North Korea
Imagery Analysis of Camp 14

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North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14

Overview of North Korea’s political prison camp system

Despite North Korea’s adamant denial that political prison camps exist—most recently again in a letter dated February 5, 2015, addressed by the North Korean permanent representative to the UN Office in Geneva to the UN Human Rights Council—research based on interviews and satellite imagery reveals a shocking and detailed operation of a vast system of arbitrary and extra-judicial, unlawful detention. In its findings released in February 2014, the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (COI) determined that “crimes against humanity have been committed in North Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State.” Many of these crimes against humanity take place against persons detained in political and other prison camps—persons who the Commission determined are among the “primary targets of a systematic and widespread attack” by the North Korean regime—including: murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political grounds, and the enforced disappearance of persons. According to the COI:

In the political prison camps of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the inmate population has been gradually eliminated through deliberate starvation, forced labour, executions, torture, rape and the denial of reproductive rights enforced through punishment, forced abortion and infanticide. The commission estimates that hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have perished in these camps over the past five decades.

The unspeakable atrocities that are being committed against inmates of the kwon-li-so political prison camps resemble the horrors of camps that totalitarian States established during the twentieth century.

Through this vast system of unlawful imprisonment, the North Korean regime isolates, banishes, punishes and executes those suspected of being disloyal to the regime. They are deemed “wrong-thinkers,” “wrong-doers,” or are seen as having acquired “wrong-knowledge” or have engaged in “wrong-associations.” Up to 120,000 are known to be held in the kwon-li-so political prison camps where they are relentlessly subjected to induced malnutrition, forced labor, and other cruel and unusual punishment. Thousands more are forcibly held in other detention facilities. North Korea denies access to the camps to outsiders, whether human rights investigators, scholars, or international media, and severely restricts the circulation of information across its borders.

Based on research conducted by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), three trends have defined the human rights situation under the Kim Jong-un regime: 1) an intensive crackdown on attempted defections; 2) an aggressive purge of senior officials, aimed to consolidate the leader’s grip on power; and 3) a “restructuring” of the political prison camp system, with some facilities, closer to the border with China, being shut down, while inland facilities have been expanded.

Introduction

As part of a joint undertaking with HRNK to use satellite imagery to shed light on human suffering in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, more commonly known as North Korea), AllSource Analysis (ASA) has been monitoring activity at political prison facilities throughout North Korea. This report details activity at the...
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facility commonly known as Kwan-li-so
No.14, Kaech’ŏn Political Prison Camp, Political Prison Facility 14 or more simply
Camp 14.4 Prisoners detained at Camp 14
are thought to never be eligible for release.
Available historic satellite imagery and
escapee reports indicate that this kwan-
li-so has been in existence at least as far
back as 1965.

Executive summary
AllSource Analysis analyzed imagery of
the North Korean political prison facility
known as Camp 14 and its immediate
environs using pan-sharpened multi-
spectral satellite imagery collected by
DigitalGlobe, Airbus Defense and Space
and Landsat from December 2002
through December 2014. Additional
declassified KH-9 satellite imagery was
used to provide limited historical context.
Imagery analysis helped determine the
operational status of Camp 14 based on
changes in the following features:

- Ferry crossings
- Guard positions and entrances
- Housing and agricultural support
  facilities and activity
- Hydroelectric facilities
- Internal road network
- Light industrial facilities

4 The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2014
identifies Camp 14 as “Caechhon No. 14 Kwan-li-so.”

- Mining and forestry activity
- Miscellaneous activity
- Railroad network
- Security perimeter and associated
  road network

Based on analysis of these features,
Camp 14 has been and remains an
operational prison camp. Economic activi-
ty within Camp 14 is focused primarily on
logging and agriculture, with smaller
instances of mining, light industry, and
hydroelectric power production. These
activities, however, are at a significantly
lower level than those at Camps 15 or 16
and some mining and light industrial
activities have been curtailed or aban-
donned. Camp 14 is one of North Korea’s
oldest operating political prisoner camps
and is, by North Korean standards, a
mature and generally well-maintained
facility as is indicated by general activity,
road construction and maintenance
throughout the camp.

It is important to reiterate the analytical
cautions presented in previous reports
(such as North Korea: Imagery Analysis
Camp 155 and North Korea’s Camp No. 25
Update6) produced by HRNK and ASA.
North Korean officials, especially

5 Available at https://hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/
ASA_AnalysisReport_HRNK_Camp15_Final.pdf

6 Available at https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/
Camp%2025%20Update%20Good.pdf

those within the Korean People’s Army
and the internal security organizations,
clearly understand the importance of
implementing camouflage, concealment,
and deception (CCD) procedures to mask
their operations and intentions. It would
be reasonable to assume that they have
done so here.

Location and organization
Established during the mid-1960s
Camp 14 is located approximately 61
kilometers (km) northeast of the capital
city of P’yŏngyang and approximately 19
km southeast of Kaech’ŏn, on forested
slopes of the Changan-sanmaek7 (Figure 1).
It occupies an irregularly
shaped area that measures approximat-
ely 14 by 21 km (8.7 by 13.0 miles).
The camp’s perimeter extends approximately
58.5 km and encompasses 153 sq km
(15,300 hectares), with 25 named villages
and numerous unnamed villages (Figure 2).
The camp straddles Kaech’ŏn-si
and Putch’ang-gun, P’yŏngan-nam-
do. The area includes a road entrance
and checkpoint and a rail entrance and
checkpoint. There are also five secondary
entrances: one on the southeastern
perimeter along the Taedong-gang at the
village of Sangdoryŏng-ni; one on the
northeast perimeter, 2.3 km northeast of
the village of Sanjunae-dong; and one
each at the ferry crossing, road and rail
bridges across the Taedong-gang.

Electric power for the camp is likely
provided by both the hydroelectric
power plants across the Taedong-gang,
1 km west of Chamsang-ni, and by local
generators. The camp is connected to
the national rail network via the station
at Naenjŏngcha’m, 1.7 km east of the
main entrance and within the camp. The
closest air facility is the Korean People’s
Air Force Putch’ang-ni Airbase 7 km
to the southwest of the main entrance. This is a transport base for airborne or airborne sniper troops and due to its mission, organization and location very likely provides no support to Camp 14.

**Imagery analysis**

For analytical purposes, the camp is divided into the security perimeter, 23 discrete locations that provide insight into changes and typify activity in the camp, and miscellaneous activities (Figure 3).

**Security perimeter**

Camp 14 is enclosed within a 58.5-km-long network of security fences, patrol paths and roads that are secured by a total of 38 barracks, guard positions and checkpoints broken down as follows:

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The absence of any vehicles observed along the perimeter or at the guard positions in the imagery analyzed, along with the size and quality of the perimeter roads/trails, suggests that guards patrol primarily on foot rather than by vehicle. Vehicles are often seen at the larger guard barracks around the camp. A majority of the perimeter guard positions are not sited to provide overlapping fields-of-view of the camp, however, they are located along the most obvious routes of escape and appear to be well maintained and in good repair (Figure 4). With one exception (see Area II), the size, composition, and nature of the security perimeter does not appear to have changed during the period under study.

Although Camp 14’s main entrance and checkpoint is on the southwest corner of the camp, the administrative center is located 4 km to the east at Yasach’am.

**Area 1 - Naenjongch’am**

The farming village of Naenjongcha’m is located in the southwest corner of Camp 14 and is bordered by the camp’s perimeter and the Taedong-gang. It contains the camp’s main entrance and is surrounded by agricultural fields. Approximately 780 meters east of the village is a small coal loading facility, rail station and the remains of a light narrow-gauge electrified mine railroad. This mine railroad runs from the loading facility to a mine portal approximately 1 km further to the east. Both the mine railroad and the mine portal appear to have been abandoned before 2004 (Figure 5). No significant changes are noted in the imagery collected between September 3, 2013 and December 13, 2014 (Figure 6).

**Area 2 - Main camp entrance and guard barracks**

Located in the extreme southwest corner of Camp 14 on the north shore of the Taedong-gang and 940 meters west of Naenjongcha’m is the main entrance to Camp 14 (Figure 7). It consists of a walled guard barracks with both road and rail entrance checkpoints. The road is the primary access route for Camp 14, while the electrified rail line is a spur line feeding the coal mines to the southeast at Pongch’ang-ni within the former Camp 18. There is a small livestock confinement and agricultural area immediately north of the main entrance and adjacent to the edge of the camp’s western perimeter fence that may be associated with the guard barracks. A new structure associated with the guard barracks has been built directly east (Figure 8, Figure 9).

**Area 3 - Yasach’am - Headquarters, administration, support, housing area**

The village of Yasach’am, located along the banks of the Taedong-gang, serves as the camp’s primary administrative, support, training, and housing area. On the northwest side of the village, leading up a small valley, is Camp 14’s Ministry of State Security headquarters, main barracks and training area.

On the south side of the village are two bridges across the Taedong-gang. The first is a 300-meter-long rail bridge that, as noted above, carries the electrified spur line to the coal mines at Pongch’ang-ni within the former Camp 18. The second is a 200-meter-long road bridge 500 meters upstream of the rail bridge that also leads to Pongch’ang-ni. While the rail bridge is well maintained and usable year-round, the road bridge is often submerged and is only marginally usable when the river level is low. The rail bridge has entrances and guard positions on both ends.

The village and Ministry of State Security areas are active in all imagery analyzed and all buildings and roads are well maintained. The only significant changes in this area identifiable on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014 were the construction of two new buildings along the river in early 2013 (Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12).
Figure 1

An early partial overview of Camp 14, as seen in a declassified KH-4 satellite image, March 17, 1970.
Figure 2

Overview of Camp 14
NORTH KOREA’S CAMP 14

Figure 3

Camp 14 report areas
Figure 4

Camp 14 perimeter
Figure 6

Area 1 - Naenjongch'am
Figure 7

The area of Camp 14’s main entrance as seen in a declassified KH-9 Hexagon satellite image, October 27, 1983.
Figure 8

Area 2 - Main Camp Entrance and Guard Barracks
Figure 9

Area 2 - Main Camp Entrance and Guard Barracks
Figure 10

The village of Yasach'am with its security headquarters, administration, support, and housing areas as seen in a declassified KH-9 Hexagon satellite image, October 27, 1983.
Area 3 - Yasach'am - Headquarters, Administration, Support, and Housing Area
Figure 12

Area 3 - Yasach'am - Headquarters, Administration, Support, and Housing Area
### Area 4 - Yasach’am - Ministry of State Security barracks and training area

Immediately up-valley from the primary administrative area at Yasach’am is the entrance to the Ministry of State Security’s main barracks and training area. Within the training area, at the head of the small valley, are several clearings (likely used for training or gardens for the troops), a likely firing range and what may be an armory. No changes of significance were observed on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 13, Figure 14).

### Area 5 - Tongch’ang-gol

Immediately northeast of Yasach’am is the village of Tongch’ang-gol. Aside from agricultural fields surrounding it, this area consists of a coal mine portal and tailings pile, two likely prisoner housing areas, guard barracks. No changes of significance were observed on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014. (Figure 15, Figure 16)

### Area 6 - Guard barracks

Approximately 2.6 km north-northeast of Tongch’ang-gol at the confluence of the Taedong-gang and Kungwang-ch’on, sits a guard barracks with a small agricultural field.\(^\text{10}\) The confluence of these two water features creates a delta of sediment that extends out halfway (i.e., 50 meters) across the Taedong-gang. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 17, Figure 18).

### Area 7 - Kadŏk-kol

Located approximately mid-way along Camp 14’s southern perimeter is a small unnamed stream that runs north-south through the villages of Kadŏk-kol and Sangmu-gol and into the Taedong-gang. A diversion dam and two hydroelectric power plants are situated on the northern bank of the Taedong-gang approximately 420 meters east of this stream. Given their location and size it is likely that these power plants provide electricity to Camp 14, the coal mines around Pongch’ang-ri within the former Camp 18 and the local railroad network. A roadway checkpoint is situated at the eastern most hydroelectric power plant. The light industrial plant on the west side of the confluence of the stream and Taedong-gang contains a five-story building—the tallest within Camp 14. During the period under study one small structure at this plant was razed.

Approximately 500 m up the stream is the small village of Kadŏk-kol that consists of a fish farm and a few buildings. Previously, this area reportedly also contained a prisoner housing area on the west side of the stream. This was razed sometime between 2007 and 2011. The light industrial plants and the roads and bridges serving them appear in a good state of repair. Aside from the minor change noted above, no significant changes were observed in imagery from October 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 19, Figure 20, Figure 21).

### Area 8 - Sangmu-gol

Approximately 500 meters upstream from Kadŏk-kol is a prisoner housing area that consists of approximately 30 structures. Approximately 400 meters north of this is the village of Sangmu-gol, which consists of a light industrial plant and barracks-style prisoner housing. The area immediately surrounding the village consists of a number of small agricultural fields. Although not visible in the imagery analyzed for this report, there was previously a much smaller light industrial plant along the same stream, but 870 meters northwest of Sangmu-gol. This was razed before 2007. The light industrial plants, prisoner housing areas and the single road serving them appear to be in a good state of repair. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between October 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 22, Figure 23).

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\(^\text{10}\) The name Kungwang-ch’on should be considered a tentative designation until the national designator can be confirmed.
Area 4 - Yasach’am - Ministry of State Security Barracks and Training Area
Figure 14

Area 4 - Yasach’am - Ministry of State Security Barracks and Training Area
Figure 16

Area 5 - Tongch'ang-gol
Figure 17

Area 6 - Guard Barracks
Figure 18

Area 6 - Guard Barracks

Guard Barracks
The portion of the Taedong-gang just east of the village of Kadŏk-hŏl where the hydroelectric power plant will be built, as seen in a declassified KH-9 Hexagon satellite image, October 27, 1983.
Figure 20

Area 7 - Kadŏk-ţol
Figure 21

Area 7 - Kadoč-kol
Figure 22

Area 8 - Sangmu-gol

Light industry

Prisoner housing
Figure 23

Area 8 - Sangmu-gol

Light industry

Prisoner housing
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Area 9 - Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-mal, Sadun and Yongsu-mal
The four villages of Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-mal, Sadun and Yongsu-mal are located along the Kilsang-ch’ŏn at its confluence with the Taedong-gang. While this area is dedicated to agriculture, there is a light industrial plant with a small fish farm and what is likely a guard barracks located on the west side of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn. On the north side of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn, and up a small valley is the village Kiyang-mal. Immediately east of this, straddling the Kilsang-ch’ŏn and connected by an 8-meter-long footbridge, are the sister villages of Chamsang-ni and Sadun. The area south of the stream contains a housing area and numerous agricultural support structures. The area immediately north of the stream contains a housing area and a threshing house. Remaining structures—a threshing house, six agricultural buildings and two housing units. (Figure 27, Figure 28).

Area 10 - Hajunae-dong
Located along the upper reaches of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn is the village of Hajunae-dong. This village has seen some significant changes during the period under study. A group of five agricultural support and 17 worker housing structures were razed between May 2003 and December 2014. Between 2002 and 2007, 15 housing structures were razed; between 2007 and 2011 three agricultural and one housing were razed. By December 2014, there were only 10 remaining structures—a threshing house, six agricultural buildings and two housing units. (Figure 27, Figure 28).

Area 11 - Perimeter Fence Relocation
Located approximately 2.3 km east of Area 11 is a 1-km section of the perimeter security fence that has been relocated approximately 50 meters to the south sometime after May 2011. The reasons for this move are unclear, however, there are two guard positions present in the area, one near each end of the relocated fence section, possibly indicating a history of perimeter breaches in the area (Figure 29, Figure 30).

Area 12 - Sanjunae-dong
The agricultural village of Sanjunae-dong is located on one of the tributaries of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn in the northeast corner of Camp 14. The area consists of agricultural fields, support buildings, a housing area, and a fish farm. Additionally, there is what appears to be a guard position on the northwest corner of the village along a road that leads to a secondary camp entrance and guard position 1.5 kilometers to the northeast. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 31, Figure 32).

Area 13 - Reinforced guard position
Located along the northeast section of the security perimeter, 1.5 km north of the village Nujinmoji, is one of Camp 14’s two remote reinforced guard positions with double walls. The walls of the guard position appear to have been updated or rebuilt during the period under study (Figure 33, Figure 34).

Area 14 - Inactive mine facility
Approximately 1 kilometer north of the village of Kilsang-ni, in the isolated mountainous north-central region of Camp 14, is an abandoned mine with two vertical shafts and a processing plant at the base of Paekt’ap-san. Although the mine is abandoned, there is evidence of probable small-scale scavenging or unauthorized activity at the facility during the period under study (Figure 35, Figure 36).

Area 15 - Kilsang-ni
The small village of Kilsang-ni is located along the upper reaches of the Kilsang-ch’ŏn. It consists of approximately eight structures, which may be barracks with a livestock pen. It is likely that at one time this village supported the activities of the mine 1 kilometer to the north. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 37, Figure 38, Figure 39).

Area 16 - Reinforced guard position
Located along the northwest section of Camp 14 and 400 meters east of the security perimeter is the second of two remote reinforced guard positions with double walls. The walls of the guard position appear to have been erected during the period under study (Figure 40, Figure 41).

11 “San” means “mountain” in Korean.
12 The type of ore mined here is unknown; however, there are a number of gold mines immediately east of the camp.
The area of Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-mal, Sadun, and Yongsu-mal, as seen in a declassified KH-9 Hexagon satellite image, October 27, 1983
Area 9 - Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-mal, Sadun, and Yongsu-mal
Figure 26

Area 9 - Chamsang-ni, Kiyang-mal, Sadun, and Yongsu-mal
Figure 28

Area 10 - Hajunae-dong
Figure 29

Area II - Perimeter
Figure 30

Area II - Perimeter

Guard Position

Relocated perimeter fence
Area 12 - Sanjunae-dong
Figure 32

Area 12 - Sanjunae-dong
Area 13 - Reinforced Guard Position
Figure 35

Area 14 - Inactive Mining Facility
Figure 36

Area 14 - Inactive Mining Facility
Figure 37

The area of Kilsang-ni and the mine to its north, as seen in a declassified KH-9 Hexagon satellite image, October 27, 1983
Figure 38

Area 15 - Kilsang-ni
Figure 39

Area 15 - Kilsang-ni
Area 16 - Reinforced Guard Position
Figure 41

Area 16 - Reinforced Guard Position
Area 17 - Road construction activity
One of three areas within Camp 14 that show significant road repair or construction activity is located in the western section of the camp. This area, along the Kumgwang-ch’on and approximately 1 kilometer northeast of the village of Kumgwang, has three new logging roads during the period under study. These provide access to the forest west of an agricultural support area consisting of two large buildings where there is evidence of logging activity (e.g., thinning of the forest) (Figure 42, Figure 43).

Area 18 - Road construction activity
The second of three areas within Camp 14 that show significant road repair or construction activity is located in the western section of the camp between the villages of Ch’ang-dong and Kumgwang. Here a new road has been built during the period under study on the east side of the Kumgwang-ch’on. This road provides access to support increased logging activity in the area. This road was most likely built to replace the original road on the west side of the Kumgwang-ch’on that suffered damage caused by seasonal flooding (Figure 44, Figure 45).

Area 19 - Road construction activity
Between September 2013 and December 2014 a new 3-kilometer-long road was constructed approximately 1.5 kilometers northwest of the village of Ch’ang-dong. The new road provides access to support new agricultural and logging activity in the area (Figure 46, Figure 47).

Area 20 - Ch’ang-dong
One kilometer northwest of the guard barracks discussed in Area 6 is the agricultural village of Ch’ang-dong located on the Kumgwang-ch’on. This village consists of worker housing and livestock confinement areas, a fish farm, and on the west side an industrial facility. This is the largest industrial facility within Camp 14 and consists of several large buildings—the longest of which is 140 meters—with two tall smoke stacks. The purpose of this facility is unclear. A road leading west from Ch’ang-dong, past a checkpoint at the industrial facility, continues 3 kilometers up a small valley past agriculture fields and a fish farm. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between October 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 48, Figure 49).

Area 21 - Communications facility
Located approximately 2.5 kilometers north of the main entrance, and 100 meters west of the security perimeter (i.e., outside Camp 14) is a microwave communications facility with a large communications tower, guard barracks and guard position along the perimeter fence. While the communications facility is part of a nationwide network it is likely that it is also used by the camp. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between October 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 50, Figure 51).

Area 22 - Southeast Entrance to Camp
A secondary camp entrance is located along the Taedong-gang at the camp’s southeast corner adjacent to the village Sangdoryŏng-ni. It consists of an entrance, walled guard barracks and several support buildings. No changes of significance were observed in this area on imagery between September 2013 and December 2014 (Figure 52, Figure 53).

Area 23 - Ferry Crossing
Located on the Taedong-gang, 400 meters north of the village of Sol-gol, is a ferry crossing connecting Camp 14 to the former Camp 18. The crossing was built sometime during 2007-2011 and consists of an entrance checkpoint, a landing ramp on both sides of the Taedong-gang and a 12-meter-long ferry. The reason for constructing this crossing is unclear, however, it may be to replace the road bridge (Area 3) at Yasach’am that is often submerged and only marginally useable when the river level is low (Figure 54, Figure 55).

Assessment
Observations and analysis derived from DigitalGlobe, Airbus Defense and Space and Landsat satellite imagery collected from December 2002 and December 2014—combined with declassified KH-9 satellite imagery and publicly available information—indicate:

- Camp 14 has been and remains an operational political prison camp. It is one of North Korea’s oldest operating political prisoner camps and is, by North Korean standards, a mature and generally well-maintained facility.

- Given the physical security measures observed, it is likely that the majority of the camp’s population are prisoners. They maintain the agricultural fields, orchards, and livestock, and work in the camp’s logging activities and wood products, light industrial facilities and mines.
Figure 42

Area 17 - Road Construction Activity
Figure 43

Area 17 - Road Construction Activity
Figure 44

Area 18 - Road Construction Activity
Figure 45

Area 18 - Road Construction Activity

Truck

New road
Area 19 - Road Construction Activity

- New road
- New clearing
- New agriculture fields
Area 20 - Ch’ang-dong
Area 20 - Ch’ang-dong

Figure 49
Figure 50

Area 21 - Communications Facility
Figure 51

Area 21 - Communications Facility
Figure 52

Area 22 - Southeast Entrance to Camp
Figure 53

Area 22 - Southeast Entrance to Camp

Entrance

Guard Barracks
Figure 54

Area 23 - Ferry Crossing

Entrance and checkpoint
Ferry
Figure 55

Area 23 - Ferry Crossing
During the period under study the camp’s population has likely remained relatively constant or declined slightly. While Camp 14 is surrounded by a security perimeter, it is not completely enclosed within a single dedicated fixed security fence. Rather, it consists of a 119-kilometers-long network of security fences, patrol paths and roads, and 35 guard positions secure it. As noted above, the southern section of the camp’s perimeter fence is secured by the Taedong-gang. This river, due to its fast current and width, represents a significant obstacle to any who are not strong swimmers. The rugged wilderness area to the camp’s north serves as significant, but not insurmountable, deterrent to escape as there are large population centers within 5-10 kilometers.

During the period under study, the number of housing units and support buildings has remained relatively stable. Administrative, barracks, housing, light industrial, and support buildings are well maintained and in good repair. The grounds around these structures and the road network throughout the camp are well maintained as is typified by the road construction/maintenance operations undertaken in the western section of the camp along the Kumgwang-ch’on. Logging, wood products production, and light industries appear to be the primary economic activities within the camp.

There is a moderate diversity of agricultural production and all agricultural fields and orchards are well defined and maintained. Some of these are irrigated from mountain streams and rivers. The few livestock facilities and small fish farms identified are well maintained and show no sign of change.

The majority of the electric power for the camp is likely provided by the two hydroelectric power plants situated on the northern bank of the Taedong-gang. These power plants likely also provide electricity to the coal mines around Pongch’ang-ni and the local railroad network.

Recommendations
Continued monitoring of Camp 14 is recommended to develop an objective baseline understanding of the camp’s activities, maintain an evidentiary catalog of physical changes at the facility, update its status, develop more conclusive evidence of prisoner population size, and assist with the identification of human rights abuses.
## North Korea: Imagery Analysis of Camp 14

### Gazetteer

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### North Korea: Imagery Analysis Camp 14

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HRNK is the leading U.S.-based bipartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, tasked to focus international attention on human rights abuses in that country. It is HRNK’s mission to persistently remind policy makers, opinion leaders, and the general public in the free world and beyond that more than 20 million North Koreans need our attention.

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