North Korea’s Political Prison Camp, *Kwan-li-so No. 14*, Update 1

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NORTH KOREA’S POLITICAL PRISON CAMP, K WAN-LI-SO NO. 14, UPDATE 1

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Size of Facility
153 square kilometers (58.9 square miles)
21.9 kilometers by 13.8 kilometers (13.9 miles by 8.5 miles)

Background
The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (UN COI) determined that “crimes against humanity have been committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as North Korea), pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State.” Many of these crimes against humanity take place against persons detained in political and other prisons—persons who the Commission determined are among the “primary targets of a systematic and widespread attack” by the North Korean regime, including murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political grounds, and the enforced disappearance of persons.

According to the UN COI, “The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the kwan-li-so political prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth century.”

Based on research conducted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), seven trends have defined the human rights situation under the Kim Jong-un regime:

1. an intensified crackdown on attempted defections
2. a restructuring of the political prison camp system, with some facilities closer to the border with China being shut down, while inland facilities have been expanded, and construction of internal high-security compounds
3. the sustained, if not increased, economic importance of the political prison camps
4. the disproportionate oppression of women by North Korean officials; women have assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families and thus represent the majority of those arrested for perceived wrongdoing at the “jang-madang” markets, or for “illegally” crossing the border
5. an aggressive purge of senior officials, aimed to consolidate the leader’s grip on power
6. targeting of North Korean escapees, and
7. increased focus on eliminating “reactionary” thoughts.

While commercially available satellite imagery as used in this report allows the world to see guard positions and sometimes people, for example in political prison camps, the full extent
of Kim Jong-un’s human rights violations in the camps remains uncovered. Nevertheless, the continued monitoring of such camps provides a way to shed some light on the abuses endured by North Korea’s most vulnerable—its political prisoners who are oppressed through unlawful arrest, detention, torture, inadequate prison conditions, sexual violence, and public and private executions.

Analysis

Executive Summary

This report is part of a comprehensive long-term project undertaken by HRNK to use satellite imagery and former prisoner interviews to shed light on human suffering in North Korea by monitoring activity at political prison facilities throughout the nation. This is the second HRNK satellite imagery report detailing activity observed during 2015 to 2021 at a prison facility commonly identified by former prisoners and researchers as “Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’on” (39.646810, 126.117058) and serves as an update to our earlier 2015 report entitled North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14, which analyzed imagery from 2002 to 2014.

For this report HRNK analyzed 10 high-resolution commercial pan-sharpened multispectral and pan-chromatic satellite images of Kwan-li-so (Political Penal-Labor Colony) No. 14 and its immediate environs focusing upon examination of the following physical features:

» Security perimeters (internal and external), entrance and guard positions
» Headquarters, administration, barracks, and support facilities
» Housing, agricultural, and agricultural support facilities
» Mining and forestry activity
» Internal road network
» Hydroelectric and light industrial facilities
» Railroad network

» Ferry crossings
» Miscellaneous activity

Based upon analysis of these features Kwan-li-so No. 14 remains one of North Korea’s oldest continuously operating political prisoner camps having been established as far back as 1965. That it is mature and well-maintained by North Korean standards is indicated by ongoing, expanding agricultural activity, minor construction, maintenance of roads and buildings, and overall good maintenance in and immediately surrounding the camp. When taken individually, these activities (e.g., agricultural, razing and construction of various structures, changes in light industrial facilities, additional guard positions, etc.) observed since our 2015 report are what is typically expected to be observed at kwan-li-so around the country. However, when taken as a whole, they likely represent an expansion or reorganization of security forces, modest increase in prisoner population, or both.

Satellite imagery coverage of the facility and interviewee testimony indicates that the prison’s economic activity is a combination of agricultural production and logging, with smaller instances of mining, light industry (e.g., clothing and other products), and hydroelectric power production—all using some level of forced labor.

Despite extensive satellite imagery coverage of the prison, HRNK is presently unable to confirm or deny escapee and open-source reports that the prisoner population of Kwan-li-so No. 14 is 43,000 people. With that said, the composition and physical size of the prison suggests that it could accommodate large numbers of prisoners. Prisoners detained at Kwan-li-so No. 14 are thought to never be eligible for release. HRNK anticipates that we will be able to develop an accurate estimate of the prison’s population in the future when emerging satellite imagery is correlated with newly declassified information.

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Figure 1

Overview of Kwan-li-so No. 14

Kwan-li-so
No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
September 2, 2021
NORTH KOREA’S POLITICAL PRISON CAMP,
KWN-LI-SO NO. 14, UPDATE 1

information and interviews with additional former prisoners. As with the analytical caution presented in previous HRNK reports (such as North Korea’s Ch’ungsan No. II Detention Facility) it is important to reiterate that North Korean officials, especially those within the Korean People’s Army and the internal security organizations, clearly understand the importance of implementing camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) procedures to mask their operations and intentions. It would not be unreasonable to assume that they have to some degree done so here.

Location and Subordination

Parts of Kwan-li-so No. 14 (39.646810, 126.117058) are located approximately 19 kilometers southeast of Kaech’ŏn and 61 kilometers northeast of the capital city of P’yŏngyang. It straddles the counties of Pukch’ang-gun (북창군) and Tulch’ang-gun ( 들창군) and the three cities (-si) of Kaech’ŏn-si (개천시), Tŏkch’ŏn-si (덕천시), and Sunch’ŏn-si (순천시), all of which are within Pyongannam-do (평안남도, South Pyongan Province). The Kwan-li-so encompasses an irregularly shaped area of approximately 153 square kilometers (58.9 square miles) that stretches approximately 21.9 kilometers by 13.8 kilometers (13.9 miles by 8.5 miles) on forested slopes of the Changan Mountain Range (장안산출기) and contains 25 named and numerous unnamed villages.

Kwan-li-so No. 14 is reported to be subordinate to the Prisons Bureau of the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Specifically, it would be under the control of the ministry’s Pyongannam-do Prisons Bureau. However, it cannot be ruled out that it is subordinate to the ministry’s Kaech’ŏn-si Bureau. The MSS itself reports to the State Affairs Commission chaired by Kim Jong-un. Since 2018 Colonel General Jong Gyong-taek has been reported to be the Minister of State Security.

In December 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury included Colonel General Jong Gyong-taek on its “Specially Designated Nationals List Update” as head of the MSS and a person of interest for illegal activities [including human rights violations]. Two years later, in May 2020, the U.S. updated its designation of the MSS Prisons Bureau (also known as Farm Bureau and Farm Guidance Bureau). Then in March 2021, the European Union designated Colonel General Jong as a person of interest for major human rights violations stating,
“As Head of the Ministry of State Security, Jong Kyong-thaek is responsible for serious human rights violations in the DPRK, in particular torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and killings, enforced disappearance of persons, and arbitrary arrests or detentions, as well as widespread forced labour and sexual violence against women.”

**Organization**

What little publicly available information and known North Korean organizational patterns indicate is that *Kwan-li-so No. 14* is likely to be organized along a somewhat standard pattern similar, but enlarged, to that seen at smaller *Kwan-li-so* and *kyo-hwa-so* (long-term re-education through labor camp). Such an organization would likely consist of a headquarters staff, communication section, finance section, political guidance section, legal and records, administration and welfare section, liaison section (Ministry of State Security, Ministry of Social Security, Korean People’s Army, Pyongyangnam-do and Kaech’ón-si Korea Workers’ Party Committees, etc.), transportation section, safety/medical section, and a security section (a guard unit). There is likely some level of coordination with the Ministry of Light Industry, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Electric Power Industry, Ministry of Food Procurement & Administration, and the Ministry of Mining Industry. What coordination there is between *Kwan-li-so No. 14* and other organizations is unknown, as is the level of cooperation with the remnants of the adjacent *Kwan-li-so No. 18*.

*Kwan-li-so No. 14* is physically divided into three broad geographic areas by the Kūmgwang-ch’ón (금광천, Kumgwang Stream) and Kilsang-ch’ón (길상천, Kilsang Stream) that run generally from north to south. These streams are tributaries of the larger Taedong-gang (대동강, Taedong River) which forms the southern perimeter of the facility. It also serves as a common border with what remains of *Kwan-li-so No. 18* to the south after that camp’s partial deactivation.

Functionally, most villages, agricultural and livestock activity, mining, and light industrial activities are located along these waterways. Little current detail is known concerning the forced labor activities imposed upon the prisoners at *Kwan-li-so No. 14*. What we do know from several interviews is that prisoners are routinely treated with brutality and receive limited food rations. At various times they have reportedly been engaged in agricultural and livestock production, light industry production, mining, and more.
Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., Dinville, Andy and Eley, implementing camouflage, concealment, clearly understand the importance of and the internal security organizations, those within the Korean People’s Army Analysis), it is important to reiterate North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp 16

In previous reports (such as North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp 15, Susŏng-dong, Ch’ŏngjin-si, and Hamgyŏng-bukto. Specifically, it is under the control of the CH’OMA-BONG RESTRICTED AREA

Camp No. 25 is under the control of the North Hamgyong Provincial Party, the head of a local MPS office, housed senior staff at the kwan-li-so. It would be reasonable to assume that they have their alleged crimes are of a political nature. The Department for National Unification, 2015), p. 122, available at http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp

A military personnel are sent off to Kwan-li-so No. 25 if those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but some inmates are released upon completion of their term as terms are committed economic crimes are not allowed into the facility. Some inmates are released houses political prisoners only, while those who living arrangements. The No. 25 kyo-hwa-so facility that looks like an ordinary prison camp

The area encompassed 13.76 hectares (164,568 square yards) (Figure 1, Figure 2). High-resolution satellite imagery from January 28, 1970, at which time it was 7.5 km northwest of the port of Ch’ŏngjin. The camp was used as a prisoner-of-war camp No. 25 this way, lag2_web_5-18.pdf. Another sources describes www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGu

Do Kyung-Ok et al., White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015

http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp

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The primary entrance to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is in the southwest corner of the camp, along the Taedong-gang and approximately 19 kilometers southeast of the city of Kaech’ón in Kaech’ón-si, Pyongan-nam-dō. The location includes a road entrance and checkpoint and a rail entrance with checkpoint. There are also five secondary entrances: one on the southeastern perimeter along the Taedong-gang at the village of Sangdoryŏng-ni; one on the northeast perimeter, 2.3 kilometers northeast of the village of Sanjunaedong; and one each at the ferry crossing and road and rail bridges across the Taedong-gang.

Electric power for the camp is likely provided by both the hydroelectric powerplant across the Taedong-gang, 1 kilometer west of Chamsang-ni (39.602222, 126.113889), and by local generators. The camp is connected to the national rail network via the station at Naenjôngcha’m, 1.7 kilometers east of the main entrance and within the camp. The prison is likely connected to the regional telephone network via buried service as no evidence of overhead service was identified in satellite imagery. It is also connected by a microwave communications facility outside the southwest perimeter of the prison.

Aside from the guard, military, and paramilitary garrisons within both *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and the remnants of *Kwan-li-so* No. 18, there are several such garrisons and air defense artillery sites observed within 15 kilometers of the prison’s center point. The closest air facility is the Korean People’s Air Force Pukch’ang-ni Airbase, which is 7 kilometers to the southwest of the main entrance. This is a fighter/interceptor base for MiG-23 aircraft that, due to its mission, organization, and location very likely provides no support to *Kwan-li-so* No. 14.

Finally, the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area (a *Kwan-li-so*) partially shares a common security perimeter along the west side of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14. What, if any, relationship there is between these two is unknown.

**Imagery Analysis**

As noted above for this report HRNK analyzed 10 high-resolution commercial pan-sharpened multispectral and pan-chromatic satellite images of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 and its immediate environs focusing upon examination of the following physical features: 12

- Security perimeters (internal and external), entrances and guard positions
- Headquarters, administration, barracks, and support facilities
- Housing and agricultural support facilities and activity
- Internal road network
- Hydroelectric and light industrial facilities
- Mining and forestry activity
- Railroad network
- Ferry crossings
- Miscellaneous activity.

For analytical purposes, the camp is divided into the security perimeter and 25 discrete areas of interest that provide insight into changes and typify activity in the camp and miscellaneous activities.

**Security Perimeter**

The security perimeter around *Kwan-li-so* No. 14 is approximately 59 kilometers long and encompasses approximately 158 square kilometers (59 square miles). It consists of a network of security fences, patrol paths, and roads that are secured by a total of 53 barracks, guard positions, and checkpoints broken down as follows:
As with the analytical caution presented in the earlier section, it is important to reiterate that North Korean officials, especially those within the Korean People’s Army (KPA), have used deception (CCD) procedures to mask their operations and intentions. This practice is not uncommon in regimes that rely on surveillance and intelligence to maintain control. The KPA is a powerful entity, encompassed by the concept of the State Security Department (SSD), which is the de facto control of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) Organizational Department (ODG).

Specifying that the KPA is under the control of the SSD is only a beginning. The SSD is a part of the KWP’s security apparatus, which includes the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and other security organs, such as the People’s Security Forces (PSF). These security organs are primarily responsible for internal security and are tasked with preventing and detecting political and economic crimes. The SSD, on the other hand, is tasked with external security and is responsible for maintaining control over the country’s borders and coastline.

The PSF is the primary security force in North Korea, and it is responsible for maintaining internal security and enforcing laws and regulations. The PSF is divided into several branches, including the People’s Security (PS), which is responsible for maintaining order and preventing criminal activity, and the People’s Armed Police (PAP), which is responsible for national security and defense.

The MSS is the primary security agency in North Korea, and it is responsible for maintaining internal and external security. The MSS is divided into several branches, including the Ministry of State Security (MSS), which is responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), which is responsible for law enforcement and internal security.

Despite the SSD’s role in controlling the KPA, it is not structured as a village, but rather a fenced-in facility that looks like an ordinary prison camp and is operated by the Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) Department of State Security (SSD). It is under the control of the KWP Organizational Department (ODG), which is responsible for controlling political and economic activities. The facility for South Korean POWs (Prisoners of War) (Figure 14) was used as a prisoner-of-war facility for South Korean POWs prior to the Korean War and was established for the purpose of detaining prisoners of war.

The No. 25 kwan-li-so, or labor camp, is located in the province of Hamgyong-bukto. Susŏng-dong, Ch’ŏngjin-si in the North Hamgyong Province. He ended up at the No. 25 kwan-li-so, the physical characteristics of which are now well documented. The camp is located on a 13.76-hectare (164,568 square yards) of land and was expanded slightly to 14.36 hectares (168,475 square yards) by January 27, 1976, when it measured 765 yards by 344 yards and encompassed 13,760 square yards (164,568 square feet). The closest air defense infrastructure to Camp No. 25 is the Korean People’s Air Force’s Sau-mi-ni Air Base, 2 kilometers to the southeast. It is connected to the national rail network via the station at Susŏng-dong, 800 meters to the east. It is connected to the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the southeast. It is connected to the regional electric power grid via a transmission line running from the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the southeast.

Satellite imagery does indicate that Camp No. 25 was established in May 1970. The camp was used as a prisoner-of-war facility for South Korean POWs during the Korean War (1950-1953). Satellite imagery from the KH-4B imagery dated May 28, 1970 and KH-9 imagery dated January 21, 2003, indicates that the camp has an irregular shape that occupies an area of 13,760 square yards (164,568 square feet). It is enclosed by a 1.5-meter high steel fence that is approximately 8 kilometers long. The fence is reinforced with mines and guarded by soldiers stationed at watch towers and guard positions along the perimeter. The camp is connected to the port of Ch’ŏngjin by an approximately 0.75-meter wide asphalt road that is 2 kilometers long.

The camp has a prisoner population of 5,000 people. Although the escapee testimonies are unreliable, it is reasonable to assume that they have escaped the camp once. Those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but not more than 20 years, can return to society once they complete their terms. Those serving terms of 20 years or longer, but not more than 30 years, can return to society once they complete their terms.

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By themselves, these numbers have only fluctuated slightly since our 2015 report and are what is typically expected to be observed at kwan-li-so around the country. When, however, taken with other low-level activity (e.g., agricultural, razing and construction of various structures, addition of guard positions, changes in light industrial facilities, etc.) observed throughout the camp during the past six years, they likely represent an expansion or reorganization of guard forces, modest increase in prisoner population, or both.

The absence of any vehicles observed along the perimeter or at perimeter guard positions in the imagery analyzed, along with the size and quality of the perimeter roads/trails, suggests that guards patrol primarily on foot rather than by vehicle. Vehicles are, however, often seen at the larger guard barracks around the camp. A majority of the perimeter guard positions are not sited to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the kwan-li-so. Rather, they are located along the most obvious routes of escape and appear to be well maintained and in good repair.

As noted above, the southern section of the camp’s perimeter is secured by the Taedong-gang.

This river, due to its fast current and width, represents a significant obstacle to any who are not strong swimmers. The rugged wilderness area to the camp’s north serves as a significant, but not insurmountable, deterrent to escape as there are large population centers within 5-10 kilometers.

Area 1, Naenjongch’am

The farming village of Naenjongcha’m (39.566667, 126.025000) is in the southwest corner of Kwan-li-so No. 14 and is bordered by the camp’s perimeter and the Taedong-gang. It contains the camp’s main road and rail entrances and is surrounded by agricultural fields. Approximately 780 meters east of the village is a small coal loading facility, rail station, and the remains of a light narrow-gauge electrified mine railroad. This mine railroad runs from the loading facility to a mine portal approximately 1 kilometer further to the east. Both the mine railroad and the mine portal appear to have been abandoned before 2004.

To the northwest of the railroad station lies a threshing house and a small agricultural village. In early 2016, one building in the agricultural village was razed and rebuilt. By late 2020, at least three new buildings were constructed directly southwest of the threshing house and north of the railroad tracks. The design of the long, rectangular building suggests that it is for livestock rearing, while the two smaller new buildings likely function as agricultural support.

Additionally, security in the area has increased with the construction of two guard positions along the Taedong-gang. One position is situated slightly southeast of the livestock buildings and was constructed sometime by August 2018. The second position is situated in the southeast corner of Area 1 and was constructed by March 2016. The road, buildings, and surrounding fields appear to
Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

As with the analytical caution presented in North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 16 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2015), p. 122, available at http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp, this imagery analysis also focuses on Camp No. 25. Extensive satellite imagery coverage of North Korea includes both commercial and intelligence products, which have been referenced and utilized in this report. Imagery dated January 27, 1976, should be used with caution as the camp was under construction and various dates of establishment have been cited in official North Korean sources.

It is important to emphasize that North Korean officials, especially defectors, have noted the use of deception (CCD) procedures to mask the camp's actual size, purpose, and activities through camouflage, concealment, and the internal security organizations, which handle the prisoner population of 5,000 people. The extent to which the data collected through imagery analysis can provide an accurate picture of these activities is an ongoing concern. Therefore, the material presented here is intended to provide a detailed overview of the satellite imagery available for Camp No. 25.

Location and Organization

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It would be reasonable to assume that they have undertaken many of those activities within the Korean People's Army (KPA) immediately following the end of the Korean War. North Korean defector XXX [sic] testified that the father of his family was a political criminal who was arrested while attempting to cross the border in North Korea. He was interrogated and sentenced to over 20 years in the camp. Mr. XXX [sic] testified, “Military personnel are sent off to the Nuclear War.” North Korean defector XXX [sic] testified, “Military personnel are sent off to the Nuclear War.”

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be clearly defined and well-maintained, indicating significant and sustained activity in this area.

Area 2, Main Camp Entrance and Guard Barracks

Located in the extreme southwest corner of Kwan-li-so No. 14, on the north shore of the Taedong-gang and 940 meters west of Naenjongcha’im, is the main entrance (39.558234, 126.012311) to Kwan-li-so No. 14. It consists of a walled guard barracks with both road and rail entrance checkpoints. The road is the primary access route for Kwan-li-so No. 14, while an electrified rail spur line from here feeds the coal mines to the southeast at Pongch’ang-ni (39.559167, 126.078611)—within the partially deactivated Kwan-li-so No. 18. There is a small livestock confinement and agricultural area immediately north of the main entrance and adjacent to the edge of the camp’s western perimeter fence that may be associated with the guard barracks.

Area 3, Yasach’am – Headquarters, Administration, Support, and Housing

The village of Yasach’am (39.570278, 126.055833), located along the banks of the Taedong-gang, serves as the camp’s primary headquarters, administrative, support, training, and housing area. On the northwest side of the village, leading up a small valley, is Kwan-li-so No. 14’s Ministry of State Security headquarters, main barracks, and training area. On the south side of the village are two bridges across the Taedong-gang. The first is a 300-meter-long rail bridge that, as noted above, carries the electrified rail spur line to the coal mines at Pongch’ang-ni within the partially deactivated Kwan-li-so No. 18.

Between September 2016 and August 2017, a structure to the north of the rail entrance and checkpoint was expanded considerably and is likely a guard barracks.

The second is a 200-meter-long road bridge 500 meters upstream of the rail bridge that also leads to Pongch’ang-ni. While the rail bridge is well maintained and usable year-round, the road bridge is often submerged and is only marginally usable when the river level is low.

The village and Ministry of State Security areas are active in all imagery analyzed and all buildings and roads are well maintained. Between September 2013 and December 2014, available imagery indicated the construction of two new buildings along the river in early 2013. In 2020, an additional third building was constructed immediately to the west of the first two new buildings. Additionally, a building along the river likely used as a cultural hall was significantly expanded. In particular, the expansion of the cultural hall suggests a growing emphasis on cultural activities in Kwan-li-so No. 14. New blue roofs were also added to the prison’s Ministry of State Security headquarters building and the camp headquarters building (located north of the village), as well as to six other buildings in the surrounding area.

Area 4, Yasach’am – Ministry of State Security Barracks and Training Area

Immediately up-valley from the headquarters and administrative area at Yasach’am is the entrance to the Ministry of State Security’s main barracks and training area. Within the training area, at the head of the small valley, are several clearings (likely used for training or gardens for the troops), a likely firing range, and what may be an armory. No changes of significance were observed in imagery since 2015. However, clearings in the training area, which were first identified in 2013, appear clearly defined and slightly expanded.
North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

As with the analytical caution presented in previous reports, it is important to reiterate that this analysis also supports escapee and other unconfirmed reports indicating that Camp No. 25's primary economic activities are centered in Ch'ŏn-ri. It is not structured as a village but is a fenced facility to Camp No. 25.

The camp was used as a prisoner-of-war (POW) detention center during the Korean War. After the Korean War, it was used as a detention facility for political criminals. It was also used as a correctional facility for prisoners of war and as a labor camp.

The camp has a prisoner population of 5,000 people. They were housed in a number of buildings, including the main building, the guard building, and the prison building. The camp was located on the Solgol stream, which is a tributary of the Yalu River.

The camp was located on the south bank of the Solgol stream, approximately 700 meters by 315 meters (2,286 feet by 1,035 feet) and was expanded slightly in the future.

Camp No. 25 is under the control of the Korean People's Army (KPA) and is located 18 kilometers south-southwest of the People's Air Force's Sungam-ni Air Base.

The facility to Camp No. 25 is the Korean People's Army's Solgol stream. The closest airfield to the facility is the Sungam-ni Air Base, which is located 2 kilometers from the facility. The camp is connected to the national rail network via the station at Susong-dong, 800 meters to the east.

The Solgol stream passes through the camp and is connected to the regional electric power grid via the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the northeast. The camp is located on the bank of the Solgol stream.

The camp is connected to the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the northeast. The Solgol stream passes through the camp and is connected to the regional electric power grid via the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the northeast.

The camp is connected to the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the northeast. The Solgol stream passes through the camp and is connected to the regional electric power grid via the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the northeast.
North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

Figure 6

Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ён-si
Area of Interest 3
November 10, 2020

Ministry of State Security headquarters and administration area

New roofs (2017-2019)

New roof (2019)

New buildings (2013-2016)

New building (2020)

Road bridge

Rail bridge

New probable cultural hall (2016)

Guard Position

Entrance

Area 3, Yasach’ам - Headquarters, Administration, Support, and Housing
Area 4, Yasach’am – Ministry of State Security Barracks and Training Area
Area 5, Tongch'ang-gol

Immediately northeast of Yasach'am is the village of Tongch’ang-gol (39.576111, 126.070556). Aside from agricultural fields surrounding it, this area consists of a coal mine and tailings pile, mine headquarters and shipping yard, large greenhouse, two likely prisoner housing areas, a school reportedly for children born in the camp, and a motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility. This area is bordered along the river by at least three guard positions, one of which was expanded upon in 2019. In 2016, three new buildings were constructed in a section of an agricultural field directly north of the river in the southern part of Area 5. Between 2017 and 2019, an additional, larger building was added directly to the west. These buildings are likely used for agricultural or administrative purposes. In late 2020, a new greenhouse was constructed northeast of these new buildings and part of the barracks were expanded.

Area 6, Guard Barracks

Approximately 2.6 kilometers north-northeast of Tongch’ang-gol at the confluence of the Taedong-gang and Kumgang-ch’on (40.218056, 124.565833), sits a guard barracks with a small agricultural field. The confluence of these two water features creates a delta of sediment that extends out two-thirds (i.e., 100 meters) across the Taedong-gang. No changes of significance were observed on imagery since 2015. However, the roads and surrounding fields remain well-maintained and indicate signs of activity.

Area 7, Kadŏk-kol

Located approximately mid-way along Kwan-li-so No. 14’s southern perimeter is a small unnamed stream that runs north-south through the villages of Kadŏk-kol (39.607778, 126.098056) and Sangmu-gol (39.615278, 126.098056) and into the Taedong-gang. A diversion dam and two hydroelectric power plants are situated on the northern bank of the Taedong-gang approximately 420 meters east of this stream. Given its location and size it is likely that these power plants provide electricity to Kwan-li-so No. 14, the coal mines around Pongch’ang-ni within the partially deactivated Kwan-li-so No. 18, and the local railroad network. A roadway checkpoint is situated at the eastern end of the hydroelectric power plant.

The light industrial plant (reportedly a processing plant) on the west side of the confluence of the stream and Taedong-gang contains a five-story building—the tallest within Kwan-li-so No. 14. In 2020, a new building was added to the plant. A second processing plant is located to the east of the stream on the banks of the Taedong-gang. Approximately 500 meters up the stream is the small village of Kadŏk-kol that consists of a fish farm and a few buildings. Previously, this area reportedly also contained a prisoner housing area on the west side of the stream. This was razed sometime between 2007 and 2011. In 2019, satellite imagery showed an addition added to a small building on the southern side of the stream, likely associated with light industry and the hydroelectric plant. The light industrial plants and the roads and bridges serving them appear in a good state of repair. Changes since 2015 suggest a small increase in the light industry activities and manufacturing output.

Area 8, Sangmu-gol

Approximately 500 meters upstream from Kadŏk-kol is a prisoner housing area including approximately 30 structures that consists of barracks-style prisoner housing. A processing plant and threshing house are situated on the east side of the stream. Approximately 400 meters north of this is the village of Sangmu-gol, which also consists of...
North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

Figure 8

Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 5
November 10, 2020

Area 5, Tongch’ang-gol
Figure 9

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech‘on-si
Area of Interest 6
November 10, 2020*

Probable guard barracks

Area 6, Guard Barracks
Figure 10

**Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si Area of Interest 7**
November 10, 2020

- Former prisoner housing area
- Fish farm
- Processing plant
- New building and greenhouse (2020)
- Hydroelectric power plants
- Floating fish farm
- Light Industry
- Dam
- Taedong-gang

**Area 7, Kadŏk-kol**

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barracks-style prisoner housing, processing plant and a probable livestock facility (located on the east side of the stream). The areas immediately surrounding both locations consist of several small agricultural fields. Overall, the processing plants, prisoner housing areas, and the single road serving them appear to be in a good state of repair. In April 2019, one likely prisoner house was constructed directly northeast of the threshing house.

Area 9, Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-ma-eul, Sadun, and Yongsu-ma-eul

The four villages of Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-ma-eul (39.606944, 126.11944), Sadun (39.604444, 126.119167), and Yongsu-ma-eul (39.607222, 126.123889) are located along the Kilsang-ch’ŏn at its confluence with the Taedong-gang. While this area is dedicated to agriculture, there is a light industrial plant and what is likely a guard barracks located on the west side of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn. A small fish farm in this area was abandoned sometime between 2016 and 2017. One new building situated in an agricultural area and immediately to the left of the guard barracks was constructed in 2019. On the north side of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn, and up a small valley is Kiyang-ma-eul. Immediately east of this, straddling the Kilsang-ch’ŏn and connected by an 8-meter-long footbridge, are the sister villages of Chamsang-ni and Sadun. The area south of the stream contains a housing area and numerous agricultural support structures. The area immediately north of the stream contains a housing area and a threshing house and is primarily dedicated to cultivating several orchards. Approximately 500 meters to the northeast is Yongsu-ma-eul. Of significance here is a large vehicle maintenance and storage facility, which likely serves the entire camp. At times as many as 20 vehicles have been seen within the facility. As of November 2020, available imagery showed up to 12 vehicles at this facility.

Area 10, Hajunaedong

Located along the upper reaches of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn is the village of Hajunaedong (39.648056, 126.180278). Agricultural activity within this region has steadily decreased since May 2003. Between 2003 and 2014, 20 buildings, including prisoner housing and agricultural support buildings, were razed. In April 2018, two likely agricultural support buildings were razed. A threshing house situated directly to the southeast of the agricultural support buildings was razed between 2014 and 2018. The agricultural activity in this area was likely relocated to other areas in the camp. As of April 2021, three prisoner housing units remain in this area.

Area 11, Perimeter Fence Relocation

Located approximately 2.3 kilometers east of Area II is a 1-kilometer section of the perimeter security fence that has been relocated approximately 50 meters to the south sometime after May 2011. The reasons for this move are unclear, however, there are two guard positions present in the area, one near each end of the relocated fence section, possibly indicating a history of perimeter breaches in the area. No further changes to this area have been observed on imagery since 2015.

Area 12, Sanjunaedong

The agricultural village of Sanjunaedong (39.665278, 126.196944) is located on one of the tributaries of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn in the northeast corner of Kwan-li-so No. 14. The area consists of agricultural fields, support buildings, a housing area, and a fish farm. Additionally, there is what appears to be a guard position on the northwest corner of the village along a road that leads to a secondary camp entrance and guard position 1.5 kilometers to the northeast. This area has experienced some changes since December 2014. While the fish farm remain unchanged, the
Figure 11

**Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si**

**Area of Interest 8**
November 10, 2020

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**Prisoner housing area**

**Processing plant**

**Threshing house**

**New building (2019)**

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**Area 8, Sangmu-gol**

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As with the analytical caution presented done so here.

It would be reasonable to assume that they have their operations and intentions.

It is interesting to note that although the escapee... their alleged crimes are of a political nature. The... documents. …North Korean defector XXX is for... those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but... the end of the Korean War.


It is for... political nature. The... upon completion of their term as terms are... committed economic crimes are not allowed... houses political prisoners only, while those who... those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but... affiliated KPA, including political prisoners, their families. …North Korean defector XXX... if... kwan-li-so kyo-hwa-so, or long-term, felony... "After the Korean War, it was used as a detention... the Camp No. 25, which is for... No. 25, which is for... defector XXX... national rail network via the station at... facility to Camp No. 25 is the Korean... 25 is unclear. One report indicates that... Several small villages and military... camps that run from the camp to... facility to the regional electric power grid via... facilities are located in the general area... primary economic activities are centered... primary economic activity is focused on... end of the Korean War. 21, 2015, indicates that the camp has... Camp No. 25 was established... Hamgyŏng Province. He ended up at the No... over high voltage power transmis...ion cables that run from the camp to... Camp No. 25 is the Korean... 315 meters (631 yards by 344 yards) and encom... 577 meters by... measured approximately 577 meters by... 1970 and KH-9 (mapping camera) imagery dated January 27, 1976.

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Figure 12

**Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si Area of Interest 9**
November 10, 2020

- Prisoner housing
- Agriculture support facility
- Probable guard barracks
- Floating fish farm
- Light Industry
- Abandoned fish farm (2017-2018)
- Entrance sign over road
- New building (2020)

Area 9, Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-ma-eul, Sadun, and Yongsu-ma-eul
Figure 13

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ён-si Area of Interest 10 November 10, 2020*

Area 9, Hajunae-dong
North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp No. 25

Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ón-si
Area of Interest 11
November 10, 2020

Figure 14

Area II, Perimeter Fence Relocation

Original perimeter

Relocated perimeter (2011)

Guard Position

Entrance

1:3,500
livestock facility approximately 95 meters away experienced minor changes. This area consisted of ten structures arranged in a square in December 2014. Between 2014 and 2018, a building was partially razed. By 2019, the remaining part of the building along with another smaller building were razed, leaving eight structures. Between 2019 and 2020, a small building was added, and these nine structures remain unchanged from November 2020 to April 2021.

**Area 13, Reinforced Guard Position**

Located along the northeast section of the security perimeter, 1.5 kilometers north of the village of Nujimog (39.675000, 126.148333), is one of Kwan-li-so No. 14’s two remote reinforced guard positions with double walls. No changes to this area have been observed on imagery since 2015.

**Area 14, Abandoned Mining Facilities**

Approximately 1 kilometer north of the village of Kilsang-ni, in the isolated area of Paekt’ap-san (Paekt’ap Mountain, 39.683333, 126.093333), are what appears to be two abandoned mining facilities. Three guard positions lie to the north. To the south, there is the small village of Kilsang-ni (see Area 15). No changes were observed in this area on imagery since 2015. However, the general area and surrounding roads appear to be maintained. It is probable that some activity continues in the area, such as small-scale artisanal mining, logging, or unauthorized activity at the facilities.

**Area 15, Kilsang-ni**

The small village of Kilsang-ni is located along the upper reaches of the Kilsang-ch’ón. It consists of approximately eight structures, which may be barracks with a livestock pen. It is likely that at one time this village supported the activities of the mine 1 kilometer to the north. No changes were observed in this area on imagery since 2015. However, satellite imagery from October 2016 shows the presence of automobiles near the barracks, indicating that there was still activity in this area.

**Area 16, Reinforced Guard Position**

Located along the northwest section of Kwan-li-so No. 14 and 400 meters east of the security perimeter is the second of two remote reinforced guard positions with double walls. Between September 2016 and August 2017, the guard position appears to have been expanded.

**Area 17, Logging and Agricultural Activity**

This area, along the Kumgwang-ch’ón and approximately 1 kilometer northeast of the agricultural village of Kumgwang (39.627778, 126.059167), has three new logging roads constructed since 2015. Construction of the roads began in 2013 and was likely completed by 2016. These roads provide access to the forest west of an agricultural support area consisting of two large buildings where there is evidence of logging activity (e.g., thinning of the forest). No significant changes to this area have been observed since 2015. However, the area is being maintained.

**Area 18, Road Construction Completed**

Area 18 is in the western section of the camp between the villages of Ch’ang-dong (39.604167, 126.063056) and Kumgwang. Construction of a temporary road on the east side of the Kumgwang-ch’ón was likely completed by 2016. This road provides access to support increased logging activity in the area. This road was most likely built to replace the original road on the west side of the Kumgwang-ch’ón that suffered damage caused by seasonal...
Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 12
November 10, 2020

Fish farm

Livestock facility rebuilt (2014-2019)

Area 12, Sanjunae-dong
This image appears to be a satellite view of a specific area within Camp No. 14, Kaech’on-si, known as Kwan-li-so No. 14. The area of interest is marked as Area 13, with a reinforced guard position and a trail leading to this guard position. The coordinates 1:1.000 indicate a scale of 1:1000, suggesting a close-up view of the terrain and infrastructure.

The labels on the map include:
- **Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’on-si**
- **Area of Interest 13**
- **November 10, 2020**

The map highlights a walled perimeter guard position and a trail leading to the guard position, indicating security measures in place. This type of imagery is crucial for understanding the layout and security arrangements of such facilities.
Analysis also includes satellite imagery of Camp No. 25, with imagery from 1970 and KH-9 (mapping camera) imagery dated January 27, 1976.

North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

It is interesting to note that although the escapee 

produced by HRNK and AllSource

open-source reports that the camp has a

light industry and agriculture. Despite

in previous reports (such as

of the nation's

fixed. Political criminals are detained alone with

served in satellite imagery are more representative

It is not structured as a village but is a fenced

houses political prisoners only, while those who

kyo-hwa-so facility that looks like an ordinary prison camp


defector XXX [sic] testified that the father of his

and other high-ranking officials. North Korean

Provincial Party, the head of a local MPS office,

an approximate

18 kilometers south-southwest.

national rail network via the station at

to the southeast. It is connected to the

facilities are located in the general area

primary economic activities are centered

expanded during this period and that its

by January 27, 1976, when it measured

approximately 700 meters by 315 meters

on agriculture and light industry (Figure 3

The date of establishment of Camp No.

in Chongjin.

Hamgyoung Province. He ended up at the No.

and other high-ranking officials. North Korean

Korean War POWs to South Korea, but he was

friend used to perform the duty of turning over

in Ch'ŏng phyŏng (i.e., Ch'ŏngjŏn stream) across from

the physical characteristics ob


HRNK anticipates that we will be able to further

almost certainly provides no support to

This is a training base, and based on

located 18 kilometers south-southwest.

Several small villages and military


diagram: Area 14, Abandoned Mining Facilities
3 Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., Dinville, Andy and Eley, their operations and intentions. and deception (CCD) procedures to mask clearly understand the importance of and the internal security organizations, Analysis), it is important to reiterate produced by HRNK and AllSource 14 North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp in previous reports (such as Analysis also supports escapee and other of the camp, AllSource is presently unable to confirm or deny escapee and other light industry and agriculture. Despite primary economic activity is focused on 25 is under the control of Area 15, Kilsang-ni

Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’on-si Area of Interest 15 November 10, 2020

New building (2016) Livestock pen

1:1,500

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Hamgyŏng-bukto.

It is interesting to note that although the escapee of the port of Ch’ŏng approximately s North Hamgyong Provincial

 Sikh, Mike.

This, how

4 "After the Korean War, it was used as a detention facility for South Korean POWs (Prisoners of War) and political prisoners."

There is no information available that provides any evidence of the camp serving as a prison camp for political prisoners. However, the report states that the camp was established in 1950 and has been expanded since then. The report also notes that the camp has been involved in various political and military conflicts since its establishment. The camp is located in the Hamgyŏng Province and is under the control of the Korean People’s Army. The camp is surrounded by various natural features, including mountains and water bodies, which provide it with a degree of security and isolation. Although the report does not provide specific details about the conditions inside the camp, it does mention that the camp is capable of accommodating a large number of prisoners and that it has been expanded to accommodate future needs. Overall, the report provides a detailed description of the camp and its history, which can be useful for understanding the circumstances surrounding the establishment and operation of the camp. However, further research is needed to accurately assess the conditions inside the camp and the impact on the prisoners who were held there.
Figure 19

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 16
November 10, 2020*

**Large walled perimeter guard barracks**
As with the analytical caution presented within the White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2015) available at https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/White_Paper_on_Human_Rights_in_North_Korea_2015.pdf, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) anticipates that we will be able to further refine the date of the camps establishment in the future.

The date of establishment of Camp No. 25 is unclear. One report indicates that the camp was used as a prisoner-of-war facility for South Korean POWs (Prisoners of War).” Do Kyung-Ok et al., “After the Korean War, it was used as a detention center for political prisoners in the 1950s.”

North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp No. 16

This map of Area 17, Logging and Agricultural Activity shows the presence of a logging area and agricultural support buildings. The map is labeled with the area of interest and includes a scale of 1:3,000. The map indicates the area is connected to the national rail network via the station at the river in Namyang, Onsung County, North Hamgyong Province. It is located 18 kilometers south-southwest of the People’s Air Force’s Sŭngam-ni Air Base, which is under de facto control of the KWP OGD Prisons Bureau of the MSS Department.

The map also includes a point labeled as the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Station, which is connected to the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the southeast. It is connected to the regional electric power grid via overhead high voltage power transmission. The camp is connected to the railroad by January 27, 1976, when it measured approximately 700 meters by 315 meters (Figure 21, 2015), and after that, it passed 15.30 hectares (181,987 square yards) (Figure 1, Figure 2).

Several small villages and military installations surround the camp, with one of those installations being the station at the river in Namyang, Onsung County, North Hamgyong Province. He ended up at the No. 25 [kyo-hwa-so] if [kwan-li-so] if [kwan-li-so], or long-term, felony prisoners. The No. 25 [kyo-hwa-so] [No. 25] is for those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but those serving terms of 1 year or longer, or those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but committed economic crimes are not allowed to work inside the camp, according to an interview with a defector from the camp.

The prison camp measures approximately 7.5 km northwest from the Susŏng District, Ch’ŏngjin-si, Hamgyoung Province. The camp is located on the south bank of the Sol River, which is approximately 700 meters by 315 meters. The camp is connected to the railroad by January 27, 1976, when it measured approximately 700 meters by 315 meters. The camp is surrounded by several small villages and military installations, with one of those installations being the station at the river in Namyang, Onsung County, North Hamgyong Province. He ended up at the No. 25 [kyo-hwa-so] if [kwan-li-so] if [kwan-li-so], or long-term, felony prisoners. The No. 25 [kyo-hwa-so] [No. 25] is for those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but those serving terms of 1 year or longer, or those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but committed economic crimes are not allowed to work inside the camp, according to an interview with a defector from the camp.

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Figure 21

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 18
November 10, 2020

Temporary road built during 2016

Area 18, Road Construction Completed

1:2,500

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NORTH KOREA’S POLITICAL PRISON CAMP, Kwan-li-so No. 14, UPDATE 1

flooding. No further changes in this area have been identified in imagery since 2015.

Area 19, New Agricultural Activity

Between September 2013 and December 2014, a new 3-kilometer-long road was constructed approximately 1.5 kilometers northwest of the village of Ch’ang-dong. The new road provides access to support new agricultural and logging activity in the area. Since 2016, there are several new agricultural fields in the area. This development is consistent with other new construction activities identified in Areas 17 and 18.

Area 20, Ch’ang-dong

One kilometer northwest of the guard barracks discussed in Area 6 is the agricultural village of Ch’ang-dong located on the Kumgang-ch’on. This village consists of worker housing and livestock confinement areas, a fish farm, and on the west side a light industrial facility. This is the largest industrial facility within Kwan-li-so No. 14 and consists of several large buildings—the longest of which is 140 meters—with two tall smokestacks. The purpose of this facility is unclear. Between March 2016 and October 2017, one building in the northeast section of the industrial facility was razed. A road leading west from Ch’ang-dong, past what may be a checkpoint, continues 3 kilometers up a small valley past several agriculture fields and a fish farm. A road to the west leads to what may be a new prisoner housing facility which is surrounded by agricultural fields.

Area 21, Microwave Communications Facility

Located approximately 2.5 kilometers north of the main entrance, and 100 meters west of the security perimeter (i.e., outside Kwan-li-so No. 14), is a microwave communications facility with a large tower, guard barracks, and guard position along the perimeter fence. While the communications facility is part of a nationwide network, it is likely that it is also used by the camp. A road leading to the southwest side of the mountain, away from the camp, appears to be maintained and well-defined. No major changes in this area have been observed on imagery since 2015.

Area 22, Southeast Camp Entrance

A secondary camp entrance is located along the Taedong-gang at the camp’s southeast corner adjacent to the village Sangdoryŏng-ni (39.5775, 126.140278). It consists of an entrance and checkpoint, walled guard barracks, and several support buildings. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery since 2015.

Area 23, Ferry Crossing

Located on the Taedong-gang, 400 meters north of the village of Sol-gol (39.586389, 126.074167), is a ferry crossing connecting Kwan-li-so No. 14 to the partially deactivated Kwan-li-so 18. This crossing was built sometime during 2007-2011 and consists of an entrance checkpoint, a landing ramp on both sides of the Taedong-gang, and a 12-meter-long ferry. The precise reasons for constructing this crossing are unclear. However, the crossing may be to supplement the road bridge (Area 3) at Yasach’am that is often submerged and only marginally usable when the river level is low. No changes of significance were observed on imagery in this area since 2015. A ferry is sometimes observed docked on either bank of the river.

Area 24, Mining Activity

Located immediately west (and outside) of the main road and rail entrances to Kwan-li-so No. 14 are several small mining activities. Given the practice of using prisoners as mine laborers within
Figure 22

Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’on-si Area of Interest 19
November 10, 2020

New agricultural activity (2017-2019)

New agricultural activity (2013-2016)

Area 19, New Agricultural Activity
Figure 23

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si Area of Interest 20
November 10, 2020*

**Figure 23**

*CAMP NO. 14*

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si Area of Interest 20 November 10, 2020*

**Figure 23**

*Area 20, Ch’ang-dong*
Figure 24

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 21
November 10, 2020

Communications facility
Shadow of microwave tower
Microwave tower
Walled perimeter guard position

Area 21, Microwave Communications Facility
Figure 25

Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’on-si
Area of Interest 22
November 10, 2020

Guard Position
Entrance

New building (2019)

East entrance to camp

Area 22, Southeast Camp
Figure 26

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 23
November 10, 2020

Ferry crossing

Ferry moored to west bank

Gravel and sand quarry

Area 23, Ferry Crossing
Figure 27

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si Area of Interest 24 November 10, 2020*

**Mining activity**

Area 24, Mining activity immediately outside the west entrance of *Kwan-li-so* No. 14
the camp and within the adjacent Kwan-li-so No. 18, it is likely that prisoners are, or were, being used at these mining activities and at similar mining activities in the immediate areas around the camp.

**Area 25, Motor Vehicle Maintenance and Storage Facility**

Approximately 500 meters to the northeast is Yongsu-ma-eul. Of significance here is a large motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility, which likely serves the entire camp. At times as many as 20 vehicles have been seen within the facility. As of November 2020, available imagery showed 13 vehicles at this facility.

**Assessment**

Analysis of high-resolution satellite imagery of Kwan-li-so No. 14 and its environs collected between 2016 and 2021, supplemented with our 2015 *North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14* report, indicates that:

» Kwan-li-so No. 14 has been and remains an operational political prison camp. It is one of North Korea’s oldest operating political prisoner camps and is, by North Korean standards, a mature and generally well-maintained facility.

» When taken as a whole, the low-level activity (e.g., agricultural, razing and construction of various structures, additional guard positions, changes at light industrial facilities, etc.) observed throughout the camp during the past six years, likely represents an expansion or reorganization of guard forces, modest increase in prisoner population, or both.

» Given the physical security measures observed, it is likely that most of the camp’s population are prisoners. These prisoners are used to maintain the agricultural fields, orchards, and livestock, and work in the camp’s logging activities and wood products manufacturing, light industrial facilities, and mines.

» Agricultural (including minor livestock rearing), light industries, logging, and wood products production appear to be the primary economic activities at the camp.

» Administrative, barracks, housing, light industrial and support buildings, and grounds are well maintained and in good repair. The grounds around these structures and the road network throughout the camp are well maintained as is typified by the road construction/maintenance operations undertaken in the western section of the camp along the Kumgwang-ch’on.

» There is a moderate diversity of agricultural production, and all agricultural fields and orchards are well defined and maintained. Some of these are irrigated from mountain streams and rivers.

» Most of the electric power for the camp is likely provided by the hydroelectric power plant situated on the northern bank of the Taedong-gang. This power plant likely also provides electricity to the coal mines around Pongch’ang-ni and the local railroad network.

**Recommendations**

While commercially available satellite imagery resolution allows the public to see guard positions and people, for example, in the political prison camp, the full extent of Kim Jong-un’s and the Ministry of State Security’s atrocities in the camps requires further scrutiny.

Continued background investigation and ongoing monitoring of Kwan-li-so No. 14 is recommended to identify all its components, provide a detailed accounting of its previous operations, and develop an objective baseline understanding of its continuing activities, maintain an evidentiary...
Figure 28

*Kwan-li-so No. 14, Kaech’ŏn-si
Area of Interest 25
November 10, 2020

Motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility

Kilsung-č’ŏn

Kilsung-č’ŏn

Livestock facility

1:1,500

Area 25, motor vehicle maintenance and storage facility northeast of Yongsu-ma-eul.
catalog of physical changes at the facility, update its status, develop evidence of prisoner population size, and assist with the identification of human rights abuses.

HRNK calls upon the Kim Jong-un regime to acknowledge the existence of its political prisons as the first step towards their dismantlement, immediately improve the nutritional status of prisoners, many of whom suffer from severe malnutrition; “grant immediate, free and unimpeded access to international humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to the most vulnerable groups, including prisoners” as per Ireland’s May 2019 Universal Periodic Review recommendation, which North Korea supported;¹³ improve health and safety standards at worksites where prison labor is present; allow the ICRC immediate, full, and genuine access to this and all other detention facilities in North Korea; abide by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) and the United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Female Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders (the Bangkok Rules); and provide access to Colonel General Jong Gyong-taek, his predecessors and successors.

HRNK calls upon the United Nations and any international organizations or civil society organizations operating near Kwan-li-so No. 14 to consider the vulnerability of prisoners inside this facility and incorporate a Human Rights up Front approach when delivering humanitarian aid to North Koreans in need.¹⁴ Prisoners inside this facility should be treated as one of the most vulnerable populations. The Kim regime’s practice of state-sponsored forced labor and egregious human rights violations, constituting crimes against humanity in both the kwan-li-so and kyo-hwa-so, must be highlighted by UN Member States when engaging with North Korea.
**Gazetteer**

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**Research Note**

HRNK would like to extend a special note of thanks to Allen Anderson for his gracious support of HRNK’s efforts to document North Korea’s prison system and the tragic conditions present within that system. HRNK would also like to express sincere gratitude to the following individuals for their contributions to this report: Maria Del Carmen Corte, for her graphic design and edits, and Madeline Hieneman, Claire McCrea, Amber Nguyen, Doohyun Kim, and Sophia Hapin for their imagery analysis support.
1. Previous reports in the project can be found at https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php.
2. Some interviewees and researchers have occasionally identified the facility as “Political Prison Camp No. 14,” “Camp No. 14,” “Political Prison Camp 14,” or the “Kaech’ŏn Kwan-li-so.”
3. The term “high resolution” in this report refers to digital satellite images with a ground sample distance (GSD) of less than 1 meter. The GSD is the distance between adjacent pixel centers when measured on the ground.
8. Jong Gyong-taek is sometimes identified as Jong Kyong Thaek, Jong Kyong-thaek or 정경택. According to Yonhap, Jong was demoted to the rank of colonel general (three stars) in September 2020. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200930004900320.
12. While satellite imagery is normally rotated to its “look angle” (the angle of view as if looking out an airplane window at the ground), the imagery in this report is all set at “north up” (north is at the top of the image) to ease comparison with our original report.
HRNK is the leading U.S.-based bipartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, tasked to focus international attention on human rights abuses in that country. It is HRNK’s mission to persistently remind policy makers, opinion leaders, and the general public in the free world and beyond that more than 20 million North Koreans need our attention.

Since its establishment in 2001, HRNK has played an important intellectual leadership role on North Korean human rights issues by publishing over 50 major reports (available at https://hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php). HRNK became the first organization to propose that the human rights situation in North Korea be addressed by the UN Security Council. HRNK was directly, actively, and effectively involved in all stages of the process supporting the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry. HRNK has been invited numerous times to provide expert testimony before the U.S. Congress. In April 2018, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) granted HRNK UN consultative status.

For media inquiries, please contact Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu at +1 202.499.7973 or by e-mail at executive.director@hrnk.org.

All satellite imagery in this document: DigitalGlobe, NextView License and Copernicus Sentinel Data.