North Korea
Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Andy Dinville, and Mike Eley
Overview of North Korea’s Political Prison Camp System

Despite North Korea’s adamant denial that political prison camps exist, research based on interviews and satellite imagery reveals a shocking and detailed operation of a vast system of arbitrary and extra-judicial, unlawful detention. In its findings released in February 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (COI) determined that “crimes against humanity have been committed in North Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State.” Many of these crimes against humanity take place against persons detained in political and other prison camps—persons who the Commission determined are among the “primary targets of a systematic and widespread attack” by the North Korean regime—including: murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political grounds, and the enforced disappearance of persons.

According to the COI:

In the political prison camps of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the inmate population has been gradually eliminated through deliberate starvation, forced labour, executions, torture, rape and the denial of reproductive rights enforced through punishment, forced abortion and infanticide. The commission estimates that hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have perished in these camps over the past five decades. The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the kwan-li-so political prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth century.1

Through this vast system of unlawful imprisonment, the North Korean regime isolates, banishes, punishes and executes those suspected of being disloyal to the regime. “[P]olitical prisoners are: real, suspected or imagined wrong-doers and wrongthinkers, or persons with wrong-knowledge and/or wrong-associations who have been deemed to be irredeemably counter-revolutionary and pre-emptively purged from North Korean society.”2 Up to 120,000 are known to be held in the kwan-li-so political prison camps where they are relentlessly subjected to induced malnutrition, forced labor, and other cruel and unusual punishment. Thousands upon thousands more are forcibly held in other detention facilities. North Korea denies access to the camps to outsiders, whether human rights investigators, scholars, or international media, and severely restricts the circulation of information across its borders.

Based on research conducted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), five trends have defined the human rights situation under the Kim Jong-un regime: 1) an intensive crackdown on attempted defections; 2) an aggressive purge of senior officials, aimed to consolidate the leader’s grip on power; 3) a “restructuring” of the political prison camp system, with some facilities closer to the border with China being shut down while inland facilities have been expanded; 4) disproportionate oppression of women, who have assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families; thus, women represent the majority of those arrested for perceived wrongdoing at the “jangmadang” markets, or for “illegally” crossing the border; and 5) the sustained, if not increased, economic importance of the political prison camps.

Introduction

As part of a joint undertaking with HRNK to use satellite imagery to shed light on human suffering in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as North Korea), AllSource Analysis (AllSource) has been monitoring activity at political prison facilities throughout North Korea. This report details activity at a facility that we have previously identified as the
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Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area, since its national designator is presently unknown.1

Executive Summary
The Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is unique among North Korea’s network of kwan-li-so in that its identification as a political detention facility is based upon the analysis of satellite imagery, comparison of its infrastructure characteristics with other kwan-li-so (e.g., security perimeter with entrance and guard positions, internal arrangement, etc.), and its physical association with Camp 14—they share a common security perimeter for approximately 3.1 kilometers (km). Although it had been privately identified as a possible kwan-li-so as far back as 2007, the first public association of the area to a kwan-li-so was made by Curtis Melvin in January 2013.2

For this report, AllSource Analysis analyzed imagery of the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area and its immediate environs using pan-sharpened multispectral satellite imagery collected by DigitalGlobe, Airbus Defense and Space, NASA’s EO-1, and Landsat from December 18, 2006, through May 24, 2015. Imagery analysis leads to the determination that the area is a kwan-li-so and provides an understanding of its operational status based on the presence and changes in physical features:
- Entrance and guard positions
- Housing and agricultural support facilities and activity
- Internal arrangement
- Mining activity
- Miscellaneous activity
- Road network
- Security perimeters (internal and external)

Based on analysis of these features, the Chomabong-ch’ŏn Valley began functioning as an operational political prison camp since about 2007. It remains so today, as one of North Korea’s newest political prison camps, and is by North Korean standards a small and generally well-maintained facility, as indicated by general activity, construction, and maintenance throughout the camp.

Work on what would become the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area was initiated during mid-2006 when crews began to widen and install a perimeter fence on a narrow trail running east on a ridge of Ch’oma-bong (Ch’oma Mountain). The following year, between February and May 2007, the road running up the Chomabong-ch’ŏn (Ch’oma-bong Stream) Valley was improved and straightened, and new housing construction began on the southeast side of Ch’oma-bong village.3 Later that year, construction began to extend the perimeter to the south around the valley and included building additional housing and grading for an entrance gate. Additional construction activity was identified further southeast of Ch’oma-bong from 2008 to 2012. Most notably, during October 2013 and April 2014, two high-security internal compounds were established (Figure 1).

Economic activity within the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is focused primarily on mining and agriculture, with a few instances of light industry. These activities, however, are at a significantly lower level than those observed at Camps 14, 15, and 16.

It is important to note that the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area has yet to be publicly identified by either the South Korean or U.S. governments as a kwan-li-so, and no escapees have identified the facility. It is also worth restating the analytical caution presented in previous reports (such as North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp 15, North Korea’s Camp No. 25 Update, North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 16, and North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14) produced by HRNK and AllSource. North Korean officials, especially those within the Korean People’s Army and the internal security organizations, clearly understand the importance of implementing camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) procedures to mask their operations and intentions. It would not be unreasonable to assume that they have done so here.

Location and Organization
Established from 2006 to 2007, the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is located approximately 72 km north-northeast of the capital city of Pyöngyang and approximately 9.5 km southeast of Kaech’ŏn. It occupies an irregularly shaped area that measures approximately 7.3 km by 3.3 km (4.5 miles by 2.1

1 The name Chomabong-ch’ŏn (Ch’oma-Bong Stream) is used here for convenience as the official name of the stream is unknown.
3 Ch’oma-bong is both the name of the mountain that borders the northwestern border of the camp and the name of a small village in the center of the facility.
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Preliminary analysis suggests that while the original residents of the area have remained within the new facility’s perimeter, additional personnel—detainees—were brought in to work and expand the preexisting mining activities (Figure 2). The main entrance and checkpoint to Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is on the northwest side of the facility, adjacent to the Chomabong-ch’ŏn and approximately 9.5 km southeast of the city of Kaech’ŏn in Kaech’ŏn-si, P’yŏngan-namdo. There are two additional secondary entrances, one each on the west and southeast sides of the perimeter. No visible connections to the national electric power grid have been identified, suggesting that power is provided by local generators. The camp is connected to the national rail network via the station at Kuŭm-ni, 2 km north of the main entrance. The closest air facility is the Korean People’s Air Force’s Kaech’ŏn Air Base, 13 km to the north of the main entrance. This is a major fighter base. Based on its mission, organization, and location, it very likely provides no support to Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area.

Imagery Analysis
For analytical purposes, the camp is divided into the security perimeter and ten discrete locations that provide insight into recent changes and typify activity within the camp (Figure 3).

Security Perimeter
The Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is enclosed within a 20.4 km security fence. Although that portion of the security fence that runs along the northern ridge-line and through the eastern mountains is generally a single fence, the section that runs along the agricultural Chomabong-ch’ŏn Valley is double-fenced—a reflection of North Korean concerns that this area is more vulnerable to people seeking to escape. In addition to the perimeter security fence, there are two mining-related compounds located in the eastern foothills of the facility that are secured by additional security perimeters and entrance checkpoints. See Table 1 for the total number of barracks, guard positions, and entrance checkpoints throughout the facility. The absence of vehicles along the perimeter or at the guard positions in the imagery analyzed—along with the size and quality of the perimeter trails—indicates that guards patrol primarily on foot. A majority of the perimeter guard positions are not sited to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the facility, but are located along the most obvious routes of escape. They appear to be well maintained and in good repair (Figure 4). The buildings that are assessed as being the facility’s primary administrative building and guard barracks are located 2 km southeast of the main entrance at the eastern end of the village of Ch’oma-bong. Another 800 meters to the southeast are the administrative offices for the mining activities and local Korean Workers’ Party offices.

Table 1

<table>
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<th>Barracks</th>
<th>Perimeter</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Guard positions</td>
<td>Entrances and checkpoints</td>
<td>Guard positions</td>
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The absence of vehicles along the perimeter or at the guard positions in the imagery analyzed—along with the size and quality of the perimeter trails—indicates that guards patrol primarily on foot. A majority of the perimeter guard positions are not sited to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the facility, but are located along the most obvious routes of escape. They appear to be well maintained and in good repair (Figure 4). The buildings that are assessed as being the facility’s primary administrative building and guard barracks are located 2 km southeast of the main entrance at the eastern end of the village of Ch’oma-bong. Another 800 meters to the southeast are the administrative offices for the mining activities and local Korean Workers’ Party offices.
Figure 1

An early partial overview of the Ch’orna-Bong Restricted Area, as seen in a declassified KH-4 satellite image, March 17, 1970.

(125.998719, 39.628522)
Figure 2

Overview of the Ch’oma-Bong Restricted Area perimeter. (125.998719, 39.628522)
Figure 3

Overview of the areas within the Ch’oma-Bong Restricted Area. (125.998719, 39.628522)
Figure 4

Overview of the Ch’oma-Bong Restricted Area guard positions. (125.998719, 39.628522)
Area 1 - Main Facility Entrance

Although work on what would become the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area began during mid-2006 with the erection of a perimeter fence on the ridgeline above the small farming village of Ch’oma-bong, it was not until mid-2007 that grading for an entrance and checkpoint appears to have begun. Initially, the entrance and checkpoint consisted of only two small structures on either side of the road and a gate with an archway sign over the road (Figure 5). By 2008, work was underway to extend the perimeter security fence down to the entrance and across the valley. That work would soon be complete. Imagery from February 2013 shows that the entrance had been expanded by the addition of a walled guard barracks and the perimeter security fence had been expanded to its current size (Figure 6).

Area 2 - Village of Ch’oma-bong

The original village of Ch’oma-bong is 500 meters to the southeast of the main entrance and consists of a scattering of old North Korean rural homes and agricultural support structures. South and west of the village is a shallow valley bisected east-west by the Ch’omabong-ch’ŏn (Ch’oma-bong Stream) that is dedicated to maintain terraced agricultural fields and orchards.

From 2006 to 2007, developments in and around the village complemented those on the security perimeter and at the main entrance (Figure 7). Most notable in imagery from 2007 is the improvement and straightening of the road running from the entrance past the village and up through the Chomabong-ch’ŏn Valley and housing construction at Ch’oma-bong. Here, approximately 14 new housing units and a communal building were under construction on the southeast side of the village. By April 2008, a total of 16 housing units were complete and 37 were under construction (Figure 8). Construction of these later buildings was soon complete and the new housing area reached its current level of 43 structures (Figure 9). Each of these housing units is divided into two sections, and each has an individual garden plot. Between December 2014 and May 2015, three new apparently agricultural-related structures were built around the village (Figure 10, Figure 11).

Along the security perimeter above (i.e., north) of the village is a guard position. Above and between the village and the perimeter are several small burial sites.

Area 3 - Ch’oma-bong Village Southeast

Southeast of the village of Ch’oma-bong construction activity was noted in an open field during 2008 to 2012 when 11 larger buildings and a monument were erected. Although one or two of these structures appears to be related to agricultural activity (e.g., threshing house) and associated activity, it is likely related to facility administration, guard barracks, Korean Workers’ Party offices, and their support elements (e.g., motor pool).

Approximately 800 meters southeast of this, and 1.7 km from the main entrance, is a small, unnamed village that appears to have served as both a housing area and support facility consisting of two small buildings with an orchard and agricultural activity (e.g., threshing house) and attached activity, are likely related to the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area. The road leading down the valley from the entrance and through Pongha-ri is a secondary facility entrance and checkpoint with a small guard barracks. This entrance provides access to a small abandoned mine and a collection of eight buildings with an orchard and agricultural fields approximately 500 meters to the north. There is evidence of other small abandoned mining activities in the area and an unused trail that leads north to the main portion of the Ch’oma-bong facility. The road leading down the valley from the entrance and through Pongha-ri has a number of small mines along it that are not directly related to the Ch’oma-bong facility (Figure 18, Figure 19).
Figure 5

Area 1 - Main Facility Entrance (125.973966, 39.649419)
Figure 6

Area 1 - Main Facility Entrance (125.973966, 39.649419)
Area 2 - Village of Ch’oma-bong (125.985990, 39.645452)
Figure 8

Area 2 - Village of Ch’oma-bong (125.985990, 39.645452)

Two new buildings
New building
Burial mounds
Threshing house
New building
Burial mounds
New building
New building
Figure 9

Area 2 - Village of Ch’oma-bong (125.985990, 39.645452)
Figure 10

Area 2 - Village of Ch’oma-bong (125.985990, 39.645452)

- Two new buildings
- Burial mounds
- New building
- Threshing house
Figure 11

Area 2 - Village of Ch’oma-bong (425.985990, 39.645452)
Figure 12

Area 3 - Ch’oma-bong Village Southeast (125.999847, 39638039)
Figure 13

Area 3 - Ch’oma-bong Village Southeast (I25.999847, 39638039)
Figure 14

Area 3 - Ch’oma-bong Village Southeast (125.999847, 39638039)

Burial mounds
Guard position
Large building, compound
Mine administration building
Burial mounds
Burial mounds
Burial mounds
Burial mounds
Area 3 - Ch’oma-bong Village Southeast (125.999847, 39638039)
Figure 16

Area 3 - Ch’oma-bong Village Southeast (125.999847, 39638039)

- Burial mounds
- Guard position
- New building
- Large building, compound
- Three new buildings
- Mine administration building
- Burial mounds
- Burial mounds
- Burial mounds

Figure 17

Area 3 - Ch'oma-bong Village Southeast (125.999847, 39638039)
Figure 18

Area 4 - Secondary Facility Entrance and Checkpoint South (125.999407, 39.611729)
Area 4 - Secondary Facility Entrance and Checkpoint South (125.999407, 39.611729)
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Area 5 - Western Perimeter Mining Activity
Straddling the western perimeter of the Ch’oma-bong facility, approximately 1.3 km north of the village of Pongha-ri and 1.5 km east of the village of Changsŏng-hyon, is a region consisting of a number of small mining activities, the majority of which are outside the Ch’oma-bong facility. Within the facility are several small, unused trails that lead northeast to the main portion of the Ch’oma-bong facility (Figure 20, Figure 21).

Area 6 and 7 - High-Security Internal Compounds
Two unique high-security internal compounds are located in the hills of the southeast section of the Ch’oma-bong facility, approximately 3 km from the main entrance. These were established between October 2013 and April 2014 when a 20-meter-wide strip was cleared of vegetation around the site of a long-established mine. A double-fenced security perimeter with two entrance checkpoints and nine guard towers were then erected in and around the cleared strip—effectively separating and securing these two compounds from the larger Ch’oma-bong facility.

The approximately 2,230-meter security perimeter of the larger of the two compounds encompasses about .25 square km (.25 hectares) (Figure 22, Figure 23, Figure 24, Figure 25). The approximately 760-meter security perimeter of the smaller compound encompasses about .04 square km (.4 hectares) (Figure 26, Figure 27, Figure 28). The two facilities share approximately 160 meters of security perimeter (Figure 29, Figure 30, Figure 31).

During the same period of construction of the security perimeters for the new compounds, a large building was constructed within the larger compound and an existing building was modified in the smaller compound. The larger compound consists of administration, support, and housing structures and appears to be engaged in a low-level of mining activity—probably coal. The small compound consists of three buildings. This compound’s proximity to the larger compound and physical layout suggest that it may be involved in administration, high-priority detention, guard barracks, or a combination of these.

Given the speed at which these high-security compounds were established (less than 7 months), their isolated location, and their highly secured nature, these camps-within-camps are unique, especially in comparison to the design and layout of existing kwan-li-so. It is highly likely that these compounds are involved in housing and administering detainees of significant importance to the North Korean government.

In the area immediately surrounding the secure compounds are a small number of mining related structures, such as processing, housing, explosives storage, etc., that have remained essentially unchanged for the past ten years.

Area 8 - Security Perimeter and Guard Position
This area on the west side of the Ch’omabong Restricted Area is representative of the security perimeter and the guard positions along it. Clearly visible in the imagery is the 4-meter-wide cleared perimeter strip with a double—probably barbed wire—security fence. Running adjacent, or sometimes on the cleared perimeter strip, is the footpath used by guard forces to patrol the perimeter. In the example illustrated here, there is a permanent guard position adjacent to the security fence. Permanent guard positions are not placed at regular intervals along the perimeter but rather are located along the most obvious routes of escape. All the positions identified in this analysis appear to be well maintained and in good repair (Figure 32, Figure 33).

Area 9 - Agricultural Area
This area is representative of the larger agricultural activity that occupies the western half of the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area. This agricultural activity has been present as far back as the 1960s, if not longer. During the period under study, only minor changes (e.g., construction or razing of small buildings or fences, etc.) were identified. All of these can typically be seen in rural agricultural North Korea (Figure 34, Figure 35).

Area 10 - Secondary Facility Entrance and Checkpoint West
This is a secondary facility entrance and checkpoint located on the western-most edge of the security perimeter, approximately 1,100 meters southwest of the main entrance. It is positioned to control the small road used by local farmers and secure the perimeter where the Chomabong-ch’on exits the facility (Figure 36, Figure 37).
Figure 20

Area 5 - Western Perimeter Mining Activity (125.990887, 39.614882)
Figure 21

Area 5 - Western Perimeter Mining Activity (125.990887, 39.614882)
Figure 22

Area 6 - High-Security Internal Compound (125.999339, 39.625641)
Area 6 - High-Security Internal Compound (125.999339, 39.625641)
Figure 24

Area 6 - High-Security Internal Compound (125.999339, 39.625641)
Area 6 - High-Security Internal Compound (125.999339, 39.625641)
Figure 26

Area 7A - High-Security Internal Compound (125.996882, 39.625987)

Guard position

Mine activity
Figure 27

Area 7A - High-Security Internal Compound (125.996882, 39.625987)
Figure 28

Area 7A - High-Security Internal Compound (125.996882, 39.625987)
Figure 29

Area 7B - High-Security Internal Compound (126.000542, 39.624441)

Future entrance and checkpoint
Figure 30

Area 7B - High-Security Internal Compound (126.000542, 39.624441)
Figure 31

Area 7B - High-Security Internal Compound (126.000542, 39.624441)
Figure 32

Area 8 - Security Perimeter and Guard Position (125.989684, 39.629830)
Figure 33

Area 8 - Security Perimeter and Guard Position (125.989684, 39.629830)
Area 9 - Agricultural area (125.978055, 39.639118)

Future livestock confinement

Figure 34
Area 9 - Agricultural area (125.978055, 39.639118)
Figure 36

Area 10 - Secondary Facility Entrance and Checkpoint West (25.961293, 39.646120)
Figure 37

Area 10 - Secondary Facility Entrance and Checkpoint West (125.961293, 39.646120)
Assessment
Observations and analysis derived from DigitalGlobe, Airbus Defense and Space, EO-1, and Landsat satellite imagery collected from December 2006 through May 2015, combined with previous analysis of the kwan-li-so and publicly available information, indicate that:

- Since about 2007, the Ch’oma-bong area has been converted into, and remains, an operational political prison camp. It is one of North Korea’s newest political prisoner camps and is, by North Korean standards, a well-maintained facility.
- The Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area is encompassed by a 20.4 km perimeter security fence that is patrolled on foot and consists of three entrances and seven guard positions. Approximately half of the perimeter security fence is double-fenced. Supporting this are at least two guard barracks.
- During 2013-14, two high security internal compounds were established at a long-existing mining facility. These two compounds are secured by a total of approximately 3 km of double security fence, with nine guard positions and two entrances. Given the nature and security of these compounds, they are likely involved in housing and administering high-value detainees.
- Given the activities and security measures observed, it is likely that the camp’s population—civilian and detainees—are engaged primarily in agricultural and mining activities. It is likely, however, that a larger proportion of detainees are involved in mining activities.
- During the period under study, the camp’s population has increased as is suggested by the construction of approximately 54 housing units. An accurate estimate of the facility’s population is not practical with the limited information presently available.
- It appears that the non-detainee residents of the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area, especially those involved in agricultural activities, have a nominal degree of freedom of movement and access to food.
- Administrative, barracks, housing, support buildings, and grounds are well maintained and in good repair. The grounds around these structures and the main road through the camp are well maintained.
- Agriculture and mining appear to be the primary economic activities within the camp.
- There is a moderate diversity of agricultural production, and all agricultural fields and orchards are well defined and maintained. Some of these are irrigated from Chomabong-ch’ŏn and other small streams.
- The agricultural and mining activities within the Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area are at a significantly lower level than those observed at Camps 14, 15 or 16.
- The few livestock facilities identified are well maintained and show no sign of change.
- The electric power for the camp is likely provided by local generators.

Recommendations
Continued monitoring of Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area, especially the two internal high-security compounds, is recommended to develop an objective baseline understanding of the camp’s activities, maintain an evidentiary catalog of physical changes at the facility, update its status, develop more conclusive evidence of prisoner population size, and assist with the identification of possible human rights abuses.
North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Ch’oma-bong Restricted Area

Gazetteer

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For media inquiries, please contact Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu at +1 202.499.7973 or by e-mail at executive.director@hrnk.org.

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