



**DATE:** July 18, 2017

**SUBJECT:** International Forum on Building an Alliance for One Korea: Vision and Solutions to the Korean Crisis, Morning Session

### MAIN POINTS

- Opinions from security, policy, and civil society leaders on Korean reunification
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### EVENT OVERVIEW

**Date:** July 18, 2017

**Time:** 10:00 a.m. - 2:30 p.m.

**Location:** Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004

### ATTENDEES

#### Opening Remarks

- **Michael Marshall (Moderator):** UPI Editor Emeritus
- **Dr. Jai-poong Ryu:** President, One Korea Foundation
- **James Flynn:** President, Global Peace Foundation
- **Inteck Seo:** Co-Chair, Action for Korea United

#### Morning Session

- **Hon. Jong-Kul Lee (Speaker):** Korean National Assembly, Minjoo Party
- **Dr. Hyunik Hong (Speaker):** Senior Fellow, Sejong Institute
- **Joseph A. Bosco (Discussant):** Senior Fellow, Institute for Corea-America Studies; Former US Defense Department China Director
- **Hyepin Im (Discussant):** President, Korean Churches for Community Development

### International Alliance for One Korea Forum

#### Opening Remarks

##### Michael Marshall, Moderator

Marshall began the forum by highlighting the that reunification of the Korean Peninsula is the final goal. In order to bring about reunification, it is necessary to involve international

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governments, as well as civil society. Marshall introduced the representatives from the organizations hosting the forum, who then came up to give their opening remarks. These organizations were: the One Korea Foundation, the Global Peace Foundation, and Action for Korea United.

### **Dr. Jai-poong Ryu**

Ryu expressed his hope that this forum will be the start of something much bigger, and that the issue of Korean reunification can move from discussion to action, and that the time has move forward. Ryu stressed the need for an out-of-the-box approach and creative solutions that have not yet been tried, given the failure of past measures. Most of the problems we face today are global in nature, and involve international organizations and coalitions like the UN. Something different needs to be created for this issue of the Korean unification, some organization built with a more appropriate framework for the international alliances tied to this particular issue. Ryu ended by saying that the international alliance should raise more money and awareness for initiatives.

### **James Flynn**

Flynn began by saying that the vision of One Korea is deeply ingrained in the hearts and minds of the Korean people. Today, people everywhere are hearing about Korea and the peninsula and understanding that there is a serious crisis there. This is an important time for the international community to be seriously considering and understanding these issues and seeing how they might contribute in a positive way to a solution on the Korean Peninsula. Flynn's organization, the Global Peace Foundation has been working on this issue for a number of years. The organization holds that governments alone cannot solve this problem and that it requires the involvement of concerned citizens, first and foremost in South Korea, as well as Koreans around the world. The solution must therefore be Korean-led. It is also important, however, that the international community understand and support solutions that can be brought to this issue. Flynn made a comparison to the apartheid in South Africa, and said that while it was an issue that had to be dealt with by that country, it was able to do so only with broad international awareness and support. The US-ROK alliance is one such form of international support. Flynn also stressed the importance of civil society organizations for engagement and support purposes. It is also fundamentally important to consider what sort of foundational principles guiding this work can bring together a One Korea, especially those principles that bring people together and guarantee the rights of all people. This is a critically important step in building a consensus among Koreans toward a One Korea.

### **Inteck Seo**

The question, Seo said, how could such an alliance be possible? Seo argued that it must be built on a shared commitment to Korean unification. This is not just a Korean issue, or an alliance issue, but an issue for the whole world. Civil society, the alliance, and the Korean public are all fighting for reunification. "As Koreans," Seo said, "we have to define what kind of reunification and what kind of outcomes we want, and share this vision with the world." Seo shared a historical example of the March 1st Movement of 1919 where Koreans came together to share their vision of a new Korea. He also made comparisons to Gandhi's independence movement in

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India and Martin Luther King Jr.'s movement in the US. Popular support is therefore an important factor in bringing about change.

### Speakers

#### **Hon. Jong-Kul Lee**

Lee started his speech by expressing his dismay that North Korea's nuclear threats have become real to people and experts alike, and claimed that the Moon administration is facing a very difficult situation. He also lamented that the international community has lost the capacity to reign in North Korea. He stated that his agenda at the conference was to discuss his opinion, as one of the members of South Korea's leading Minjoo Party, and President Moon administration's position on how to deal with North Korea. In doing so, Lee raised and answered five questions related to North Korea and reunification.

- 1) What policies should the Moon government carry on from the Sunshine Policy, and what should it discard? The Sunshine Policy's aim was to eliminate the nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula by reducing military pressure on North Korea and ushering it towards reform and openness. Lee answered that given the advanced nature of North Korea's nuclear weapons and the need to eliminate them, South Korea cannot revive the Sunshine Policy, but urged that we should carry on its spirit.
- 2) Should we revive the Six-party talks to resolve the nuclear issue? Lee answered that talks cannot be reinitiated unless the relations between the two Koreas and between North Korea and China improve.
- 3) Should South Korea stop the deployment and operation of THAAD? He answered that President Moon had made it clear that its deployment will not be stopped. The ideal scenario would have been ratification by the South Korean National Assembly prior to deployment, but now it is too late.
- 4) Can the nuclear issue be resolved without regime change? Lee argued that we need to separate the nuclear issue from the regime change issue, and send a message to North Korea that it can maintain its deterrence and regime simultaneously. Lee also emphasized the need to deter future tests.
- 5) Should South Korea develop new weapons? Lee agreed that South Korea needs to increase its military spending in order to counter North Korea's nuclear weapons and suggested a nuclear armament in South Korea to ensure equalize South and North's military capabilities.

#### **Dr. Hyunik Hong**

Hong presented the South Korean government's ideas, as well as his own ideas, on how to deal with North Korea. He started by saying that he and President Moon agree that national security concerns take precedence over reunification, and that reunification will come naturally after peace, like what happened in Germany. Since South Korea's economy is already about 40 times that of North Korea, Hong claimed that reunification will not be long. Regarding the sufficiency of THAAD in protecting South Korea, Hong agreed with Lee that THAAD was insufficient, since South Korea does not have a guaranteed shield if North Korea were to use nuclear weapons.

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Regarding the recent meeting between President Moon and President Trump, Hong assessed that they have reached an agreement that improvement in the inter-Korean relations is vital. Both presidents have also agreed that they do not want forceful reunification and that they can and will support co-existence. They have also suggested reunion of separated families and emphasized the importance of civil societies in mending the relationship between the two Koreas.

In regard to dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons, Hong suggested mutual threat reduction. He then expanded on his previous point that THAAD's capacities are limited and recommended the reintroduction of tactical nuclear weapons to protect both the South Korean people and the United States' army. He argued that this deployment should be conditional and temporary and should be withdrawn if North Korea meets the right conditions.

### Discussant Response

#### Joseph A. Bosco

Bosco spoke about security issues and the role of China in the Korean Peninsula. He began by asserting that reunification on the Korean Peninsula is a long-cherished goal dear to Koreans on both sides of the DMZ. The question is, what would a unified Korea look like, and what system of government would prevail? In 1950, the DPRK tried to unify Korea by force under its totalitarian communist regime, with critical help from China. Bosco argued that the DPRK would certainly try again if there was a reasonable prospect of success. But if its military failed, it knows its regime would be destroyed, and would be unable to return to the status quo like after the Korean War. This is the South Korean security dilemma for the Kim regime. Pyongyang apparently believes it has found a solution, which will allow them to achieve reunification on their terms. The pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is intended to deter the US from coming to South Korea's defense. Once again, China can be expected to be at North Korea's side in its aggression. After all, for every step of Pyongyang's nuclear missile development, Beijing has provided ample material, and financial and diplomatic support to protect and enable three generations of the Kim regime.

The security dilemma faced by the ROK, Japan, and the US is the reverse, continued Bosco. It requires a reunified, democratic Korea under the rule of law, not a megalomaniacal personality cult with a blatant disregard for human rights. This necessarily means regime change in North Korea by one means or another. The challenge is how to achieve that objective without reigniting the Korean War, because now there are far more devastating weapons on both sides. The key today, as it has been from the beginning, is the critical role played by China. For far too long, the West has convinced itself that Beijing shares its goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. That is why the US unilaterally withdrew its own tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in the early 1990s. The US wanted to show their good faith in exchange for China's commitment never to allow North Korea to acquire nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them. Unfortunately, on the communist side, it was a ruse, and US administrations of both parties have fallen for it. Policy makers were supported and encouraged in this self-deception by a generation of Asia experts, starting with the eminent Henry Kissinger, who has written numerous articles and books on China's role and excusing its behavior. Contrary to conventional wisdom that Beijing opposes a nuclear North Korea, there is ample evidence of China's collusion with their nuclear

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development, said Bosco. It started with the initial transfer of Chinese nuclear technology, to Pakistan's A.Q. Khan effort, and continues today in shipments of missile technology through China. Why would China want to see a nuclear- and missile-armed North Korea on its border? For several reasons, said Bosco, starting with the old lips-and-teeth relationship, that caused Beijing to encourage and later join the Korean War. Although Chinese leaders don't use this colorful phrase as often these days, their behavior toward Pyongyang is not much different than it used to be. They still block or ignore multilateral sanctions against North Korea. They still publically say that it is America's problem, while making major diplomatic and economic concessions toward Pyongyang. They still allow Chinese entities to actively support the Kim regime both financially and through the actual transfer of missile parts and technology.

Beijing wants the North Korean regime to stay in power, to serve as a so-called buffer between China and the West. Bosco asked, "A buffer against what? Does anyone seriously believe that South Korea, the US, or Japan is planning to invade China through the Korean peninsula?" This is the typical paranoia from another of history's insecure, authoritarian regimes, he argued. They see threats from imaginary enemies from around them and use that to justify their own aggression. China refuses to tighten economic pressure on North Korea because it fears triggering the regime's collapse and a massive flood of refugees over Chinese borders. This pervasive argument has been put forward by Kissinger and others, including Beijing, and has taken on the aura of holy writ. Experts tell us that Kim Jong-un and his clique simply see nuclear weapons as the only way of preserving their hold on power, and that they are not irrational but simply not suicidal. At the same time, experts argue that even if China gave Pyongyang a credible ultimatum – that is, give up nukes or give up power – Kim and company would choose regime suicide. Somehow these two propositions don't logically come together. Of course, Beijing has never presented Pyongyang with that choice; instead, the two East Asian communist states seem to be working together to pull off a geostrategic charade that benefits them both at the expense of the democratic West, which includes South Korea and Japan. North Korea's nuclear missile program has served China's strategic interests very well. They have been a major political and diplomatic distraction for several US administrations and have forced a significant diversion of resources from other national security challenges. Most important, said Bosco, is that the North Korea problem has enabled China to pose as a responsible international stakeholder in good faith with the negotiation process of the West when in fact, it is not. Pyongyang's nuclear challenge has given Beijing immense leverage over issues of trade, currency, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and human rights. Washington and other capitals are reluctant to press China because, as several US presidents have said, we need China on North Korea. But China never delivers, and excuses itself with specious arguments that too many in the West are willing to accept at face value.

Having North Korea in power serves the Chinese government in the area of human rights as well, said Bosco. Standing next to the cruel Kim regime with its laundry list of atrocities, which does not disturb Chinese leaders at all, Beijing can pretend to be on a higher moral plane despite the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party, which is revealed in its disturbing treatment of dissidents and others that do not conform to state ideals. It may be different in

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degree, but not in kind, to the abuses by its protégé Pyongyang, which has shockingly dehumanized its own people.

This brings us to the other side of the security dilemma the West faces, continued Bosco, which is an interrelated political and moral dilemma. This is where reunification and denuclearization come into conflict. The morality of human rights is not in the vocabulary of the DPRK or the PRC. Even assuming good faith on Beijing's part in its cooperation on pressing Pyongyang to give up its nukes, it would do so only with a security guarantee for the DPRK. That is why Secretary of State Tillerson explicitly took regime change off the table recently. If that is truly going to be US policy, it should be modified to require Pyongyang to drastically alter its treatment of its population, argued Bosco. Denuclearization cannot be enough. Reunification of the North Korean people must be part of the deal with the Kim dynasty, or with a substitute interim regime. Reunification is the eventual goal as a moral imperative. As was stated, the new Moon Jae-in administration is and should be committed to helping improve the human rights and livelihood of the North Korean people. Washington should make clear to Beijing that if it does not cooperate in denuclearization and reunifying Korea, the US and its allies will proceed anyway. If China persists in its position that a nuclear North Korea threatening the West is preferable to the end of the DPRK, it should be made to understand that US policy is exactly the opposite, and that we are on a collision course that Beijing and Pyongyang have created. The status quo is dangerously unacceptable and unsustainable.

Bosco then made a couple of points on security issues. Regarding China's opposition to the THAAD system, Bosco stated that according to the technical experts that devised the system, it provides maximum protection for the South Korean people under North Korea's missile threat. South Korea's defense capabilities should be considered with political and diplomatic intent. China bears an enormous responsibility for helping create the current situation entrapping South Korea, Japan, and the US. If China has to feel some discomfort over the deployment of THAAD, so be it. Until China acts responsibly to delay a nuclear threat, the US should seriously consider redeploying in South Korea the tactical and nuclear weapons they withdrew in the 1990s as a monumental gesture of good intent. We should also put the option of South Korea and Japan developing their own nuclear weapons on the table. The democracies of South Korea and Japan can be trusted with nuclear weapons a lot more than the aggressive regime in North Korea. If Beijing opposes these moves, they can work to remove the threat that triggered these responses.

### **Hyepin Im**

Im spoke on the role of civil society in unification. She argued that it is not just South Koreans who care about what is happening on the peninsula, but Korean Americans like herself as well. The voice of the Korean American community, Im argued, is often missing from discussions on reunification and other peninsular issues. There seems to be a growing grassroots movement for by second generation Korean Americans to come together in groups such as The Council of Korean Americans and Liberty in North Korea. Im said that growing up in both South Korea and then in the US, she was presented with a very set picture of North Korea as an enigma, and a place where spies go undercover. Im wanted to share another piece of the story, which she was exposed to by faith-based groups that had operated going in and out of North Korea. This



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perspective is equally important to the conversation, argued Im. The following are some examples she discussed:

- 1) Im discussed the concept of going to North Korea through the front doors. The group that suggested this was invited by the North Korea Tourist Organization to train their tourist guides to surf because they wanted to bring surfing into North Korea. As a mission organization, by going to North Korea, they were also able to then touch the hearts of these North Koreans and sing hymns. The Korean American community is 75% Christian, so the activities of these missionary groups in North Korea is, Im said, a model that also gives the Korean American community hope.
- 2) An American man, married to a Korean American, one day had a vision of digging wells in North Korea. At the time, he did not have the expertise, connections, or money to do this, but now, he is now in North Korea helping Chinese business people, who need access to water, get access to water. He also digs wells for other North Korean communities and villages.
- 3) In North Korea, you can't really talk about religion, so a missionary went to North Korea and eventually was able to earn enough trust that when she saw young girls without access to sanitary napkins, instead of using leaves or branches – unsanitary to the point where they became infected or even died – she brought together resources to create a factory to help these women create sanitary napkins. This also led to bringing in eyeglasses, which meant bringing in expertise within the walls of North Korea.
- 4) Dr. Stephen Yoon, a chiropractor by training, got the opportunity with his Caucasian wife, whose parents were missionaries in South Korea, to go to North Korea. Healthcare was so poor that all kinds of patients came to him despite his lack of expertise in so many of those areas of health. His reputation preceded him all the way to Pyongyang. The government gave him a plot of land next to the Supreme Leader's office to build a facility to treat cerebral palsy in children, who until this point had pretty much been sentenced to death by their condition as there is supposed to be no disability in North Korea. Key leaders in the North Korean government have children kept in the shadows because of this, and they rallied around Dr. Yoon.

Im shared these stories because she wanted to show a different side to the reality of doom and gloom that is always presented at these sorts of conferences. Im reiterated that the reality of North Korea is a threat that she takes seriously, but also that there is a whole other dimension of North Korea that outside observers need to be mindful of as well. A group, Compassion International, has developed a curriculum for the future leaders of a unified Korea, and are currently testing it on North Korean defectors who live in South Korea.

There should be some sort of communication channel, argued Im, between government officials, who talk about peace and unification, and the civil society and grassroots organizations that are on the ground doing work in North Korea. Im said she isn't sure why there is no real connection, dialogue, or collaboration happening in this area and presents that as a goal. Thought and ideas are helpful, but not good enough. Im asked, "So what can we do?" In terms of the nuclearization of South Korea, Im said it might force China to pay a little more attention. In terms of the

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dehumanization of North Koreans by the regime, Im stated that it is really the faith-based and humanitarian organizations that have gone into North Korea and shown the people that they are of true worth. Im expressed her hope that there will be more effort not just in policy on the issue of North Korea, but in efforts to show North Koreans the truth and their true worth.

### Q&A

**Q:** How probable do you think North Korea and China would be to cooperate on denuclearizing and rehumanizing North Korea? Would they pretend to cooperate while not adopting either agenda?

**A (Hyepin Im):** If there is a way to increase pressure on China to bring it to the negotiating table, we can pursue that. Deploying nuclear weapon in South Korea, which will grab Japan's attention, can be a way to increase pressure on China.

**A (Joseph Bosco):** Cost-benefit, risk analysis. Most people in Washington oppose re-nuclearizing South Korea, but I think it is an option that we can consider.

**A (Dr. Hyunik Hong):** China finds North Korea's provocations destabilizing, but sees North Korea's collapse as more threatening. However, US, South Korea, and Japan's alliance is even more threatening to China's strategic interest than North Korea. Therefore, China would not agree to a severe sanction on North Korea if the United States continue to deter China, such as by deploying THAAD. Thus, if we want China to impose severe sanctions on North Korea, we need to change US policy towards China.

**Q:** Why are South Korean policies closer to China's than the United States'?

**A (Hong):** South Korea relies heavily on exports for its economy, and its exports to China are greater than its exports to the United States or Japan. We should ask the German people about how they achieved reunification. It is thanks to Gorbachev and the relationship between East Germany and the Soviet Union, and that relationship is similar to the relationship between China and Korea. China has the veto power to oppose reunification. It is thus more important to have favorable relations with China than with Japan to realize reunification.

**A (Hon. Jong-Kul Lee):** South Korea and China have a strategic bilateral relationship, whereas South Korea and the United States and Japan and United States have real alliances. This is different from South Korea and Japan's mutual alliance due to the unresolved issue around comfort women and colonial history.

**Q:** President Moon was a human rights lawyer, but there is no mention of human rights of North Koreans in discussion on North Korea.



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**A (Lee):** I was in the same organization with President Moon, a group of lawyers for democracy in Korea. We worked together to draft the North Korean Human Rights Act. Ten years ago, South Korea possessed tactical nuclear weapons whereas North Korea did not have a nuclear weapon. However, today, North Korea possess nuclear weapons and thus we need tactical nuclear power.

**Q:** What is being done and what can be done to communicate with people in North Korea such as through radio broadcasting?

**A (Hong):** East Germany did not collapse because of NATO or American military forces, but collapsed naturally by implosion of its own people. That's why the best way to bring down the North Korean regime is through coexistence of the two Koreas and continual transmission of information to and interaction with North Korea. I recommend peacefully sending as much media information to North Korea as possible.

**A (Im):** A lot of information is transmitted into North Korea and many in the younger generations disgruntled. Can we find more points of contacts such as Women Cross DMZ to develop areas where North and South Koreans can more opportunities for interaction? Also, many Korean Americans are in positions of influence and would be happy to be part of the alliance for one Korea. Providing hope in dealing with North Korea will help attract more allies.

**Q:** How would South Korea's potential redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons contribute to mutual threat reduction, a strategy that you recommended to resolve the nuclear issue? Wouldn't that give incentive for Japan to nuclearize?

**A (Hong):** The best way to guarantee South Korea's security would be to sign a pact with the United States on automatic intervention if North Korea were to perform a nuclear attack on South Korea. Currently, there is only a military alliance pact between South Korea and the United States, but there is no guarantee that the US forces will intervene militarily upon North Korea's attack on South Korea. Therefore, if Washington were to promise an automatic intervention upon North Korea's nuclear attack, that would be the best option. The second best option would be the tactical deployment of a nuclear weapon. This should be temporary and conditional because this would not be a means to enhance South Korea's overall national security, but just a way to counter North Korea's nuclear threat.

**A (Bosco):** Many discuss North Korea's history of violating the agreements it signs, but little attention has been paid to China backing down on promises it has made. In the 1990s, China agreed to ensure that the Korean peninsula remains free of nuclear weapons. However, China has broken its promise and has actively participated in North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missiles programs. Therefore, the United States has a strategic and a moral basis to reconsider the original agreements with China.

## Luncheon and Roundtable

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**Dr. Robert Schuller**

Dr. Schuller expressed his confidence that miracles in North Korea could come through prayer, commitment and faith. He told the audience that God is bigger and more real than anything they can imagine. He encouraged the audience to believe in God's promises and to pray for healing on the Korean peninsula.

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### **Rev. Kenneth Bae**

Rev. Bae first shared some of his disappointment on President Moon's recent declaration that the Korean government would solve the Korean unification problem alone. Rev. Bae believes Koreans across the world should lead unification efforts, including South Koreans, North Koreans, and overseas Koreans. After sharing some reflections and stories of his imprisonment in North Korea, Rev. Bae underscored the importance of conveying to the North Korean people that unification is the only way to access and preserve human rights. He also emphasized the importance of winning the hearts and trust of the common people living in North Korea, as well as the need to make the elite feel safe since they will not want to let go of the privileges and luxuries they currently have. Through working with refugees and working with people inside North Korea, Rev. Bae has heard on multiple occasions of the growing dissent under the Kim regime. Rev. Bae advocated an online prayer petition where one million people have committed to pray for North Korea both in Brazil and in China. He reminded the audience that US government officials had once told Rev. Bae it was impossible to insure his release, but his return represents a beacon of hope for future Korean unification.

### **Dr. Richard Bush**

Dr. Bush gave an analytical perspective on the prospects of Korean unification by comparing and contrasting with the unification experiences in Germany and Vietnam. Dr. Bush's presentation mainly drew from a Brookings conference that was held in February this year, titled: [Korean unification: Prospects and global implications](#). From the onset, Dr. Bush strongly supported the right kind of unification for the Korean peninsula and cautioned against any naivety about the challenges that lie ahead for Korean unification.

- 1) The division of Korea has been longer than the divisions of Vietnam or Germany.
- 2) There are differences between German reunification (through absorption) and Vietnamese reunification (by force). Dr. Bush guessed that Korean unification would not occur through absorption.
- 3) There are profound economic and social gaps between the two Koreas.

He continued his presentation by outlining differences between the reunifications of Korea, Vietnam, and Germany in terms of social, political, economic, and diplomatic issues.

Social issues: East Germans and West Germans were allowed to travel across their shared border before unification. With respect to defectors, about 3.5 million East Germans resettled in West Germany between 1961 and 1989, a number far greater than the number of North Korean defectors resettled elsewhere. After reunification in Hanoi in 1976, the government put forward a narrative that negatively portrayed the South Korean elites as agents of the US and used this message to justify harsh treatment of those people. This demonization was related to the radical socialization campaign in South Vietnam, which also later contributed to the economic crisis that unified Vietnam faced in 1976. West Germany laid out the foundations for unification, North Vietnam did not. These experiences give insightful implications of the challenges for Korean unification, given the two Koreas' developments on very different paths.

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Political issues: The political aspect of German unification was relatively easy. The East German government had already lost legitimacy and West Germany was already a mature democracy, though regionalism still exists today. Vietnam was different – a repressive state took over a more democratic state. The North Vietnamese participated in political cleansing and created deep cleavages in the political structure that still exist today. Dr. Bush suggested that it is relatively easier for a non-democratic society to merge into a democratic establishment; still, questions for Korea include: how do you deal with the former officials in North Korea? How do you socialize common North Korean people into democratic institutions? How do you teach them the arts of compromise and win-win solutions and replace their sole zero-sum mentality? How do you approach regionalism, which is a problem in South Korea even today?

Economic issues: Germany spent 16 times more than what they estimated in reunification costs (roughly a trillion dollars), but it did its best given its sudden reunification and lack of unification plan. Conservatives in South Korea estimate Korean unification will cost a trillion dollars, with some estimating double that. North Vietnam had a state-run economy similar to North Korea's, but it had a large farming sector, which later allowed a low-tech labor-intensive agricultural economy to move quickly into an export-led growth economy. Korean unification is going to be extremely expensive and involved. Some estimates say that just bringing North Korean population up to half of South Korea's standard of living would take 15% of the country's GDP. Dr. Bush strongly encouraged creating a unification fund so that there is financing to apply to this effort later. Secondly, Dr. Bush suggested the more planning, the better, with emphasis on the need to plan for legal architecture in the merge of judicial systems, property rights, and markets.

Diplomatic issues: 1) What will be the role of foreigners during the unification process? 2) What is the impact of regional stability? There were not many issues with Vietnam because external influences were negated once the US left Vietnam. German unification was mainly led by the West German government, which was supported by the US. There were some legal issues held over from the end of World War II amongst the occupied powers in Berlin but this was worked out in tandem with East-West German unification. The Soviet Union was deeply concerned with the consequences of the German, but then-President George H.W. Bush was able to skillfully appease Gorbachev and coordinate the Soviet Union's cooperation. Dr. Bush questioned whether this sort of navigation would be possible with North Korean and Chinese leadership.

In conclusion, the reunifications of Germany and Vietnam show that a Korean reunification faces fundamental challenges but also has comparative advantages. Civil society faith-based organizations can play a large role in helping fill the cultural and social gaps. The likely difficulty of Korean reunification is not a reason to abandon it as an objective, rather it is a reason to start now, especially in 1) mobilizing resources 2) assessing the wide array of issues and 3) preparing to implement these reforms in a smart and efficient manner.

*Report by: Marina Booth, Elizabeth Yang, Kayla Yoon, Research Interns*

