



DATE: October 2, 2017

SUBJECT: Schieffer Series: North Korea: Next Steps | Center for Strategic and International Studies

MAIN POINTS:

- Sue Mi Terry said that North Korea's alleged redline is nuclear weapons proliferation and it is capable of conducting a nuclear test into the Pacific Ocean, referring to the North Korean officer who said North Korea will not give up its nuclear weapons when it is very close to completing the program.
- Michael Green emphasized that the US should be in lockstep with its allies, explaining that South Koreans put in place standard rules of engagement that if they get hit they hit back one level higher and that the current South Korean government is much more risk-averse and much more pro-engagement and suspicious of the military than the previous government.

The event can be viewed at: https://www.csis.org/events/schieffer-series-north-korea-next-steps?__s=icrqdp9qsp6ow5qr2puy, accessed 10/01/2017.

EVENT OVERVIEW

Date: Tuesday, September 26, 2017

Time: 5:00 p.m. - 6:30 p.m.

Location: CSIS Headquarters, 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036

Attendees:

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)
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- **Bob Schieffer**, Trustee, CSIS
 - **David Sanger**, Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times
 - **Michael J. Green**, Senior Vice President for Asia and Japan Chair, CSIS
 - **Sue Mi Terry**, Former Korea Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency; Former Korea Director, National Security Council
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SUMMARY

Introductory Remarks

Bob Schieffer

Bob Schieffer started by quoting from an article in The New Yorker by Evan Osnos, which he wrote after coming back from North Korea. Osnos wrote, and Schieffer quotes, “Our grasp of North Korea’s beliefs and expectations is not much better than their grasp of ours. To go between Washington and Pyongyang at this nuclear moment is to be struck by just how little the two countries understand each other.” Schieffer goes on to say, “In 18 years of reporting, I have never felt as much uncertainty at the end of a project, a feeling that nobody – not the diplomats, the strategists, or the scholars who have devoted their lives to this subject – is able to describe with confidence how the other side thinks or what they expect.” Schieffer then asked three panelists to comment on this article.

Opening Comments by Panelists

Sue Mi Terry

Sue Mi Terry said that she would agree with that. First of all, NK is the hardest target state because it is the most difficult country to figure out. In addition to that, the hardest thing to understand is the intentions of the regime because we do not have enough human intelligence and it is the most isolated country in the world. Therefore, we are in a very risky situation here where we do not quite understand them, and the regime has a really hard time understanding us at this juncture. They are used to doing certain things and there was certain predictability from the US government and certain action they are used to getting. However, now that there is a lot of unpredictability from the Trump administration, so there would be a lot of questions from

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their side too. There is a huge debate among the Korea Watchers community right now, and that is because we do not understand the regime's intentions. At the end of the day, if everything – the pressure measures, sanctions, dialogue – fails and NK ultimately achieves this capability to attack the US with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile, the question here would be if we could live with a nuclear NK and if traditional deterrence and containment, which worked against the Soviet Union would work against the N. Korean regime. And there is actual debate about this because we do not quite understand regime intentions.

There are Korea Watchers who say, “Yes, of course, because we live with nuclear Russia, nuclear China, nuclear India and Pakistan, so why can't we live with nuclear North Korea when Kim Jong-un is all about regime survival?” There are other Korea Watchers who say “No, we cannot ultimately live with nuclear NK because their end goal is not just survival, but to unify the Korean Peninsula by force,” which means that after they achieve the capability to attack the US, they will push US forces out of the Korean peninsula and then try to unify the Korean peninsula by force. She said that we do not really understand because we cannot get at what Kim Jong-un is really thinking right now.

Michael J. Green

Michael J. Green said that he would agree with Evan Osnos' observation broadly, and yet there is no diplomatic resolution to this problem, and the North Koreans are not going to negotiate away their nuclear weapons.

In one of the negotiations in Pyongyang in 2002, we confronted the North Koreans with knowledge of their secret uranium enrichment program. They were cheating on the previous deal, and yet they denied it. Green said that the head of the delegation, Jim Kelly, asked me to engage in a broad discussion with the head of the North Korean delegation, Kim Kye-gwan, on the world situation. Kim Kye-gwan then gave this description of world system in Asia based on Kim Il-sung-ism. The amazing thing was that this was their number two diplomat who traveled around the world. He believed it. He really believed that Kim Il-sung-ism could explain all developments in the world. That fundamental difference in worldview is profound, so we should be talking because we need to understand and to communicate, said Green. However, he showed skepticism about the possibility of negotiating way out of this one between the US and North Korea.

Green was asked to comment on the possibility of NK giving the weapons under current circumstances. He said that he does not think it is impossible. It is one more reason to try dialogue. The odds are very low, and we can talk about that more. North Korea has cheated on

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every single agreement it has ever made since they began working on nuclear weapons. Their constitution now enshrines them as a nuclear weapons state. And efforts by the current South Korean government and others to try to get some dialogue going have been rebuffed and rejected. So I wouldn't say impossible, but very, very unlikely in the current circumstances.

David Sanger

David Sanger said that he would broadly agree with what has been said by Terry and Green. KJU has pursued an incredibly rational, understandable policy. It is not that we can condone it, but it certainly makes sense if he looks out at the world as he sees things.

First of all, his grandfather and father started this program but did not really put enough energy into it to turn it into a real deterrent to the US. And if Terry's alternative scenario is right that he has a view of it as a way to unify the peninsula or to achieve other objectives in Asia, he is doing the right thing. The second thing is he looks at a case like Libya, a country that in 2003 gave up its nuclear weapons. They did not have weapons at the time. They had a series of A.Q. Khan's centrifuges. Somebody in the US government, to avoid embarrassing Pakistan, had put black paint over the A.Q. Khan Laboratories sign. This is exactly the same way that North Korea got its enrichment capability. They look at what happened in the case of Libya, a country that we promised to begin to integrate with the West and bring economic benefits to, and did a sort of half-hearted job of that. After that, first time that there was an uprising by the Libyan people, we moved in with our European and some Arab allies and helped drive Gadhafi from power. And the next time the North Koreans saw him, it was on TV as he was being pulled out of a ditch and being shot. Message should have resonated, and the answer was 'Do not believe the Americans if they tell you that when you denuclearize they will take care of you. They will let you rot until you get overthrown.' Therefore, what he is doing may make sense.

In the interviews referred, then-candidate Trump was in a very different place. President Trump said that he would go have a hamburger with KJU and could strike a deal with him. He came to it initially with that very transactional sense that he has, that he can make a deal with anybody. Judging by his tweets now, this would be the first case where he has persuaded himself that maybe he could not make a deal, and that he has got to do it all from the bluster and threats part. Now, maybe that is just a first step, and that he thinks he can intimidate them. As Evans Revere said in a story, the North Koreans do not get intimidated terribly easily. What has happened in the past week or two is that it has moved from a clash between countries to a clash between two different leaders who have significant ego. Neither one of them want to be seen as backing down in front of their own people. And that is what leads to the kind of very dangerous situation that

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could lead to Green and Terry's pessimism.

Discussion

Bob Schieffer

Bob Schieffer asked the panelists what they think the impact of the tweets are.

Sue Mi Terry

Terry said it is very counterproductive. We are giving a gift to the KJU regime because you are just giving the talking points and you are just showing it to the people. And that is why he was able to mobilize the public to protest because the public is already indoctrinated into thinking the US is the most hostile threat. All you have to do is play what President Trump said about totally destroying North Korea. Another problem is that we made it very personal. Kim Jong-un's statement that came out after President Trump's speech at the UN is notable. We have watched North Korea for many years. It has never come from the first person. KJU signed his name and it was front page of the Rodong Sinmun. KJU took it very personally. Therefore, by taunting him like this, we are limiting our options because KJU has to act. He has to go over with the provocations. He was going to do it anyway, but we are now giving him even further excuses. In addition, he cannot back down because now it is his credibility, his legitimacy, and everything in his country. For the domestic reasons, he cannot back down. North Korea would continue with trying to complete the program, perfect their nuclear arsenal. They are going to do that. We would get to act. However, taking exercising a military option is truly unthinkable because of all the casualties.

Michael J. Green

Green said he worry about it for another reason in addition to that. The reason why North Korea wants nuclear weapons is regime survival. That is almost a cliché to say. But they also want these nuclear weapons and missiles for the blackmail leverage it gives them. They want to use it to press the US in particular to relax sanctions, to give legitimacy to the regime, to press Japan and Korea to give economic aid, and to end our nuclear umbrella over Japan and Korea. Green said that he knows this because that is what the North Koreans ultimately said in negotiations. And by getting in this rhetorical game, what the president is doing is scaring our friends and allies. He is making it more likely that China or South Korea or the Europeans are going to push him and us to make concessions to avoid war. So he is actually creating leverage for North Korea diplomatically when there should be none. Green expressed skepticism about the prospects for

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diplomacy in the near term. But if we are going to have any prospects it's going to be the result of setting the stage with sanctions and pressure, and then especially pressure from China. And China is not going to press unless they see that the US, Korea and Japan are solidly together. The problem with this rhetoric is it gets those countries to start worrying more about us than about North Korea. It is not helpful.

Bob Schieffer

Schieffer asked panelists what they think KJU wanted for his long-range objective. He said that he agrees that regime survival would be number one on the list, but beyond that, we need to know if he sees his nuclear arsenal as something to use in defense against US. Schieffer also asked if KJU sees it as part of his grandfather's plan to reunite the Koreas and if we can make any kind of certain prediction about that or understanding of it.

Michael J. Green

His grandfather, Kim Il-sung, saw what happened when the Americans intervened in the Korean War using aircraft carriers and bombers based in Japan, and the power of American air power. So he wants a deterrent and the ability to hit our bases in Japan, Korea, and Guam. Both Koreas exist for the purpose of unification, but he does not have a claim anymore. The one thing he can claim the South Koreans do not have is nuclear weapons. KJU wants them because of a fear of absorption from China. China is also a threat. Lastly, he wants them because his military knows that they have poor conventional capabilities. So, internal reasons saying 'I ultimately can unify the peninsula and defeat the imperialist puppets in the South because I have nuclear weapons' is critical. It is hard to know whether that is propaganda or whether they really believe they can unify the South. However, the thing about North Korea, sometimes it is hard to distinguish between the propaganda and what people really believe.

David Sanger

They have learned the lesson of asymmetric capabilities here. Nuclear has obviously always been one especially if you are a country as small and poor as North Korea. When we try to think about his desire to reach out beyond Korean borders, think not nuclear for a moment but think cyber. Three years ago, the Sony hack was all about North Korea trying to go out and change the way Hollywood was about to turn out a movie about KJU. He was willing to reach across the Pacific with a weapon that he thought might not be easily traced back to him, attack an icon of Hollywood, and show that he had a degree of power out there. His father or grandfather would not have had that imagination. When you look at the weapons that he is now developing that can

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reach LA or Chicago, or will be able to in a couple years, you have to begin to think: Is our old assumption that this is simply about survival the whole story?

Bob Schieffer

Schieffer asked Terry what we would negotiate about if we had a negotiation with North Korea and where it will start.

Sue Mi Terry

Terry said that she sees the US going through negotiation in terms of trying to reach denuclearization and knows what North Koreans want. She had a chance to meet with North Koreans this summer in Sweden. They said:

Denuclearization is off the table. We are very close to completing the program. We are this close to perfecting our arsenal. Why would we give this up? Gadhafi is dead. Look at what happened to Iraq. They talked about an agreement, Bush came in and said the Axis of Evil, and things turned around. So we know we can't trust any agreement anyway looking at even what is going on with the Iran deal now.

So they have a rationale in terms of why they have to have this nuclear program and say 'So forget the denuclearization. That's off the table.' We will never meet for that. Nevertheless, we are willing to meet to discuss a peace treaty or a peace regime because the Korean War never technically ended. We are still at war. But the problem is that we cannot get there. We cannot, obviously, get to peace treaty discussion from where we are. We are going to have problems with verification. Even if there is a peace treaty and they say they will get rid of nukes, how do we verify that? Every single time there was a deal, it failed.

Bob Schieffer

Schieffer asked Mike what is the relationship between China and North Korea. He said that he asked Evan Osnos this question and Osnos answered:

There was a time when Mao said we are as close as lips and teeth. But he said, he was recently in China, before he went to North Korea. And he asked a Chinese official there if that was still the case. He said, no. It is more like dirt between the toes.

Michael J. Green

Mao's son was killed fighting the Americans in the Korean War. There is still nostalgia in the People's Liberation Army at senior levels. There is clearly a fear in the Zhongnanhai among the

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Chinese leadership about pushing the North Koreans to the point where they might collapse, which China could probably do if they were serious. They provide over 80 percent of the food and fuel to the North. But they are very scared of how the North Koreans will react and whether or not they'll collapse, because if they collapse you have a million-man army, chemical, biological, nuclear weapons, separated by the Yalu River from 5 million ethnic Koreans in the rust belt of China, with the potential of a Korean peninsula being unified under an American ally right on their border. And so that is part of the problem we have with China. However, Xi Jinping has done everything he can in terms of protocol to humiliate KJU. He has never invited him. He has had multiple summits with South Korean leaders. On Weibo and among the Chinese public, North Korea is deeply unpopular. In China, you can feel the tremors from the North Korean nuclear blasts. There are active volcanoes. However, China is paralyzed by fear of what will happen if they do what we would really like them to do to control and really squeeze the North. They are doing more. China is doing more than it ever has. But they are still deeply afraid of pushing the North too far.

Bob Schieffer

It is a very important point that there is no love lost between the two. They say that some in North Korea see themselves as simply a bargaining chip between the US and China. And they do not like that.

Michael J. Green

We have to remember 2,000 years of history between the Korean kingdoms and China. Koreans often point out that Japan invaded Korea three, four times. However, China invaded Korea, depending on the historical accounts, 600 or 900 times. Therefore, it is geopolitical and historical. It is not just the current problem.

Bob Schieffer

How close do informed people think the North Koreans are to having an ICBM that could reach the mainland of the United States?

David Sanger

They are really close. If you look at their last two ICBM tests, they worked out the distance problem. They just did it very vertically instead of flattening it out. And then when they did their

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most recent test, they flattened out a medium-range missile to show that it could make it the distance to Guam. It is just a matter of time before they do an ICBM test that they also flatten out. However, they want to be careful so that they do not hit something wrongly.

There are basically three different things you have to be able to do. One is have the missile be able to go the distance. Secondly, have a nuclear weapon that you can shrink down to the size you can fit into the warhead, and make it light enough that you are not cutting into the distance that that warhead goes. Thirdly – and this is the one they have not proved – they have to show that it will not burn up on reentry into the atmosphere. An ICBM leaves the atmosphere and comes back in. This took the US years in the 50s to go figure out. We burned up a lot of stuff before we did this. And then the fourth thing is you need to prove at least some level of accuracy and ability to detonate a weapon as it is being released, as the warhead is coming down. So far every test they have done has been underground. That is what made this threat last week to do an atmospheric test so particularly chilling. Because if they do that, they would not do it the way we used to do them, which was largely put a weapon out on a barge and set it off in, in our case, the Bikini Atoll. They do not have any outside islands to go do this with. So they would probably launch it on a missile and see if they could make it detonate. The US and the Soviet Union agreed in 1963, just before Kennedy was assassinated that they would never do that again. And they have not. The Chinese were the last ones to do such a test. It was in 1980. So it has been 37 years.

Sanger said that this would pose a huge problem for the Trump administration, because if you actually saw a weapon being loaded up on a launch pad in North Korea, first, you do not know exactly what it is aimed at. Secondly, they were probably getting ready to go do their atmospheric test. Therefore, even if it missed Guam, the belt of radiation that would be created could go over Guam or hit some other populated area. It would be a very tough decision about whether or not to do a preemptive strike, even if it was limited to taking out that one missile on the pad, or whether you would try to knock it out with missile defenses, which means that you take the risk that your missile defenses do not work. And the reason that President Obama ordered the cyber strikes on the missile program starting in 2014 was because he was not very confident that our kinetic systems designed to hit these warheads as they return to Earth was terribly good.

Bob Schieffer

Someone said that while the US would not say that it might cross the red line, we would not stand for them having an ICBM that could reach the US mainland with a nuclear warhead on it.

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And it would not burn up coming back into the atmosphere. That is where we say you cannot do that.

Michael J. Green

Part of our problem is that the US across many administrations has put out a variety of red lines. As Steve Hadley used to say, if you keep drawing red lines, eventually you are making a red carpet. We have to be careful about how we articulate them. One red line was the North Koreans in 2003. In 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed a Syrian reactor that was being built by the North Koreans. So transferring is a red line.

In addition, the EMP, the electromagnetic pulse effect, could be hugely damaging. That probably is a red line. So we do not know exactly what the red lines are. And the North Koreans are going to try to guess where that red line is and drive right up to it. And the danger we now face is that Pyongyang will think that we will be deterred because it has this capability, and they will have a lot more room to do things, like testing in the Pacific or what they did in 2010, sinking a South Korean Navy ship in the West Sea, or cyber attacks. And we have criticized the administration.

Green said that the administration was right to send B-1 bombers off the North Korean coast, to do a lot of the military steps they are doing, because we need to demonstrate that we are not going to be intimidated, and that we are going to respond if they try to do these attacks that they think we might be afraid to respond to because they have nuclear weapons. That is the dangerous new world we are in.

Bob Schieffer

Why are we threatening to pull out of the trade agreement with South Korea? How do our allies feel about all this? And what is the feeling in that part of the world about this?

David Sanger

One of the interesting proxies for measuring this is what discussion you hear about their need to go off and get their own independent nuclear deterrent. South Korea tried twice to start such programs in the 1970s and 1980s from a lot of different political sectors. In Japan, you do not hear it very much at all. Japan has got the greatest capability to go to it. One of the most striking

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lines in those interviews that Schieffer mentioned at the beginning came when President Trump was asked whether he would be unhappy if Japan and South Korea went off together and acquired nuclear weapons. President Trump said, “Well, I think it’s going there anyway, don’t you?” Sanger said that that was probably his gut feeling, that that probably is where it is headed. And that is why there was this little flurry of discussion about whether we should put our tactical nuclear weapons back on the Korean peninsula. Sanger said that he does not think that is going to happen. The Pentagon does not want to have it happen and there is no place in North Korea you cannot reach from a bomber in Guam or from a missile in Nebraska.

Q&A

Q (Pat Bergstresser): There are two things that I have yet to see discussed. And one is that the ruler of North Korea studied in Switzerland. Could Switzerland play a part in terms of reducing this rhetoric? And the second thing is the effects of these missiles and bombs on the planet. When the missile flew over Japan and exploded near Japan, they had an earthquake, first one. North Korea has had an earthquake from when they had the underground explosion. Then there was another missile that went over Japan and exploded in the sea. There is a ring of fire, the Pacific Rim basin, and now we have an earthquake in Central America, two in Mexico, two small ones in California. Cause and effect, I mean, it just seems to me that there might be a correlation. And I don’t understand why people are not discussing these issues.

A (Sue Mi Terry): I think when Kim Jong-un came to power, there were a lot of people who were hopeful that at least he was educated in Switzerland, the West, so that he would change, he’d be more reform-minded, and pursue that course. He has proven that is not the case, just because he was educated in the West does not change course. I mean, Pol Pot was educated in the West, right. NK has its own strategies and goals. We cannot even get China to really pressure North Korea. I do not think Switzerland is going to play that much of a role. North Korea has its own strategy. And the biggest player if any in the international region that can do anything about North Korea is really China. That is why we like to focus on China, to get China to do more to reign in North Korea.

A (Michael J. Green): I do not think the Swiss really have a role here. I mean, they do in some circumstances. The US interests are represented by Sweden, which has a procedural role and we have dialogue. Ultimately, there is a long list of countries volunteering to broker between

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the US and North Korea. That is not the problem. I think the US should be talking at some level. On the earthquakes I am even less qualified, but this is – you know, in the area, people are asking and debating about this, especially in China. It is one of the reasons, as I said, that the Chinese public is pissed off at North Korea.

Q (Peter Humphrey, Intelligence Analyst): They test a missile for two reasons: To make sure the engineering of the missile is copacetic and to see what the accuracy of the landing point is. So every time we let one of these things fall into the ocean, we are giving Kim Jong-un a free data point on his accuracy. So I got to ask, why are we not routinely practicing with our own ABM systems to knock down these test missiles one after another? We may miss half the time, we will get better through time, but it seems that policy change has to be made.

A (David Sanger): This is not as easy as it looks. We have two major kinds of ABM systems. The one that you hear about the most is the one that is in Alaska and California. They are designed for intercontinental ballistic missiles. And they are supposed to do the interception as the warhead is reentering the atmosphere and coming down in the US. So this is what you hear the bullet with a bullet. Under ideal testing circumstances, when they go test these things – they did one just a month or so ago – and you know roughly when the test is going to happen and the rough direction it is coming from. In the ideal circumstances, it works half the time. So one way you could improve that is throw all the missiles you have at it. And we only have 44 set up right now. I think it is 44 or 46. So you do not want to get into a situation where the North Koreans, by prompting your missile defense, learns a lot about what it can and cannot do. And you do not want to go through the embarrassment of having it miss. The second missile – kind of missile system we have are based on ships. They are on the Aegis destroyers and so forth. We have got a lot of those. They have got a higher accuracy rate, but they have got to be in the right place. And that is why it is sort of interesting that recently the North Koreans started launching from near the Pyongyang airport. They usually launch from a remote area off the coast. And part of that was to say we can move these around. We've got mobile missiles. And they have a lot of mobile missiles now. But the second was if you think you are going to do a preemptive action and just take something out and not kill a lot of people first, we are here to tell you we are going to do this from our most populous city, thus complicating the preemption decision.

A (Michael J. Green): So the THAAD system we just deployed in South Korea has hit 100 percent since the new system was developed. And Aegis is more like 70 percent. However, where Sanger is right is they are designed for defending a certain geographic area, not the entire Pacific Ocean. That is the problem. So the other technology that is within our grasp is boost-phase intercept, hitting it in the first minute of launch, which involves lasers and other things,

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which if we wanted to invest the money it is technologically feasible. And that, I would expect, is going to be a focus for the Pentagon, for the reasons Sanger said.

Q (Bob Schieffer): You know, and that also raises another interesting point. These missiles are very expensive, not just the ones that we make but the ones that they are making. Do we believe that North Korea is getting some kind of financial help from maybe Russia, maybe Iran to do this? Because this is an enormously expensive program they have got. And firing these missiles is very expensive.

A (Michael J. Green): As Sanger mentioned earlier, the uranium enrichment program, one way to build bomb, they got help from AQ Khan in Pakistan. China initially, under Mao Zedong, helped them develop technology. There is circumstantial evidence that I think is more than a smoking gun that over the years on missile development they have got help from Iran.

A (David Sanger): And they have worked in both directions. I mean, initially the Iranians were helping the North Koreans. I think there is a sense now that, you know, it is in both ways

A (Michael J. Green): And the North Koreans get cash through a variety of means, mostly illicit. We should, I think, commend the administration for the executive order last week, which gives the Treasury Department the authority to sanction any North Korean individual or entity, which is an important tool to stop that money flow because the earlier authorities, you know, we can get this company or that company, and they would just change the name. Now I think they have, if they want to use it, a real tool to start squeezing some of that money flow.

Q (Kya Palomaki, Graduate student at George Washington University): It seems to me that there is a difference between Trump, the person and the Trump administration writ large, when there are statements – official statements coming out of the White House versus these kinds of erratic tweets. So I was wondering how our allies can know which one to trust when there is information conflicting and if that is becoming – if you see that becoming an issue now and in the future.

A (David Sanger): One of the striking things is that you have had Secretary Tillerson and, to some degree, Secretary Mattis say “We are not out there to do regime change.” And then you have the president’s tweets come out saying we will destroy your country, and you will not be there anymore, things that sound a little like regime change. And I have had more than a few diplomats who said to me “Which one of these is we supposed to believe?” And I have to say to

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them all honestly that I believe the tweets, because I think that they reflects more where the president's mind is, even if it is unfiltered, and gives you a sense of where he has headed. But this has been difficult, because if the message that you are trying to consistently send to Kim Jong-un is that you can get into a negotiation with us because we are not out to change your regime. The second dissonance has been General McMaster's reference on various occasions to conducting a preventive war – not a preemptive war, but a preventive war. Now, the other way to think about this is General McMaster's, in a very savvy way, trying to introduce a level of unpredictability here, to tell Kim Jong-un: You are not the only one who is going to be the master of surprise.

Q: I'm probably one of the few in the room who remember the Pueblo. I worked for a year in Seoul, Korea in the Foreign Service to get them back. And one thing – and as you may recall, we signed an agreement apologizing. But we told the North Koreans at the same time, look, we are going to rescind this. But it was a matter of face that was important. And now move it up. We have in effect two nuclear powers here, both of whom have a lot of personal face that is involved. So let me ask a naïve question. We are in Korea originally because of the UN. And we talk about quiet, confidential talks, and so on. Is there any role for the secretary-general to step in here and get something done? And perhaps he is already doing it, let us hope.

A (Michael J. Green): As you know, we are technically still in a state of war with North Korea. We are only at peace because of an armistice. And the UN is a party to that war. We have a UN command, as you know, in Korea. I do not think the secretary-general can play a role. The UN development program, other parts of the UN engage the North Koreans hugely, which is helpful. But the Security Council itself is going to end up playing a critical role up in all of this. It has done it now because of sanctions. And we have not talked about this, but sooner or later this regime is going to collapse. And when that happens, the US, China, Japan, Korea, and Russia – we are going to return to the basic diplomatic framework we created in the 1950s and have to decide what comes next. And at that point, I think the UN, particularly the Security Council, is going to be the place where a lot of the action happens, where we diplomatically find a way to avoid a new world without North Korea, where the US and China are enemies. And instead, trying to find a way where the US, Japan, China, and Russia are all working together. When we started the six-party talks in 2003, part of our purpose was to start laying the groundwork for that kind of dialogue among the major powers, tactically to do with the North Korean nuclear problem, but beginning building the diplomatic connections so we were ready for whatever came next. And I think there will be a next chapter beyond the one we are now talking about.

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