North Korea
Camp No. 25 - Update 2

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North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp No. 25 - Update 2

CAMP NO. 25

Background
The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (UN COI) determined that “crimes against humanity have been committed in North Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State.” Many of these crimes against humanity take place against persons detained in political and other prison camps—persons who the Commission determined are among the “primary targets of a systematic and widespread attack” by the North Korean regime—including: murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political grounds, and the enforced disappearance of persons.

According to the UN COI, “The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the kwan-li-so political prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth century.”

Based on research conducted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), five trends have defined the human rights situation under the Kim Jong-un regime: 1) an intensive crackdown on attempted defections, 2) an aggressive purge of senior officials, aimed to consolidate the leader’s grip on power; 3) a “restructuring” of the political prison camp system, with some facilities, closer to the border with China, being shut down, while inland facilities have been expanded; 4) disproportionate oppression of women, who have assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families; thus, women represent the majority of those arrested for perceived wrongdoing at the “jangmadang” markets, or for “illegally” crossing the border; and 5) the sustained, if not increased, economic importance of the political prison camps.

Executive Summary
As part of a joint undertaking with HRNK to use satellite imagery to shed light on human suffering in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as North Korea), AllSource Analysis has been monitoring activity at political prison facilities through North Korea. This report details activity observed during the past two years at the prison facility commonly identified as Camp No. 25, but also known as Kwan-li-so No. 25, Political Prison Camp No. 25 or the Susŏng-dong Kyo-hwa-so, and updates HRNK’s February 2013 and June 2014 reports on the same subject.

For this report, AllSource Analysis analyzed pan-sharpened multispectral satellite imagery of Camp No. 25 and its immediate environs collected by DigitalGlobe from January 18, 2003, through September 21, 2015, and USGS declassified KH-4B from May 28, 1970, and KH-9 from January 1, 1976. This analysis focused upon examination of the following physical features:

- Entrances and guard positions
- Housing and agricultural support facilities and activities
- Internal arrangement
- Miscellaneous activity
- Security perimeters (internal and external)

Based on analysis of these features, Camp No. 25 is a small operational prison camp that is well maintained as is indicated by general activity and maintenance in and immediately surrounding the camp. This report presents information gathered from satellite imagery taken in late 2016 and early 2017.


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analysis also supports escapee and other reports indicating that Camp No. 25’s primary economic activity is focused on light industry and agriculture. Despite extensive satellite imagery coverage of the camp, AllSource is presently unable to confirm or deny escapee and open-source reports that the camp has a prisoner population of 5,000 people.

As with the analytical caution presented in previous reports (such as North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp 16 and North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp 14 produced by HRNK and AllSource Analysis), it is important to reiterate that North Korean officials, especially those within the Korean People’s Army and the internal security organizations, clearly understand the importance of implementing camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) procedures to mask implementing the mission, organization, and location, this is a training base, and based on its mission, organization, and location, almost certainly provides no support to its primary economic activities since at least the 1950s. Satellite imagery does indicate that Camp No. 25 was established prior to May 28, 1970, at which time it occupied an irregular shaped area that measured approximately 577 meters by 315 meters (631 yards by 344 yards) and encompassed 13.76 hectares (164,568 square yards) and was expanded slightly by January 27, 1976, when it measured approximately 700 meters by 315 meters (765 yards by 344 yards) and encompassed 15.30 hectares (181,978 square yards) (Figure 1, Figure 2).6

High-resolution satellite imagery from January 18, 2003, through September 21, 2015, indicates that the camp has expanded during this period and that its primary economic activities are located in the general area around the camp. The camp is connected to the regional electric power grid via overhead high voltage power transmission cables that run from the camp to the substation approximately 1 kilometer to the southeast. It is connected to the national rail network via the station at Susŏng-dong, 800 meters to the east of the facility (Figure 16). The closest air facility to Camp No. 25 is the Korean People’s Air Force’s Sŭngam-ni Air Base, located 18 kilometers south-southwest. This is a training base, and based on its mission, organization, and location, almost certainly provides no support to Camp No. 25.

Location and Organization

Camp No. 25 is under the control of the Prisons Bureau of the State Security Department (SSD), which is under the de facto control of the KWP OGD. Specifically, it is under the control of the SSD’s North Hamgyong Provincial Bureau and is located approximately 7.5 km northwest of the port of Chŏngjin-si in Susŏng-dong, Ch’ŏngjin-si, Hamgyŏng-bukto.4 More specifically, it is located on the south bank of the Solgol-ch’ŏn (i.e., Solgol stream) across from the village of Susŏng-dong, to which one foot and two road bridges connect it.

The date of establishment of Camp No. 25 is unclear. One report indicates that the camp was used as a prisoner-of-war camp housing South Korean soldiers at the end of the Korean War.4 This, however, remains to be verified as it may not be referring to the present day camp but rather to an activity in this area. The area in which it is located has been involved in agricultural activities since at least the 1950s. Satellite imagery does indicate that Camp No. 25 was established prior to May 28, 1970, at which time it occupied an irregular shaped area that measured approximately 577 meters by 315 meters (631 yards by 344 yards) and encompassed 13.76 hectares (164,568 square yards) and was expanded slightly by January 27, 1976, when it measured approximately 700 meters by 315 meters (765 yards by 344 yards) and encompassed 15.30 hectares (181,978 square yards) (Figure 1, Figure 2).6

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4 It is interesting to note that although the escapee descriptions of this facility’s mission matches that of other kwon-li-so, the physical characteristics observed in satellite imagery are more representative of the nation’s byo-hwa-so, or long-term, felony penitentiaries and prison camps. David Hawk, The Hidden Gulag: Second Edition, Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012, www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_HiddenGulag(Web)-5-18.pdf. Another sources describes Camp No. 25 this way:

It is not structured as a village but is a fenced facility that looks like an ordinary prison camp [byo-hwa-so] and is designed for collective living arrangements. The No. 25 [kwon-li-so] houses political prisoners only, while those who committed economic crimes are not allowed into the facility. Some inmates are released upon completion of their term as terms are fixed. Political criminals are detained alone without their families...North Korean defector XXX [sic] testified, “Military personnel are sent off to the Susong byo-hwa-so [No. 25 kwon-li-so] if their alleged crimes are of a political nature. The Susong byo-hwa-so [No. 25 kwon-li-so] is for those serving terms of 10 years or longer, but they can return to society once they complete these terms.” It was also testified that the No. 25 kwon-li-so housed senior staff at the Provincial Party, the head of a local MPS office, and other high-ranking officials. North Korean defector XXX [sic] testified that the father of his friends used to perform the duty of turning over Korean War POWs to South Korea, but he was arrested while attempting to cross the border at the river in Namyang, Onsung County, North Hamgyong Province. He ended up at the No. 25 kwon-li-so in Chongjin.


5 After the Korean War, it was used as a detention facility for South Korean POWs [Prisoners of War]. Do Kyung-Ott et al., White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2015 (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2015), p. 122, available at http://www.tijmu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp

6 HRNK anticipates that we will be able to further refine the date of the camps establishment in future updates. Referenced imagery includes: KH-4B imagery dated May 28, 1970 and KH-5 (mapping camera) imagery dated January 27, 1976.
Overview of the Camp No. 25 area as seen in a declassified Top Secret KH-4B satellite image dated May 28, 1970. (41.8374 N, 129.7346 E)
Figure 2

Overview of the Camp No. 25 area as seen in a declassified Top Secret KH-4B satellite image dated January 1, 1976. (41.8354 N, 129.7297 E)
Figure 3

Overview of Camp No. 25, January 18, 2003. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 4

Overview of Camp No. 25, March 5, 2004. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Overview of Camp No. 25, February 25, 2005. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 6

Overview of Camp No. 25, March 21, 2006. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 7

Overview of Camp No. 25, April 11, 2007. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Overview of Camp No. 25, February 24, 2008. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 9

Overview of Camp No. 25, October 27, 2009. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 10

Overview of Camp No. 25, October 27, 2010. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)

- 12 buildings razed
- New high security walled building
- New air defense site
- New entrance gate and checkpoint
- New leadership memorial building
- Entrance closed
- Nine buildings razed
- New agricultural support building
- Camp perimeter
- Entrance and checkpoint
- Guard barracks
- Guard position
Figure 11

Overview of Camp No. 25, January 6, 2011. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 12

Overview of Camp No. 25, May 19, 2012. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 13

Overview of Camp No. 25, May 26, 2013. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 14

Overview of Camp No. 25, November 7, 2014. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Overview of Camp No. 25, September 21, 2015. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Susŏng-dong Railroad Station, September 21, 2015. (41.834 N, 129.734 E)
Imagery Analysis

Based on previous HRNK satellite imagery reports, publicly available information, and high resolution satellite imagery, Camp No. 25 and its immediate surroundings can be separated into five broad areas (Figure 17):

- **Security Perimeter**
- **Administrative**
- **Central Camp (light industry, prisoner housing, and agricultural support)**
- **Agricultural Activities**
- **Additional Activities**

**Security Perimeter**

A security perimeter consisting of a combination of walls, fences, gates, and guard positions not only separates Camp No. 25 from the surrounding countryside but also segments it internally (Figure 18). Neither the external perimeter of the camp nor the wall surrounding the central compound has changed significantly since our 2014 report. The external perimeter is approximately 5,100 meters long, encompasses approximately 100 hectares (.389 square miles), and has seven internal and external entrances. All walls, fences, and gates are well maintained and in good repair, as is the perimeter patrol road. There is a main entrance and checkpoint astride the only road leading into the shallow valley in which Camp No. 25 is located. The walled prison component of the camp occupies a generally irregular-shaped area that measures approximately 350 meters by 410 meters (382 yards by 448 yards) and encompasses 12,628 hectares (151,030 square yards).

Including the guard positions at the main and administrative area entrances, there are a total of 40 identifiable guard positions—22 along the perimeter, eight on the walls around the central compound, and ten distributed internally. Although this is one less than identified in HRNK’s 2014 report, this lower number is not significant and appears to be the result of routine adjustments made in agricultural activities around the camp. All guard positions are well positioned to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the camp and are well maintained and in good repair. The absence of any vehicles along the perimeter patrol roads or at the guard positions suggests that guards rotate positions on foot rather than being shifted by vehicle.

During the period under study, the camp grew in physical size. In 2003, there were approximately 20 guard positions strategically placed throughout the camp. New positions were slowly erected, with two added in 2007 and four in 2009. From 2003 through 2009, the camp had a perimeter of approximately 3,650 meters (3.991 miles) and encompassed 56,950 hectares (681,157 square yards). During 2010, however, the perimeter was dramatically expanded to approximately 5,100 meters (.5,577 yards), and the area enclosed increased to 101 hectares (.389 square miles)—a 37 percent and 72 percent increase, respectively. With this expansion, a new main gate was erected, two previously separate agriculture fields in the northwest area of the camp were combined, the road between fields was blocked off, and 17 additional guard positions were erected, predominately along the new perimeter line. The security perimeter has remained essentially unchanged since 2013, and all guard positions and entrances appear to be well maintained and in good repair.
Camp No. 25 report areas, September 21, 2015. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Figure 18

Camp No. 25 Perimeter and Guard Positions, September 21, 2015. (41.833 N, 129.725 E)
Administrative Area
Camp No. 25’s primary access road and administrative area are located on the east side of the camp along the Solgol-ch’ŏn (i.e., Solgol stream). Two gates on the primary access road serve as entrances to the camp—the main gate in the east corner of the camp controls the road leading south to Ch’ŏngjin, while a secondary gate in the northeast corner controls the road leading to the village of Songgong-ni. On the road between the two gates are three bridges (two road bridges and one foot bridge) that cross the Solgol-ch’ŏn and connect the camp to the village of Susŏng-dong. The camp and administrative area are further separated from the access road by two additional gates.

The administrative area consists of approximately 30 buildings, several monuments/memorials, and what appears to be a fishpond (Figure 19). Escapee reports and imagery analysis indicate that the buildings are used for prison administration, cultural welfare, housing, maintenance, and other support functions. In the past, the central courtyard for the barracks had frequently been used by guards and staff as a football pitch (i.e., soccer field). Only one vehicle is visible in the latest satellite image, and all buildings and grounds are well maintained and in good repair.

Although there have been no significant changes within the administrative area since our last report, the construction activity on the banks of the Solgol-ch’ŏn appears to have been completed. This activity included the banks of the stream being improved with retaining walls, landscaping, the approaches to the footbridge being improved, construction of a path on the camp side of the stream—opposite the main entrance to the administrative area—and construction of what appears to be a park/sports facility (begun in early 2014) on the Susŏng-dong side of the stream. The presence of four well-maintained bridges (three road bridges and one foot bridge—one being further upstream of the camp) within 1 kilometer and connecting Camp No. 25 and Susŏng-dong suggests that there is an important economic and social relationship between the two.

Little significant activity was noted in imagery from 2003 to 2009, with the exception of the construction of one building in 2004 and one building in 2009. New roofs were applied to several buildings in 2009-2010. During 2010, a number of changes were noted, including the construction of what appears to be a leadership memorial hall (sometimes called an “Observatory”), additions to the adjacent fountain/reflection pool, and new roofs on the barracks. Additionally, a new gate and guard position were constructed on the road between Ch’ŏngjin-si and the camp.

No significant changes have been noted in the administrative area of the camp since 2011.

Central Camp
The central camp consists of an irregular-shaped walled-in compound composed of wood products, light industrial, prisoner housing, water treatment, and agricultural support areas. It is separated from the remainder of the camp by a barbed wire-topped 5-meter-high wall with eight guard towers that is approximately 1,450-meters-long, encompasses 12.628 hectares (151,030 square yards) and has seven gates.

The wood products area consists of two milling and three factory buildings, a lumber yard, and wood chip storage bins. It is separated from the central compound by a wall with a gate. The central compound consists of several light industrial buildings and prisoner housing. One of the light industrial buildings is, according to escapees, used to manufacture bicycles using hand tools. A number of trucks are often present in the courtyard of the central industrial facility. This area has seen little change during the period under study, although several light industrial buildings were razed between 2006 and 2007. Prisoner housing consists of a large 218 meter by 34 meter (238.4 yards by 37.2 yards) double-arched, roofed building that is sub-divided into four sections. There are numerous monitors (sometimes called clerestories) along the lengths of the roofs. This structure is in a moderate state of repair.

The agricultural support is immediately adjacent to the central compound and separated from it by a wall. It consists of greenhouses, livestock and poultry pens, maintenance buildings, etc. Between February 2008 and October 2009, five small livestock buildings were razed and replaced with one large building.

Beginning in late-2014, construction of what appears to be a small water treatment compound began in a small walled-in area immediately west of the wood products and north of the central compound. This was completed during 2015 and consists of a building, pond, and two storage tanks. The reason for this development is unclear but may be related to the wood products factory or expanded livestock herds.

All walls, buildings, and grounds appear to be generally well maintained and in a moderate state of repair. Both the wood products and light industrial factories appear to be operating, as evidenced by the presence of vehicles and supplies.

9 Cultural welfare is a term used for various political activities sponsored by the Korean Workers’ Party. For prison camps it has the general meaning of political re-education.
Figure 19

Central Compound and Administrative Areas, September 21, 2015 (41.833 N, 129.727 E)
Agriculture Areas

Located within the camp’s perimeter are approximately 79 hectares (0.3 square miles) of cultivated fields of grain crops immediately north of the central camp and orchards on the hillsides to the west and south (Figure 20). During 2010, there was an expansion of the camp’s outer perimeter to encompass more land for agricultural. On the east side the wall separating the camp from the two flat agricultural fields immediately to the north was razed and a new wall erected encompassing them. Guard towers were placed in the center of these fields to provide full coverage of the expanded perimeter. During 2012, a large greenhouse was erected on the west side of these fields, on the northern perimeter. Subsequently, during 2015, a new variety of crop was planted in the western portion of the two fields (Figure 21).

The steep terrain to the south and west of the central compound requires terraced agriculture and is covered with orchards. With the expansion of the camp’s outer perimeter during 2009-2010, this area was enlarged, and approximately 12-15 farming buildings were razed and these areas converted into agricultural fields. With the expansion of the perimeter, an old burial ground along the northern boundary and another along the southern boundary were incorporated within the camp. Neither of these burial grounds exhibited any evidence of activity during the period under study. This would suggest that any Camp No. 25 prisoner deaths are dealt with by cremation or burial elsewhere.

Additionally, two years after the perimeter expansion during 2012-2013, an area northwest of the agricultural support area was used for temporary greenhouses. These were likely used to start the plants for the orchards that were subsequently planted in the area immediately to the west.

Between May and October 2014, a small facility was built in the center of terraced orchards in the southern agricultural area (Figure 22). This facility is approximately 100 meters (109 yards) from the central walled compound and consists of a retention pond, a small stepped structure built into the side of the hill, and several smaller outbuildings. Although its exact purpose is unknown, it appears to be a processing facility, probably associated with the orchards.

All fields are well defined, maintained, and irrigated. The absence of any mechanical agricultural equipment in any imagery indicates that the fields and orchards are planted, maintained, and harvested by hand. All fields were under active cultivation during the period under study. With the exception of normally anticipated activities in typical rural North Korea settings, no other changes of significance are noted in the acres under cultivation during the past 18 months.

Additional Activities

Aside from the activities and facilities noted above, there are several others worthy of comment—a small secured compound, two old cemeteries, and two air defense sites.11

Located within the extreme southwest corner of Camp No. 25’s perimeter is a small 25 meter by 25 meter (27 yard by 27 yard) walled compound that was constructed during 2010 (Figure 23, Figure 24). Inside the compound is one

11 The Korean tradition of burying the dead in burial mounds on hilltops and slopes (typically south facing) dates back centuries. While the practice is fading in South Korea it remains strong in North Korea, especially in rural areas. Typically, a grave site is located among ancestral graves and occupies a small round or oblong cleared area. In the center is the actual grave, over which a small mound is erected. Often a simple grave marker is placed in front of the burial mound.

14 meter by 9 meter (15 yard by 9 yard) single-story building. Approximately 100 meters to the east is a 14 meter by 6 meter (15 yard by 6 yard) single-story building. The relative isolation of the walled compound within the camp and the fact that it is overlooked by seven guard positions is strongly suggestive of a high security prison compound as its size and construction are not consistent with DPRK practices for the storage of heavy equipment or munitions.

Immediately adjacent to Camp No. 25’s perimeter are two air defense artillery sites—one to the west and one to the south (Figure 25, Figure 26). With the expansion of the perimeter in 2010, the southern anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) site, consisting of a battery of eight light caliber anti-aircraft guns, was removed and its land incorporated into the expanded perimeter. It was replaced by a new AAA site 60 meters to the south of the expanded perimeter. The AAA site to the west consists of a battery of six medium caliber anti-aircraft guns. Both sites consist of headquarters, barracks, and support buildings. Although these are well placed to provide protection to Camp No. 25, they are more likely components of the integrated air defense of Ch’ŏngjin-si.
Figure 20

Northern Agricultural Area, September 21, 2015. (41.836 N, 129.723 E)
Figure 21

Western Agricultural Area, September 21, 2015. (41.832 N, 129.715 E)

- Old burial grounds
- Terraced orchards
- Reported crematorium
Figure 22

Southern Agricultural Area, September 21, 2015. (41.829 N, 129.722 E)
Figure 23

Secured Compound, September 21, 2015. (41.830 N, 129.727 E)

- Terraced orchards
- Possible processing plant
- Air defense site
Figure 24

Secured Compound, September 21, 2015. (41.828 N, 129.722 E)
Figure 25

Southern Air Defense Artillery Site, September 21, 2015. (41.829 N, 129.729 E)
Western Air Defense Artillery Site, September 21, 2015. (41.828 N, 129.719 E)
Assessment
Analysis of imagery collected since 2003 of Camp No. 25 and its environs indicates that,

- Camp No. 25 remains an operational prison facility that was significantly expanded between 2009 and 2010
- It is, by DPRK standards, a mature and well-maintained prison facility
- There have been no significant changes to the physical size, including prisoner housing, of the facility during the last 30 months
- Perimeter walls, fences, and gates are well maintained and in good repair
- Guard positions are well positioned to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the camp and are well maintained and in good repair
- Administrative, barracks, housing, cultural welfare, support buildings, and grounds are well maintained and in good repair
- The grounds and buildings (i.e., wood products factory, light industrial, and prisoner housing) of the central compound appear to be moderately well maintained and in a moderate state of repair
- The wood products and light industrial factories appear to be operating, as evidenced by the presence of vehicles and supplies
- All agricultural fields are well defined, maintained, and irrigated. The fields to the north of the camp have two different crops under cultivation.
- Prisoner population has likely remained relatively constant and is employed to both maintain the agricultural fields, orchards, and livestock, and to work in the camp’s wood products and light industrial factories
- There is likely a sustained, if not increased economic relationship between Camp No. 25 and the adjacent villages of Susŏng-dong and Songgong-ni.

Despite extensive satellite imagery coverage of the camp area, it is presently not possible to confirm or deny escapee and open-source reports that the camp has a prisoner population of 5,000 people.

Continued monitoring of the area is needed to derive more conclusive evidence of prisoner population size and possible human rights abuses.

Recommendations
Further monitoring of Camp No. 25 is recommended to develop an objective baseline understanding of the camp’s activities, maintain an evidentiary catalog of physical changes at the facility, update its status, develop more conclusive evidence of prisoner population size, and assist with the identification of possible human rights abuses.
# Gazetteer

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<th>Location</th>
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<td>Songgong-ni</td>
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Since its establishment in 2001, HRNK has played an important intellectual leadership role on North Korean human rights issues by publishing more than 30 major reports (available at http://hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php). HRNK became the first organization to propose that the human rights situation in North Korea be addressed by the UN Security Council. HRNK was directly, actively, and effectively involved in all stages of the process supporting the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry. In the past five years, HRNK has been invited numerous times to provide expert testimony before the U.S. Congress.

For media inquiries, please contact Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu at +1 202.499.7973 or by e-mail at executive.director@hrnk.org.

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