After Kim Jong-Il:

Can We Hope for Better Human Rights Protection?

By Kim Kwang Jin
After Kim Jong-Il: Can We Hope for Better Human Rights Protection?
After Kim Jong-II: Can We Hope for Better Human Rights Protection?

Board of Directors, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

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-MBA in Finance, Insurance
University of North Korean Studies (2008), Republic of Korea
-Masters in Economics/IT of North Korea
Kim Il Sung University (1989), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
-Degree in British Literature
Pyongyang Foreign Language Institute (1984), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
-Degree in English

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2009-Present  -The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Fellow
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2007-2009    -Institute for National Security Strategy
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2003-2002    -Singapore Representative of NEAB
2002-2000    -Korean Foreign Insurance Co., North East Asia Bank
1999         -Foreign Trade Bank of DPRK
1998-1997    -ING-North East Asia Bank
1997-1991    -Pyongyang Computer College, Professor
1991-1989    -3 Revolution Work Team
On a dark night in September, 2003, Mr. Kim Kwang Jin, accompanied by his family, rushed to an airport in Southeast Asia to fly to freedom in Seoul, South Korea. His wife later recalled that every step she took felt like she was walking to the gallows. Only a few months earlier, the Kims had been privileged members of the North Korean regime’s overseas banking operations, bestowed with benefits that many members of North Korea’s official diplomatic missions do not receive. The Kims had entertained visiting North Korean officials, including some of the high level people mentioned in this report, and enjoyed purchasing power and lifestyles that other North Koreans can hardly imagine. With privilege comes an understanding of reality—most obviously, the false precepts of a regime that exists solely for the benefit of Kim Jong-Il at the expense of a nation that is impoverished, starving, and suffering. The family of Kim Kwang Jin, like many other recent defectors, can now speak openly in the West about the misery they know exists in North Korea and their patriotic hopes for a North Korea that will be different after Kim Jong-Il.

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea is the leading US-based bipartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy. Launched in 2001, it was created to build a broad base of knowledge about conditions in North Korea and focus the world’s attention on human rights abuses there. We have published reports including the path-breaking *Hidden Gulag: Uncovering North Korea’s Prison Camps; Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea;* and *Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China.*
This report is something different—the first in a series of “Occasional Papers,” this sets out a point of view that is not necessarily representative of the Committee or its Board of Directors. It is the viewpoint of a courageous man who has had a unique opportunity to see how outcomes in North Korea are produced, which individuals are critical to the political process, and what limitations and latitude they have to achieve results. We are pleased to give him the opportunity to exercise a right none of his former colleagues were permitted to exercise while in North Korea—the right to imagine what might happen after Kim Jong-Il ceases to rule North Korea, and to work to improve the lives of his countrymen.

Richard V. Allen,  
Co-chair

Stephen J. Solarz,  
Co-chair

Chuck Downs,  
Executive Director
North Korea’s Second Succession Will Be Different From the First

North Korea today is in a state of power succession in which it is not clear who will attain legitimacy and power. That was not the case in North Korea’s first succession following the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994.

For the twenty years preceding the death of Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il had been groomed to be his father’s successor. After a long period of mourning, the North Korean Constitution was changed in 1998, abolishing the title of presidency and enshrining Kim Il-Sung as the “eternal president.” At the present, fifteen years after the death of Kim Il-Sung, North Korea is still referred to as “Kim Il-Sung’s nation” and all aspects of its life revolve around Kim’s reign.

Through the deification of his father, Kim Jong-Il was able to seize and retain power in his father’s name. Although nominally “socialist,” the new feudal system under the singular dictatorship of Kim Jong-Il was widely accepted as the only means of succession after Kim Il-Sung. This basis for power succession cannot be used successfully again.

Even though there is a flood of recent reports and some signals that Kim Jong-Il already named his third son, Kim Jong-Eun, as the next heir, there is no sure guarantee this time that it will work well.

Depending on how the succession proceeds and many other unpredictable developments, a number of possibilities will arise. Before
the “next leader” of North Korea emerges, power may shift from one candidate to another.

**The Possibility of Hereditary Succession**

Kim Jong-Il’s first son, **Kim Jong-Nam** was sometimes cited as a candidate, but he is no longer a contender. Following his father’s health problems, Kim Jong-Nam appeared in public and media too frequently and too frankly, saying that “if I were a successor, you would not be able to see me in Macao.” This is an admission that he understands he is largely excluded from the process taking place in Pyongyang. There was a report that when Kim Jong-Il’s 3 sons were interviewed, the first and second sons declined and vowed to back their youngest brother, Kim Jong-Eun, paving the way for his designation as heir. But the reality seems to be the opposite. If Kim Jong-Nam wants to be a real help, silence would be expected. But he has become more talkative. We are even hearing that Kim Jong-Nam believes Kim Jong-Eun’s associates have tried to assassinate Kim Jong-Nam.

It is often pointed out that Kim Jong-Nam spends little time in Pyongyang and seems to be out of favor with his father.

It could be that Kim Jong-Il fears that Kim Jong-Nam harbors ill feelings toward many in the inner circle in Pyongyang. In the memoirs of Lee Han-Yong, the nephew of Kim Jong-Il, Lee wrote that Kim Jong-Il's loss of his mother and resentment toward his step-mother laid the foundation for Kim Jong-Il's cold ruthlessness as he purged his opponents and rose to power. Kim Jong-Nam's mother was similarly mistreated by his father, ended up losing her mind and died in Moscow.

Perhaps Kim Jong-Il fears that Kim Jong-Nam will act against his
father's associates in much the same way that Kim Jong-Il himself did.

Nevertheless, it is believed that Kim Jong-Nam’s chances to lead would increase if the People's Republic of China became involved in North Korean transition. Kim Jong-Nam lives in Macao and is generally assumed to act under the protection of the People's Republic of China. The alleged report that China saved Kim Jong-Nam from an assassination attempt by his brother and protected him in a safe place indicates China’s concern. Although it is unlikely that China would provide lasting political or economic support, if China found a reason to intervene, China might be expected to give support to Kim Jong-Nam, and he could be installed as the future leader of North Korea.

The other two sons also pose questions. As early as 2001, there was a campaign to have Ko Yong-Hui, the mother of Kim Jong-Il’s second and third sons, worshiped as the “mother of the soldiers.” A recent defector from suburban Pyongyang confirmed in 2008 that songs of Ko Yong-Hui were still being sung openly among soldiers. There were indications that second son Kim Jong-Chol was working at the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) and there was a posted slogan in the central party honoring his “high leadership.”

Kim Jong-Eun's candidacy became regular fare in news releases in 2009, even though he is only 26. Reports indicate that he has been honored with several positions of authority; in the Army (“Four-star general”), State Security Department (SSD—where he was a “Major General”), National Defense Commission (NDC—where, in 2009, it was reported he was designated an “instructor”), Organization and Guidance Department (OGD—where he was the “director”), and is being given credit for the new campaign aimed at promoting productivity (named the “150-day campaign”). On June 1, 2009, there were press reports that North Korea had advised its officials stationed abroad that Kim Jong-
Eun had been designated Kim Jong-II’s successor.

For a hereditary succession to be successful, however, this step would only be the first among many actions that could prove difficult under current circumstances: (1) confirming Kim Jong-II’s decision itself; (2) winning acceptance for the decision among family members like Kim Jong-II’s sister, Kim Kyong-Hui, and brother-in-law, Chang Song-Taek, and with other senior officials and close aides; (3) appointing the heir to positions appropriate for his succession; (4) obtaining the gradual and perhaps begrudging acceptance by the people at large; (5) and finally, giving him power. Even in totalitarian North Korea, these steps are fraught with difficulty and must be managed with care while Kim Jong-II is alive and there is no certainty he can accomplish these steps within the time he has left.

For this reason, we can anticipate a potential temporary-transitional power shift outside of the hereditary line of Kim Jong-II. A strong political figure loyal to Kim Jong-II might be able to take over as a kind of “regent,” while one of Kim’s sons undergoes preparation for taking power at a later date—this may in fact explain why the youngest son, arguably the least ready to take power, is being given so much attention.

Temporary Non-Hereditary Succession

In this scenario, a temporary hand-off of power would be given to a non-hereditary successor in order to facilitate the gradual transition to the ultimate hereditary successor. With likely candidates dubbed “too young” to effectively govern, Kim Jong-II's worsening health and the fear of a sudden power vacuum might justify resorting to such a transitional system. This power shift would most likely be made either to
a power block with a central player such as Chang Song-Taek or to collective leadership.

**Transitional Rule by a “Regent”**

The present North Korean system does not allow for any formation of governmental power blocks. However, with a “royal” family background and high-level position at the Administrative Department (formerly in OGD), Chang Song-Taek has developed a strong reputation and is a trusted power in the Kim Jong-II regime. As such, Chang occupies the strongest possibility to be a “regent” for the transitional government towards a hereditary succession. Chang could be expected to begin in a capacity with less power than Kim Jong-II until a hereditary successor would be deemed fit to serve.

**Transitional Collective Management**

In the case of collective management, no one person would maintain central power during a transitional government. In the event that Kim Jong-II would not support Chang Song-Taek as the leader of transitional government or if Chang were reluctant to do so, a collective management could arise. Likewise, in the case that a hereditary successor was named, this option could be chosen to divert support away from Chang Song-Taek who with experience and reputation poses a possible threat to an incoming hereditary regime. Or the opposite could be true—Chang could recognize the weakness of the hereditary heir and use it to wrest control of the state from the Kim family.

**Permanent Non-Hereditary Succession**

There still remains the possibility that Kim Jong-II will abandon the idea of a hereditary successor. His sudden death or a failure of
hereditary succession in the early stage of transition would allow complete power transfer to a non-hereditary successor.

**Leadership by One Individual**

Although there are several options, the strongest candidate remains Chang Song-Taek. With a record of consistency with Kim Jong-Il’s policies, no imminent challenge from the military and an allegiance to Kim Jong-Il’s family, Chang Song-Taek represents a viable possibility for non-hereditary succession. A smooth transition of power, the maintenance of central state power in most contingencies could be expected.

**Collective Leadership**

Yet should Kim Jong-Il choose not to select Chang Song-Taek, the outcome may be less sanguine. A collective leadership may arise as the succeeding regime to Kim Jong-Il. Such a government is likely to be fragile. The North Korean system is not now constructed to allow competing voices to vie for power. With no central leader, a collective government could produce fierce power struggles among competing leaders. Group factions and power blocks could undoubtedly form. This would lead to less cooperation among potentially competing forces and likely to destabilization.

**Implications of Power Succession**

Fragile, worsening health, long drawn-out economic collapse and growing political instability in North Korea indicate that the Kim Jong-Il regime is drawing to an end. *The question of power succession is not when it will happen but how it will occur and progress.* The success or failure of succession will define the future of North Korea.
Given the current system’s total reliance on the rule of one man, it is more than likely that the next regime in North Korea will not be able to adhere to the policies of Kim Jong-Il. Even Kim Jong-Il found it necessary to change key policies of his father. A successful succession may be conditional on the revision or denial of Kim Jong-Il’s policy, marking a new era of non-Kim governance that could ultimately lead to increased reform, the opening of North Korea and the dissolution of socialism.

The next regime, regardless of who succeeds, will be unable to maintain the same policy that the current regime is pursuing. Even if it tries, it cannot be as strong as the current regime was. It will be this loosening of the current system and the resulting deviations from totalitarian Kim-ism which will allow for the rise of market activities and individualism and which will likely lead to improve overall human rights in North Korea (although perhaps incrementally). If the new leader must coordinate various power groups and respond to them, this may produce broader policies aimed at accommodating various concerns. In North Korea, this constitutes a sea change. If the new leader seeks to use popular support as one basis for establishing his authority and legitimacy, the opening may become wider.

Yet, there is another opportunity for both the current and next regime. If North Korean leaders took what Nicholas Eberstadt calls a “bold switch-over” in their military and security policies, abandoning nuclear weapons and their “military first policy,” they would be given many opportunities to overcome their economic hardships. They would attract a flood of foreign assistance and capital. For leaders who are not certain of their power base, the opportunity of getting massive foreign aid could prove helpful in meeting the challenge of governing North Korea. (For detailed analysis, see Nicholas Eberstadt, “Economic

Despite the optimism of some observers that the protection of human rights might naturally increase in North Korea in a post-Kim Jong-Il regime, the threat of a military coup or clique forming out of the succeeding regime is also a clear concern. At present, the possibility of formation of such cliques in the current Kim regime is very low. High ranking military officials above the level of regiment commanders, as well as political leaders, are under constant, strict surveillance and supervision. In this system, close ties among superiors, subordinates and peers do not extend past official matters.

Although traditionally such cliques would occur through educational background, family connections or ambition, these have heretofore been forbidden. It is possible that such cliques will form after Kim Jong-Il’s death, driven by opposition to Kim’s former rule, ideology or possibly patriotism. This could bring only positive change to North Korea’s policies.

Recent Developments Inside North Korea: The Formation of Power Blocks

It is possible to recognize that in certain recent developments, the changes are already under way. The appointment of Chang Song-Taek and others in the NDC demonstrates the development of a power block that has implications for succession.
Chang Song-Taek and the Emerging New Importance of the Defense Commission

In February, 2009, the Party’s Operations Department Head, O Guk-Ryol was appointed Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). At the first session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong-Il was elected for a third time as Chairman, along with these new members:

- Chang Song-Taek - Administrative Department Director
- Ju Sang-Song - Minister of Public Security Ministry (police)
- U Dong-Chuk - Vice Director of the State Security Department
- Ju Kyu-Chang - 1st Vice Director of the Party’s Munitions Industry Department
- Kim Jong-Kak - 1st Vice Director of the Army's General Political Bureau

The photos of all of the members of the Commission were made public on the 10th of February by North Korean media, a very unusual measure. Until that time, only the photographs of vice chairmen had been openly released. The election of Chang Song-Taek and the extension of membership to men whom he supervises in the security apparatus indicate his growing importance. Not only is he gaining power, but he is also gaining “votes” on the Commission. The public identification of NDC member U Dong-Chuk, the head of the SSD, a very sensitive position, and another of Chang Song Taek’s people, is quite significant. Paek Se-Bong, who was already a member of the NDC and is in charge of North Korea’s munitions industry had never been acknowledged in
public, until the Party’s first vice director of munitions, Ju Kyu-Chang was identified in public and listed as a new member of the NDC. In North Korea, such public announcements inform everyone of who has attained new heights of power.

With all these changes the Commission is now assuming the status of a standing organization, somewhat like a politburo. Amidst Kim Jong-Il’s failing health and looming political instability, the Defense Commission is the state’s contingency governing body in addition to its role as the supreme organization providing military guidance. The NDC, as it has now been designed, can pre-empt the power of the Worker’s Party. Even the party’s Organization and Guidance Department, long considered the most powerful office in North Korea’s party structure, has to recognize that the NDC is now more powerful. There is no doubt this is true for emergencies, certainly matters of succession, and increasingly seems true overall.

Collective Guidance and Decision Making

This proactive measure toward decentralization in Kim Jong-Il’s ruling power and a shift towards collective guidance and counsel marks a significant change in the style of governance in North Korea. In light of Kim Jong-Il’s illness, the concern over a potential power vacuum or loss of overall control has already led to a type of collective leadership. General trends in policy have yet to change as seen in the continued and highly vocal support for North Korea’s “military first” policy.

Reshuffling of Military Control to Central Command

Recent appointments of Kim Yong-Chun as the Minister of the
People’s Armed Forces, and Lee Yong-Ho, the former head of Capital Defense Command as the Chief of the General Staff indicate a shift in the regime to reorganize the military under a single, central authority. Similar to the period under O Jin-U, the military would be unified under one command, consolidating the current three sections: political, forces and administration. Although the divided commands were designed to strengthen Kim Jong-Il's sole grip on power, his incapacity makes continued, divided control of the military impossible. Reshaping major spy bodies under the party and affiliating most of them with the Army's Reconnaissance Bureau which has now become a General Reconnaissance Bureau constitutes another major move to centralize and consolidate military power.

**Recommendations**

Despite the various challenges that must be faced in addressing the succession and the future of North Korea, one requirement has become clear. We must shift American policy away from singular attention to the issue of nuclear programs to a multi-faceted approach in dealing with North Korea. Emphasis must be placed on two important outcomes: (1) promoting international involvement and (2) preparing the foundation for the new policies of a post-Kim Jong-Il North Korea.

**Promoting International Involvement**

The “North Korean problem” lies with its regime, specifically Kim Jong-Il himself. Without an end to the current regime, we cannot hope to find a solution to all the fundamental problems in North Korea.

With Kim Jong-Il’s regime coming to an inevitable end, the
emerging North Korean government must necessarily develop, internally, a plan for sustainable control and management of national governance. It is certainly reasonable for any group coming to power to seek stability. But there is a danger that given the lack of technology, scarce resources and decreasing central control, such internal efforts to maintain stability may fail. An external effort to demand concessions from weakened leaders in North Korea under such circumstances would likely prove counter-productive.

At the same time, there is an opportunity for bringing change to North Korea that must not be missed. International cooperation and oversight must therefore be planned well in advance to deal with the inevitable reduction of state control in North Korea. Because the military option to accomplish the end of Kim-ism in North Korea is only a last resort and undesirable at that, the coordination of unified efforts of the international community as Kim passes is vital.

This international cooperation will necessarily build on the existing strong military alliance between the United States and South Korea, continued close cooperation with Japan, and the concerted efforts of China and Russia. What is needed above all is firm determination and preparedness from the international community.

**Preparation for Post-Kim Policies**

It is not too late for the international community to undertake substantive discussions regarding preparations for a post-Kim Jong-Il era for North Korea. Both formal and informal dialogue should be encouraged as most parties to the 6 Party Talks have a direct interest in its future. Consensus among concerned nations, with the absolute support of China, the US and South Korea, must be obtained in order to
bring about the desired change in the post-Kim Jong-Il North Korea. Regardless of whether the next regime is pro-China, pro-South Korea or pro-United States, the future of North Korea must be focused on creating the possibility for North Korea to become an open state, ready for wide-scale reform. It is through this reform that an open North Korea will be able to develop the necessary pre-conditions for lasting governance and prosperity.

The opening of North Korea, however, will not be likely to occur through an accelerated unification process. Although often considered the “de facto” resolution to North Korean policy, it is clear that rapid and overhasty unification will lead to greater nation-wide economic difficulties, political rancor and overall destabilization. If the Sino-US-South Korea parties external to North Korea were to reach an agreement to enforce unification ahead of its time, there is little doubt that such intention would forever be undermined by opposing parties including factions within North Korea itself. This does not mean that eventual unification is out of the question. It is clear, however, that unification should occur after North Korea has reformed. That is to say, North Korea must dispose of the legacy of Kimist policies before it is united with South Korea. It will be the openness of the government in North Korea following a period of reform that would best allow North Korea to progress out of its current situation and attain the necessary conditions for unification as a viable possibility in a post-Kim Jong-Il North Korea.

The preparation of a sustainable, nation-wide system of new management and the adoption of new post-Kim Jong-Il policies must be based on a fundamental understanding of human rights in North Korea. The continual lack of concern for basic human rights in North Korea has caused the overall degeneration of the North Korean state and resulted in the adoption of state policy which does not meet the basic needs of the
citizens. Kim Jong-Il allowed for the misallocation of resources away from nation-promoting initiatives to nation-crippling nuclear weapons, military spending and an elite-centered economy. The right of the people to benefit under a new system is understood by all external parties, even by those that are not true democracies, but it is not understood within North Korea itself.

Regardless of who takes power in North Korea after Kim Jong-Il, international influence will prove to be a necessary precondition for the very survival of North Korea’s people. Through an international resolution by nation-states and by international organizations such as the United Nations, the global community must address the future of North Korea, not merely as one of military engagement and political conflict, but as one of global importance for the continued prosperity of the global community.

Only through such resolve can we hope to rise above the current situation and avoid the imminent dangers of the “state of emergency” which is North Korea.
After Kim Jong-Il: Can We Hope for Better Human Rights Protection?

Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

The word “Credentials” in these charts means current and past positions held
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Kim Ok © 2006 Daily NK
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Chang Song-Taek © 2006 Yonhap News
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Choi Ik-Kyu © 2003 Opentory
Lee Yong-Chol © 2007 Associated Press
Lee Je-Gang © 2009 Nate SK Communications

The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
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Washington DC 20006 USA
### Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Kim Jong-Nam</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date of Birth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of Birth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family Relation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Places Lived</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Credentials** | • Reported to be the Chairman of Chosun Computer Committee (1998–)  
• Known to have been involved with Office No. 39 and its illicit activities in Macau  
• Sometimes listed as involved in the State Security Department (*Bowibu*, 2002–) |
| **Summary of Power Base** | • First son of Kim Jong-II  
• Often said to be in disfavor with his father  
• Implicated as having a possible role in the 1997 assassination of Lee Han-Yong, perhaps to gain favor with his father  
• Lives abroad and does not freely meet Kim Jong-II when he visits NK |
| **Possibility of Succession** | • Little possibility for succeeding Kim Jong-II  
• Will most likely continue to be estranged from his father because he now lives under the Chinese protection in Macau, and some believe Chinese intervention may bring him to power |
## Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

![Image](image.png)

### 2. Kim Jong-Chol

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>September 25, 1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Second son of Kim Jong-Il. His mother was Ko Yong-Hui who died in Paris in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td>Switzerland for schooling (1993~1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Credentials          | - Known to have taken Special Course at Kim Il-Sung Military University (2001~April, 2006)  
                        - Reported to be in a mid-level position in the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) of the Worker’s Party of Korea |
| Summary of Power Base| - Second son of Kim Jong-Il  
                        - Even while Ko Yong-Hui was alive, her deification was seen as having an implication for succession for her sons |
| Possibility of Succession | - Could succeed in a hereditary succession scenario  
                           - Would be purged if hereditary succession failed |
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

### 3. Kim Jong-Eun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>January 8, 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Third son of Kim Jong-II. His mother was Ko Yong-Hui who died in Paris in 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td>Two years in Switzerland for schooling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Credentials         | • Known to have taken Special Course at Kim Il-Sung Military University (2002–April, 2007)  
                      • Reported to have been appointed Instructor at National Defense Commission in 2009  
                      • Described as Four-star General in Kim Jong-Il’s Body Guard (a large Command), in the Army, or a Major General at State Security Department |
| Summary of Power Base | • Third son of Kim Jong-II and Ko Yong-Hui  
                          • Even while Ko Yong-Hui was alive, her deification was seen as having an implication for succession of her sons |
| Possibility of Succession | • Could succeed in a hereditary succession scenario  
                              • Would be purged if hereditary succession failed |
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

### 4. Kim Ok

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>1964</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Recognized as the de facto first lady to Kim Jong-II after Ko Yong-Hui’s death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Credentials | • Reported to have graduated Pyongyang Music and Dance Univ. and a pianist  
• Known as a Personal Secretary to Kim Jong-II at the Secretarial Office of the Worker’s Party of Korea  
• Visited the US under the title of Section Chief of NDC in 2000  
• Reported to be involved with Office No. 39 operations |
| Summary of Power Base | • First lady  
• Known as a Personal Secretary to Kim Jong-II at the Secretarial Office of the Worker’s Party of Korea |
| Possibility of Succession | • Active support and role in succession behind the scenes  
• May control Kim Jong-II’s personal, secret funds  
• Will likely be purged in a failed succession |
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

5. Kim Kyong-Hui

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>May 30, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Younger sister of Kim Jong-Il; wife of Chang Song-Taek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Credentials</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director of Light Industry Department, Worker’s Party of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Director of Economic Policy Inspection Dept., WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vice Director of International Relations Department, WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Power Base</td>
<td>Only sibling of Kim Jong-Il (not a half brother or half-sister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of Succession</td>
<td>Will support and advise on succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Will retire if succession is successful, will be purged in failed succession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

### 6. Chang Song-Taek

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>February 6, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>North Hamgyong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Brother-in-law of Kim Jong-Il and husband of Kim Jong-Il’s sister Kim Kyong-Hui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td>Has traveled extensively in Asia (South Korea, Singapore, China, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Credentials**
- Member of National Defense Commission (2009)
- Director of Administrative Department of WPK, of which the task includes supervising the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the State Security Department (SSD)
- 1st Vice Director of Capital Construction Department, WPK
- 1st Vice Director of Administrative Section of Organization and Guidance Department (OGD)—the task includes supervising MPS and SSD
- Director of Youth and “3 Revolution Work Team” Department, WPK

**Summary of Power Base**
- Brother-in-law to Kim Jong-Il; married to Kim Jong-Il’s only sister
- 2nd most powerful man in North Korea (controls security Dept)
- Strong influence over Organization and Guidance Department
- Experience in raising and handling "Revolutionary funds"
- Deeply involved in capital construction and economic measures
- 2 older brothers were important generals in the army

**Possibility of Succession**
- Major role in supporting another hereditary succession
- Role as a regent if hereditary succession is not ready
- May come into power in his own right as the next leader of North Korea
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

7. **Kim Yong-Chun** (five star general)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>March 4, 1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Descendant of anti-Japanese partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td>Russia (Frunze Military Academy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credentials</td>
<td>Vice Chairman of National Defense Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minister of the People's Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Chief of the General Staff, the People's Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander in Chief of KPA Corps 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director General of Military Mobilization General Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director of Operations Bureau of the People's Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Director, the Worker’s Party of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Power Base</td>
<td>Graduate of Mangyongdae Revolutionary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Descendant of anti-Japanese partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Graduate Russian Frunze Military Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has held all major positions in the army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Led a purge of the Corps 6 after the 1996 incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of Succession</td>
<td>Support for another hereditary succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will maintain unified control of the military</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

8. O Guk-Ryol (former full general)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>1931</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>Jilin City, China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Descendant of anti-Japanese partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td>China, Pyongyang, Russia (Frunze Military Academy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Credentials | • Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, still in charge of former WPK Operations Department (OD) and possibly the General Reconnaissance Bureau of the Army which is reported to have merged 2 spy bodies, OD and former WPK Office No. 35  
• Director of Operations Department, WPK  
• Director of Civil Defense Department, WPK  
• Former Chief of the General Staff, People's Armed Forces  
• Commander of Air Force, KPA  
• Dean of Air Force University |
| Summary of Power Base | • Descendant of anti-Japanese partisan (only son of O Jung-Song whose younger brother Jung-Hup idealized Army loyalty to Kim Il-Sung)  
• Graduate Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, and Kim Il-Sung University  
• Graduate Russian Frunze Military Academy  
• Has grown up with Kim Jong-II  
• Lead modernization of Army in 1980s  
• Has planned all intelligence and covert operations for 20 years as the head of the Operations Department |
| Possibility of Succession | • Will support another hereditary succession  
• Plays a major role in controlling the army  
• Old age prohibits long-term involvement in succession |
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

9. Choi Ik-Kyu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>February 26, 1933 (1934?)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td>Hwadae, North Hamgyong Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td>Pyongyang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credentials</td>
<td>• Secretary and Director of Propaganda and Agitation Department, WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minister of Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Well-known bandleader of the <em>Bochonbo</em> Electronic (musical) Band organized for Kim Jong-II’s private entertainment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vice Director of Propaganda and Agitation Department, WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Creation Department Head at Mansudae Art Theatre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Section Chief of Propaganda and Agitation Department, WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Power Base</td>
<td>• Close aide to Kim Jong-II at the period of succession from Kim Il-Sung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Contributed greatly to the deification, succession through creating movies and other cultural products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of Succession</td>
<td>• Will design and manipulate propaganda supporting succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Old age prohibits long-term involvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea

10. Lee Yong-Chol (former major general)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>March 24, 1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credentials</td>
<td>1st Vice Director of the OGD, WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of the Central Military Commission, WPK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Director of the Chosa-bu (Office No. 35--Foreign Intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Power Base</td>
<td>Chief of the OGD, WPK in charge of military (HR affairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Became a close aide after Kim Jong-Il’s succession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of Succession</td>
<td>Will support succession, and serve an important role in the military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Old age prohibits long-term involvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Influential Persons in the Next Power Succession in North Korea**

### 11. Lee Je-Gang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of Birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Relation</td>
<td>Descendant of anti-Japanese partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Places Lived</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Credentials | • 1st Vice Director of the OGD, WPK  
• Vice Director of the OGD, Secretary to Kim Jong-Il |
| Summary of Power Base | • Descendant of anti-Japanese partisan  
• Worked heavily in OGD, in charge of human resources  
• Long time aide of Kim Jong-Il |
| Possibility of Succession | • Will support succession, important role in Workers’ Party  
• Old age prohibits long-term involvement |