



DATE: August 11, 2017

SUBJECT: Korea Defense Reform 2.0 |The Sejong Society

MAIN POINTS:

- ROK military reform history presents its endeavor to innovate the existing conditions of the military system.
- ROK should raise powers with divergent values and visions and build a cooperative relationship within the region.
- Given its own exposure to war threats from North Korea, ROK should check the current state where it stands and propose the diversified solutions using the Art of War written by Sun Tzu.
- ROK makes an earnest request for continuous support and cooperation from the US in diplomatic and defense affairs.

The event can be viewed at: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?432101-1/south-korean-military-defense>.

EVENT OVERVIEW

Date: Thursday, August 4, 2017

Time: 6:30 p.m. – 8:30 p.m

Location: Rome Auditorium, 1619 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036

Attendees:

- **CHUN, In-Bum**, Lieutenant General (R), Visiting Fellow, Center for East Asia Policy Studies

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SUMMARY

Introduction

Lieutenant General Chun said that he would talk about Korea's armed forces reform, give an overview of what Korea has been doing for the past forty years, and try to see where Korea is right now. There have been more than 10 to 15 military reforms in the history of the Republic of Korea's armed forces. Now, most military reforms occur either because they have a new strategy, a new way of thinking, or a new weapons system such as a machine gun, said Chun. He asserted that actual military reform, unfortunately, comes when a war has been lost, thus the worst thing that can happen to a military is continued success. However, Koreans have been constantly trying to conduct reform for the past 30 or 40 years, said Chun.

Plan 818: President Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993)

Lt. Gen. Chun started with Plan 818, emphasizing that it was a very important stage in Korea's military history because it was the first time the South Korean military started to modernize its armed forces. It started with President Roh Tae-woo's administration, and there are two things to remember:

- 1) Unified Command: The first thing that President Roh wanted to do was to create a unified command, a chief who would be able to command the ground, air, and naval forces. Before this endeavor started, the chief of naval operations, the air force chief of staff, and the army chief of staff all had separate command authority to conduct operations for their troops. President Roh wanted this because it was much more effective to have a unified command. Such system defined most communist states at that time, so the Koreans thought that having a unified command would be the most effective way to build a military at this time.
- 2) Division of Command and Administrative Authority: Another thing was the concept of divided command and administrative authority. When you have "command" of someone, you can tell them what they have to do, assign them positions, pay them, promote them, the whole spectrum. What President Roh wanted to do, or what he was forced into doing, was to divide the promotion and assignment part from the command part. This was a compromise because the service chiefs who had all of this authority

were very reluctant to give it up to a Supreme Chairman. Therefore, in order to come up with a deal that everyone could enjoy, he came up with this concept of divided command and administrative authority. Another challenge that he had was the lingering suspicion by the Korean public of creating a super military commander because this was back in 1990. Back then and even to this day, there has been suspicion that a powerful military strongman would not be a politically smart thing to do from a civilian perspective. It did not fully succeed, but partially succeeded in that he was able to have a much stronger Chairman who now had the authority to conduct operations, especially during armistice. In 1994, operational control of Korean forces was retained by the Koreans and the Chairman had operational control of Korean forces during armistice.

Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations (1993-2003)

During the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations, there were changes but not changes that can be seen as a military reform. During this time, President Kim Dae-jung truly believed that peace on the Korean peninsula was possible, said Chun. The first notions of having a smaller military started to spring up during Kim Dae-jung's era. South Korea had about 700,000 men under arms at that time and Kim's administration was the first administration that said Korea could probably do well with about 500,000 soldiers. It was a good estimate at that time because this concept, by the time that Roh Moo-hyun became president, fulfilled itself into Defense Reform 2020.

Defense Reform 2020: Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)

Defense Reform 2020 had three main focuses:

- 1) More Balanced Tri-service: The Koreans thought the army had too much influence and thus needed to have a military that was more balanced, which was against what South Korea's allies - the United States in particular - thought. Rather, those allies thought South Korea has a great air force. The US has a huge navy and they thought they could take care of that for South Korea, but wanted South Korea to do the ground battle, said Chun. That idea of the US' was different from the concept of Defense Reform 2020.
- 2) Robust Civilian Control: They wanted more robust civilian control, and during this process, wartime operational control became an issue in that wartime operational

control needed to be retained or transferred back to the South Koreans.

- 3) Smaller Force: In the beginning of the administration, they were quite confident that they could do it with a smaller force, so the catchphrase at that time was, “A smaller military, but high-tech.” When the Roh administration came in, about 75% of the total force was conscripted, but now it is about 60%, which implies an increase of 60% more “professionals,” at least with a minimum of four and half years in service. It has become a much more career oriented force during the past 15 years.

Plan 307: Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013)

1) Revising the Direction of Defense Reform: This plan came because the ROK military had a failure when the North Korean military sank one of corvettes in the ROK naval fleet (ROKS Cheonan) and had the audacity to fire about 250 rounds at one of the islands of South Korea (Yeonpyeong Island). During these two critical incidents, South Korea found out that they had a major problem in their defense. Namely, since the service chiefs could promote, pay, and assign people, the local commanders—and the Chairmen—were calling their service chiefs first as they were supposed to.

2) Parameters of the 307 Plan: The 307 Plan focused on i) the North Korean artillery threat directly towards Seoul, so they bought more precision guided bombs, ii) the cyber threats, so they established cyber command, and iii) the North Korean special forces threats, so they started to change their procurement priorities. The navy increased procurement for anti-submarine warfare, including minesweepers, anti-submarine helicopters, and sensor systems.

3) Changes in the Structure: As a part of the 307 Plan, President Lee wanted to give the Chairman the authority for promotion to at least the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The Chairman would function as the theater operational commander with limited administrative authority (personnel, logistics, and training) over the military services, and especially authority for mobilization. It “beefed up” the Chairman's authority. As a compromise, the Service Chiefs who until then had no command authority, could promote, assign, and pay, but they could not conduct operations.

Defense Reform 2.0: Moon Jae-in (2017)

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The Moon administration recently announced Defense Reform 2.0. It is an extension of the reform that the Roh administration started. It focuses on i) the North Korean nuclear and missile threat, ii) better civilian control, iii) waste and fraud related to defense industry, and iv) human rights for soldiers.

As for the North Korean nuclear and missile threat in particular, continuance of the current military systems to counter North Korea plays an important role.

- 1) Kill Chain: It is a military defense system that detects signs of a nuclear attack by the North and launches an attack on Pyongyang. For the Kill Chain, the military plans to rent four to five intelligence satellites from overseas to monitor North Korea.
- 2) KAMD (Korea Air and Missile Defense): It is a military defense system that traces and shoots down North Korean ballistic missiles heading for South Korea. The military planned to introduce one radar system. Due to the increasing threats from the North's submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), the military is planning to secure an additional radar system.
- 3) KMPR (Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation): It is a military defense system that is used to punish and retaliate against North Korea if it strikes South Korea. The military plans to mobilize its locally developed surface-to-surface ballistic and cruise missiles, the Hyun-moo, for the operational concept.

This is what has been going on the defense reform in South Korea for the past 30 years. How we are going to know if we have been a success or not is a big question, said Chun.

The Art of the War

Chun proposed a defense reform strategy using the Art of War written by Sun Tzu and compared it with five factors: 道(Mission), 天(Climate), 地(Ground), 將(Command), 法(Methods)

- 1) 道(Mission, Dao): Dao is translated into morals. It is the understanding between a sovereign and his people about what they are trying to do and why they are doing it. Sun Tzu said if the sovereign is able to make his people understand why they are fighting, then he will have a good chance of winning. To be able to build consensus, to be able to

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tear off tri-service rivalries, what is good for the overall effectiveness of the armed forces should be considered, said Chun. Will Koreans and the Moon administration be able to do this is the big question that we must ask and look for support.

- 2) 天(Climate, Tian): Tian is heaven, the weather, and the direction of the wind. In ancient times, knowing the wind strength and direction was very important. The ROK is getting new UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle). Chun said that he feels that there are things we could do more on the intelligence and information side, emphasizing that North Koreans have a very robust cyber capability that they can theoretically wipe out all bank accounts in South Korea if they wished, even without nuclear weapons that they might have.
- 3) 地(Ground, Di): Di is translated into terrain. In modern times, it can be translated into intelligence and information. Every article pertaining to defense reform in Korea always points to the fact that the South Korean military lacks the required information and intelligence about North Korea. Clearly, South Korea knows there is a problem or a shortfall in intelligence gathering towards North Korea and to the surroundings of the Republic of Korea. According to open sources, Korea is endeavoring to get new satellites, said Chun. A Global Hawk is being purchased through the United States.
- 4) 將(Command, Jiang): Jiang means leadership. A good general needs to have knowledge, needs to be a good person, a man of courage, and a man of integrity. Leaders need to be trusted, and need to be a person who could command trust from not only his subordinates, but also by his peers and his boss. Leaders should be strict on themselves. Chun said that Korea has great potential, but they still need to work a lot on the issue of leadership. Although, even at this very moment, there are some scandals going on in South Korea pertaining to the senior military leaders, Chun emphasized that it is very healthy that Korea has now evolved into a society where people can criticize senior generals openly, and even prosecute senior generals who are not doing their job or are misusing their authority. In addition, he emphasized that tri-service rivalries really need to be suppressed and that we need to think about what is most effective for the defense of the Republic of Korea
- 5) 法(Methods, Fa): Fa means law and management. It is about how orders are related, how the troops are trained, and especially how awards and medals are given out. Sun Tzu said leaders should always punish bad deeds and always reward good deeds. Chun said this is very important because most of leaders do the punishing part really well, but seldom do the rewarding part. Chun divided this into i) organization, ii) command and

control, iii) training, iv) equipment, and v) sustainment. As for Organization, making the armed forces effective should be the objective. In order to do that, it requires downsizing the army and increasing the air force, and it should not be the other way around. For command and control, Korea is the best connected country in the world, with the best internet service, and yet still its communications, radios, and tri-services need to have separate computer systems, said Chun. Training in Korea has been a peculiar challenge because every man goes to the military. However, the training system should be improved through realistic education, effective personnel management, and through innovative logistics management by shaping elite reserve forces and improving the logistics system. As for equipment, Korea has the best aircraft, the F-15 and F-16, and radar equipped ships, said Chun. However, South Korea still uses 30-year old rifles. Defense reform really needs to look at the fundamentals of equipment. Finally, as for sustainment, South Korea had about 690,000 men 15 years ago. Now, it has about 620,000 men, which suggests that 70,000 have been reduced already. There should be a plan to cover the reduced number of troops by training advanced fighters and securing surveillance aircraft, naval platforms, and ground combat vehicles.

Q&A

Q (Andrew, Program Coordinator of Sejong Society): I want to ask a question regarding the reduction of the length that soldiers have to dedicate in the military service in Korea. For Korean males, when they become 21, they have to serve 21 months for army corps, 23 months for navy, and 24 months for air force. According to the reform suggestions, it's about to be decreased if passed. There are many criticisms, but the core argument is that we have increased the number and quality of professionals. I strongly agree with that, but still I think there is a problem with the whole military and big picture, which is raising the respect, making civil society pay attention, and giving certain credit to the military as a whole. In Korea, it is compared to the US which has a strong military mind in which people pay their sincere respect. In Korea, there is a low level of respect so how can you raise the level of respect that civil society can pay in the Republic of Korea?

A (In-Bum Chun): You asked a two-part question. One part is about the duration of service for conscripts in the military and the other part is about getting respect from the general public. As for getting respect, we are now in an open society where military people do not lie to

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our people. It is going to take a little bit more time, but if we stay on this course, we will be able to gain the respect from the Korean people. Concerning your comments about reduction in service time, I think it is set in stone that the Moon administration will reduce it from 21 months to 18 months. The challenge that we have is that a large percentage, more than half of units are rotating every year. It is the job of the professionals to figure out how we are going to do this and how we can make this workable. I think there is a way to do that.

Q (American citizen): Have you studied something to do with coordination with the government as interagency cooperation, not having to do with the military background agencies?

A (In-Bum Chun): No, I haven't, but there was a discussion during my career that we, the South Korean military, could be a place where we are able to educate our young men and some of our women about the values of freedom and democracy. In fact, Plan 307 had an emphasis on that kind of education and in order to do that, we did coordinate with the Ministry of Education to introduce a credits system for military service in academia. The Ministry of Health & Welfare is another agency who we could coordinate with.

Q (American citizen): When I left Seoul, there was a significant effort and problem that was being addressed with the birth rate and I am wondering if it is still a problem there. Is the youth still refusing to create families?

A (In-Bum Chun): It does not correlate with the birth rate or reduction and does not have any kind of correlation with generating or increasing the birth rate. However, due to low birth rates, we now recognize it would be very difficult to maintain 500,000 men and that is why we are employing more women.

Q (American citizen, intern at a law firm in Washington, DC): Does this apply to the Korean Coast Guard? What is coming to my mind is the issue with search and rescue, particularly the example of the Sewol Ferry disaster a couple of years ago.

A (In-Bum Chun): Defense reform and the Coast Guard have no direct correlation. The shoreline of South Korea is now managed by military units, and they are responsible for smuggling as well as infiltration by North Korean agents or armed insurgents.

Q (John Walsh, a student at Strategic Studies): You mentioned a medium-term/long-term transition from a force structure optimized for a joint fight with the US to something more

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balanced with a capability of a blue-water navy and long-range air operations. Does that reflect a new mission set and what is driving that choice?

A (In-Bum Chun): That was the thinking in the early 2000s. At that time the North Korean threat was comparatively not as critical as now, so we thought the armed forces needed to be more general in its ability to conduct operations not only towards defense against the North Korean invasion or intrusion but also for other missions that would take us to, for instance, anti-piracy operations with a warship in the Persian Gulf. So that kind of effort prompted and resulted in these capabilities.

Q (Joel, a graduate student at the University of Texas): I just had a question about the organization and integration with the ROK Army and USFK. I wondered how the movement from Yongsan to Camp Humphreys will affect the abilities of the two different forces to work together.

A (InBum Chun): It is going to multiply the challenge. It is going to require more effort to make it as effective as it is now. Basically, combined operations between two nations require a lot of efforts. We are now going to be physically about an hour and a half away. We have VTCs and other mechanisms, but still it is different. We are going to see a lot of train rides between these two organizations, and there is still going to be a significant number of Koreans stationed at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, so hopefully they can do their job well. Hopefully fiber-optics will help with their jobs. And back in Seoul, they have dedicated spaces where partners can come to use national assets. So, we are going to do that. But having somebody physically an hour or an hour and a half away is going to increase the effort required.

Q (Andrew, Program Coordinator of Sejong Society): How about the effectiveness of the unified division? Should it increase the amount of the divisions and multiply more divisions into the command of the unified commander who orders both ROK and US soldiers or just maintain the quantity for now and see how it rolls out?

A (In-Bum Chun): When you said unified division, are you talking about the US?

Q (Andrew, Program Coordinator of Sejong Society): Yes.

A (In-Bum Chun): The American 2D Infantry Division has now become a combined division. It has more than 50 Korean officers serving at the division staff, taking orders and

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directions from the 2ID Commander, and they work in critical conditions such as planning, operations. The commander is quite satisfied with the performance of these officers. In wartime, the 2D Infantry Division will be augmented with Korean units, and the good news is that they are practicing every day. Remember the training issue I told you about? When training with Americans, Koreans did a lot better, and this is an added value that is coming out. If you are asking me if we should expand that, I am sure I would. It costs money, but I think it is worthwhile. I think it is an endeavor that we did right. By the way, my nickname is the “father of the combined division,” so I might be biased in my comments.

Q (A visiting student at Johns Hopkins): I think we can observe the international trend of increased outsourcing of military operations and resources to private military companies, also known as PMCs, like Blackwater. I was wondering what implication this riding PMC would have on Korea and the overall capacity?

A (In-Bum Chun): Let me use an example. In a Korean unit, which is mostly a battalion sized unit, you have five companies. One is the headquarters company, three are rifle companies, and one is a weapons company. And any given day, except for the headquarters company, one of these companies is always committed to guard duty. What that means is the battalion commander is unable to deploy all of his troops on a field exercise. He can only do this for two months out of a year when they are freed from guard duty and the commander is allowed to take his troops out. If you have a location of 50% or more troops a year, it means that individual soldier probably gets maybe one or two experiences where he sees his entire unit move around. So, how much money should we be investing in alleviating this problem? If we were to spend a couple of thousand dollars on some company having some retired military people who have a nice little pension, and who would be more than willing to do this job for a thousand dollars a month, outsourcing this is something that is do-able. Also, maintenance of modern-day equipment is not like what it used to be. These helicopters and tanks are ten million dollars. We need to make sure they run and get oil, and you do not screw on the screw too hard or too light.

Q (Stanley, American citizen): This is a session on defense reform and you have given a very judicious professional overview. I'm sure you are familiar with a lot of the political debate here on North Korea. There are a lot of people now arguing that we must consider military preemption. And since you are here as a professional military officer, from South Korea, I was wondering what your opinion might be on this regard.

A (In-Bum Chun): There is a talk that it will be thousands of people dying over there,

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not here. However, if you think that anything bad happens on the Korean peninsula is going to end there, look again. Japan is going to get involved quickly. And probably the Chinese will get involved. Once that happens, all of you, your sons, and your daughters will get involved. I know there is a lot of planning and thinking going on, I just hope that the United States has learned a lot of lessons from initial operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Double-check your intelligence information. The targeting information you have might not be as sufficient as you think.

Report by: Huiwon Yun, Legal Research Intern



DATE: August 28, 2017

SUBJECT: Jinhye Jo Speaks At TEDxLakeArtemesia

MAIN POINTS:

- Jinhye Jo shares her daunting story to freedom in addition to raising awareness concerning human rights in North Korea and the plight of North Korean defectors.

EVENT OVERVIEW

Date: August 6, 2017

Time: 2 p.m-5 p.m.

Location: The Clarice Smith Performing Arts Center, 8270 Alumni Dr., University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1625

Attendees:

- **Jinhye Jo**, North Korean Refugee Rescue Program + Journey, NKinUSA
- **Erika J. Kendrick**, Combating Depression
- **Michael Mitchell**, Spreading Gamer Music
- **Tianyi Dance Team**, Keeping Chinese Traditional Dance Alive
- **Sabrina He**, HRNK, Reporter

SUMMARY

OPENING REMARKS: While you know that autocrats and dictators are bad, luckily many of us have never had to deal with such a problem. For us, it is a nightmare and this means that unless the person impacts us, we do not have to deal with it. Ms. Jo, unfortunately, lived through one

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such nightmare. However, she has a story to share with us about perseverance and family. It is an inspiring story that tells a lot about the human spirit and endurance. Please join me in welcoming Ms. Jo.

JINHYE JO: Hello, I am North Korean American Jinhye Jo. I heard about TED and I am honored to be here today. I was born in North Korea in 1987. My father was a party member and he had to do whatever the government asked him to do. He worked long hours and came home late every day without much time to spend with me. When I was seven years old, my father stopped working for the government and as it stopped providing for us, he had to start looking for food. But because he was a party member, he was not allowed to conduct business and in looking for food, my father was sentenced to jail.

When my father got out of prison a few months later, he asked the party what could he do, given that he would not receive money and food by working for the government while he had to provide for five children. He said “if I go look for food, you will put me in prison,” and the government’s response was: “find out for yourself”. So finally, my father decided to work and find food in China once a month at the risk of his life. This way, he could work for the government while accounting for food. However, the third time he went, he and my mother got caught by the border police. After accusing them of seeing the Internet, going to church, and meeting with South Koreans, the government tortured them non-stop.

Since my mother was three months pregnant, my father confessed to crimes he never committed to enable her to go home. When she returned, she cried and screamed in fear while visions of our father being tortured constantly recurred in her dreams. Five months later, we received a letter from the government, informing us that our father had tried to escape from the train so they shot him to death. The truth is though, due to his infections post torture, he died in the train in lack of food and water for 10 days. When my mother found out the truth, she was so sad that she delivered her baby in the house. We did not have a car or money to bring her to the hospital, so my seventy-six-year-old grandma and I helped her deliver the baby.

My older sister was sixteen years old. During this time, she was the only one in the family who went out to look for food. One day, she did not come back. We later learned that she was sexually trafficked to China. Seven days after delivering my baby brother, my mother walked two hundred miles to China in seek of my sister. In her absence, I took care of my baby brothers and tried to feed them milk and food. But because my father was killed by the government, no one wanted to help me, so I found some corn on the ground near the trash and made it into powder to feed to my baby brother. When he had a few bites, my baby brother smiled at me and thought that I was his mother.

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Meanwhile, my grandma got ill and could not move at all. I was alone in taking care of my two brothers, sister, and my grandma. My newborn baby brother slowly died in my arms two months later due to starvation. Three days after he passed away, my mother returned with food and powder for milk. After she found out that the baby was not in the house, she started yelling and crying, cursing the government. Some people heard and reported her to the police, who came and used a stick to heat my mother's head and body. As my mother bled, they took her with them along with the food she garnered.

Afterwards, we did not have any hope of survival. I remember my family stayed in bed while giving up on our lives, but just then, my mother returned. She had escaped in the knowledge that we would give up otherwise. When I saw my mother, her head was infected, she had a fever and she could not walk well. But my mother was a strong woman and she never gave up after she escaped from prison. We hid in the mountains for a few days, during which time we ate grass and bark to survive. My grandma did not make it. Her last hope was to eat a potato. She asked us to survive and go to China. I was ten years old but had to take care of her dead body. With her last strand of hope, our mother asked that I take my brother and younger sister and leave for China.

We walked a hundred miles without shoes and when I was too tired, I sat and cried. My mother found some neighbors, and asked them to take care of my brother for five days. She told them that she would return with food if they watched him. When we walked away, my brother held our pants and started crying. He asked why the youngest sister could go. We answered, the youngest sister will bring back candies and cookies and we will bring rice for him. We told him to be strong and wait for five days, before we come back and get him. But after we crossed the Tumen River border to China, we could not return on time because there was too much rain. Two months later, we sent a broker to North Korea to bring my brother to China, but instead he found that the neighbors had difficulty surviving so they abandoned my brother, who became a homeless child. Later, we discovered that he died due to starvation in the streets.

In China, we hid and tried to survive for ten years. We were caught and sent back to North Korea four times. I prayed a lot and we met a lot of nice people, and it is thanks to them that we could survive to this day. I can still feel pain in my body due to torture, but I survived and now I am in the United States, where I have found freedom. Still, I cannot forget my family. I am sorry to my brother that I could not take him with me. I explain my past life not just to share how difficult it was, but for the world to know about what happens inside North Korea. Because like me, there are three hundred thousand North Korean defectors and people who lost their families or died from starvation. In 2005, I tried to rescue a North Korean defector from China to Mongolia, but I got caught and China put me in prison for one year and three months. From that day on, I never gave up on helping North Korean people, but I am also trying to survive today.

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I ask you for three ways to help North Korean defectors. Do not send food, money, or medication to North Korea. It never goes to the people but stays with the government. Pressure the Chinese government to stop sending North Korean defectors back to North Korea. They will die. There are more than two hundred North Korean defectors here in America, and thirty thousand North Korean defectors live in South Korea. Help them and rescue their families. Send information back to North Korea through radio or USB. Through them, make the North Korea regime collapse. If you can, please rescue orphans, North Korean women, and children in China being sexually trafficked. My organization has rescued almost a hundred North Korean defectors from China to America. I also want to take a moment to introduce my sister. Grace, can you stand up? I am very happy because I am in heaven here in America and I hope that people here will know about North Korea and rescue North Korean defectors. Please continue to pray for them.

EDITED FOR CLARITY AND BREVITY.

Report by Sabrina He, Research Intern, HRNK.



DATE: September 7, 2017

SUBJECT: Foundation for Defense of Democracies – Addressing the North Korean Threat

MAIN POINTS:

- **Dr. Pollack** expressed skepticism about meaningful change beyond dialogue.
- **Malinowski** argued for the importance, in the long term, for information flow into North Korea.
- **Ruggiero** made the case for freezing the assets of the Chinese and imposing secondary sanctions, referencing the effectiveness of secondary sanctions on European banks in the case of Iran.
- **Dr. Ravich** reinforced the major cyber threat that North Korea poses, which is an asymmetric tool that the US needs to respond to aggressively.

The event can be viewed at: <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/events/addressing-the-north-korean-threat/>.

EVENT OVERVIEW:

Date: August 24, 2017

Time: 9:15a.m

Location: 1800 M St NW, Washington, DC 20036

Attendees:

- **Tom Malinowski**, former Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
- **Dr. Jonathan Pollack**, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
- **Anthony Ruggiero**, senior fellow at FDD

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- **Dr. Samantha Ravich**, senior advisor at FDD's Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance
 - **Josh Lederman**, journalist at The Associated Press
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SUMMARY:

A brief introduction was delivered by **Joe Dougherty**, FDD's Director of Communications, who introduced the moderator for the event, Josh Lederman.

Lederman thanked Dougherty and began his introduction of the frightening and confusing current times in regards to North Korea. With senior US officials assuring Lederman that progress is being made, many questions arise with North Korea's proliferation and the ongoing human rights concerns in that country. Lederman then provided a brief introduction of each speaker: Tom Malinowski, Dr. Jonathan Pollack, Dr. Samantha Ravich, and Anthony Ruggiero.

The first question from Lederman was directed at Dr. Jonathan Pollack. He asked how bad the situation was and if it is under control when it appears to be a roller coaster from the outside.

Dr. Pollack responded by differentiating between the public and the private. After referencing North Korea's propaganda to state the jarring rhetoric used by the regime, he stated that their actions are more calculated. The situation is frankly not good because Kim Jong-un has focused his energy on his nuclear and missile weapons, and this has been the case since the founding of the North Korean state. The US's deterrence policy has worked well for 65 years and South Korea's economy has developed significantly in that time. However, nuclear and missile weapons give Kim Jong-un a feeling of validation, which endangers Korea and the region, which is what we should be most worried about. Quoting Secretary Mattis when he said that the last place that the US wants to fight is on the Korean peninsula, Dr. Pollack concluded his remarks by saying that the US is in a very long-term struggle of "strategic patience."

Lederman then asked Dr. Pollack if Secretary Tillerson is being intentionally vague about the situation and timeline that would lead to US talks with North Korea.

Dr. Pollack responded by providing advice for Secretary Tillerson. He suggested that a lack of a long-range missile test is not equivalent to restraint. The total number of missiles that North Korea has tested does not look like restraint. There also may be other

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reasons why North Korea is not testing. There has not been a nuclear test in almost a year, but the US does not want to give them too much credit. However, Secretary Tillerson seems to believe that going some time without “provocation,” will lead to US talks with North Korea. Dr. Pollack then postured that dialogue does not mean negotiation. He then expressed his skepticism with meaningful change beyond a discussion.

Lederman transitioned from Dr. Pollack’s statements to Tom Malinowski by asking about the actual situation in North Korea, involving Western media, luxury goods, and pop culture. His next questions involved the level of importance and relevance of this situation, where North Koreans have access to luxury goods and pop culture, when the Kim regime does not place the economic wellbeing of the people as a high priority.

Malinowski answered Lederman’s question by stating that in the end, the situation is more than relevant. He believed that it is “the key to the puzzle.” He then compared the current situation to that of the Cold War in the sense that it is a situation that must be managed through diplomacy, deterrence, and pressure through sanctions. However, solutions will come from change in North Korea. The only way the regime has survived is through a total information blockade. This has been most important to the Kim regime compared to other totalitarian regimes because North Korea is an unnatural state of one indefinitely ruling family. The myths that the regime created are why it has succeeded. As a result, this makes North Korea even more vulnerable to information. He then gave a brief overview of the history of the information flow into North Korea since the Great Famine of the 1990s, which has resulted in the large amount of information flow through flash drives and SD cards today. There is a significant subculture consuming this information. In terms of strategy, Malinowski is wary of using the term “regime change.” However, he believes that current trends in North Korea can be accelerated by funding NGOs who work on pushing information across the China-North Korea border.

Lederman responding to the topic of regime change, referencing President Trump, Secretary Mattis, and Secretary Tillerson as saying that they are not seeking regime change in North Korea despite not making those assertions with Iran or Venezuela. He then asked if the US is undermining its moral leverage on rights and democracy by trying to placate Kim Jong-un’s concerns.

Malinowski responded by saying that there is a fine line. He remained hesitant to use the rhetoric of “regime change.” Despite believing that a future with this problem solved does not involve the existence of North Korea, he believed that rhetoric is still very important with diplomacy. When that type of rhetoric is used, Malinowski argued that it diminishes the legitimacy of appropriate things that are being done to defend human

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rights around the world. Stating that it is important to be clear about the goal, he reiterated that care should be taken with the rhetoric that is used. He would use the rhetoric of human rights.

Lederman then turned the conversation to Dr. Pollack's mention of "strategic patience." He asked if there are any substantive differences between administrations aside from the rhetoric used.

Malinowski strongly stated that he did not believe there was any substantive difference because phrases like "strategic patience" do not actually mean anything. Modifiers like "strategic" are used before a mundane, meaningless concept.

Dr. Pollack included that it should be a bold new strategy.

Malinowski stated that the administration has no strategy, which should be stated if one would like to make it far in the think tank world. He found these things silly. Substantially, the policy is the same between administrations. He found the pressure campaign to be wise in order to make it difficult for North Korea to modernize, even though it would denuclearize the regime. In the short run, he believed North Korea could be managed by protecting US allies and thus, protect the US. The conditions can be created where it is more likely for change to occur in North Korea.

Dr. Pollack interjected at this point and stated that President Obama understood that the policies of the US were not working. This is why he met with President-Elect Trump two days after the election. President Obama did try with North Korea.

Ruggiero disagreed and stated that it was important to be careful not to suggest that the Trump administration is the same as the Obama administration. Reading the documents from 2009, he questioned what the US was doing for eight years when there was evidence of North Korea using US dollar transactions. The Trump administration is finally going after Chinese banks. There were six separate actions against Chinese entities. If C4ADS had not exposed the Dandong Hongxiang network, then he did not think that the Obama administration would have pursued them. In conclusion, he would not give the Obama administration as much credit as pushing the pressure aspect of strategic patience.

Lederman then asked whether those steps are actually working and what the specific metrics are that can be looked for from North Korea to see whether these actions are having any kind of an effect.

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Ruggiero stated that the question is being debated. He questioned whether the end goal is denuclearization, containment, containment toward denuclearization, or containment not toward denuclearization. He argued for just containment with pressure not toward denuclearization. He then agreed with Malinowski that more information into North Korea is beneficial and referenced “regime transformation” rather than “regime change.” Moving on to the topic of metrics, he stated that metrics are high. Looking at the Iran model, there used to be conversations that the US should never go after Iran’s oil exports, but once they did, it worked. The US seems to be in the same situation as before on North Korea. Going after commodities and overseas labor would be the next step. The Kim regime is trying to get back some money through the US financial system. The source of the problem is Chinese banks. They are not asking the right questions. The US should do what was done to European banks with Iran and fine them significantly. Then, they will start to ask the right questions.

Lederman then asked if Ruggiero saw Dandong as a precursor to broader secondary sanctions, which were effective with Iran.

Ruggiero positively affirmed. He used “escalation ladder” to describe the next steps that the US is taking against larger networks in China. However, he understood that there are concerns about harming the US-China economy or trade. His solution was to freeze their assets rather than cutting them off from the US. He argued that it would get people’s attention.

Dr. Pollack then asked Ruggiero about US efforts to expose North Korean operations in China and elsewhere. He questioned if the Trump administration is having these conversations with the Chinese.

Ruggiero suspected that the administration is doing what it has been doing for a decade with China, where there is a back and forth request. The current administration wants to give China time, but he believed that China has had too much time. In terms of metrics again, one metric was reports that the Chinese are telling their companies to stop hiring North Korean laborers. Another metric would be when Chinese security services talk to large Chinese banks about what is happening because there is a long list of Chinese banks involved in transactions with North Korea.

Lederman then directed the conversation to Dr. Ravich to discuss the cyber and economic threat posed by North Korea. Referencing the Sony hack, he asked for more information regarding the extent of North Korea’s cyber crimes and how an isolated country could get so good at this.

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Dr. Ravich began her remarks by reflecting on conversations with Dr. Pollack 25 years ago and how she could not have imagined North Korea as a cyber power. She listed the cyber attacks by North Korea, including a DDoS attack against US and South Korean institutions, the Sony hack, the Bangladesh bank heist, and WannaCry. She stated that North Korea is a very capable adversary. She then questioned what North Korea's goals are. Perhaps monetary gains are their goal, but Dr. Ravich believed that North Korea is increasing their cyber attacks as part of a broader campaign to destabilize an adversary. It is a very powerful asymmetric tool. They can inflict much more pain on the US or South Korean economy because there are more vulnerabilities. At FDD, Dr. Ravich works on a project called Cyber-Enabled Economic Warfare, which is the purposeful use of cyber means to undermine parts of an economy in order to weaken that country militarily or politically. She reiterated that she believes that North Korea is not just trying to fill their coffers.

Lederman asked about the other side regarding US cyber efforts to sabotage the supply chain for North Korea's ballistic missile programs. He asked whether North Korea has developed defensive cyber capabilities to prevent US efforts from being effective.

Dr. Ravich stated that the US has been trying to understand this for the last 25 years. She answered in two parts: 1) She believes that the US must fight on the frontier to push back on the use of cyber forward deployed forces. She emphasized the need to be forceful and aggressive; 2) North Korea's cyber experts are targeted in middle school and are trained. They get positions in IT companies in Southeast Asia, China, or Russia during the day. At night, they undertake biddings from Pyongyang.

Lederman opened the panel up to Q&A.

Lederman concluded by thanking the panelists and the audience at FDD.

Report by: Rosa Park, HRNK Director of Programs and Editor



DATE: September 8, 2017

SUBJECT: How to Handle North Korea

MAIN POINTS:

- Professor Galluci proposed three options: negotiation, containment, and military action, regarding which he highlighted the difference between preemption and preventive war.
- Professor Etzioni presented a China centering around China and introduced a concept called *differential saliency*. The idea is that the US should give China something that is important to China, but not the US, in exchange for something that is important to the US but not China.
- Professor Brazinsky presented the difficult and complex challenges facing the China option. Mainly, he discussed the historical and symbolic nature North Korea is to Chinese national identity, which makes complete jeopardizing of the nation an undesirable option.

The event can be viewed at: <https://www.c-span.org/video/?433122-1/us-policy-north-korea>, accessed 09/08/2017.

EVENT OVERVIEW

Date: August 28, 2017

Time: 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Location: The Institute of Korean Studies at George Washington University

Attendees:

- **Robert L. Gallucci**, Dean of Georgetown School of Foreign Policy, Ambassador at

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Large (Former), Korean Affairs at Department of State

- **Amitai Etzioni**, Professor of International Affairs at George Washington University
- **Gregg A. Brazinsky**, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs at George Washington University
- **Jisoo Kim**, Moderator, Associate Professor of History, International Affairs, and East Asian Languages and Literatures.

SUMMARY

Robert L. Gallucci

There are three options in handling North Korea. The first option is containment: containing and managing the threat with strategic patience. The US will first tend to its alliances with ROK and Japan, meaning that we will do military exercises and consult. We will extend our deterrence principle to these countries. Second, there will be sanctions. Our third step will be with China. Asking for Chinese help to mitigate the threat is important. All of these options drive to managing the threat and the second of three options: negotiations. The Bush Administration started with negotiations, then containment, which was not very containing in North Korea's case. It is not clear whether the next administration (Obama) really pursued negotiations. We are now in a situation where it is very difficult to tell what we are doing. It seems like we are involved in containment and that we are considering option two, containment. Negotiations could mean a great many things and at some point aimed at normalization, but it is different from containment.

The third option is military action of one kind or another. There is a distinction between preemption and preventive strike. I hope everyone favors preemptive strike, which is a strike a nation launches towards another just before the other attacks. This is acceptable in international law but it must be done just before the other side strikes. However, if you prevent someone from getting the ability to strike, that is not preemption. Preemption yes, but preventive war, I am prejudiced against. Preventive war masked as preemption, such as in the case of the Iraq War, is not very good. When we think about prevention, it is useful to think of the capability we are trying to prevent North Korea from getting. Clearly, it is not nuclear weapons. They have nuclear weapons. It is not arming nuclear missiles with nuclear weapons, because it is quite plausible that they can, in terms of size, fit the nuclear weapons they have designed into a nuclear missile. Whether that warhead will withstand the reentry forces in a continental missile is another matter. But certainly, IRBMs are the proposition. We have allowed that to happen. Will we tolerate a

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vulnerability to let our allies suffer under a nuclear North Korea? Our vulnerability adds a degree of question about whether we are credible if North Korea did attack our allies.

We have now three options open. We had 40 years of containment, 10 years of negotiation, and now 15 years of containment. This leaves us silent on the question of transfer. I think that deterrence has worked against the Soviet Union, China, and it will work against North Korea. It will not work against terrorists, and I worry about nuclear terrorism. I thus worry about transfer, for example in 2007-2008 from North Korea to Syria, as North Korea helped Syria build a plutonic weapon. What is the confrontation between the US and North Korea all about: territory, religion, ideology? We are actually allies with a country that is contingent to North Korea, so this is not a geostrategic kind of situation. North Korea's only ally China is not happy with it. What is the source of hostility between the US and North Korea? Do we/they get a lot out of that? The key is human rights. If the North Korean human rights situation is not what it is, normalization would be easily imaginable.

Amitai Etzioni

I will speak of one option that is more promising than others. The US should offer China incentives large enough to convince it to use its abilities to force North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, while not changing regime (just behavior). The good news is the incentive we need to give to China is not horribly hard. I use a new phrase: differential saliency. First of all, it would be a clear and present danger if North Korea is not taken care of. Second, China has the means to force North Korea. If we prevent North Korea from gaining resources and selling things, North Korea will not be able to function. But, for China to take this stance, it will be taking a huge risk. If the regime collapses, millions of North Koreans will surge into China. Equally concerning if not more, a unified Korea will allow the US to move its troops to borders with China. Giving up the North Korea buffer is at considerable cost.

The essential approach is not to look for shared, but different interests. China's interests may not be very important to the US. Give them things that are important to them but not to us and have them give us things that are important for us but are not important to them. It is important for us to stop North Korea's nuclear program. For China, such is not at the top of their interests. What they are concerned about is the anti-nuclear missiles put in South Korea. We claim that these missiles are aimed to stop North Korean missiles but do not target. If we have the capacity to stop retaliation from China, it will feel very exposed and will urge them to build nuclear weapons. The essence of nuclear weapons is to hit back. China is very keen for us to not have those installed in South Korea. So, for example, the beginning of a deal could be: if we do not

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have to worry about nuclear weapons in China, there will be no need to keep THAAD in South Korea. A second approach is to take our troops home once North Korea is solved. What makes China angry are daily intelligence flights to China. What we want from China is a big ask, so we need to give a big give. We may argue for a 10-year package and think outside of the box. Where salience is different is where a deal would be made.

A military attack would be horrific to South Korea. Containment is wonderful but when we are dealing with someone who we do not know it could be challenging. India and Pakistan, both with nuclear weapons, do not threaten the US like North Korea does. The other notion is negotiation. When we sit down and negotiate with North Korea, it will automatically think that we want a regime change (not behavior). When negotiating with Syria, for example, the US claimed a precondition that the head of state has to go for negotiation to happen. Such method is therefore not very effective. Our past record shows that we do not only want to defend against weapons but also try to make states more liberal. At the end of the day, with Syria, we do not have a democratic regime either. Let us focus on behavioral change right now, instead of trying to change the regime. I see no reason why China would not consider this option and there is no downside. If you offer, and China refuses, we do not lose anything. When Trump talks to China, he thinks that International Relations is a country club. When the Chinese did not comply, he was not happy but his strategy did not involve giving China something that it would like to have, so it did not work.

Gregg A. Brazinsky*Introduction*

The East Asian world stage has had a long history of hostility towards the United States. The People's Republic of China (PRC) had carried out successful nuclear tests and developed missiles capable of hitting the United States. President Richard Nixon visited the PRC in 1972, changing the course of America's relationship with it and transforming the international situation in ways that greatly favored the United States at the time. The situations are not completely analogous, but I believe there to be parallels amongst options we have. In 1972, there really was no way to make the PRC give up its nuclear weapons or ideology, although the US had done everything in its power to prevent it from getting nuclear weapons. The Nixon administration realized that it had two choices. The first was to have a powerful and nuclear-armed China that was completely isolated from the rest of the world. The second option was to have a nuclear-armed China that was integrated into the international community and worked together with the US or could work together with the US on areas where there were common interests. Nixon

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chose the latter. Although the choice did not work out perfectly and there are areas of conflict with China today, it was nonetheless vastly superior to its alternative. The US needs to make a similarly bold and direct diplomatic gesture in dealing with NK. He said that it would give NK a stake in its relationship with the US and it would make it less likely to use its arsenal against America and its allies although NK is and will remain a repressive authoritarian country for the foreseeable future.

Current Diplomacy Measures towards NK

International Relations is a realm in which there are no perfect and often no good options. He emphasized that the best we can do is to reduce the risk of conflict and improve the chances that East Asia can continue to develop peacefully. He said that diplomacy with NK gives us the greatest chance of achieving this. He described three other options pursued so far:

1) Use of Force: He emphasized that it should always be in the background. If they ever used their arsenal on the United States, it will be met with overwhelming force and we should work to continue developing counter capabilities. Seoul has over 12 million people and its greater metropolitan area is within 30 miles of the area, making it in easy striking range of North Korea's old artillery. Even without its nuclear arsenal, North Korea is likely to inflict millions of casualties and do billions of dollars in property damage. Given that South Korea has the 11th largest economy in the world, he emphasized that such a strike would have horrific ramifications for the world economy in addition to creating a humanitarian disaster. He said that the Kim Jung-un regime would have been taken out a long time ago if Seoul was not such an easy target. As long as they are hostages to North Korea's artillery, the risk of a military option is simply too great.

2) Sanctions: Sanctions also have their limitations. Many advocates of sanctions always say that the problem is that they have not been tightened enough, so they will have an impact if we tighten them a little bit more or if we impose stricter secondary sanctions. However, as much as we dislike North Korea's political leadership, North Korea has been resilient, survived and been raised to the ground. If we ratchet up sanctions on North Korea, the North Koreans are just going to do what they always do, tighten their belts a little bit, and continue to develop. Another problem is that the entire international community has to cooperate in order for sanctions to work. He emphasized that North Korea will find a way to get what it needs otherwise. He said that aside from China there are several other nations that overtly aid North Korea. He asserted that the more the US pressures them to enforce the sanctions, the more the US risks itself coming across as a domineering bully.

3) China Approach: This is the approach taken by the Trump administration during its first few months. China will not ever give us what we really want on North Korea and never support the US if the latter's larger objective is to achieve regime change. Such attitude persists for historical, strategic, and cultural reasons. It is not entirely true that China was allied with North Korea during the Cold War but now regards it as a nuisance. It is important to remember the symbolic role North Korea plays in reinforcing Chinese national identity.

How Should We Pursue a Diplomatic Action Towards NK?

China has been applying more pressure to South Korea for taking actions that can be considered as in South Korea's self-defense than it has been pressuring North Korea. This really leaves us with diplomacy as the only option that that can work. A few necessary options:

1) Close Coordination with South Korea: There is no more critical relationship to the US today than its relationship with South Korea, not only because of the North Korean issue, but also because South Korea is a country in Asia that shares democratic values with the US. The US also has a deep history with South Korea and helped build it up economically. In recent months, however, Washington and Seoul have not coordinated policies as closely as they should. The media in South Korea has recently become obsessed with what it calls "Korea Passing," meaning the US will seek to solve the North Korean problem on its own without consulting Seoul. President Trump and the new South Korean president are not entirely on the same page. When Trump talks about "fire and fury" one day and the South Korean president says no one should be allowed to decide on military action on the Korean peninsula without his permission a few days later, it gives an appearance of disunity, which is exactly what Beijing wants. He also pointed out that we are now eight months into the Trump administration but there is still no US ambassador to South Korea. Aside from that, there are also several key posts in the State Department that remain unfilled.

2) Information Programs: The US should continue its information programs that are directed at North Korea such as the Voice of America. These kinds of activities might at least change the view that some North Koreans have of the US. the US should also continue humanitarian work in North Korea to make clear that whatever political differences exist between the US and North Korea, we do not hold the North Korean people accountable for the actions of their leaders.

3) Open-ended Negotiation: The process of diplomacy should be kept open-ended, such

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as when the US first initiated talks with China during the 1970s. North Korea should be allowed to bring up the issues that are most important to its leadership.

4) Patience in Implementing Policies: We have to realize that North Korea is deeply mistrustful of the US, its allies, and even some of its own allies. It has been emblazoned on the North Korean national consciousness for the past six decades that the country once fought a horrific war against the US in which millions died and many cities were destroyed. It is a country that can remember very easily several decades of continuous American efforts to try to isolate it and it can see how the US has pursued and succeeded in achieving regime change in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other countries that became its adversaries. If we choose diplomacy, we must be prepared for it not to succeed immediately. We have to understand that North Korea will not abandon its nuclear weapons or missile programs right away. This kind of patience is tricky because in a democracy, the electorate is always somewhat results-oriented and if it does not produce results immediately, it will want to change the policy. This is why we keep going back and forth between deterrence and engagement or some combination of the two. We need to have a more consistent policy pursued over a longer term which will offer the best chance of slowly getting North Korea to modify its behavior.

Q&A

Q: It seems like the North Korean conflict has not changed much after 20 or 30 years. We continue to deal with it. Is reunification the only way to end this issue?

A (Gregg A. Brazinsky): I think you can never resolve the issues that the Korean War was fought over, and the basic political differences between North Korea and South Korea, including differing perspectives of each state's legitimacy, but I do think that you can have a significant reduction of tension between the US and North Korea without reunification. I am increasingly pessimistic that we would never see unification in our lifetime, but I do think it is not too much to hope that there can be a significant reduction of friction between the US and North Korea if the policies are right. China has the capacity to bring North Korea to its knees if it wants to but I am not convinced it that it will ever do so. We underestimate how important North Korea is to China's national identity and to the identity of the Chinese Communist Party, and when you talk to Chinese government officials, you still see that. There is still an underlying sympathy for North Korea in China. I think that the Chinese like seeing North Koreans embarrass the United States secretly. Even if they do not admit it and say "ha ha ha," I think that

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at some level they enjoy seeing this. I am not convinced that we can offer them anything that would be acceptable to us that would in the end get them to really start putting enough pressure on North Korea to get it to abandon its nuclear weapons, which will only go away with a change in regime.

Q: Would the Chinese agree to exchange the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland for that of the two Koreas?

A (Gregg A. Brazinsky): I do not think so. The way China sees it is that Taiwan is a part of China, and the US should not be selling arms to Taiwan in the first place. Why should they put pressure on North Korea to give us something that is rightfully theirs in the first place? From our perspective it makes a lot of sense. We are going to give you back Taiwan and you will give us North Korea, but from the Chinese perspective, it does not make sense. It is important for people who work on this issue to spend more time in China and read Chinese materials because I am not convinced that a lot of the people in the Beltway really understand the Chinese perspective.

A (Amitai Etzioni): We need to learn much more about how the other side looks at it. Explicit or implicit, we will look to recognize Taiwan as an independent state. Moving from implicit to explicit would be one more character.

Q: None of you mentioned unification. It seems to be a central issue and I would like to ask what would be the analogy to the German reunification. I know there is a difference but the emphasis on reunification should be important.

A (Robert L. Gallucci): American diplomats, when they talk to Koreans about subjects like this, always talk about the ultimate goal as the reunification of Korean people. However, I do not think that many people who work on this issue believe that the reunification of the Korean people is going to happen anytime soon. If it does, it will be the result of incredible violence. South Koreans suspect that nobody is really enthusiastic about the reunification of the Korean people other than the Korean people, and the Korean people are divided over how that would happen when South Koreans think under some nice democratic South Korean government, and the North Koreans under some part of the Kim dynasty. The rest of the world from their perspective is hostile. The Chinese certainly are not enthusiastic about a reunited peninsula, particularly if it was reunited under alliance with the US. They are not looking forward to seeing this unification on their border. The South Koreans are suspicious, the Japanese are not

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enthusiastic, and we Americans look at the divided peninsula as an excuse for a forward base of operations and part of our encirclement strategy.

Q: What do you think it would take to deal with North Korea under Kim Jong-un vs Kim Jong-il, who wanted nuclear light water reactors?

A (Robert L. Gallucci): The last time I met with North Koreans was a little less than a year ago and they said that they are a nuclear weapons state and will always be. I could not continue the discussion without legitimizing their nuclear weapons program when we were allied with two countries that had voluntarily committed themselves not to have nuclear weapons. Most of us have one or two models in mind as to why the North Koreans develop nuclear capacity. The happy model is that they want to use nuclear weapons to deter the US from accomplishing regime change, as a defensive and deterrent posture. The other model is that they want to have nuclear weapons so that they can deter the US intervention with threat.

Report by: Sabrina He & Huiwon Yun, Research Intern