, however, are propaganda demonstrations of on-site guidance in every sector of North Korean society at military units and exercises, weapons testing, economic enterprises, anniversaries, memorials, and state and Party events. Individuals from the regime’s second-tier leadership and key action officers from the Party, military, and government always accompany Kim Jong-un during these on-site guidance visits.

Kim Jong-un holds many positions of authority ("hats") within the regime structure (Party, military, and government), as shown below. Each has a specific function to give Kim overlapping authority in every sector of North Korean society. Kim Jong-un’s authority is based in several roles that are based in political ideology, the Party, the government, and the military.

Kim Jong-un’s “Hats”:

- Supreme Leader;
- Supreme Commander, KPA;
- Chairman, KWP;
- Presidium Chair, KWP Politburo;
- Chairman, KWP CMC;
- Chairman, KWP EPB; and
- Chairman, State Affairs Commission.

As the overseer of the OGD, Kim controls the assignments, promotions, demotions, purges, and, if necessary, executions of all senior leaders in all sectors of society. Kim personally commands the military as the Supreme
Commander of the KPA. As the Chairman of the KWP, Kim Jong-un oversees the Party lead in controlling all levels of society. As the Politburo Presidium Chair, he controls all political leaders and institutions. As Chairman of the KWP CMC, he controls all military policy. His rank as the Supreme Commander of the KPA is Marshal of the Republic (“six-star”), second only to the rank of Generalissimo (“seven-star”) held by his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, and father, Kim Jong-il.

One South Korean analyst of North Korean affairs reports that after Kim Jong-il died in December 2011, Kim Jong-un held high-level cadre meetings twice a week on Tuesday and Friday afternoons. The Tuesday meetings addressed matters unrelated to the military, but related to the KWP CC and subordinate elements’ reports sent up the previous week. The group debated urgent issues from these reports. The Friday sessions addressed matters pertaining to the United States, South Korea, China, and security issues. Participants included members of the KWP CMC and the State Affairs Commission. After these meetings, Kim Jong-un repeated his father’s practice of holding a party for core cadre and made decisions on policy proposals.

As the Chairman of the Party’s EPB, Kim directs policy implementation. It is in this position that he focuses on the byungjin policy of joint development of the nuclear program and the economy. As Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, Kim Jong-un oversees the government’s implementation of Party policy and mobilization of all factories, mines, enterprises, farms, organizations, and the population to support military objectives. Following the major changes made during the Seventh Party Congress in May 2016, the Fourth Session of the 13th SPA eliminated the NDC and replaced its authority with the State Affairs Commission, thus reducing the military’s influence in policy decision-making and implementation.

405 The position’s importance is reflected in the fact that it is the first position that Kim was appointed to after his father’s death in December 2011.


Kim Yo-jong (김여정)

In addition to her position as a Vice-Director of the PAD, Kim Yo-jong has also reportedly been appointed as an OGD First Vice-Director and is referred to by other Party cadre as North Korea’s “No. 2.” In the OGD, issues that require Kim Jong-un’s ratification go through Kim Yo-jong. Party cadre are reported to both fear and respect her. Though there has been no official designation of Kim Yo-jong as an OGD first vice-director, she is likely treated that way as the North Korean media always mentions her with Party cadre who are serving at that level.\(^\text{408}\)

As the younger sister of North Korea’s Supreme Leader, Kim Yo-jong is part of the “Paektu bloodline” which is considered within Kim regime ideology as “royal blood,” and therefore justifies the continuity of the Kim family’s dominance of leadership in North Korea. She is a candidate member of the KWP Politburo, a member of the KWP CC, and a member of the 13th SPA.\(^\text{409}\) She was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on November 1, 2017 for human rights abuses.\(^\text{410}\)

\(^{408}\) "김여정, 北서‘2번 동지’로 불리…간부 인사 다루는 조직지도부 1부부정 임명" [Kim Yo-jong Referred to as the North’s #2 Cadre Treat Her as an OGD First Vice-Director], Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 2014. http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/03/25/2014032504324.html.


Kim Jong-chol (김정철)

Born in 1981, Kim Jong-chol is Kim Jong-un’s older brother. He has served as a Section Chief within the OGD PLG Section, but he is treated as an OGD Vice-Director, which is two ranks above the aforementioned position title. Kim Jong-chol worked under Ri Je-gang until June 2010 at the Party headquarters.411 Kim Jong-chol has little real power and his position is likely ceremonial. He was not chosen by Kim Jong-il to be the successor due to his easy-going personality. Educated in Switzerland, he speaks English and German with some level of proficiency. He has consistently demonstrated that he is far more interested in music and guitar playing than politics. In this picture, he is seen with Thae Yong-ho during a visit to England to watch an Eric Clapton concert.412

**Kim Sol-song**

Kim Sol-song is the paternal half-sister of Kim Jong-un who stays out of the limelight. Some South Korean analysts believe that she may have been an acting Director of the KWP OGD, but there is no clear evidence to support this claim. Born in 1974 to Kim Yong-suk, Kim Jong-il’s third wife, Kim Sol-song has consistently been reported as being heavily involved in supervising the Supreme Leader’s security. Two separate reports state that she leads the Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat.

**Kim Kyong-hui**

Kim Kyong-hui is Kim Il-sung’s daughter, Kim Jong-il’s younger sister, and Kim Jong-un’s paternal aunt. She was married to Jang Song-taek, who served extensively in the OGD and was publicly executed in 2013 at Kim Jong-un’s orders. Kim Kyong-hui graduated from Kim Il-sung University and, due to her family connections, held a number of positions within the KWP and government, most notably the Director of the KWP Light Industry Department (1988–2012).

Most reporting on Kim Kyong-hui over the last decade has been based on rumors or political speculation. When Jang was executed, the two were reportedly estranged. Most significantly, she was once reported to be the Director of the OGD, even though there was no such acknowledgement from the Kim regime. While the latter is certainly possible, she would have likely served as a ceremonial head, with Jo Yon-jun overseeing day-to-day operations.


Jang Song-taek (장성택)

Jang is infamous for having been executed by his nephew, Kim Jong-un. Jang became a member of the KWP CC in 1992 and designated an OGD First Vice-Director in November 1995. He was elected a member of the 12th SPA in 2009 and a member of the NDC in the same year. He was promoted to NDC Vice-Chairman in June 2010 and became a candidate member of the KWP Politburo and a member of the KWP CMC three months later. Jang became the Chairman of the National Sports Committee in 2012 and was elected a full member of the KWP Politburo the same year.

Jang was Kim Kyong-hui’s husband. He was well-known for taking advantage of the family position and abused power to the point where he was sent to “revolutionary re-education” three times. The OGD AD was separated from the OGD in 2007 and placed directly under the KWP CC. After returning from his third “revolutionization” experience in that same year, Jang was rewarded by his brother-in-law, Kim Jong-il, with an appointment as Director of the very influential AD and its separation out of the OGD to become an independent KWP department. The AD was responsible for the political supervision of the State Security Department (SSD), the MPS, and all elements of the North Korea court system—including judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. The AD’s separation from the OGD created natural barriers between the two organizations.

415 Revolutionary re-education is the party term for punishment in the form of hard labor on a farm or in a factory to learn the error of their ways for some political, personal or procedural transgression.
The purge of the AD occurred immediately after the ceremonies observing the second anniversary of Kim Jong-il’s death. “Purification teams” were established to clean up the remnants of Jang’s impact on the Party and the government. This effort was led by the OGD. All of the senior KWP AD personnel were replaced by cadre from other Party organizations, primarily from the OGD.416 Prior to Jang’s execution, the AD had three vice-directors: one for the SSD, one for the MPS, and one for the court system.417


417 Photos by KCNA.
Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 1945–1950s

Ho Ka-i (허가이)

Ho was an original member of the KWP OD. He was born in 1904 in the Soviet Far East as a second-generation Korean immigrant. After becoming a local party cadre in the CPSU, he entered North Korea in August 1945 as a member of the Soviet forces. In October 1945, Ho was designated the Organization Committee Chairman of the North Korea Bureau of the Korea Communist Party. In August 1946 at the founding assembly of the North Korea Workers’ Party (NKWP), Ho was designated a NKWP CC member and Senior NKWP CC member. He was promoted to Vice-Chairman of the NKWP in September 1948 at the Third Session of the Second NKWP General Congress. At a joint meeting of the South-North Workers’ Party in June 1949, Ho was elected Vice-Chairman along with the South’s communist leader, Pak Hon-yong. In January 1951, he took over the position of Vice-Premier. Ho committed suicide in 1953.418

Pak Yong-bin (박영빈)

Pak was the Director of the OD from 1953 to 1959 and was originally from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. In 1955, Pak, who was known as one of the “four Paks” that were part of the pro-Soviet faction, urged Soviet Union party members to no longer use the term “American imperialists” but to use the term “imperialists.” He returned to North Korea to tell Kim Il-sung the same thing. Kim shamed Pak for suggesting that North Korea discontinue anti-United States propaganda in order to support Soviet Union efforts at reducing tensions with the United States, accusing Pak of being a “revisionist” and a “flunky” for the Soviet Union. Pak was relieved of his position of Director

of the OD and the beginning of the juche line soon followed thereafter. Pak eventually left for the Soviet Union.419

**Choi Yong-rim (최영림)**

Choi is another current high-ranking government official who began his career in the OGD. As a member of the North Korean elite, he graduated from Mangyongdae Academy and Kim Il-sung University. He also studied at Moscow State University and served as a soldier during the Korean War. He then began his career in 1956 as a Guidance Officer in the OGD and rose during the 1960s to the rank of Section Leader and then to the rank of Vice-Director within the OGD. Leaving the OGD in 1971, Choi began a career in the DPRK government by working as Kim Il-sung’s Presidential Secretary. He served as Deputy Premier, Secretary of the SPA Standing Committee (the highest-ranking position in the SPA), Responsible Secretary for the Pyongyang City KWP Committee, Director of the Central Public Prosecutors Office, and Premier of the DPRK cabinet (2010–2013). He has served in the KWP Politburo on several different occasions. He has also been a longtime member of the KWP CC, and has been a member of the 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 12th SPA. He was awarded the prestigious Kim Il-sung Medal in 1982. His daughter, Choi Son-hui, is currently the Vice Foreign Minister.420

419 Lee, Korean Workers’ Party, 96.

Kim Yong-ju (김영주)

Kim Yong-ju is Kim Il-sung’s younger brother, the third son of Kim Hyong-jik and Kang Pan-sok. He was born in 1921 and served as a youth corps member in of the anti-Japanese partisan group known as the Palchisan in the 1930s. After liberation in 1945, Kim studied at and graduated from Moscow State University. Upon graduation, he attended Moscow’s senior party academy.

Upon his return to North Korea, Kim Yong-ju was assigned to the KWP OGD and in March of 1953 during the Korean War, he led the purge of former South Korean Labor Party cadre, who were led by Lee Sung-yop. In 1954, he became an OGD Section Chief. He became a cadre member of the OGD in 1957, and eventually became the Director of the OGD in September 1960. He became a member of the KWP CC at the Fourth Party Congress in September 1961. Up to that point, the leader of the OD had been the first vice-chairman of the KWP.

Kim Yong-ju was also a Vice-Chairman of the SPA Presidium. His Party protocol rank was only 41st at the 1961 Fourth Party Congress, but this rose dramatically at the 1966 Second Party Conference to sixth on the CC protocol list. In 1966, he became a KWP Secretary and was appointed a candidate member of the KWP Political Committee, the forerunner to the KWP Politburo. This gave credence to the rumors at that time that Kim Yong-ju was being groomed to be the successor to Kim Il-sung. However, Kim Yong-ju began to suffer from depression, and by 1972, rumors of succession began to focus on Kim Jong-il.

He played an important role in the famous North-South Communique of July 4, 1972 as the North’s lead representative. In 1974, he became a Deputy Premier.

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421 At this time, “secretary” referred to group of issue area-specific assistants to General Secretary Kim Il-sung.
and served as Kim Il-sung’s personal envoy to Romania, Hungary, Japan, China, and Egypt. After being removed from the public scene for nearly two decades during Kim Jong-il’s succession campaign, Kim Yong-ju resurfaced on December 8, 1993 at the 21st session of the Sixth Party Congress as a member of the KWP Politburo, the KWP CC, and as a Vice-President under the 9th SPA. In 1998, he was appointed an honorary member of the 10th SPA Presidium. He also served as a member of the 11th, 12th, and 13th SPA. 422

Pak Su-dong (박수동)

Pak Su-dong was reported in the South Korean press as having replaced Kim Il-sung’s brother, Kim Yong-su, as the Director of the OGD in March of 1974. Previously, Pak had been an OGD Vice-Director. Yonhap News also reported that Kim Il-sung selected Pak Su-dong, then OGD Director, to be a member of the KWP Politburo at the Fifth Conference of the Eighth Plenary Session of the KWP CC (February 11 to 13, 1974). 423 However, this conflicts with other reports stating that Kim Jong-il became the OGD Director in 1973. 424 Pak Su-dong died on May 25, 1994 at the age of 65 as the former Chairman of the Farmers’ League. 425


424 Yoon Sang-Cheol, “김영주 후임으로 북괴 노동당 조직지도부장에 무명의 박수동 승진” [Pak Su-dong, a Previously Unknown Figure, Named Director of KWP OGD, Succeeding Kim Yong-ju], Kyonghyang Shinmun, March 6, 1974. http://newslibrary.naver.com/viewer/index.nhn?articleId=19740306000329201021&edtNo=2&printCount=1&publishDate=1974-03-06&officeId=00032&pageNo=1&printNo=8750&publishType=00020.

Kim Chi-gu (김치구)

Kim Chi-gu served as an OGD Vice-Director beginning in March 1977. He also served as a candidate member of the KWP CC beginning in January 1974 and as a full member beginning in November of the same year. Kim served as a Guidance Officer starting in May 1951, and then as a Vice-Chairman and then Chairman in the People’s Youth Committee in Twejo County and Chongpyong County, South Hamgyong Province. In August 1958, he served as a Section Chief, Vice-Director, and Director of the Korean People’s Youth League. He then served as a Section Leader and Vice-Director in the KWP CC.

Beginning in January 1963, he became the Responsible Secretary of the North Hamgyong Province Party Committee. He also served as the Vice-Chairman of the National Inspection Committee of the Central People’s Committee; Responsible Secretary of Nampo City; and as the Political Bureau Director of the Social Safety Department (now the MP). He was awarded the Kim Il-sung Medal. Kim was born February 28, 1932 and died on October 9, 1983. He is buried in the prestigious Martyrs’ Cemetery in Pyongyang.

Kim Hak-bong (김학봉)

Kim Hak-bong became an OGD Vice-Director in 1965. He was born in 1926 in North Hamgyong Province and graduated from Kim Il-sung University. In 1975, he was appointed the Party Vice-Director of the Ministry of Industry Party Committee. He was appointed the Chairman of the South Hwanghae Province KWP Committee in October 1989 and then as the Chairman of the North Pyongan Province KWP Committee in November 1990. He became a member of the KWP CC in 1986. He was also a member of the 9th SPA.426

Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 1980s –1990s

Moon Song-sul (문성술)

Moon served as an OGD First Vice-Director in charge of the OGD Party Headquarters from November 1990 until his death on March 10, 1999. Moon went back and forth between OGD assignments when he served alongside Kim Jong-il in the 1960s to other assignments outside the OGD. Moon was replaced by Ri Je-gang.

Moon was born in 1922 in South Pyongan Province. Moon reportedly had Kim Il-sung’s total confidence. Moon began serving as a Party Section Chief in South Pyongan Province in October 1956. In November 1959, he became the Party Committee Chairman in Kangso County in the same province. In December 1964, Moon was appointed the North Hamgyong Province Agriculture and Finance Committee Chairman. In March 1968, he became the DPRK’s Ambassador to Indonesia. In June 1973, he was appointed the South Pyongan Province Administrative Committee Chairman. He also served in the KWP PAD during the mid-1970s.

Moon began serving as a Vice-Director in the OGD in 1981. In October 1984, he was promoted to a First Vice-Director. However, in 1987 he was appointed as the Minister of Agriculture, which, under the Kim regime, is somewhat of a demotion. He then followed this with a tour as the South Hwanghae Province Party Committee Responsible Secretary before returning to the OGD in 1990. He was appointed as a KWP CC member in October 1980. He was elected to the 3rd, 4th, and 8th SPA. He was awarded the prestigious Kim Il-sung medal twice, in April 1982 and April 1992. He graduated from the KWP Central Party Academy.427

**Ri Je-gang (리제강)**

Ri succeeded Moon Song-sul as the OGD First Vice-Director and the Responsible Secretary in charge of the KWP Party Headquarters. In this position, he was in charge of the Party life of central Party workers and tasks within the central Party. Ri served as an OGD Guidance Officer beginning in the 1960s and advanced to become a Deputy Section Chief, Section Chief, and Vice-Director until eventually becoming a senior OGD leader under Kim Jong-il. He served for more than 20 years as a KWP Politburo member or candidate member. As the lead OGD official overseeing senior personnel decisions, he was instrumental in appointing and dismissing senior personnel in the Party, government, and military.

Ri Je-gang died in a car accident on June 2, 2010. It is rumored that Ri and Jang Song-taek were competitors and that Jang “arranged” the car accident. The *Korean Central News Agency* (KCNA) stated in a eulogy that “Comrade Ri Je-gang gave his all to secure the monolithic leadership system and match the demand for building a strong country, through party organizations functions and roles.”

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428 Interview with retired Republic of Korea intelligence official who specialized in the KWP.


Ri Hwa-son (리화선)

Ri served as an OGD Vice-Director beginning in April 1986, but his end date is unknown. In July 1974, he was appointed the Chosun Student Committee Vice-Chairman. In November 1975, Ri was appointed the Vice-Director of the KWP International Department. In October 1980, he was appointed a candidate member of the KWP CC. In March 1985, he was designated the DPRK’s Ambassador to the Congo. Ri was born in 1934 in North Hwanghae Province and passed away in November 1996.  

Hong In-bom (홍인범)

Hong began his career as a KCNA reporter in the late 1960s before being appointed to the OGD, where he eventually became a Vice-Director in 1993. Hong served as the Responsible Secretary of the South Pyongan Provincial KWP Committee (2010–2016). He was elected a candidate member of the KWP CC at the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980. In November 1982, he was the Chief KWP Secretary for the Anju Coal Mining Complex’s Party Committee. Hong was elected to full membership on the Party CC on September 28, 2010. Hong was a member of the 12th and 13th SPA.


Kim Si-hak (김시학)

Kim Si-hak served in the OGD as a Vice-Director and as Chief of the OGD Petitions Section in the mid-1990s. He spent several years working on the KWP Three Revolutionary Team in the 1980s. He was also a member of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and 11th SPA. He ended his career as the Kim Il-sung Higher Party School President.433

Ri Chan-son (리찬선)

Little is known about Ri other than the fact that he served as an OGD First Vice-Director and was a close personal friend of Kim Jong-il.434 After serving as a Responsible Secretary in 1954 for a county-level KWP Committee (location unknown), Ri served in a variety of Party positions embedded within Party, government, and diplomatic postings. He was finally appointed an OGD First Vice-Director in 1984, a position from where he managed senior government and Party officials.435

Yun Sung-kwan (윤승관)

Yun Sung-kwan was an OGD First Vice-Director who was appointed acting OGD Director from 1992 to 1993. He was formerly a bodyguard for Kim Il-sung and was very close to Kim Jong-il as well.436 The two leaders had absolute trust in Yun. However, Yun never knew his place around high-ranking government and Party personnel. When one takes a position as “high-sounding” as the OGD Director, Party cadre tend to lean on relations with that individual. However, being friends with the Supreme Leader can be risky business if one forgets one’s place, which Yun did frequently. Yun was subsequently purged for corruption. During a Party-government meeting, he disrespected the DPRK

434 “North Korea’s Mun Song-sul, First Vice Director of the KWP OGD, Dies,” Yonhap News, August 30, 2001.
Premier by sitting in a higher priority seat than the Premier. He was fired for doing so after almost two years in the position. Consequently, Kim Jong-il resumed immediate leadership of the OGD by not appointing anybody to replace Yun.\textsuperscript{437}

\textbf{Ri Su-yong (리수용)}

Ri is currently a KWP Vice-Chairman, having been appointed at the Seventh KWP Congress in May 2016. He also serves as a member of the KWP Executive Bureau, the KWP Politburo, and the DPRK State Affairs Commission. His long-standing relationship with Kim Jong-un has served to put him in numerous senior positions. The former DPRK Foreign Minister (April 2014 to May 2016) began his career as an OGD Responsible Secretary in the Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat in 1980. He then served as the DPRK’s representative in Geneva for seven years. He became North Korea’s Ambassador to Switzerland in 1998 and concurrently Ambassador to Liechtenstein. He became the Ambassador to the Netherlands in December 2001 and then served another tour as the Ambassador to Switzerland. The latter position is responsible for the Kim regime’s funds in Swiss banks and overseeing the education and security of the Kim family regime children, including Kim Jong-un. He served in senior economic positions, which indicate his talent in finance, managing the Kim regime’s funds in Switzerland.

He is and has been a member of the 11th, 12th, and 13th SPA. He received the Kim Jong-il Medal in February 2012. In the same year, he became a Vice-Director in the KWP CC.\textsuperscript{438} In April 2017, the SPA re-established the Foreign Relations Committee after a nineteen-year absence with Ri as its Chairman.\textsuperscript{439}

Ko Hak-chon (고학천)

Ko became an OGD Vice-Director in October 1988. Ko was appointed the Kim-chaek City Responsible Secretary in February 1970. In October 1980, he was appointed a KWP CC candidate member. In July 1982, Ko became the Responsible Secretary of the Party Committee of the Songjin Steel Enterprise, which was either a demotion or an assignment to fix significant problems at the steel plant. Ko was born in North Hamgyong Province and died in April 2000. Ko was a member of the 5th SPA.440

Yom Ki-sun (염기순)

Born in 1935, Yom served in the military and then entered the Economics Department at Kim Il-sung University, where he studied with Kim Jong-il. After graduating, he entered the KWP OGD as a Guidance Officer and eventually was promoted to the position of a Vice-Director in 1974. In 1977, Yom became the Responsible Secretary for the Kangwon Province Party Committee and served as the Responsible Secretary for Ryanggang Province Party Committee (1988–1991). He also served as the Chairman of the Ryanggang People’s Committee.

He experienced no problems during these terms of service and was promoted accordingly. He had a meticulous and reserved personality, and was known for “playing his cards right.” He became famous for his solution to the steel problems associated with building roads and railroads in Hyesan City known as the “Gateway City to the Revolution Battlefield,” which he saw as his greatest accomplishment. During that time, he was known for his intolerance for failure.

From there, he was promoted to a First Vice-Director in the OGD in December 1991. After Kim Il-sung died, Yom was promoted to First Vice-Director of the OGD PHQC, thus becoming one of the most powerful officials within the regime. However, Yom’s son became complicit in the infamous Frunze Academy

Incident of the 1990s and was executed.\textsuperscript{441} The son, who worked at the KPA Navy Headquarters, had learned of secret information about OGD operations and shared it with Russian intelligence. Yom Ki-sun then committed suicide by consuming poison.\textsuperscript{442}

Yom served as a member of the 8th, 9th, and 10th SPA. He was awarded the Kim Il-sung Medal in April 1992. He ranked 108th on the Kim Il-sung funeral protocol list and 105th on the O Jin-u funeral protocol list.\textsuperscript{443}

\textsuperscript{441} The Frunze Academy Incident refers to the conspiracy to overthrow the Kim regime by numerous North Korean graduates of that Russian military academy. This led to a widespread purge of those graduates based on the results of an investigation by the KPA MS.

\textsuperscript{442} Kim Hyeong-Soo, “[북한실체를 밝힌다] 보위사령부의 검열에서 살아난 사람들” [Exposing the Real North Korea: Those That Survived the MSS’s Inspections], The Tongil Shinmun, April 5, 2018. http://m.unityinfo.co.kr/25517.


Ri Yong-chol (리용철)

Ri served with the rank of four-star general as the OGD First Vice-Director. He was responsible for overseeing the North Korean military’s political organizational and personnel issues from 1994 until his death by heart attack at the age of 81 in 2010. \(^{444}\) Ri was also in charge of the Party life of military leaders.\(^{445}\) He was succeeded by Kim Kyong-ok. Ri served in the KWP Operations Department before being appointed in 1986 as the Director of the Investigations Department.\(^{446}\) Ri was appointed a member of the KWP CC in December 1993. He was then appointed a member of the KWP CMC in December 1996. He was a member of the 10th, 11th, and 12th SPA. While serving in the OGD, he was simultaneously the Chief Secretary of the Kim Il-sung Socialist Labor Youth League.\(^{447}\) General Ri was the KPA Chief of Operations in the early 1980s.

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\(^{445}\) Interview with retired Republic of Korea intelligence official who specialized on the KWP.

\(^{446}\) The Operations Department is responsible for tactical infiltration into South Korea. The Investigations Department handled overseas intelligence, and was subsumed under the KPA Reconnaissance General Bureau in 2009.

Pak Chong-sun was an OGD First Vice-Director when he died of lung cancer on January 22, 2011. He had only been in that position for nine months after being assigned there at the Third KWP Delegates Conference in September 2010. His predecessor, Ri Je-gang, and OGD First Vice-Director for the military, General Ri Yong-chol, had died in April and June of the previous year.

Pak was born in Pyongwon County, South Pyongan Province and graduated from the Central Party School. Pak served in numerous Party positions including Vice-Chairman of a county KWP Committee, provincial Party Guidance Officer, KWP CC Guidance Officer, Vice-Chairman of the South Hamgyong Province KWP Committee, KWP CC Section Chief and then Vice-Director, Organizational Secretary for the Pyongyang KWP Committee (an extremely critical and influential position), and KWP Department Director. Pak’s appointment was interpreted as an effort to gather support for Kim Jong-un among older- and middle-aged cadre. Pak spent half his life handling Party personnel affairs.

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Choe Hui (최희)

Choe is a KWP First Vice-Director who served in the very powerful position of Chief of the OGD PLG Section beginning in 2004. After attending the Kim Il-sung High-Level Party School, Choi became a Section Chief within the OGD. Choe was recently promoted to the position of First Vice-Director in the KWP PAD. Beginning in 1990, Choe served as the Kim Il-sung Kim Jong-il Socialist Labor Youth League’s External Indoctrination Bureau Chief as well as the league’s Ideology Secretary. Choe escorted a youth league band to Seoul in 2002.

Choe was born in 1955 as the son of Choe Jae, who was the Construction Minister under Kim Il-sung. Choe was educated at Kim Il-sung University. In 2013, he was promoted to a First Vice-Director in the OGD and was also elected to the 13th SPA. Choe is a candidate member of the KWP Politburo and a member of the KWP CC. Choe was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on November 1, 2017 for human rights abuses.


Cha Hui-rim (차희림)

Cha has served as the Chairman of the Pyongyang City People’s Committee since September 2012. In that position, he is responsible for everyday events in support of the Kim regime’s activities in Pyongyang. Those duties include following local Party guidance channeled through the Pyongyang City’s KWP Committee. Cha is thus responsible for the distribution of resources prioritized to Pyongyang, and support of the KWP and the regime’s internal security agency personnel and families. Cha began his career in the KWP OGD and became the Organizational Secretary for the Ministry of Capital Construction. From there, he was appointed to be the Pyongyang City KWP Committee Chairman in October 2011. He was a member of the 13th SPA, the National Sports Guidance Committee, and the SPA Legislative Committee. 453

U Dong-chuk (우동측)

U Dong-chuk was a KPA General who served as Senior Vice Minister of State Security. Until April 2012, U was a member of the NDC (then the government’s highest executive body), an alternate member of the KWP Political Bureau, and a member of the KWP CMC. U’s career background is in counterintelligence and intelligence operations. From 2009 until 2012, he was responsible for the daily operational management of State Security. His official career began in the late 1960s. Like many current members of the central leadership, U’s first official position was as an instructor under the KWP OGD. He was eventually promoted to Section Chief. He was trained and assigned to

453 2019 Bukhan juyo insa inmul jeongbo, 655.
work in counterintelligence at the MSS. U was replaced by Kim Won-hong in April 2012 after U’s disappearance.454

Moon Myong-on (문명언)

Moon was a Vice-Director in the OGD. He previously served as the Kim Il-sung University’s KWP Committee Responsible Secretary. Moon died on December 18, 2005.455

Organization and Guidance Department Leaders: 2011–Present

Choi Ryong-hae (최룡해)

Choi was the OGD Director from October 2017 to April 2019. He was appointed to this position at the Second Session of the Seventh Party Congress.456 As of May 2016, Choi has been a KWP Vice-Chairman, a member of the KWP EP, and a member of the KWP Politburo Presidium.457 He has also been a member of the KWP CC since 1981. In the government, Choi serves as a Vice-Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, the North Korean government’s highest executive body.458


455  “北 문명언 조직지도부 부부장 사망” [OGD Vice-Director Moon Myong-on Dies], Daily NK, December 20, 2005. https://www.daily nk.com/%E5%8C%97-%EB%AC%88%EB%AA%85%EC%96%B8-%EC%A1%B0%EC%A7%81%EC%A7%80%EB%8F%84%EB%B6%80-%EB%B6%80%EB%B6%80%EC%9E%A5-%EC%82%AC%EB%A7%9D/.


457  Madden, “WPK Central Committee Organization May 9, 2016.”

458  Madden, “The Fourth Session of the 13th SPA: Tweaks at the Top.”
Born January 15, 1950, in Sinchon County, South Hwanghae Province, Choe is considered North Korean “royalty” as his father, Choi Hyun, served alongside Kim Il-sung as an anti-Japanese partisan in the 1930s and 1940s, and then served as North Korea’s Defense Minister. A life-long Party man, Choe was a close friend of Kim Jong-il. He spent much of his career as the Chairman of the Kim Il-sung Kim Jong-il Socialist Labor Youth League, a Party organization designed to ideologically indoctrinate and mobilize North Korean youth. He served as the Responsible Secretary of the North Hwanghae Province Party Committee from 2005 to 2010. He served as the Director of the KPA GPB from April 2012 to April 2014, and was replaced by Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong-so. While serving in the GPB, Choe was appointed a four-star General in 2012 and a Vice-Marshall in 2013, even though he had no actual military experience.

Choe was awarded the Kim Il-sung Medal in 1987 and appointed a “national hero” in 1993. He has served in the 8th to 13th SPA. In late 2015, Choe was assessed by South Korean intelligence to have been purged after not being listed on the funeral committee list for the deceased Vice-Marshall Ri Ul-sol. The assessment was that he was receiving “revolutionary re-education” at a cooperative farm. However, he reappeared three months later to resume his official duties. Upon his return from a visit to Nicaragua in January 2017, Choe was greeted by an honor guard at the Pyongyang Airport, a rare event in North Korea’s diplomatic history.

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461 Honor guard ceremonies for visiting dignitaries and the Supreme Leader are standard, but not for second-tier leaders of the DPRK. See video at http://www.yonhapnewstv.co.kr/MYH20170117013900038/?did=1947m.
Ri Man-gon (리만건)

Appointed in April 2019, Ri Man-gon is the Director of the KWP OGD. Prior to this, he was an OGD First Vice-Director. As the OGD Director, he oversees the careers of all KWP leaders and the political life of every North Korean citizen. Nobody has as much political power as Ri other than the Supreme Leader. Prior to serving in the OGD, Ri was the Director of the Military Industries Department (MID). The KWP MID is in charge of the development and production of all of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. This department is critical to Kim Jong-un’s premier domestic policy of byungjin, which is committed to the dual development of the North Korean economy and the North’s nuclear program. Appointment to leadership of both the OGD and the MID makes Ri the most unique political figure in Kim regime history other than the Supreme Leaders. Another indicator of Ri’s critical role in the Kim regime is that he is one of only three men who are members of North Korea’s four leading political-military decision-making organizations: 1) the KWP Politburo; 2) the KWP EP; 3) the KWP CMC; and 4) the DPRK government’s State Affairs Commission.

Ri was born in 1945 and has spent his entire career in the KWP. He became a member of the KWP CC in September 2010 and became the Responsible Secretary (Chairman) of the Pyongan North Province KWP Committee in the following month. An indicator of his influence was his appointment to Kim Jong-il’s funeral committee, an honor given only to the top regime power brokers. He is a member of the 13th and 14th SPA, and a member of the SPA Qualification

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Inspection Commission, which oversees background checks of all nominated to be SPA members.

**Jo Yon-jun** (조연준)

Since October 2017, Jo has served as the Chairman of the KWP Inspection Committee, a position responsible for inspecting those suspected of anti-regime behavior.\(^\text{465}\) In this position, Jo has enormous authority to conduct purges. From January 2012 until his reassignment to the Inspection Committee, Jo served in the extremely influential position of KWP OGD First Vice-Director. As with others in that position, Jo’s access to Kim Jong-un was unsurpassed by any other adviser outside Kim’s Personal Secretariat. All of Jo’s predecessors had the same level of access since Kim Jong-il took over the OGD in 1973.

Jo was born around 1937 in Kowon County, South Hamgyong Province. He graduated from Kim Il-sung University and worked as a political economist. He served as a senior instructor at Kim Il-sung University, and then as the Organizational Secretary in South Hamgyong Province. He was selected as a KWP Politburo candidate member in April 2012 and again in May 2016.\(^\text{466}\)

Jo supervises all cadre evaluations of every agency and is the “commandant of the KWP headquarters.” In the latter capacity, he oversees all political Party activities in central government and Party agencies, particularly within the KWP CC, which is the core of the North Korean elite.

Jo is responsible for overseeing the political investigation and assessment of everyone in North Korea except the Supreme Leader, and, thus, possesses the capability to demote, hire, and transfer all high-ranking personnel except those that require Kim Jong-un’s approval. He is known as North Korea’s “angel of death” for his role in inspections and executions.\(^\text{467}\) It

\(^{465}\) 2018 *Bukhan juyo insa inmul jeongbo*, 523.

\(^{466}\) Ibid., 485-87.

is Jo who led the purge of Jang Song-taek at the Politburo meeting where Jang was arrested, as displayed across most international media outlets. A precursor to this event was in 2004 when Ri Je-gang led the purge of Jang Song-taek, who returned in 2007. Jo also led the purge of former SSD Chief Ryu Kyong in 2012.

No other person in the North Korean political system other than the Supreme Leader can turn the career and advice of a subject matter expert into ruin faster than Jo. In this service, he ensures that all policies, practices, and procedures ensure the security of Pyongyang and that there are no changes to the Kim regime’s policies unless approved by Kim Jong-un. Jo has no foreign policy or military experience, but he shapes the advice of foreign policy and military experts based on domestic security considerations.

Jo is known for his well-rounded personality, dedication to his work, being a stickler for rules, and being a heavy drinker. He was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on July 6, 2016 for human rights abuses.


Jo (red circle) standing in the front line with other “top ten” leaders at a 2016 New Year’s ceremony at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun.  

Jo (B) shown here lining up with those that serve at the level of KWP vice-chairmen at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun on October 15, 2015.  

General Kim Kyong-ok (김경옥)

General Kim has been serving in the OGD since at least 2007 and is currently a First Vice-Director. A long-time Political Action Officer and Vice-Director in the KWP dating back to 1991, Kim has also served as a Political Commissar within the KPA GPB. Kim’s rise to OGD First Vice-Director is tied to the designation of Kim Jong-un as the successor to Kim Jong-il. His responsibility is

maintaining security for Kim Jong-un and, thus, he oversees the activities of the Guards Command and the KPA MSC. Born in 1949, he was appointed a four-star General at the same time as Kim Jong-un and Kim Kyong-hui in September 2010, but is a General in appointment only with no formal military training. Kim has been and is a member of the 12th and 13th SPA. He was awarded the Kim Jong-il Medal in February 2012. Kim was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on July 6, 2016 for human rights abuses. Kim was once falsely reported to have been executed when he was absent from public view for some time. He is rumored to be the husband of Kim Jong-un’s paternal half-sister, Kim Sol-song.

Kim Kyong-ok typically accompanies Kim Jong-un to military events.
Kim Jo-guk (김조국)

Kim Jo-guk currently serves as a First Vice-Director of the OGD, reportedly in charge of military affairs, which would mean he replaced Kim Kyong-ok. Kim was relatively unknown prior to surfacing in 2019. There is speculation that his name is either a pseudonym or that he is a relative of Kim Jong-un.476

Hwang Pyong-so (황병서)

Vice-Marshall Hwang has experienced a tumultuous career within the OGD, although he was and is one of Kim Jong-un’s most critical and closest advisers. He served as the Director of the KPA GPB from 2014 to 2017. In November 2017, Hwang was punished after an OGD inspection of the GPB found significant corruption within the GPB. Hwang was relieved of his command.477 However, Hwang was retained as a Vice-Director in the OGD after serving three months in “revolutionary rehabilitation.”478 He was finally seen in Kim Jong-un’s company in July 2018 at a meeting of the KWP CMC. He was not wearing a uniform, as is standard for the GPB Director. Some assessments have Hwang serving as the Director of the KWP Military Department, but there is no official announcement to support this.479 Hwang is a member of the KWP Politburo Presidium, the KWP CMC, and the KWP CC.480 He is also a Vice-Chairman of the


480  Michael Madden, “WPK Central Committee Organization May 9, 2016.”
State Affairs Commission. Once referred to as North Korea’s “Number Two,” Hwang exercises significant influence over North Korea’s military.

Appointed in April 2014, Hwang is a member of the 13th SPA. A life-long political officer, he has no known combatant experience or training. Born around 1949, Hwang began working in the KWP OGD in 2005 as a Vice-Director. He was promoted to a two-star General in September 2010, a three-star General in April 2011, a four-star General in April 2014, and a Vice-Marshal in April 2014—when he was appointed as a First Vice-Director within the OGD in charge of the Military Directorate. Hwang has accompanied Kim Jong-un on a large number of military-related on-site visits of weapons testing, unit and DMZ visits, and military conferences. Hwang always takes great care to be deferential to Kim Jong-un in public. The Republic of Korea has sanctioned Hwang among dozens of other North Korean leaders on human rights abuses. Hwang reportedly went to China for spinal surgery in late 2015.

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481 Michael Madden, “The Fourth Session of the 13th SPA: Tweaks at the Top.”
Hwang (center) was part of a three-man entourage from North Korea to attend the closing ceremonies of the 2014 Asian Games on October 4 in Incheon, South Korea. The other two were Kim Yang-gon (left), who is now deceased, and Choi Ryong-hae (right).  

Hwang, wearing civilian attire, attends a May 2018 expanded meeting of the Seventh KWP CMC chaired by Kim Jong-un. 


General Ri Byong-chol (리병철)

General Ri Byong-chol serves as a Vice-Director of the KWP Munitions Industry Department, which is responsible for North Korea’s weapons development, including WMDs and all missiles. He also serves in one of the regime’s most critical positions in the OGD as a First Vice-Director.\(^{487}\) Since being moved from the position of Commander of the KPA Aviation and Air Defense Command, Ri has accompanied Kim Jong-un on inspections of North Korea’s leading weapons development programs—nuclear weapons, long-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Ri was born in 1948 and attended the prestigious Mangyongdae Revolutionary School. He then attended and graduated from the Kim Il-sung Military College. Ri rose through the ranks in the KPA Air Force to become the Second Air Division Commander in 1990 and was promoted to Major General in 1992. Ri became the Commander of the KPA Aviation and Air Defense Command in April 2008 as a Colonel General. In that capacity, he visited Russia, Cuba, and China on several occasions as the head or a member of military delegations. He was promoted to a four-star General in April 2010. Ri has served as an member of the Democratic People’s 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th SPA. He is currently a member of the KWP CC and the KWP Politburo. He was also a member of the Kim Jong-il Funeral Committee in 2011.

Ri was awarded the coveted Kim Jong-il Medal in 2012.\(^{488}\) He is unique in having combatant commander experience and senior Party experience. Combined with his close access to Kim Jong-un, this makes him one of Kim Jong-un’s most critical advisers, particularly during times of crisis on the Korean peninsula.

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\(^{488}\) 2015 Bukhan juyo insa inmul jeongbo, 260-62.
Jo Yong-won (조용원)

Jo became a Vice-Director within the KWP OGD in 2014. He also serves as the Deputy Chief of Kim Jong-un’s Personal Secretariat. He is in his early 60s. According to a report from South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, Jo appeared on the political scene in 2014 in his current position. Though Jo received the highly regarded Kim Il-sung Medal in 2012, it was not until 2014 that he was detected attending senior-level meetings with the regime’s leadership. Jo accompanies Kim Jong-un to on-site inspections more than any other official, replacing Vice-Marshall Hwang Pyong-so in that status in 2016. Jo participated in an expanded meeting of the KWP CMC during the period of high tensions in 2015 when North Korean mines severely injured South Korean soldiers inspecting the DMZ. More importantly, he provided personal assistance to Kim Jong-un during the Seventh Party Congress in May 2016. Based on his attendance at that meeting, Jo appears to be Kim Jong-un’s personal Action Officer within the OGD.

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Jo rose through the ranks within the OGD, starting as a Guidance Officer and advancing to Section Chief to becoming an OGD Vice-Director, of which there are approximately ten within the OGD. South Korean intelligence analysts believe that Jo is responsible for all of Pyongyang’s personnel matters.

Jo’s closeness to Kim Jong-un as an Action Officer is demonstrated in this photo at the Fifth KWP Cell Chairmen Conference on December 22, 2017. A video review of Jo accompanying Kim can be seen on Naver. Jo was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on November 1, 2017 for human rights abuses.

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492 Party ranks within the KWP OGD from high to low are Party secretary, department director, 1st vice-director, vice-director, section chief, sub-section chief, guidance officer, and action officer.


495 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMYYv7MMDzs.

Min Byong-chol

Min Byong-chol is an OGD Vice-Director and serves as the OGD Inspection Section Chief, a powerful position which handles investigations of all discrepancies within the Party that do not conform to the Supreme Leader’s guidance and expectations. Min is also known within the Party as the “angel of death” for his role in political inspections and purges. Min was responsible for purging Chu Sang-song, the former Minister of People’s Security, in 2012. Min’s political inspection teams undoubtedly played a role during the inspection and investigation of Jang Song-taek. Min was sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury on November 1, 2017 for human rights abuses.

Mun Kyong-dok

Mun served early in his career as an OGD Guidance Officer for the Pyongyang City Party Committee. He served as the Pyongyang City Party Committee’s Responsible Secretary from 2014 to 2016. He was relieved of that position and has not been heard from since. He may have been purged due to his close relationship with Jang Song-taek, who was purged and executed in 2013. Born in Pyongyang in 1957, he completed his military service and then attended and graduated from Kim Il-sung University’s economics department. He was awarded the Kim Il-sung Medal and Hero of the Republic medal. He was a member of the 10th and 11th SPA.

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500 2018 Bukhan juyo insa inmul jeongbo, 343.
Kang Sang-chun (강상춘)

Kang was a classmate and close personal friend of Kim Jong-il during their time at Kim Il-sung University. He has served for more than two decades as Chief of Kim’s Personal Secretariat, which is subordinate to the OGD.501

Hyun Chol-kyu (현철규)

Hyun attended the Mangyeongdae Academy and served in the Guards Command. He formerly served tours of Party duty as an OGD First Vice-Director, Chairman of the KWP Inspection Committee, and Director of the KWP Cadre Department.502

Pak Tae-song (박태성)

Pak is the KWP Committee Responsible Secretary of South Pyongan Province. In this position, he is responsible for all activities—political, professional, and personal—taking place in the province. Born in 1955, he is concurrently an alternate member of the KWP Politburo, a member of the KWP CC, and a member of the 13th SPA.503 Pak has accompanied Kim Jong-un on several on-site inspections of military-related facilities, including research institutes, munitions factories, biological research facilities, and precision industries factories. Pak was formerly a Vice-Director in


the OGD’s Military Directorate. It is common for OGD leaders to be promoted to provincial and city Party Committee chairmanships.\(^5\)\footnote{Joo Seong-Ha, "현지지도 나선 김정은 옆엔 박태성" [Pak Tae-song Is Always At Kim Jong-un’s Side During On-Site Visits], DongA.com, July 3, 2013. http://blog.donga.com/nambukstory/archives/61552; see also 2015 Bukhan juyo insa inmul jeongbo, 374-75.}

**Kim Chang-son (김창선)**

Kim serves as the Director of the Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat. He is responsible for Kim Jong-un’s schedule and managing the flow of information to Kim Jong-un. Kim Chang-son served in the OGD from 1990 to 1992. He was born in Myongchon County, North Hamgyong Province. He graduated from Kim Il-sung University with a degree in Russian language. He served in the military at the MPAF.\(^\footnote{Michael Madden, “Kim Chang Son,” North Korea Leadership Watch, May 14, 2013. http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/kim-chang-son-2/}.\footnote{505}
Other OGD Leaders About Whom Little is Known

- **So Yun-sung (서윤성)**: former OGD Vice-Director.\(^5^0^6\)
- **Ri Kwan-pil (리관필)**: little is known about Ri other than that he served as an OGD Vice-Director and was a close personal friend of Kim Jong-il.\(^5^0^7\)
- **Kim Hui-taek (김희택)**: served as an OGD Vice-Director, KWP CC member, Responsible Secretary for Ryanggang Province Party Committee, and a member of the 9th, 11th, and 12th SPA.\(^5^0^8\)

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507 “North Korea’s Mun Song-sul, First Vice Director of the KWP OGD, Dies,” Yonhap News, August 30, 2001.

Section 13:
The Future of the Organization and Guidance Department

Though the Kim regime is in its eighth decade, it seems unlikely that a group of anti-Japanese partisans could sustain such a dynamic rule over that period of time. However, by the assessment of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), the reason the regime remains relatively stable is the prescribed obligations demanded by the KWP of every institution and citizen. To that effect, Party organizational life, institutional organization, required revolutionary study, and saenghwal chonghwa (self-criticism) sessions “keep the North Korean regime afloat.”

Those policies and practices, overseen by the OGD, create the conditions for human rights denial. They have developed over the decades since the earliest days of the regime, when Korean revolutionaries entered the North with the Soviet military in 1945, to internal conflicts between factions in the 1950s, to the socio-political classification of each North Korean individual of the 1960s, and the ideological commitment of everything to the Suryong (Supreme Leader) in the 1970s. Any meaningful possibility of human rights observance disappeared with these developments.

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509 Jung et al., *Joint Study of the Realities and Changes in Organizational Culture of Organizations in North Korea*, 3-4.
The evolution of the OGD over this period, especially under the leadership of Kim Jong-il, cemented the policies and practices of human rights denial that developed from the aforementioned dynamics. Because the OGD is the regime’s control tower, its durability is critical to the continued security of the Supreme Leader. The OGD is the citadel of political terror, and Pyongyang is the capital of the Kim family regime’s power. The two combine to create a nexus of human rights denial for the North Korean people.

However, the Kim regime’s structure and function is anything but flexible. The regime’s ability to respond to large-scale contingencies is highly limited. The loss of the regime’s governing authority would require, among other things, a failure of the OGD’s control over society. The existence and survivability of the OGD is highly dependent on the position of the Supreme Leader. The death of Kim Jong-un in the near future, regardless of the cause, would compel the OGD to choose the next Supreme Leader. The regime has focused most of its ideology and propaganda to justify the Kim family as the only true and capable leader of the DPRK, the military, and the Party. In the event of Kim Jong-un’s death, the OGD’s options would be:

- Kim Jong-chol (mid-30s), brother of Kim Jong-un and a current OGD Vice-Director.
- Kim Yo-jong (late 20s), sister of Kim Jong-un and current KWP Politburo candidate member.
- Kim Pyong-il, stepbrother (different mother) to Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il. Born in 1954, Kim Pyong-il was considered a political threat to Kim Jong-il by Kim Il-sung. He was thus sent to a diplomatic posting in Yugoslavia. He has since served as the DPRK’s Ambassador to Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, and Poland, and is currently the DPRK’s Ambassador to the Czech Republic.
- Kim Sol-song, stepsister to Kim Jong-un and currently a Party Vice-Director serving in the Supreme Leader’s Personal Secretariat. By far, she possesses the most experience of any other family member

510 Hwang Jang-yop, the highest ranking North Korean defector, insisted that the OGD would choose the next Supreme Leader should the current leader die. See Park, “KWP OGD Will Determine Who Becomes Successor,” Chogabje.com, September 22, 2008.

working in the OGD, where she has been in charge of Kim Jong-un’s security details.

- Kim Yong-ju, the younger brother of Kim Il-sung. He serves as an honorary Vice-President of the SPA Presidium. Born in 1920, he is far too old to effectively act as the Supreme Leader. Indeed, some reports suggest that he may have already passed away.

- Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong-il’s sister. Born in 1946, her age and reports of ill health or even death likely disqualify her from serious consideration.

The possibility of a woman becoming the ruler in North Korea’s male-dominated society would be difficult to defend domestically. Her children would belong to a “different family,” thus guaranteeing the end of the dynasty. There are reports that Kim Jong-un has three children. The first child is a girl, but the gender of the other two is not known. If Kim Jong-un has a son, one of the sisters could conceivably serve as a stand-in until the son is at least in his early twenties. At least two decades need to pass for this to be a viable option, however.

The elevation of a non-Kim family member to take the Supreme Leader position would be a perilous enterprise for the OGD. The most plausible option as of 2019 would be the current OGD Director Choi Ryong-hae. At least his family carries the history of anti-Japanese partisan activity, which is a major component of the current regime’s ideology.

There are several scenarios where the OGD’s ability to control society would be disastrously impacted and, thus, threaten the future existence of the OGD and even the KWP. Those scenarios include natural or manmade disasters, regional rebellion, a coup d’état, internal civil war, war with the South Korea-United States alliance, assassination, regime collapse, and internal corruption or competition.

Natural or manmade disasters, depending on their magnitude, would have a severe impact on the ability of local Party Committees and government people’s committees to communicate with central Party and government institutions in Pyongyang. One stark example would be a volcanic eruption from Mt. Paektu on the Sino-North Korean border. Such an incident would impact the entire northern area of North Korea, not to mention China’s northeast. The collapse of the Kim regime’s ability to govern and the resulting chaos
could potentially undermine the ability of the OGD to control society. This would enable other institutions, such as the military or security agencies, to take the lead in protecting regime survival.

A Chernobyl-type nuclear accident at North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex in Yongbyon County, North Pyongan Province, would be disastrous for the local population and the several counties around it. The accident at Chernobyl contaminated 63,000 square miles with a contamination radius of 19 miles. The land was so severely contaminated that it cannot be used for agriculture. One estimate of a nuclear catastrophe at Yongbyon is that it puts at risk 100 million people in Northeast Asia.512

Based on the size of the impact, such a catastrophe at Yongbyon would also impact the traffic on National Highway 1, which is the primary trade route between Pyongyang and Dandong, China. It would also disastrously impact the political prison camps located nearby, where the regime is highly unlikely to provide aid or assistance to political prisoners. Political Prison Camp No. 14 at Kaechon, Camp No. 18 at Bukchang, and the Choma-bong Political Prison Camp are all just south of Yongbyon. The prevailing winds that move west to east would soon reach Camp 15 at Yodok. These winds would also blow over and contaminate the east-central region of North Korea, throwing panic on at least one-fourth to one-third of the country. With these developments, the ODs of regional Party Committees would undoubtedly lose local control, thus impacting the OGD’s ability to control the country on multiple levels.

Rebellion is the least likely scenario to negatively impact the OGD’s ability to control society. Indeed, the OGD’s policies and practices are designed to prevent any resistance whatsoever at every level of society. The OGD’s direct control of all internal security agencies and the judicial system directly facilitate this control. However, rebellion is a distinct possibility when it comes as a result of other scenarios such as war, natural or manmade disasters, coup d’état, or civil war.

Internal civil war in North Korea would obviously have a devastating impact on North Korean society, but much less on the OGD. Should some elements of the KPA find a way to suppress internal political control and initiate combat operations against the regime, the local ODs of local Party Committees would necessarily be suppressed by the force rebelling against the regime. It goes without saying that civilian casualties would be extreme. The fact that the Military Department of KWP Committees at local levels assign a military mission to every able-bodied civilian makes it likely that the 1977 Protocols of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 will be ignored. However, if the Kim regime wins such a civil war, nothing will change for the OGD except for their increased focus on purging the surviving opponents.

War with the South Korea-United States alliance would have disastrous effects on the entire country. Under such conditions, the Supreme Leader would lead the country from the position of Supreme Commander of the KPA. The OGD’s societal control would be severely weakened in the face of martial law and military dominance, even though the OGD controls the GPB. Losing the war likely means the end of the KWP, including the OGD. Those who served in the OGD would likely be sought for prosecution for their role in human rights denial.

The possibility of war also raises the question of whether the OGD and its facilities in Changgwang-dong, Chung-guyok, Pyongyang, can be justified as a military target. The OGD officials serving in the OGD Military Directorate—roughly 300 of them—are assigned military ranks; the first vice-director is a four-star general. However, the remaining 1,000 personnel in the OGD are not. That would depend on the United States’ “three interdependent principles—military necessity, humanity, and honor—which provide the foundation for other law of war principles, such as proportionality and distinction, and most of the treaty and customary rules of the law of war.”

Regime collapse could conceivably result from any of the above scenarios. It should be noted that the Kim regime was able to withstand a highly

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513 The term “internal civil war” is used to refer to war internal to the DPRK. Many analysts refer to war between North and South Korea as civil war. This author refers to war between the North and South as a war between North Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance.

debilitating famine in the 1990s, demonstrating resiliency at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. At the same time, the security services went through a severe internal purge when 25,000 internal security and related Party officials and families were purged during the Simhwajo incident that was initially based in the excesses of Jang Song-taek.\footnote{Hwang Il-Do, “전 북한 핵심 관료가 육필로 쓴 ‘김정일 권력장악 비화’ [Former North Korean Bureaucrat’s Handwritten account of Kim Jong-il’s Rise to Power], Shindonga, September 28, 2005. http://shindonga.donga.com/docs/magazine/shin/2005/09/28/200509280500048/200509280500048_1.html; Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights, “North Korea’s Control over its People and the People’s Safety Agency,” June 20, 2016. http://eng.nkhumanrights.or.kr/eng/datacenter/related_write.php?mode=view&bbs_idx=4503&search_mode=&search_word=&pg=2; see also Kim So-Jeong, “장성택 주도 2만5천명 숙청 ‘심화조 사건’ 전말이” [The Full Story of the Shimhwajo Incident Where Jang Song-taek Led the Purge of 25,000 People], Daillan News, April 26, 2014. http://www.daillan.co.kr/news/view/429849/.} The combination of these two situations severely weakened the Kim regime, perhaps more so than any other point after the Korean War.

There are two scenarios for an assassination: group assassination and lone assassin. The former may be premeditated with a follow-up plan, or impulsive. In the latter, the assassin may or may not have a personal relationship with the target.\footnote{Sungmin Cho, “Anticipating and Preparing for the Potential Assassination of Kim Jong-Un,” International Journal of Korean Studies 19.1 (2015): 175-95.} Regardless of the exact scenario, the subsequent upheaval would significantly stress the regime’s structure and function. The OGD would necessarily carry out draconian actions to maintain control until it could designate the next successor based on the evaluation of potential candidates outlined above.

However, the OGD may be its own worst enemy. Abuse of power, corruption, and internal competition have all already been addressed in this report. As the Kim regime deals with international sanctions, those issues will magnify and likely cause internal disruption within the OGD, thus degrading its effectiveness at societal control and service to the directives of the Supreme Leader. The OGD’s greatest vulnerabilities are the triple reporting system, lack of subject matter experts in the decision-making cycle, and loss of privilege—which would create greater corruption and abuse of power. Its wide span of control also slows down the decision-making process and places extreme stress due to over-responsibility.

Regardless of the potential scenarios for the OGD, the survival of the Kim regime and the security of the Supreme Leader depend on the effectiveness


of the OGD and continued societal loyalty to the MG and the MI. As long as these hold, there is no reason to expect the Kim regime to observe and enforce human rights, given its track record to date. Supporting such policies would be contrary to the regime officials’ vision of personal success. It is impossible for any individual living under the Kim regime to expect the protection of human rights in any meaningful sense.
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